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Foreword
The papers collected in this volume represent the research papers of fourteen advanced graduate students 
from seven disciplines who completed the Ford Foundation Interdisciplinary Research Seminar on 
Regional and Global Issues during the 1993 94 academic year at the University of Illinois at Urbana- 
Champaign
Each of the seminar papers is the product of the joint efforts of the graduate student listed and his or her 
major disciplinary advisor Each of the papers attempts to address a disciplinary question in a way that can 
illuminate a problem or issue confronting the world society through the specialized knowledge and 
methods of the student s discipline
This approach had several advantages First, students in different disciplines were encouraged to 
examine global problems in light of their specialized knowledge and skills The Ford Seminar had the 
effect of sensitizing these students to the research agenda posed by the emergence of a global society for 
the first time m history and the need to apply the specialized knowledge and know how of the social 
science disciplines including history to learn how this society works and what are its problems
Second students of different disciplines were exposed to different social science perspectives and 
methodologies Many of the papers subtly reflect the fruits of these exchanges and students were 
challenged to meet the criticisms of other disciplinary perspectives and insights
Third students and faculty gradually developed a deeper understanding of the growing interdependence 
of the world society and the contnbuuon that their particular discipline brought to an understanding of its 
principal characteristics and the major political economic and technological forces shaping its future 
There clearly developed among the participants a heightened sense of consciousness of the revolutionary 
conditions under which we now live as members of a world society
None of these positive outcomes including the papers presented in this volume would have been 
possible without the encouragement and incentives provided by the Ford Foundation grant The faculty and 
students associated with the seminar expect to develop a similar set of papers and exchanges m the course 
of the 1994-95 academic year
Edward A Kolodziej
Research Professor of Political Science and 
Coordinator Ford Foundation Seminar
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Chapter 1
A Generalized Dynamic Theory of State Implosion
by Badredine Arfi
The new trends to globalization m the world have prompted a flurry of studies that have in most cases 
emphasized a dichotomy between a tendency towards globalization and a tendency towards persistent and 
self sustained localization in ideational political economic security social and ecological dimensions of 
human life Ironically these studies under emphasize at the same time the inescapable fact that humans 
live within historical contexts and this affects then- interpretations of the past perceptions of (and 
accomplishments in) the present and expectations concerning the future The role played by the shadow 
of the past m human life at individual group societal and world wide levels cannot and should not be 
overlooked The fate of new trends of globalism and the persistence of old trends of localism are mdeed 
determined to a large degree by the shadow of the past Put simply human beings cannot escape the 
embrace of historical memory
Similarly cultural identity of individuals groups and societies is another imperative of the human 
condition Both histoncal memory and cultural identity will impinge on if not totally determine the 
emergence or not of a World Society In other words an eventual progressive development toward an 
effective World Society is and will be facing not only obstacles due to a resistance created by a 
multitude of divergent cultural identities around the world but also and more seriously the constant 
emergence (or re emergence) of dilemmas between different groups of peoples states and societies 
rooted in their histoncal memories These dilemmas create turbulences on the path of the eventual 
appearance of a World Society These turbulences open up the way to bifurcations on many outcomes 
hence stressing the possibility that the emergence of an effective World Society is far away from being a 
historical necessity 1
Secunty is increasingly becoming a global concern for most countnes Modem weapons and long range 
striking power have increased the scope of security As demonstrated during the Cold War secunty 
concerns were globalized from the perspective of the availability of nuclear weapons to many nations and 
the prospect of nuclear proliferation around the world They were also globalized from the perspective of 
conflicts between superpowers that would have inevitably touched all humanity Old secunty concerns are 
persistent for local and regional conflicts are still part of daily life particularly between endunng nvals In 
fact they appear to be increasingly separated from the global structure of big power accord and their 
relations due to the demise of the Cold War and its logic In the aftermath of the Cold War many local 
dormant conflicts have been inflamed and many new local ones have erupted making the persistence of 
localism in security matters a characteristic of the day The dilemma between globalism and localism 
(rooted in both historical memory and identity) is clearly manifest in the very important secunty issues of 
state implosion and creation processes The creation and implosion of states are two important theoretical 
normative and practical issues The creation of new states has strong geopolitical economic cultural and 
religious impacts on international and/or regional politics
It appears that the post Cold War era would be charactenzed by state implosion and/or creation 
resulting from domestic as well as international disputes and conflicts Many of the existing rivalries in the 
world today are the legacy of the creation of new states (Middle East Indian subcontinent, central Europe 
to name a few) The breakups of the state of former Soviet Union the collapse of the Lebanese Ethiopian 
and Somali states and the ensuing conflicts emphasize the importance and inescapable relevance of state 
creation and implosion to international politics It is remarkable that m many cases the creation of a new
1 James N Rosenau Turbulence in World Politics A Theory o f Change and Continuity (Princeton Princton University Press 
1990) James Mayall Nationalism and Intemauonal Secunty after the Cold War Survival XXXIV no 1 (Spnng 1992) pp 19- 
35 Adda Bozeman The Intemauonal Order in a Mulucultural World in The Expansion o f International Society pp 387-406
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state or the implosion of an old state has been accompanied by either internal conflicts (especially in the 
case where the new state is the fruit of a revolution or the collapse of the old state was due to a failed 
revolution) or by external conflicts escalating rapidly to wars These conflicts often affect other states and 
people many far away from the initial point of armed conflict
Contemporary security and international relations theory has given little attention to the problem of the 
imploding state This lapse is ironic smce the state is crucial to the development of security theory The 
discussion below will attempt to partly correct this oversight It identifies two slighted though slighted 
variables—historical memory and cultural consciousness—to explain both state implosion and 
preservation Both realism and modern cooperation theory the leading perspectives in security theory 
provide little explanation for state implosion and accordingly for identifying historical memory and 
cultural consciousness as key factors Barry Buzan s neo realist approach to the study of international 
security and the requirements of a strong state 2 widely recognized as a key feature of current thinking 
about international security are evaluated and his contribution to security theory is enlarged to cover the 
implosion of states We argue that historical memory and cultural consciousness determine Buzan s 
requirements of a strong state A concluding part summarizes the argument and considers objections to the 
argument
Security Theory
As the cases of Lebanon Yugoslavia U S S R  —not to mention the Ottoman and Habsburg empires— 
have demonstrated state implosion is inescapably a profoundly disturbing security issue Its consequences 
for international regional state group and individual securities are extremely important not only from a 
normative point of consideration but equally well from analytical and empincal perspectives The 
delineation of factors leading to state implosion has far reaching implications for theory building as this 
paper argues as well as for policy making In this respect Figure 1 1 is an attempt to go beyond the usual 
realist conception of the state as a unitary actor albeit without losing the realist insight that states today 
are the primordial actors of the anarchical international system In this section we critically evaluate the 
realist contribution to the theory of state implosion and propose an enlargement of the international 
security agenda to include the issues of state implosion and creation as inherent in the security dilemma 
of the anarchical society of states We also evaluate the modem cooperation theory and propose a 
perfection to it by including the factors of history (the shadow of the past) and players identities as 
determinants of the players choices and strategies
Realism Modem Cooperation Theory and State Creation/Implosion
Realism The realist school of international security studies (and international relations studies m general) 
makes two fundamental assertions First the conduct of states in international politics has remained the 
same since the formation of nation/state system All states are guided by the structural imperatives of self 
help and balance of power or must be if they hope to survive Second states are not functionally 
differentiated within the structure of international politics What differentiates states is their position 
within the system i e their power relative to others Underlying these two assertions are two crucial 
assumptions First the nation states or more generally states form an anarchical international system 
i e lacking an international and sovereign governing body and second these states have a perpetual 
existence as basic units of the international system3 On an empirical level of analysis the realist school 
appeared ostensibly to capture the actual phenomenon of international security The seemingly stable 
East-West bipolar system for many decades added much credibility to its concepts (e g balance of 
power deterrence)
Generally speaking there has been little attention given to the possibility of state and/or nation state 
creation or implosion Both are international (or at least a regional) security issues Either condition raises 
the international (or regional) security status quo into question since under realist assumptions a
2. Barry Buzan People States & Fear (Colorado Lynne Rienner Publishers 1991)
3 Kenneth N Waltz Theory o f International Politics (New York McGraw-Hill Publishing Co 1979)
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disruption of the power structure and distribution among other states inevitably anse whenever a state is 
created or implodes The expectation of dislocation is rooted in the Hobbesian statement of the secunty 
dilemma accepted by the realists as a constant sum game The remaining states are forced to deal with a 
new situation which makes the previous security arrangements either inappropriate or ineffective The 
absence of suitable security arrangements could potentially prompt disputes and lead to escalating 
conflicts Therefore these two issues i e state formation and state implosion are of paramount 
importance to international security studies for they affect the very foundation of the anarchical 
international system In fact the end of the Cold War has been brought about by the disintegration of the 
state of the former USSR which led to the dissolution of the international secunty status quo that prevailed 
for many decades
Because of group nvalry inherent to political phenomena groups tend to defend themselves and 
preserve their autonomy and identity both within and across states 4 The imperatives of cultural 
consciousness and histoncal memory are critical to state formation and implosion These two factors 
challenge the present structure of state system They both simultaneously confront an adaptation 
imperative to internal developments as well as external challenges The adaptation imperative and/or 
challenges may run counter to the very self appreciations that are rooted in histoncal memones and 
cultural consciousness This coping process is more than one of imposing a solution through coercion or 
through the temporary victory of one particular group over another It is m fact a mutual adaptation 
process Because histoncal memory and cultural consciousness are rooted in the human condition they 
are lasting parts of state analysis and international secunty Therefore this is tantamount to changing the 
nature of the phenomena (as conceived by the realist school) whose behavior the analysis is supposed to 
explain If the realists are correct that coercion and force stand behind all political institutions and 
processes and are therefore the sources of the secunty problem so also must coercion and force come to 
terms with histoncal memory and cultural consciousness both within the state and in the relations of 
states by considenng them as additional dimensions of international security The realists do not 
recognize the importance of the security dilemma created by cultural consciousness and histoncal 
memory below the level of states (Lebanon) or across state boundanes (Kurds Somalis Serbs ) yet 
their assumptions of behavior should have reached these problems
Some important social forces such as religion and culture are arguably international and not purely 
domestic factors although their representation is domestic They have been neglected by realist theonsts 
as cntical to state formation support maintenance or implosion In this respect realists have not been 
consistent with their own assumptions Group nvalry over the very object of the state itself and the regime 
that governs the state is at the center of realist assumptions and expectations of behavior The security 
dilemma is hardly restricted to states Conflicting preferences interests values and the pursuit of power 
pnvilege and status are the subject matter of political phenomena and these are to a large degree shaped 
by religious and cultural identifications within and across state boundanes The current debate among 
realists has artificially narrowed the discussion to states whereas Hobbesian assumptions imply state 
formation as highly provisional and contingent The state s integrity and stability depends on a social 
compact which depends on the histoncal memory and cultural consciousness of its component groups 
Culturally derived and historically given values and preferences are precisely those that groups pressure 
the state to preserve and extend rather than simply arbitrate in the guise of neutrality and objectivity
The neutral state is but one conception of state From the larger perspective of history the notion of the 
state defined as a coercive mechanism for arbitrating differences between rival groups and of protecting 
groups against external enemies conflicts with the histoncal record The history of state formation cannot 
be construed on such narrow a base Even if the neutral secular state ongmating in Western tradition is 
ostensibly an accurate portrait of most of the present states of the world system it is arguably a dubious 
guide to the future On purely theoretical grounds the neutral state cannot be taken for granted The state 
as Buzan suggests5 and as this paper argues is a variable even from a realist perspective If the state as a 
coercive mechanism is also expected to play other roles than just arbitration such as welfare and/or the
4 Benedict Anderson Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York Verso 1991)
5 Barry Buzan op cit.
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extension of ideological cultural and religious values then the notion of the state assumes a variable 
character Therefore generalizations about the state and its stability are more complex than one would 
initially believe They certainly cannot be reduced to realist strictures
Modern Cooperation Theory This part of the analysis is concerned with implications for Axelrod s 
argument6 and the modem cooperation theory that non coercive cooperation under the security dilemma7 
anses partly from the shadow of the future Modem cooperation theory explains cooperation and its 
evolution in terms of three circumstantial dimensions namely the structure of payoffs the continuing 
interaction between the different players (termed as the shadow of the future ) and the number of 
players i e cooperation becomes more difficult as the number of players increases As suggested in this 
paper the shadow of the past is a necessary element for understanding the evolution of cooperation 
along with the three elements delineated by the modern cooperation theory groups Failing to recognize its 
importance with respect to the security problem at an individual group state and international level 
renders both the understanding and the resolution of the security problem impossible State accords in a 
security regime must presumably be sensitive to conflicting cultural consciousness and historical memory 
Conversely too much of a focus on the past and the selective use of history and culture for the purposes of 
current actors contribute to the security dilemma
The modem cooperation theory groups fail to recognize the critical and often decisive importance of 
the shadow of the past These analysts have largely accepted the unarticulated assumption of the 
Western neutral secular state They reject both as an explanation for cooperation and implicitly as a 
valued norm both history and cultural consciousness as parts of the calculus of choice of the very groups 
whose behavior they purport to explam 8 In fact the past or the shadow of the past influences and in 
many instances predetermines not only the ability of the players to recognize others past behaviors but it 
also defines the attributes of the players themselves as they deal with each exchange The longer the 
shadow of the future the more positive its effect will be on promoting cooperation and sustaining i t 9 In a 
similar fashion the extent of the shadow of the past in the memory of peoples impinges on the 
development of cooperation both present and future Indeed expectations of others future behaviors are 
perceived based on their credibility i e their past propensity (and capability) to defect or cooperate as 
well as to retaliate or reciprocate The calculation of payoffs would certainly at stake There is a de facto 
causal linkage between the saliency of the shadow of the past or historical memory and the shadow of 
the future " This relation is context dependent since historical memory is not the only salient determinant 
of present or future actions due to the potential erosion of memory inherent in perceptual dynamics and the 
contribution of other social factors The change in the structure of payoffs or at least the expectation of 
each player s payoffs is to a large extent based on past payoffs which were interpreted as or might have 
been actual losses or benefits
The other shortcoming of the modem cooperation theory is their oversight of the primordial role played 
by the players self identities The assumption of value independent payoffs based on complete rationality 
of the players is a senous pitfall that affects the relevance and explanatory power of the modem 
cooperation theory Not only is the structure of any cooperation exchange determined by the players self 
identities but also are the values at stake The past behaviors of the players the prospects of defection 
and the perception of opportunities in the future are all determined by the players self identities This is of 
paramount importance because actors are not homogeneous They are instead differentiated by their self 
identities and are likely to remain so for all practical urnes Self idenuty is an enduring aspect of the 
human condiuon States and socieues are therefore variable10 In what follows we present a generalized
6 Robert Axelrod The Evolution o f Cooperation (New York Basic Books New York 1984)
7 Robert Jervis Cooperation under the security dilemma World Politics 30 January 1978 pp 167-214 R O Keohane After 
Hegemony (Princeton Princeton University Press 1984)
8 Some cooperation theories concede implicitly the saliency of the past m shaping the evolution of cooperation since the 
evolution of cooperation is influenced by the ability of the players to recognize past cooperators and defectors and to distinguish 
between them Stephen Van Evra World Politics 38 October 1985 p 80
9 Robert Jervis and Robert O Koehane World Politics 38 October 1985 p 226
10 J P Netti The Sute as a Conceptual Variable World Politics Voi 20 ( July 1968) pp 559-93
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dynamic theory of state structure in an attempt to correct the oversight of the importance of historical 
memory and cultural consciousness as determinants of state structure and dynamics
A Generalized Dynamics of State Structure
Figure 1 1 schematizes a generalized dynamics of state structure that is differentiated along five cells 
historical memory cultural and identity consciousness state binding idea institutions and territoriality 
None of these cells constitutes an independent level of analysis These five elements are m a permanent 
dynamic interaction with each other Historical memory while distinct from cultural consciousness is 
intimately related to it Historical memory ceaselessly impinges on cultural consciousness by providing 
historical justifications and rationalizations for cultural practices and identity More specifically historical 
memory is a mam constituent element of cultural consciousness and identity It provides them with an 
historical perspective a rootedness in the past and it gives legitimacy to their claims Conversely 
cultural consciousness plays a dominant role in defining and choosing which aspects and periods of history 
to emphasize and which aspects and periods to marginalize in coping and adapting to new challenges in 
the environment Cultural consciousness directs the interpretation of history 11 It also creates history such 
as the creation of myths12
The relationship between cultural consciousness and Buzan s three elements the state binding idea the 
institutions and territoriality is a two way dynamics Cultural consciousness provides the perceptual lens 
and conceptual lens through which the individual the society and the state view the three elements 
Conversely the dynamic character of Buzan s three elements raises cultural authenticity tensions as well 
as cultural commensurability tensions both within the society and between the state s elites and the 
society The political alienation or recognition of a group(s) within the society bnngs about two issues 
First it raises the level of cultural and identity consciousness of the alienated or recognized goup(s) 
Second it bnngs back histoncal memones to the forefront and magnifies past glories and/or grievances 
The revival of these histoncal memones takes then the form of a resistive effect that opposes adaptability 
and change or compromise
The state binding idea plays the role of an ordering principle and provides the grounds for state 
legitimacy and sovereignty It differentiates states along three dimensions a concept of nationhood 
ideology and religion Similarly the state institutions provide the practical grounds for legitimacy of the 
political processes preserve order m the society and provide the practical grounds for society welfare 
Institutions are differentiated according to their degree of autonomy adaptability power and degree of 
coherence The relationship between the state binding idea and institutions is that of complementarity or 
substitutability13 depending on the circumstances and the issue at stake But in most states the two are 
really complementary to each other Even in the extreme cases of totalitarian regimes where the state 
binding idea is very strong it cannot escape the complementarity of state institutions (in most cases the 
coercive ones) The state binding idea also provides the practical definition of territoriality via its 
conception of nationhood and ideology
The external environment (which is not exclusively restricted the international state system for it 
includes for example transnational institutions) impinges on the state structure and society m four 
different ways First, due to the anarchical character of the state system and the perpetual states
11 Note that one is not advocating here some heimeneuiic umversalism which argues that all knowledge is interpretation Instead 
and in spite of the difficulty of dealing with a subject matter such as history we believe that there is a distinction between 
understanding and interpretation that is as put by Richard Shustetman understanding and interpretation are epistemologically 
different in terms of their functional relations understanding initially grounds and guides interpretation while the latter explores 
validates or modifies that initial grounds of meaning Richard Shusterman Beneath Interpretation in David R Htley James F 
Bohman and Richard Shusterman (eds ) The Interpretive Turn Philosophy Science Culture (Ithaca New York Cornell University 
Press 1991) pp 102-128
12 In most cases it is the intellectual and/or political elite that relies on such manoeuvers for some definite purposes (whether 
political or cultural)
13 Barry Buzan argues that one might posit something like a sliding scale on which ideas and institutions can to a considerable 
but not complete extent extent be substituted for each other op cit. p 85
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A Generalized Dynamic Theory o f State Implosion 7
competition in matters of security politics and economics states always face adaptability challenges to 
the external environment which practically manifest themselves m adaptability challenges for the state 
binding idea institutions and notion of territoriality Second due to the techno scientific achievements m 
communication and transportation means and to the relatively easy availability of worldwide networks of 
communication and transportation both within and outside the jurisdiction of the states individuals and 
societies are constantly subjects to processes of exposure to and learning from the external environment 
This affects the scope and nature of internal demands on and expectations from the state apparatuses 
which then face inescapable adaptability challenges if the state is to preserve its legitimacy and 
sovereignty Third due to the large diversity of different cultures in the world which are necessarily linked 
to if not sustained by international structures of power and due to the historical linkages between 
worldwide cultures that have been more conflictual than cooperative the society s cultural consciousness 
and identity constantly face authenticity and commensurability challenges Fourth the international 
political alienation or recognition of a group within the society or of a state brings back historical 
memories of past achievements glories and grievances These memories then take the form of a resistive 
effect that imposes adaptability challenges on the state apparatuses
In this generalized framework a given state is qualified as strong if there is harmony between us 
society s sense of history and cultural consciousness(es) and a strong binding idea of state effective and 
stable institutions and territorial integrity No discontinuity exists m practice between its society s 
history and cultural consciousness(es) and its political institutions state binding idea and notion of 
territoriality We now proceed to explicitly discuss the five levels of analysis namely histoncal memory 
cultural consciousness state binding idea institutions and notion of territoriality
Historical Memory
History is not a mere collection of recorded facts We can view and understand the past only through the 
eyes of the present History is a continuous process of interaction between a people s shared cultural 
consciousness and their connection to past events It is an unending dialogue between the present and the 
p ast14
Historical memory can be delineated according to its functions in the society and state and the relations 
between them At least three different functions can be listed First histoncal memory provides the 
peoples with an historical perspective a shared view of history both actual and imagined past glones and 
losses thus allowing them to locate themselves as a continuing collectivity through time In fact no group 
or society of people can ignore the need to an histoncal perspective It is ingrained in daily expenence 
and appears to be inherent in the human condition The histoncal perspective allows people to understand 
the histoncal process which leads to a purported understanding of both themselves and others m a 
temporal perspective The resulting course of action is then either to seek to dispense with history and 
start afresh or to perpetuate (and maybe recover) the lost history The cause of either course of action is 
the outcome of tensions and struggles between the salience of histoncal memory as one of the important 
determinants15 of future actions and a perspective based on expectations about the future
Second histoncal memory provides a sense of rootedness to the society and/or the state This is for 
instance manifested by the importance given to the place and temtory of birth and bunal of fathers and 
forefathers Any community attempting to build a political system is faced with the problem of rootedness 
in the past Rationalizing state formation especially in those parts of the world that were under foreign 
occupation or part of a former larger political entity such as an empire has always attracted the focus of 
political leaders as well as common people In this respect calling on historical memory has been a
14 Edward H Carr What ts History7 (New York Vintage Books 1961) R G CoUingwood The Idea o f History (New York 
Oxford University Press 1956)
15 One should bear in mind that circumstantial choice by the actors is one of the determinants of the course of acuon 
Nevertheless there is a strong relationship between the circumstantial choice and the imperative of histoncal memory
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common practice 16 Even among modern states like the United States present ambitions are ceaselessly 
justified by recalling past achievements and values 17
Third historical memory also provides legitimacy which is an issue that is usually used to give 
credibility and strength to calls for self determination by different groups of peoples a movement that 
accelerated in the aftermath of World War II The construction of a state on premises that are alien to the 
society s historical memory entails a lack of legitimacy for the state This fatal blow manifests itself in 
two different ways First, it can assume the form of an immediate eruption of social and political 
turbulence in the society Second it could remain in a latent form awaiting favorable conditions for social 
and political instabilities to appear even though the state would have seemed to be strong and fully 
capable to exercise sovereignty over a given society Conversely historical memory can enhance state 
legitimacy when taken into consideration leading to a compatibility between the vision of the state and 
the society s historical memory When historical memory is neglected it backfires through a resistive 
effect which erodes state legitimacy As time passes the state strength erodes thus bringing its collapse
Cultural Consciousness
Cultural consciousness involves the process of delineating one s sense of belonging to a certain culture— 
norms beliefs attitudes and practices—and of differentiating one s culture from others 18 The existence of 
an identification process (see identification process in Figure 1 2) is usually implicitly assumed It 
becomes explicit when external conditions make the individual or the group feel threatened or challenged 
by other cultures Identity is a socio psychological concept which refers to how people perceive 
themselves and how they distinguish themselves from others 19 Why does an individual identify with a 
group7 Identity stability is crucial for a sense of psychological secunty and well being 20 Its disintegration 
prompts personality and group breakdown Under the perception of a real or imagined threat the group and 
the individual seek to protect and enhance identifications already made More generally one may argue 
that there are three reasons at least why one identifies with a given group of people First there is the 
structural pressure towards normalization from the group or more generally the society on the individual21 
The process of normalization can take different forms varying from indoctrination to forced socialization 
depending on the circumstances as well as the power structure within the group or society For example in 
totalitarian societies both extreme means i e indoctrination and forced socialization are constantly used 
to normalize the individual In more open political systems implicit as well as explicit indoctrination is 
the means for socialization of the individual22 Second the individual s instrumental rationality may lead
16 Enc Davis and Nicolas Gavnelides Statecraft in the Middle East Oil Historical Memory and Popular Culture (Miami Fionda 
International Umversity Press 1991) p 13
17 This line of analysis could arguably be extended to all states but that argument and the implied investigation that it would 
require fall beyond the scope of this paper
18 Munir Khoury s definition of culture is worthwhile citing in full Culture is a compound product of symbolic mteracuon 
between human beings and their habitats through time By human being we mean that individual human organism with all us 
inherent vaned and seemingly unlimited potentials By habitat we mean that part of the physical and/or social environment of which 
this human orgamsm is aware and with which he is constantly or intermittendy interacting By time we mean that part of history 
which is sull vividly living in the conscience of human beings By interaction we mean that kind of symbolic mteracuon which is 
earned out not mechanically but purposefully and meaningfully In other words we can safely say that a culture is in essence no 
more no less than a group personality What is Wrong with Lebanon (Beimi Al Hamra Publishers 1990) p 75
19 Peter Weinreich defines one s identity as the totality of one s self construal in which how one construes oneself in the 
present expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one construes oneself as one 
aspires to be in the future Peter Weinreich Vanauons in Ethnic Idenuty Identity Structure Analysis in Karmela Liebkmd (ed ) 
New Identities in Europe Immigrant Ancestry and the Ethnic Identity o f Youth (England Gower Publishing Company Limited 1989) 
pp 41-75 This is a very interesting definmon for it clearly stresses the continuity in time as a major feature of identity This 
perfectly concords with the joint considerauon of both historical memory and cultural consciousness and the strong relauonship 
between them as stressed m this paper
20 William Bloom Personal Identity National Identity and International Relouons (Cambridge Mass Cambridge Umversity 
Press 1993) p 50
21 Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish The Birth o f the Prison (New York Vintage Books 1979)
22 This does not rule out the possibility of forced socialization of rebellious individuals and groups such as what happened m the 
1968 the students uprising m France where the state used ihe university system to implement its normalizing policies on the 
students
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the individual to opt for a certain identification with a given group In other words the individual makes 
the rational choice to identify him/herself with a given group to maximize a certain valued utility or 
conversely to minimize the loss of a certain valued utility Third because the individual seeks more 
affective stability such as psychological security or emotional harmony s/he identifies with a given group 
of people 23 In actual situations the process of idenufication is usually a mixture of the three elements 
since the individual can never escape structural pressures nor his/her affective onentaüon and is always 
using instrumental rauonality to make choices It is evident that structural pressures are to a large degree 
directly determined by collecüve historical memones and cultural consciousness But even in the 
seemingly contrary case where the structure is not compatible with the historical memory and cultural 
consciousness of die group to which the individual belongs the very realizauon of the existence of a 
structural pressure is due to the incompatibility of the imposed structure with the individual s value system 
which is undoubtedly rooted in his group s historical memory and cultural consciousness The impact of 
historical memory and cultural consciousness on the affective orientation is through the value system and 
the educational and socialization processes that every individual goes through m his/her life There are 
two different processes through which the individual identifies him/herself with a given collectivity first 
empathetic identification which stands for recognition of sameness between the individual and the others 
constituting the group and second role model identification which corresponds to an individual s wish to 
emulate the others 24
Evidently since any culture is located in an external environment i e always m contact with other 
cultures and of diffenng often opposed cultural consciousnesses it is faced with a challenge between 
adapting or insulating its norms values and practices In today s world where techno scientific 
achievements have permeated all societies and henceforth enabled billions of peoples to enter m contact 
with each other s culture through different transportation and communication networks cultural exchanges 
and transformations have become a daily routine This continuous stream of exchanges is characterized 
more by conflict and perception of threat than by consensus and likely prospects of consensual cooperation
23 Note that we are generalizing William Bloom s notion of psychological stability as a mam cause of identification to other 
aspects of human affective orientation In fact Bloom s explanation is no more than a restatement of the basic Hobbesian 
assumption that in the sute of nature all is against all due to a feeling of insecurity under conditions of scarcity of resources
24 Peter Weinreich op ciL
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in the future 25 Insulating one s culture is nowadays not only just unpractical but is also a potential 
source of social unrest26 At least three issues winch are crucially related to attempts by states at cultural 
insulation and which have far reaching consequences for state stability can be delineated Fust regimes 
policies of cultural insulation usually end up being policies of censorship on people s right to free access 
to other cultures People would however ultimately become aware of this condition of censorship 
whenever a window of opportunity is open to them on other societies 27 and attempt to relax i t  Second 
every culture and hence every cultural consciousness of a particular people endures permanent 
challenges to change generated by internal as well as external criticisms and conflicts Finally 
establishing and maintaining a thm balance between preserving one s cultural identity and interacting with 
other cultures requues a delicate balance of history and cultural consciousness as differentials between 
peoples (and states) and as dynamic attributes susceptible to changes and transformations The two 
aspects of adaptability i e internal and external cannot be insulated from each other especially in cases 
where the society is a web of different cultures and cultural consciousnesses that reflect existing world 
cultures and cultural consciousnesses
The identification process is a basic problem faced by all group of people in any part of the world 
whatever its ethnic religious cultural or ideological base It is self sustaining and self perpetuating 
especially m times of crisis or conflict Even in the absence of crisis or conflict there is the potential for 
the members of a group to act together to enhance and protect their shared identity At the state level the 
problem of cultural identification is inescapable Any state aspiring to create a national identity must take 
into consideration its citizens sense of cultural identity if it wishes to survive or discharge its security 
functions In the process the state then becomes the stake for nval groups with differing cultural 
identifications If national identity describes that condition m which a mass of people extend the definition 
of their identity in terms of national symbols 28 and if a pervasive national identity is an essential element 
of the continuous existence of every nation state any attempt of creating this identification is problematic 
and is a security issue whenever it ignores the cultural identification of the people which then produces 
conflict between the two identifications as a result of an incompatibility between them The state can deal 
with the issue in two different ways It can either create a national identity that surmounts cultural 
differences29 or rely on a social compact between the different cultural groups within the society and/or 
the state 30 But in both cases the stability of the state and its legitimacy relies on a thin balance that it 
promotes within the society if it does not want to have recourse to purely coercive measures to preserve 
order Cultural identification is therefore a de facto security issue for it cannot be avoided as part of social 
cohesion (or compact) and at the same time it is a potential source of conflicts between different cultural 
groups 31
Authenticity is another facet of cultural consciousness A group of people raises the question of 
authenticity32 whenever it faces a cultural challenge that extends through time and threatens its cultural
25 Adda B Bozeman Politics and Culture in International History (Princeton Princeton University Press 1960) Nicholas J 
Reugger Culture Society and Order in World Poliücs m John Baylis and Nicholas J Reugger (eds ) Dilemmas o f World Politics 
International Issues in a Changing World (Oxford Clarendon Press 1992) pp 85-103
26 James N Rosenau op cit
27 As argued by Wadi A Haddad the technological revoluuon has not been land to multinational sutes in which the 
aggregate ldenuues of the communities have not already congealed around the sute As technology has enhanced the perception of 
the threat to community ldenuty posed by central governments new communication and transporuuon capabilities so too has that 
technology provided more effecuve means to mobilize the communities whose identity appears to be threatened in Lebanon The 
Politics o f  Revolving Doors (Washington D C Praeger Special Studies 1985) p 6 This happened m the case of the Islamic 
revolution of Iran against the Shah and was an important factor that contributed to the success of the revoluuon
28 They have internalized the symbols of the nation so that they may act as one socio-psychological group when there is a threat 
to or a possibility of enhancement of these symbols of national identity William Bloom op cit p 73
29 This scenano is possible whenever the histoncal juncture is such that the social condiuons allow it to happen such as in the 
United Sutes and Canada (at least before the calls for Quebec secession became strong enough to threaten the temtonal integnty of 
Canada) or wherever there is a homgeneous culture and cultural consciousness m the society such as in Japan
30 Malaysia is a good case where there is a social compact between the Malay populaUon and the Chinese populauon living in 
Malaysia
31 Samuel P Huntington The Clashes of Civilizations? in Foreign Affairs Summer 1993 p 22
32 Abdallah Laroui The Crisis o f the Arab Intellectual TradUionalism or Historic ism? (Berkeley C A  University of California 
Press 1976)
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identification The different religious movements around the world who raise the issue of authenticity 
when calling for revival of their respective interpretations of religion provide indeed a good illustration of 
this dimension of cultural consciousness What is the relation between temporality and authenticity7 Is it 
exclusionary or dialectical7 As the process of historical memory creation is selective so also is cultural 
consciousness How to preserve and promote cultural authenticity under condiuons of challenge is a 
delicate matter Too much alteration leads to a condition or at least a perception (which m the end is not 
much different) of alienation and a sense of threat and therefore a security issue Conversely too ngid a 
conception of the importance of authenticity leads to conservatism As time passes and the pressures from 
internal social forces as well as external challenges accumulate the dilemma of authenticity/alteration 
then leads to an identification crisis thereby creating a security issue
A third facet of cultural consciousness is the problem of incommensurability33 or resistance to borrowing 
This facet manifests itself when an alien culture is imposed on an indigenous culture The case of 
colonialism or an elite attempting to subordinate a popular culture to a different culture to which the elite 
belongs and that is being imported are two such instances The concept of modernization as applied to 
non western societies is a good example where commensurability issues an se34 Incommensurability could 
lead to a sense of threat of identity loss and becomes very much a security issue When it happens 
between an elite holding the state power and an indigenous population it weakens undoubtedly the 
legitimacy of the state and potentially leads to an erosion of order Contrary to widespread belief of the 
modernization school of comparative politics mdustnalization urbanization and the spread of education 
did not reduce either ethnic or cultural consciousness impact on internal political and economic processes 
Assimilation of cultural minorities into a large integrated whole which was viewed as the inevitable future 
did not succeed m many parts of the world It is therefore worthwhile reconsidering what factors lead to 
strong states by considering the dilemmas raised by the social forces which originate from historical 
memory and cultural consciousness
State Binding Idea
Barry Buzan argues that a binding idea is of central importance to the state and that such a 
conceptualization is necessary for security studies35 Different societies may have different conceptions of 
the state Even within the same society people may have different conceptions of the state and thereby 
making the state binding idea a potential source of conflicts Buzan delineates two sources of the idea of 
the state the concept of a nation and organizing ideologies This characterization although acceptable 
could be addressed m a different way by delineating the idea of state along functional and differential 
lines (see Figure 11)
In terms of its functions the binding idea of state may either enhance or reduce order m the society 
increase state legitimacy or reduce it in the minds of the population and justify state sovereignty or 
undermine it depending on its degree of compatibility with the cultural consciousness (es) and historical 
memory of the society The binding idea of the state loses its legitimacy when it alienates the society The 
alienation can take other forms than incompatibility with the society s historical memory and cultural 
consciousness It could also be a political alienation when people are denied the right to have a say m the 
country s political affairs or are frustrated due to the state s non responsiveness to their security and 
welfare expectations 36 All the above causes impinge on each other and enhance each other in most cases
The idea of state can also be differentiated along at least three axes a conception of nationhood an 
organizing ideology and religion (or more generally communalism) Nationhood is a dynamic concept, 
the meaning of which has been evolving through time and changing across cultures Usually it is used to
33 Partha Chatterjee Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World A Derivative Discourse (Minneapolis M N University of 
Minnesota Press 1993)
34 Guillermo A O Donnell Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley 
C A University of California Press 1979)
35 Barry Buzan op cit
36 Edward A Kolodziej What is Security and Security Studies7 Lessons fron the Cold War Arms Control Voi 13 No 1 (April 
1992) pp 1-31
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characterize groups of people who have actual or imagined common language culture history and maybe 
religion 37 The relation between nation and state is not a simple one Buzan delineates four models of 
possible links between nation and state the nation state the state nation the part nation state and the 
multination state38 Except for few instances in the world (and m history) most of the present states are 
multinational states Every state is faced with the issue of national integration whatever its definition of 
nation might be Integration usually proceeds along three dimensions (1) Social integration (2) economic 
integration and (3) political integration Social integration proceeds through assimilation the melting pot 
or the recognition of cultural pluralism 39 Political integration is certainly the most difficult to accomplish 
for its implications can be potential sources of conflict The relation between the three types of integration 
is very strong and all three types need to be accomplished simultaneously Attempts of political 
integration could in some cases lead to a counter effect resulting in political instability if the society is 
permeated by different currents of cultural identity ethnicity religion and ideology
An organizing ideology could be in some cases so deeply ingrained into the state that change would 
have transformational or perhaps fatal implications In other cases organizing ideologies have only 
shallow roots and large changes in official orientation occur frequently 40 The organizing ideology of the 
state would have shallow roots if there is a problem of incommensurability between it and the society s 
cultural consciousness Incommensurability occurs usually if this ideology is imposed (through coercion or 
failed indoctrination) by the state apparatus (as in totalitarian regimes) Similarly this would eventually 
lead to a loss of state legitimacy and a decrease in stability The issue of competing ideologies either 
between the state and the society or between groups within the society has a high potential of inducing 
state instability It becomes highly relevant when the state loses its monopoly of coercive means for policy 
implementation i e when armed groups challenge state sovereignty and become states in the state 
Strongly held ideologies by only a segment of the population do not always strengthen the state 41 Rather 
they incite internal conflict
Religion is an important differential among states and is being recognized as such Neglecting its impact 
on the idea of state makes the explanation of state behavior problematic Indeed at a policy level 
neglecting or downgrading the role of religion m the state has been a source of pohucal turmoil in those 
societies where religion encompasses not only the personal but also (and on an equal footing) the societal 
aspects of life such as politics This state of affairs leads then to political instabilities and conflictual 
relations between the state and the society or at least among those groups in the society which insist on 
compatibility between the political system and their cultural consciousness and historical memory m 
which religion plays an important if not a central role The Islamic movements and popular uprisings in 
many parts of the Muslim World well illustrate this issue At an analysis level the Western concept of a 
secular state where religion and politics are separate realms is incompatible with peoples conceptions of 
a way of life in many regions of the globe Not properly considering this issue in international (or regional) 
security studies is a senous shortcoming in theoretical analysis and a potentially damaging omission It 
might be argued that religion and culture are so bound together that analytical differentiation between the 
two becomes problematic Empirically we can well differentiate between for instance different Islamic 
cultures such as Pakistani culture Algerian culture and so forth Part of the analytical difficulty comes 
from the fact that both terms religion and culture are part of a post Enlightenment terminology that is 
descriptive of a very specific historical experience namely modem Western Europe Therefore a more 
encompassing and generalizable conceptualization of culture and religion as well as the relationship 
between the two becomes an imperative if one would like the analysis to escape the trap of ethnocentrism 
Unfortunately pursuing such a venture would take us far away from the scope of this paper 42
37 Elie Kedoune Nationalism (London Hutchinson University Press 1993) Benedict Anderson op cit
38 Barry Buzan op cit
39 Anthony H Birch Nationalism and National Integration (London Unwin Hyman Ltd 1989) p 51
40 Barry Buzan op cil  p 79
41 The collapse of the former Soviet Union is a recent example of how devastative a role could a strong ideology have on state 
stability
42 John L. Esposito raises the same question in his book entitled The Islamic Threat Myth or Reality7 (New York Oxford 
University Press 1992)
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Religion can have at least two effects on the political system of a society First, it can play a major 
national integrative role when there is a general harmony between the state and the societal aspirations as 
to the role of religion in politics (such as in Iran or the Sudan43) Second it can alternatively play a major 
polarizing role in the society when there is a diversity of religious communities of approximately equal 
demographic sizes as well as political weights This latter case can be further delineated into two different 
subcases (a) when none of the religious communities holds the state power (such as m the case of a 
secular state) then the polarization remains within the civil society but has an important impact on the 
state (especially where there is political freedom and the political system is genuinely representative of 
the society fabnc) and (b) when one of the religious communities holds the state power then the 
polarization is between this community and the rest of the communities although the polarization within 
the latter exists and impacts on the formation of coalitions either with or against the state The integrative 
and polarizing aspects of religion make religion assume different roles in different circumstances When 
religion plays an integrative role in the polity under the favorable circumstances of religious harmony and 
commensurability it then supports and enhances the state status quo therefore opposing and weakening 
any tendency to state implosion Conversely because of its potentially polarizing effect on the society 
(into different religious communities) when incommensurability prevails religion enhances state 
implosion and becomes a major factor exacerbating if not leading the forces of implosion International 
religious ramifications exacerbate the effect of religion on the state Indeed religious identification 
permeates national boundaries and cross national solidarity movements grow up easily and expand rapidly 
when based on religion The availability of international religious support (either moral or matenal) to a 
dissenting religious group (and for that matter to any dissenting group) within the state s jurisdiction 
enhances the capabilities and willingness of the dissenting group The implication for theory building is 
that only those theories of conflict resolution and cooperation that give due consideration to religious 
commitments and identities as determinants of players strategies and expectations can succeed to 
analytically delineate effectively favorable conditions that promote religious groups relations from the 
polarization end of the group interaction spectrum to the coexistence if not integration side
Political Institutions
Strong institutions are another requisite of a strong state (see Figure 11) Institutions are expected to 
provide legitimacy to the state order in the society and welfare to the people Political Institutions can 
also be differentiated m terms of their autonomy adaptability and coherence 44 The complexity aspect of 
political institutions is usually dependent on the complexity of the society being considered 
Dichotomizing societies into traditional and modern has led many scholars to draw a correspondence 
respectively between these societies and with simplicity and complexity Although this typology has been 
useful in many studies 45 it is in fact a manifestation of a cultural bias (not necessarily intentional) and 
subject to cultural interpretations Indeed how useful would a very complex political institution be if its 
complexity makes it unsuitable for the societal needs
The degree of autonomy of a political institution is subject to two factors First the state ideology is 
usually a determining factor of the political institutions for any state holds a certain ideology (ì e a 
specific worldview) that rationalizes its decisionmaking processes and policies 46 The stronger the 
ideology is the less autonomous the institutions are Second m praetorian 47 societies existing societal 
(not specifically political) currents tend to manipulate and control political institutions to such an extent 
that it is very hard to delineate political institutions from the social fabnc
The attnbute of adaptability plays a major role since it directly relates to the cultural consciousness of 
the society as well as to the state ideology Political institutions must adapt to new psychological as well 
as socio-economic environments First any society is subject to social transformations that are the result
43 Except for the southern part of the Sudan where the situation is still unsettled
44 Samuel P Huntington Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale Yale University Press 1968)
45 James A Bill and Robert L Hargrave Jr Comparative Politics The Quest for Theory (Boston Bell & Howell Company 
1973) Howard J Wiarda New Directions in Comparative Politics (Boulder Colorado Westview Press 1991)
46 Totalitarian systems where the state monopolizes all political economic and social institutions are but an extreme category
47 S P Hunttington op cit
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of competing internal social forces and external pressures and challenges Second social transformations 
and mobilizations do affect to some degree peoples cultural consciousness A failure of the institutions to 
do so would most probably entail a loss to their legitimacy and effectiveness History is full of examples of 
political systems which collapsed due to the lack of adaptability of their institutions (Ottoman empire 48 
Soviet Union 49 to name just two)
The more coherent a political institution the stronger it is Although this argument appears very 
persuasive it is not without problems Indeed if an institution becomes too coherent it faces the potential 
problem of groupthmk syndrome This condition tends to impede the effectiveness of the institution on 
the long run as well as its adaptability since it becomes a prisoner of standardized operating procedures50 
A very high degree of coherence in political institutions can also become an imposition of strict 
conformism which eventually leads to a violation of minorities right to differ It creates (at least m the 
long run) a potentially conflictual relation between the minorities and the political institutions
Territoriality
As Buzan correctly contends territory as the physical basis of the state is a necessary ingredient for the 
existence of the state (see Figure 1 1) Territory becomes a determining factor in state stability when it is 
contested either internally among different political factions who call for secession or externally by other 
states and/or nations that may claim pieces of land or call for territorial re unification These two issues 
play opposite roles with regard to state stability 51 The existence of an external threat is usually used by 
politicians as a diversionary measure to strengthen their power within the society while internal 
secessionist movements are a senous threat to the state legitimacy order and its very existence 52 The 
negative impact of territoriality in a multi ethnic and/or multi religious country on state stability is 
exacerbated when the state bases its national integrative strategy on the concept of the territorial nation 
state Minorities which are not always necessarily small m size would perceive themselves alienated by 
the ruling ethnic cultural or religious group
In those parts of the world where colonial powers designed the borders between countries without taking 
into consideration the wishes and aspirations of the indigenous peoples as expressed either explicitly by 
their independence movements or defined by their histoncal memory and cultural consciousness latent 
territorial crises have been planted that would eventually but not necessarily surface as soon as the 
conditions are favorable53 Because groups of people who see themselves as one community cannot be 
easily divided (and are not arguably divisible for all practical purposes) when the land on which they live 
is divided this potentially invites conflict The more cohesive the group is the higher is the potential to 
conflict Even in the case where the group is not divided but is instead expelled as a whole from what it 
perceives as its homeland (or part of it) the situation is no less acute Indeed the intangible bonds such 
as past collecave memories and cultural attachments are what make the homeland so cherishable The 
group therefore equates the loss of the homeland (or part of it) with the loss of a constitutive element of its 
idenuty and this invites conflicts par excellence The 1991 Gulf war is but one example out of many 
(evidently it is not the only possible explanation since political economy and security provide at least
48 The Ottoman Sultanat could not successfully modernize the political institutions in the middle of the nineteenth century 
Subsequently the Young Turks gradually rose to power and ultimately abolished the empire with the concourse of the international 
circumstances prevailing prior to World War I and in ns aftermath Lord Kinross The Ottoman Centuries The Rise and Fail o f the 
Turkish Empire (New York Morrow Qill Paperbacks 1977)
49 The incapacity of the Soviet political insutuuons to adapt to both geopolitical and international economic challenges and to 
internal demands for more welfare and political freedom is one of the major factor that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet 
empire Edward A Kolodziej op cil
50 Irving Jones Groupthmk (Dallas Texas Houghton-Mifflm 1982)
51 Gary Goertz and Paul F Diehl Enduring Rivalnes Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns International Studies 
Quarterly (1993) 37 pp 147-171
52 In fact the literature on this issue is controversial Jack Levy The Diversionary theory of W ar A Critique in Midlarsky 
(ed) Handbook o f War Studies (Ann Arbor MI Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press 1993) pp 259-288 Jack Levy
Domestic Politics and War Journal o f Interdisciplinary History (1988) 18 no 4 pp 653-673
53 Mohammed Ayoob The Security Problematic of the Third World World Politics p 257 Caroline Thomas In Search o f 
Security The Third World in International Relations (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder Colorado 1987)
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other ones) Iraq overtly claimed that Kuwait is but one of its provinces that was separated from it by the 
British m 1960
Historical memory and cultural consciousness have paramount impacts on the territorial problematic All 
conflicts based on territorial disputes (all over the world) emanate principally (although not exclusively) 
from the neglected and latent resistive effect of historical memory Speaking of territorial disputes is 
tantamount of speaking of historical memory whether it is between Russia and Japan Ethiopia and 
Somalia Iraq and Kuwait Germany and France or Bosnian Serbs Croats and Muslims The causal 
linkage between the latent resistive effect of historical memory and territorial disputes is inescapable
Why Do States Implode7
The focus of this study has been to delineate the most important factors leading to state implosion as well 
as the causal link between them and to extract some support for a more generalized understanding of 
security and the requirements of international security
State implosion is an ipso facto endemic security issue of the anarchical society of states The implosion 
of a state can be explained using a dynamic combination of Buzan s three elements namely a state 
binding idea stability of political institutions and territory and the two elements introduced in this paper 
i e cultural consciousness and historical memory We argue that state implosion cannot be explained 
without invoking the primordial roles played by historical memory and cultural consciousness In addition 
to these elements the role of external factors ought to be considered m order to make the explanation as 
encompassing as possible Nonetheless these external factors exacerbate the internal sources of the 
implosion rather than play primary roles
The implosion of a state is explained as an actualization of the latent resistive effect of historical 
memory which expresses itself m the cultural consciousness(es) of both the state and the society This 
actualization manifests itself along many interrelated dimensions First it appears in an identification 
cnsis(es) Each faction attempts to differentiate itself from the others Second a cultural 
incommensurability between the state and the society as well as within the society itself i e between 
the different factions manifests itself and turns the relations between the different factions to zero sum 
games Third a hunt for authenticity by all groups and factions is used to legitimize claims and gains 
Fourth a sense or perception of alienation among all groups results from these zero sum game relations 
especially among the faction(s) that do not hold the state power
These factors impinge then on the state binding idea which loses its functions of order legitimacy and 
sovereignty These losses are actualized m nationhood dilemmas ideological struggles and religious 
polarizations They also affect the political institutions which become unsuitable m addressing societal 
expectations The political institutions become incapable to adapt to changing societal and international 
environments and lose their autonomy to other societal players They drawn then in a state of total 
absence of coherence and effectiveness i e they lose their functions of legitimizing the state providing 
order in the polity and responding to societal ever rising demands for more welfare These factors affect 
also the very physical basis of the state i e the territory which becomes an issue of discord rather then 
unity
All these processes are dynamic as well as interdependent impinging on each other and are influenced 
if not directly manipulated by regional and international actors and conditions A lack of adaptability to 
external environment in an era where globalization is conspicuously becoming the foreseeable trend of 
international relations exacerbates the internal instabilities of the country in question But equally 
problematic is the fact that too much adaptability to external environment is perceived by the society at 
large as a threat to its very existence as a separate entity in an anarchical world Therefore adaptability to 
external environment is a persistent dilemma that states cannot escape
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Security Theory An Enlargement
This section perfects and extends Barry Buzan s useful effort to define the requirements of a strong state 
as prerequisites for a mature system of international security under conditions of anarchy To the three 
elements introduced by Buzan i e a binding idea stable institutions and a temtory two other elements 
namely cultural consciousness and historical memory must be added These latter elements are 
interdependent and are critical factors for the maintenance and stability of the state They define and form 
the contextual framework for Buzan s three elements They also define the substantive content attributable 
to Buzan s notions of binding idea institutions and temtory as the determinants of a strong state The 
paper focuses on historical memory and cultural consciousness as critical elements m explaining strong 
and weak states From a satisfying theoretical perspective strong states cannot be explained without 
presumably explaining weak states Explaining weak states implicitly explains the occurrence of state 
implosion like Lebanon Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union The application of history and culture to an 
explanation of the state can be extended to all states provisionally54
Buzan argues that the state particularly the strong state is an indispensable element for international 
security International security stability depends critically on strong states with the weak states being 
causes of international insecurity The endurance through time of the anarchical and therefore fragmented 
international system requires its basic units the states to be stable and strong Weak states are by 
definition not stable They are vulnerable to threats emanating both from contending groups within and 
from other states and groups outside their territories This differentiation between internal and external 
aspects of threats though convenient for the purpose of analysis is not always as differentiable as one 
would like it to be since weak states can export their internal instabilities and are permeated by other 
states internal instabilities or temptations Strong states are those where socio political coherence is high 
and relatively impermeable with respect to external influence The conceptualization of international 
insecurity as partly due to the existence of weak states in the anarchical international system is 
counterintuitive since historically speaking the major shocks to international security have been directly 
caused by great powers that the capability to challenge prevailing security status quo 55 Buzan s argument 
seems to imply that were it not for the inability of weak states to protect themselves (from internal and 
external enemies ) the strong states would not have been tempted to challenge the status quo These 
challenges take usually one of two forms (1) direct intervention m the weak state s internal affairs or (2) 
supporting or promoting through different ways and means the internal instabilities of the weak state for 
the sake of advantage in the struggle with other strong states The weak prompts the strong to act One 
implication of this conceptualization of international security however is that one is faced with the 
problem of putting on equal footing the national secunty issues of all states as equally relevant to 
international security From normative and legal perspectives a case can be made for equality At an 
empirical level however the secunty interests of great powers of the nation state system are obviously 
more significant to the world than those of a very small state This differentiation makes Buzan s 
conceptualization of international secunty through national secunty lenses very much context dependent 
for Buzan it depends on the relative position of the weak state and its perceived importance as a state and 
interest to regional and international powers This latter distinction is made because a weak state is 
generally speaking not much of a relevant and/or determining actor in the international structure of power 
(m the realist sense) but could still be very much relevant from a political (or political economic) view 
point The implication for analysts is therefore to make sure that they have a genuine international (or 
regional) secunty problem which is indeed caused by the weak state under consideration
54 Harry Ekstein Case Study and Theory in Political Science m Handbook o f Political Science Nelson Polsky and Fred 
Greenstein eds (Reading Mass Addison-Wesley 1975) pp 79-128
55 This conceptualizauon locates Buzan s analysis within neo realism though it goes beyond usual structuralism In this respect 
it is worth noting the new Buzan and coworkers effort to go beyond neo realist theoretical framework to a more generalized 
structurlism Barry Buzan Charles Jones and Richard Little The Logic o f Anarchy Neo Realism to Structural Realism (New York 
Columbia University Press 1993)
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Conclusion
Summary
The realist argument that states are the basic unit of analysis of the anarchical international system is 
ostensibly inescapable at least in the foreseeable future Nonetheless the failure of the realist school of 
international security to consider the issue of state formation or implosion is a major weakness as 
demonstrated by the failure to predict and explain the demise of the Soviet Union and its empire The 
perpetual existence of states as they are presently constituted or even the state system as we know it 
today cannot be continued to be implicitly assumed State implosion is a security issue that ought to be 
considered if security studies are to be more explanatory than the existing realist and neo realist schools 
purport to be
The relevance of history culture and religion to international secunty cannot be ignored for it is clear 
that their impact on a large part of the world body is increasingly becoming a determinant of security The 
case of Lebanon illuminates this constraint The explanation can be generalized to other states and 
peoples Culture and religion are indeed among the elements fueling rivalry today between groups and 
states The implication for international secunty studies is that a stnctly realist perspective in which only 
power (mostly military) pervades is no longer encompassing enough as to capture the actual phenomena 
of security and for that matter international relations The scope of analysis ought to be widened A 
consideration of new dimensions such as culture and religion which are genuinely international in 
character permits the analysis to escape the usual conceptualization of secunty and international relations 
in terms of power distnbution and structure only The purported depth of secunty analysis cannot be 
accomplished without considenng these new variables as determinants of international secunty Secunty 
requires more than power Power is a necessary element of security but it is not a sufficient one as the 
cases of Yugoslavia and U S S R  have shown The agenda of secunty studies ought to be enlarged to 
include not only economic and political imperatives but also other important elements such as culture and 
histoncal memory to ensure stable and legitimate international and regional secunty regimes This may be 
a necessary but not sufficient condition since there remains the problem of coordinating preferences for an 
increased number of culturally differentiated states
This raises the issue of whether strong states especially if defined by cultural commitments and non 
neutrality do actually contnbute to international secunty In other words is Buzan s argument that a 
mature society of strong states as the best provisional solution for international secunty under conditions of 
anarchy still a valid one9 The analysis in this paper seems m fact to agree with Buzan s argument for a 
mature society of strong states but with the proviso that strong states are defined by the five structure 
theory of Figure 1 1 and not restncted to Buzan s three requirements Put differently states defined not in 
accordance with the requirements of Figure 1 1 are potential sources of international insecurity
At the normative level cultural differentiation is acknowledged as a characteristic of today s world 
which implies that many of the concepts thought to be absolute and transcendental for centuries such as a 
dichotomization of societies to modernized and traditional are being reconsidered afresh56 Therefore 
expanding the scope and concepts of international secunty studies by taking into consideration historical 
memory and cultural consciousness is a plausible way to help us capture the actual phenomena of secunty 
and polmcs m general 57 A world of strong states based on cultural and histoncal differentials would seem 
to be more encompassing than a differentiation solely based on Buzan s three elements If the coherence 
of a state in many prominent cases depends on histoncal memory and cultural consciousness then the kind 
of stability that Buzan posits in international relations may be more problematic than his analysis 
admits At the international system level one would posit a minimum of shared values of a neutral anarchy 
and the creation of a society of states (or maybe a society of civilizations) based on this minimum set of 
common rules and norms a la B ull58
56 Howard J Wiarda Toward a Non Ethnocentric Theory of Development Alternatives Conceptions from the Third World New 
Directions in Comparative Politics edited by Howard J Wiarda (Colorado Westview Press 1991) p 131
57 Samuel P Huntington The Clashes of Civilizations7 m Foreign Affairs Summer 1993 p 22
58 Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society A Study o f Order m World Politics (New York Columbia University Press 1977)
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This study also argues that modern cooperation theory which explains cooperation on the basis of three 
circumstanual elements namely the shadow of the future the payoffs structure and the number of 
players falls short of being satisfactory from an empirical as well as a theoretical viewpoint Indeed the 
shadow of the past is an unavoidable circumstantial element that affects the evolution of cooperation 
through the effects of historical memory culture and value systems of the players whether considered as 
individuals groups or states Similarly considerations emanating from the shadow of the past shape to a 
large degree the payoffs structure The paper argues that attempting to understand and promote cooperation 
without giving due consideration to the shadow of the past as well as the players identities is a senous 
flaw From a policy making perspective cooperation can be promoted and enhanced only when based on 
the three circumstantial elements delineated by the modem cooperation theory and the shadow of the past
Objections
Several objections can be raised against the approach used in this study While all merit senous 
consideration none alone or m combination challenge the theory of this paper Invoking histoncal memory 
as a factor impinging on state stability raises several analytical and normative issues A first analytical 
problem stems from the difficulty of precisely defining histoncal memory or more generally history It 
might be argued that the approach loses part of the parsimony of a purely realist school approach by 
relying on such an elusive concept as histoncal memory The challenging and unavoidable question from a 
social science perspective is How can historical memory be universally charactenzed and 
operationalized to be shown to have causal effect on state stability and implosion7 Such a venture is a 
necessary requirement and must be senously considered in future work Nonetheless parsimony is not an 
end by itself but rather either a tool to the understanding of the phenomenon or maybe a purported virtue 
of theory If understanding the phenomenon requires us to depart from a purported parsimony then the effort 
is worthwhile
Another analytical issue is that histoncal memory may have either a positive or negative impact on 
state stability This issue is indeed problematic but it is to be conceptualized as an unavoidable historical 
memory dilemma faced by all states though in different degrees From a normative point of view invoking 
histoncal memory is a potential source of conflict arousal between groups who advocate history as an 
explanation of their respectively antagonistic positions that are threatening international or regional 
secunty But from an analyst point of view it is precisely this capture of the phenomenon by invoking 
histoncal memory that makes the approach very much relevant
Using cultural consciousness as a level of analysis in discussing state strength raises some potentially 
problematic issues An implication of cultural relativism might be raised against the approach From a 
theoretical standpoint cultural differentiation is only another complication that the analyst has to address 
though the complication is by no means trivial From a causal explanatory perspective one need not raise 
the normative issue of which culture is nght One needs only show that culture shapes behavior
Differentiating states along cultural lines runs counter to the usual Western conception of the state as a 
neutral arbiter Historically speaking many political communities both within and outside the 
geographically known part of the world as the West lasted for very long periods of time without being 
built on the notion of state neutrality (such as the Ottoman empire59 and Japan60) The main rationale 
behind invoking histoncal memory and cultural consciousness is the fact that these elements of societal 
life are latent factors shaping all other societal phenomena even though their causal linkages do not 
always lend themselves easily to delineation Empincally speaking historical memory and cultural 
consciousness have been very much ingrained m the minds of billions of peoples as social and political 
imperatives especially in the aftermath of the colonial period They also ostensibly manifest themselves 
with greater force than before m the post Cold War world Historical memory and cultural consciousness 
rooted in national religious and ethnic identity challenge nouons of Western umversahsm (which are
59 Louay Safi Nauonalism and the Mulunauonal State The American Journal o f Islamic Social Sciences Voi 9 Fall 1992 
No 3 p 338
60 Richard Boyd “The Case of Japan The Stale and Instabdity in the South edited by Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy 
Saravanamuttu (New Yode St. Martin s Press 1989) p 84
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actually an extension of Eurocentnsm) The presence of these social forces also partly explains the demise 
of colonialism imperialism and communism
Another analytical issue would stem from the mputism syndrome well known in comparative politics 
where by including so many non political variables (such as cultural consciousness and historical 
memory) one is explaining everything and therefore failing to explain anything The avoidance of this 
theoretical dilemma has stalled international security studies for many decades In fact it has hampered 
the international security studies community from predicting the demise of the US USSR based 
international security structure i e the end of the Cold War A respectable number of security analysts 
are endeavoring today m the aftermath of the Cold War to expand the framework of security studies to 
make it capable of capturing the security phenomena 61 If expanding the framework of analysis helps us 
understand and fruitfully theorize about international security phenomena then it becomes an imperative to 
doso
A normative issue stems from the fact that though implicitly and intuitively appealing to explain state 
stability historical memory and cultural consciousness would also seem to impede change and therefore 
be a source of conflict and pressure both internal and external on a regime or state The political system 
is faced with continuous struggles between stability based on both histoncal memory and cultural identity 
and adaptability as new endogenous and exogenous challenges to its viability and legitimacy arise It is 
precisely this capture of the phenomena that lends much credit to these two concepts From an analyst s 
perspective it is therefore a very encompassing approach that possesses enough explanatory power to 
cover a wide variety of political phenomena Histoncal memory and cultural consciousness cannot be 
escaped as explanatory vanables of state behavior
An important implication for the resolution of both sub national and international ethnic conflicts is the 
promotion of cooperation not from a rational choice perspective i e stressing only the payoffs matnx and 
the shadow of the future Instead cooperation between conflicting ethnic (and for that matter religious or 
cultural) groups should be conceived in a perspective that takes into account the very differentiation 
which is the root cause of the conflict i e the identity differentials (with its two components of histoncal 
memory and cultural consciousness) of the rival parties It is only then that it might be possible to fully 
understand the conflict and henceforth resolve it
Notwithstanding the above objections the approach based on cultural consciousness and histoncal 
memory presented in this paper provides an analytical perspective for understanding the phenomenon of 
state implosion and the role it plays in international secunty It widens the scope of international security 
studies and for that matter international relations in general so as to perfect the realist paradigm The 
approach also offers friendly amendments to perfect Buzan s useful neo realism by recasting the 
conception of secunty requirements of a strong state in a more encompassing framework based on 
histoncal memory cultural consciousness state binding idea institutions and territory It also perfects 
modem cooperation theory by including the shadow of the past as an essential element of the evolution 
of cooperation Whether an international system made of strong states provides more international secunty 
is a question left to additional analysis
61 Edward A Kolodziej op cit John L Gaddis International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War International 
Security Voi 17 no 3 (Winter 1992/1993) pp 5-58
Chapter 2
Magic Wand or Double edged Sword9 
Theory and Data Concerning Solidarity Groups As a Mechanism 
for Guaranteeing Loans to Poor Women and Men
by Holly Arrow
Abstract
Solidarity groups are a popular mechanism used to ensure acceptable repayment rates in 
credit programs for poor people who have neither a credit history nor any collateral to sss 
that may affect the success of these groups have not been systematically studied across 
programs Theory and evidence available from the study of small groups in controlled 
conditions is used to predict which features of solidarity groups— size and gender 
composition for example— should be associated with better performance as measured by 
loan repayment rates Data from case studies of seven credit programs in six countries m 
Asia Africa and the Caribbean are examined to assess support for these predictions 
Results are consistent with predicted effects of gender composition member training 
programs visibility of individual repayments and rural versus urban settings No evidence 
was found to support group size effects Implications for project design and evaluation are 
discussed
In deciding whether to grant a business loan to a prospective borrower lending officers typically consider 
the five Cs of credit management m assessing die nsk of the proposed loan (Select Committee 1988 p 
22)
1 Capacity ability to repay the loan
2 Character willingness to repay the loan
3 Capital accumulated income of the borrower
4 Collateral goods that can secure the loan
5 Conditions environment in which the business will operate
Poor people have neither abundant goods (4) nor abundant income (3) They often have little or no 
credit history to recommend them on capacity to pay (1) or character (2) When a poor person is doing 
business in a country that is itself very poor (5) the chances of being assessed a good credit nsk seem 
especially remote How then are we to account for the 98 percent repayment rate enjoyed by the 
Grameen Bank over its first ten years of operation9 (Remenyi 1991 p 78) Located in Bangladesh a poor 
country by any measure the Grameen Bank loans to people that by traditional assessment measures would 
have to be deemed among the least promising credit nsks in the world
The Paradox
Consider the following statistics In 1987 Bangladesh had a GDP per capita of $180 (UN 1991 Table 
9) In 1988 82 percent of the borrowers were women (Remenyi 1991) whose prospects as entrepreneurs 
would have to be rated as even worse than those of Bangladeshi men A Bangladeshi woman will bear and 
rear an average of five to six children m her lifetime (UN 1991 Table 2) which means that a substantial 
amount of her energy will be devoted to reproduction and household production limiting her time for 
income generating activities In addition a female entrepreneur in Bangladesh operates in a sociocultural 
environment that both restricts her mobility and pressures her both by law and custom to be dependent on 
men (UN 1985) Women are not supposed to appear in the marketplace and thus may be forced to
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depend on male children to act as their proxies (Millmga 1994) These women must also be deemed 
unpromising by traditional human capital measures such as education 87 percent are illiterate (UN 1985 
p23)
Explaining the Paradox
What is the secret of the Grameen Bank s success m loaning to these women (and also to poor men)9 One 
standard answer is solidarity groups Solidarity groups are groups of borrowers (typically formed by the 
prospective borrowers) who take collective responsibility for one another s loans Collective responsibility 
may mean that all members co sign one another s loans it may mean that default by any group member 
disqualifies other members from taking out subsequent loans Variations on these themes or a combination 
of both mechanisms may also be used
The use of solidarity groups in credit programs for the very poor are cited frequently as an important 
ingredient for success (Select Committee 1986 1987 Berger 1989 Sawyer & Overholt 1985 Tendier 
1989) Several programs that use solidarity groups have also adopted specific features of the Grameen 
Bank model such as single sex composition and small size (five per group in the Grameen Bank model)
A few examples of such programs are the Kinondoni Credit Scheme in Tanzania (Millmga 1991 1994) 
and the Solidarity Group component of the PRODEME credit program in the Dominican Republic (Sawyer 
& Overholt 1985)
To be confident that these design features contribute to the success of credit programs however one 
must examine programs that do and do not have the features believed to contribute to success (Campbell 
& Stanley 1966) Grameen Bank is indeed a dramatically successful program By February 1987 it had 
300 branches serving 5 400 villages and close to a quarter million borrowers were both repaying their 
loans promptly and improving their own incomes substantially (Calomins & Himmelberg 1994) However 
this does not mean that using small size same sex solidarity groups guarantees success or even 
contributes to success It shows only that such features do not preclude high repayment rates in credit 
programs for the poor It is also not clear to what extent the Grameen Bank model is applicable to other 
regions and cultures
The PRODEME credit program m the Dominican Republic for example was designed with the 
presumption that peer pressure would be sufficiently strong to ensure prompt payback on the part of 
each member of the Group (Sawyer & Overholt 1985 p 226) The average size of groups was 6 3 96 
percent were same sex groups 83 percent of groups were all male (opposite sex distribution from the 
Grameen Bank) For this program however solidarity groups did not prove to be the royal road to good 
loan performance After the first seventeen months of the program 85 percent of the groups had one or 
more late payments and m a third of the triciclo groups (formed by operators of cargo tricycles) it had 
been necessary to either repossess a triciclo or remove a member (p 233) The latest repayment figure at 
the time the case study was published was 67 percent
Although they shared several features with the Grameen Bank groups the PRODEME groups were also 
different m several ways They were on average larger by one person all male groups predominated the 
setting was urban rather than rural It appears that only the group president was required to attend weekly 
meetings (p 227) in the Grameen Bank model all members must attend every meeting And unlike 
recipients of Grameen Bank loans prospective borrowers in the PRODEME Program were not required to 
attend training sessions or meet as groups for an extended period before becoming eligible for loans 
(Training sessions were added later as a strategy to address the problems of late payback and group 
disintegration ) Finally the programs operate m different cultures and cultural differences affect people s 
social behavior in many ways (Triandis 1994)
Sorting out which differences and which similarities are important in explaining the success of the one 
program and the difficulties of the other is complicated by the sheer number of possible hypotheses This 
problem is difficult to resolve when programs differ on so many variables However an approach that 
combines several research strategies can improve our ability to make inferences about the impact of
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different variables (McGrath 1984) Social psychological theory on groups and data from controlled 
laboratory studies can be used to narrow the theoretically infinite number of possible hypotheses to a finite 
set of plausible ones Data from additional case studies can be examined to untangle theoretically 
important factors that are confounded in the Grameen Bank/PRODEME comparison This multi pronged 
investigation should allow us to identify with at least some degree of confidence which features of 
solidarity groups are more or less likely to affect the performance of credit programs as measured by 
repayment rates
This information should be of use to policy makers and program designers Insights from social 
psychology may also provide at least a preliminary explanation of why under certain conditions the very 
poor confound the conventional 5 Cs wisdom of credit management
Theory and Data from the Social Psychology of Groups
In this section the solidarity group model is analyzed for both strengths and potential weaknesses as a 
mechanism for promoting high repayment rates Theory and data on features of groups such as size gender 
composition and rural versus urban setting are examined The discussion concludes with a list of six 
theoretically important variables that should affect repayment rates
Groups as a Mechanism for Applying Social Influence
The unexamined presumption by PRODEME project designers that peer pressure automatically promotes 
good performance is one that organizational and social psychologists (and parents of adolescents) would 
immediately recognize as flawed Yes peer pressure is powerful But people can be pressured in many 
different directions The direction depends upon group norms
Evidence from social psychological experiments and from field experiments in organizational settings 
confirms that peer pressure (referred to as social influence in this literature) does indeed affect the 
behavior of group members A senes of studies by Asch (1951) for example demonstrated that even in ad 
hoc groups of relative strangers over half of the subjects tested in groups on a perceptual matching task 
denied the evidence of their own senses rather than disagree with fellow group members (confederates of 
the expenmenter) who gave unanimous but incorrect answers Not all subjects went along with the group 
and very few conformed on every tnal This is still a powerful result however given the ephemeral nature 
of the groups and the persuasive power of what one sees with one s own eyes In this case the group norm 
influenced naive members to perform poorly on a very easy task
Studies of groups in organizational settings have confirmed the power of groups in influencing member 
behavior (Roethlisberger & Dickson 1939) Once again the impact on performance was determined by 
group norms Observers discovered that a group of 13 men who made telephone switching equipment for a 
Western Electric plant m Hawthorne Illinois was highly effective in holding the output of individual 
members to the group norm of 825 connections per hour (Homans 1950) Members who deviated from the 
norm either by completing too few or too many connections were sanctioned by the group This was true 
even though the pay of group members depended on the output of the group and thus increased output 
would have brought greater monetary rewards to all members
The analogy with solidarity group members who may lose their chance at a second loan if any group 
member defaults should be clear To predict group performance based on peer pressure we must know the 
group norms about performance The more cohesive the group the stronger the peer pressure and hence 
the more closely members should adhere to the group norm From this perspective the excellent 
repayment rate enjoyed by the Grameen Bank members may depend in part on its strategy of combining 
the solidarity group structure with an intensive training program that instills newly formed groups with the 
right group norms and values Thorough training programs to inculcate the norm of prompt repayment 
should thus be associated with higher repayment rates among group members
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An example of how a credit group like an adolescent gang may encourage its members to adhere to 
the wrong norms is provided by the Kredit Usaha Rakyat Kecil (KURK) Small Village Credit Project in 
East Java (Tjokrowmoto 1985) The author of this case study suggests that one determinant of the 
program s success is the ability of KURK officials to gain the cooperation of informal leaders (p 162) 
Why7 Depending on their interpretation of Islamic scriptures these leaders may view the payment of 
credit interest as a religious taboo Solidarity group members who agree with this position may well adopt 
a group norm that justifies default by its members
Defection and Social Loafing The Role of Self Interest
Solidarity groups have some features m common with a well studied category of social situations termed 
social dilemmas In a social dilemma noncooperative behavior by a single member (such as defaulting on 
a loan) will yield a larger individual payoff in the short run yet all members will be better off m the long 
run if everyone cooperates More specifically a solidarity group can be characterized as a social fence 
in which undesirable actions in the short term (parting with money each week or month to repay one s 
loan) leads to desirable outcomes in the long run (each group member will be eligible for a new loan if all 
repay their current loans) (Messick & Brewer 1983) Because the loan is secured by other group members 
rather than by personal property a defaulting (noncooperative) member can come out ahead financially by 
taking out a loan and then failing to repay When group members can qualify for larger loans each time 
they complete repayment on a round of loans the incentive for selfish defection actually increases the 
longer a group has stayed together Support for the importance of this factor comes from none other than 
the Grameen Bank project As summarized by Von Pischke (1991 p 236)
Repayment discipline deteriorates as groups gain expenence A 1985 survey indicated that 97 percent of 
groups borrowing for the first time had no installments in arrears while the percentage fell to 33 percent 
for groups that had completed four borrowing cycles Those paying the exact number of installments due 
slipped from 78 percent of first cycle groups to 25 percent of groups that had borrowed four times
Apparently most defections do not become permanent defaults loans are generally fully repaid at the 
conclusion of fifty weeks
However with a higher fence of repayments and a larger reward for defection it does appear that a 
substantial number of later cycle borrowers are cheating on the margin so to speak
Social loafing is the tendency of people to exert less effort when working together on a group task than 
they do when performing the same task as an individual (Latane Williams & Harkins 1979) This effect 
is robust across cultures it has been documented in India (Weiner Pandy & Latané 1981) and in Taiwan 
(Gabrenya, Wang & Latané 1981) for example However social loafing can be eliminated if group 
cohesion is high if the group sets clear performance goals and if individual contributions can be 
identified and evaluated (Baron Kerr & Miller 1992 p 48) Clear performance goals and identifiable 
individual contributions are typical of solidarity group designs although the degree to which individual 
performance is publicly identified vanes depending on the repayment process Cohesiveness should also 
vary with group size and gender composition for reasons discussed in more detail below
If the evaluation of other group members is relatively unimportant as may be the case in a group with 
poor cohesion the ldentifiability of one s contnbution may be insufficient to deter social loafing Groups 
may also fail to adopt the performance goals set by the lending officials as normative
The Importance of Cohesion for Group Performance
When late payments became a problem for the PRODEME solidarity groups project officials made 
several changes in the program New sanctions for poor loan performance were added and prospective 
group members were required to take two training courses before registering as an official Solidarity 
Group These courses emphasized the seriousness of the responsibility members were taking on In 
addition if course instructors judged that a new group did not demonstrate real solidarity the group
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could not register (Sawyer & Overholt 1985 p 227) In this context real solidarity may be considered 
a synonym of high cohesion
If the groups did adopt prompt repayment as a group norm then high cohesion should indeed improve 
repayment rates As indicated by extensive research members of highly cohesive groups conform more 
closely to group norms than members of groups that are less cohesive (see for example Festinger Back 
Schächter Kelley & Thibaut 1952 Lott & Lott 1965 O Reilly & Caldwell 1985) Hence any 
characteristics that increase group cohesion should improve loan repayment rates if prompt repayment is 
indeed adopted as a group norm
Before we go on to enumerate variables that are associated with high cohesion we need more precise 
definitions of both cohesion and norms Group cohesion can be defined as the sum total of forces that 
attract members to the group (Cartwright, 1968) Such forces include liking for other group members 
attraction to the group task and attraction to the status that devolves from belonging to the group Norms 
can be defined as shared expectations about how the members of a group ought to behave (Levine & 
Moreland 1990 p 600) Norms differ in intensity (the strength of approval or disapproval evoked by 
conforming or violating the norm) range of tolerable behavior (narrow or broad) and crystallization or 
the degree of consensus among group members (Jackson 1965)
Group Size and Cohesion An Inverse Relationship
Smaller groups tend to be more cohesive hence should have better repayment rates provided that group 
norms favor prompt repayment Numerous studies (see Levine & Moreland 1990 or Baron Kerr &
Miller 1992 for a review) indicate that smaller groups are both more cohesive and more cooperative Left 
to themselves people seem naturally to favor smaller as opposed to larger groups although this vanes 
somewhat by culture Burgess (1984) observed casual groups of people in public settings in the United 
States such as shopping malls and noted that 90 percent of the groups were dyads or tnads Seven was the 
largest group size Tnandis (1990) replicated this finding for street settings in the U S but found that in 
Greece a collectivist culture groups of three or larger were more common than dyads and groups of 6 7 
and 8 were fairly common More formal voluntary groups in the U S tend to be larger (McPherson 1983) 
but 70 percent of the groups surveyed sull contained fewer than 10 persons
One explanaUon for the greater cohesiveness of smaller groups is that the number of relations expands 
rapidly as members are added to a group increasing the effort involved in maintaining strong ues (A 
group of size 3 has 3 dyadic ues a group of size 5 has 10 ) At the same urne as the group grows larger 
the relaüve importance and disüncüveness of each member declines The status of being a member one 
of the bases for attraeuon to the group is diluted From the applied perspective of solidarity groups a 
smaller number of fellow group members is also easier to monitor than a large number Hence deviauons 
from group norms are apt to be noticed and sanctioned more quickly In practice the relationship between 
performance (assuming a group norm of high performance) and group size should not be linear but should 
reach an asymptote at higher levels The practical (and proportional) difference between a group of 25 and 
30 is much smaller than the difference between a group of 5 and a group of 10 persons
Gender Composiuon
Two predicuons are possible for the effect of gender composiuon on group performance One is that same 
sex groups should outperform mixed sex groups The second is that all female groups should out perform 
all male groups
The theoretical basis for the first prediction is that perceived similarity among members increases 
liking which increases cohesion (Byme 1971) which m turn increases member conformity to group 
norms Sex is a highly salient characteristic on which people differ and the construction of gender 
typically exaggerates differences and multiplies them by assigning different roles to the two sexes 
Division of labor by sex is a pervasive features of human societies (Stichter 1990) Sex is also a status 
cue women generally have less status than men although the size of the difference vanes by culture
26 H olly A rrow
Lower perceived similarity among members of mixed sex groups on an array of gender linked dimensions 
including status should make these groups less cohesive and less cooperative
The basis for the second prediction is the differential orientation of men and women with respect to 
competition and cooperation as models for social exchange Knight & Dubro (1984) for example found 
that a competitive orientation is more common among males than females and a cooperative orientation is 
more common among females Since cooperating with group members by staying current on loan 
payments is a key aspect of solidarity groups all female groups should have a higher rate of repayment If 
solidarity groups follow the patterns found in experimental groups however the effect of gender (all male 
vs all female) should be much smaller than the effect of group size (Stockard Van de Dragt & Dodge 
1988)
Urban and Rural Groups Collectivism Cohesion and Tightness
The Grameen Bank and PRODEME programs operate in different countries and cultures so differences m 
behavior by borrowers m the two countries could be attributed to cultural differences This concept is too 
vague to be useful in generating concrete predictions One way to be more precise about cultural 
differences is to focus on summary features of culture known as cultural syndromes (Tnandis 1994) 
Tightness collectivism and individualism are three syndromes useful in predicting the behavior of people 
in solidarity groups A culture is considered tight if norms are clear narrow and reliably imposed 
(Pelto 1968) In tight cultures little behavioral deviation is tolerated and people typically conform quite 
closely to the norms of their in group (whichever group they identify with) A society is considered 
collectivist if the culture is organized around collectives such as the family tribe religious group or 
nationality Members of collectivist societies are strongly attracted to and identified with their group (high 
cohesion) and such societies are also typically tighter than individualist societies m which culture is 
organized around autonomous individuals (Tnandis 1994) By definition members of tight cultures 
conform more closely to the norms of in groups Because of the association between collectivism and 
tightness and the higher social cohesion of collectivist societies we would expect solidarity group 
members in highly collectivist cultures to conform more closely to group norms than group members in 
more individualistic cultures
However this should only be the case when all solidarity group members are drawn from the same m 
group Members of a credit group who have different tnbal identities for example may feel very little 
pressure to conform Another aspect of collectivism is distrust of and even hostility toward any one do who 
does not belong to the in group (termed out group members) Evidence from the field supports this 
prediction In a review of credit programs Buvinic Sebstad & Zeidenstein (1979) caution
The relative advantage of group lending however depends on the nature and location of the 
program In some cases group lending has not been successful such as in the West African 
case where there is high competition among women who belong to different ethic 
backgrounds (p 27)
Unfortunately for the purposes of this study all the credit programs for which reasonably complete data 
was found are located in collectivist societies However a useful proxy for indicating degree of 
collectivism is the rural vs urban distinction as comparative measures of collectivism are not available 
for many of the countries m which solidarity group credit programs are located Because of the greater 
complexity of life higher mobility and larger number of different groups present in urban than in rural 
settings urban people are more individualist and rural people are more collectivist within the same culture 
or country (Tnandis 1989)
Frequency of Repayments The Power of Habitual Routines
More frequent repayments should improve the repayment rate both for practical reasons (smaller 
payments are easier to manage) and for social psychological reasons In groups habitual routines are a 
powerful predictor of behavior (Gersick & Hackman 1990) When making a payment is institutionalized
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as a ritual that accompanies every group meeting it is liable to become a habitual routine that is earned 
out automatically by group members Each time the routine is earned out the habit is reinforced making 
it more likely to occur at the next appropnate occasion
Visibility and Identifiability of Individual Contributions
Some features of the repayment process may highlight or downplay the visibility and importance of 
individual contnbutes to overall good repayment performance by a group Grameen Bank group members 
for example must all attend the weekly center meeting (a center is composed of up to six groups in the 
same village) and make their repayments in person Individual performance is visible not only to members 
of one s own group but also to members of other groups m the center In the PRODEME project m 
contrast it appears that the president was responsible for both collecting and then depositing the payments 
from all group members at the weekly meeting If a group was behind in its payments it would not be so 
readily apparent which member was responsible for the poor performance of the group loans Public 
embarrassment can also be a potent deterrent against deviation from collective norms (presumed in this 
case to favor prompt repayment)
Six Factors Predicted to Influence Repayment Rates
The previous discussion identified six factors that should influence repayment rates 
Member training in desired group norms (positive relationship)
Group size (negative relationship)
Gender composition (same sex > mixed sex female > male)
Rural vs urban setting (rural > urban)
Frequency of loan payments (positive relationship)
Visibility of individual payment rate (positive relationship)
Based on these predictions small all female rural groups in which members participate in a training 
program and make public individual and frequent repayments should have the best repayment rates 
Large mixed sex urban groups with no training programs and infrequent payments made m a way that 
keeps the repayment rates of individuals pnvate should perform poorly
Field Data from Seven Credit Programs
In this section data gleaned from case studies of seven credit programs in six countries in Asia Africa 
and the Caribbean are presented for each group The data are then summarized statistically for each 
variable to see whether the six factors discussed above vary in the predicted direction The number of case 
studies is too small to make the calculation of precise confidence levels meaningful However data from 
even a small number of case studies can increase or decrease our subjective confidence that the proposed 
factors are plausible candidates for explaining variations in the repayment rate across programs 1
1 Bangladesh Grameen Bank
Repayment rate 98 99 percent 97 percent for men 98 4 percent for women (Nov 1982)
Member training Extensive for all members 
Group size 5
Gender composition Same sex 82 percent female groups 18 percent male 
Setting Rural
Frequency of payments Weekly
Visibility of payments Individuals make payments at meetings of the center composed of up to six 
groups in the same or neighbonng villages
1 Many readers will recognize this as a Bayesian approach to scientific inference The articles m Earman (1983) discuss the pros 
and cons of the Bayesian approach
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Comments Members must also contribute to individual and group savings accounts every week 
Sources United Nations 1985 Von Pischke 1991
2 Dominican Republic Solidarity group component PRODEME
Repayment rate 67 percent (date unclear but probably 1982) 78 percent (1983)
Member training Initially no added later 
Group size 6 7 (average 6 3)
Gender composition 83 percent all male 13 percent all female 4 percent mixed sex 
Setting Urban
Frequency of payments Daily or weekly for members
Visibility o f payments Group president collects from members and makes weekly payment to Foundation 
representative It appears that only group presidents were required to attend weekly neighborhood 
meetings (7)
Comments The program was later restructured so that payment was collected from individual members 
rather than from group presidents Collective risk for member default was also strengthened to include 
repossession of vendor licenses and/or tncycles [cargo vehicles] from all members of groups who fell 
too far behind m their payments (p 229) The date of the restructuring is not clear 
Sources Sawyer & Overholt 1985 Select Committee 1986
3 India Working women s forum (WWF) m Madras 
Repayment rate Over 90 percent (1978 1982)
Member training No
Group size 10 20
Gender composition Same sex groups all female 
Setting Urban slums of Madras 
Frequency of payments Daily or weekly
Visibility of payments Leader collects from members deposits repayments monthly 
Comments Madras is characterized as a rural metropolis since the city has grown by swallowing up 
surrounding hamlets The rural/urban distinction may be problematic in this case 
Source Chen 1983
4 Indonesia Family planning nutrition income generation (P2K)
Repayment rate 98 percent for the 6 villages visited by the evaluator Overall rate for the total of 200
villages not reported
Member training For group officers only
Group size 5 80 (9) Estimated for the 6 villages
Gender composition Single sex all female groups
Setting Rural
Frequency of payments Weekly or semi monthly
Visibility of payments Members pay group officers (9) officers make monthly payments to the bank 
Comments Each group is the members of the women s group for each kelompok or sub village unit 
Group officers were typically the top PKK or women s movement officials (pp 143 146) Participation 
m the credit program was limited to women with existing productive skills and officers were frequent 
borrowers Hence groups included more near poor than very poor people It appears that groups rarely 
met as groups instead most contacts were between the small core of group officers (3) and other 
member borrowers Repayment rates for the 6 villages may not be representative selection bias seems 
plausible
Source Pyle 1985
5 Indonesia Kredit Usaha Rakyat Kecil (KURK)
Small village credit project
Repayment rate 88 percent, with most delinquencies in two sub districts Rate is 92 percent for the other 
6 sub districts
Member training Not mentioned 
Group size 15 20
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Gender composition Not reported but examples are given of both male and female borrowers so 
probably mixed sex 
Setting Rural
Frequency of payments Not reported 
Visibility of payments Unclear
Comments Program officials (and apparently the village heads as well) visit borrowers whose 
repayment record is shaky and help them overcome the problem KURK officials frequently try to 
minimize bad debts by paying the difference from their own funds 
Sources Tjokrowinoto 1985
6 Tanzania Kinondom credit scheme 
Repayment rate Over 90 percent in 1989 
Member training Yes
Group size 5 (Centers of up to 6 groups for a maximum of 30)
Gender composition Same sex female groups only 
Setting (in 1989) urban groups only 
Frequency of payments Weekly
Visibility of payments Individual make payments at center meetings that all are required to attend 
Comments This program is explicitly modelled after the Grameen Bank structure It is now being 
extended into rural areas 
Sources Millmga 1991 1994
7 Zimbabwe Small farm credit program (SFCP)
Repayment rate 11 percent (1979 1982) Female rates higher than male rates but no percentages given 
Member training No 
Group size 20 30
Gender composition Apparently mixed sex 
Setting Rural
Frequency o f payments Seasonal
Visibility of payments Payments deducted from sales to the agricultural coop before the farmer is paid 
Comments Loans are mainly to individuals but 10 percent are to groups as a whole Individual default 
affects future borrowing privileges of all group members 
Sources Due 1983
Summary of Results
Member training Positive relationship predicted and found Two programs have training for all members 
one has training for program officers only two have no training and one had training in the latter part of 
the program only (PRODEME Dominican Republic) For this analysis I will consider the early and late 
repayment figures for PRODEME as matching (very roughly) periods with and without training The 
median repayment rate for programs (or program phases) with at least some training was 94 5 percent (N = 
4) the median rate for programs with no training was 77 percent (N  = 3) The results are consistent with 
the prediction of a positive relationship between training and repayment rate (Note 91 percent is used for 
over 90 percent repayment rates )
Group size Negative relationship predicted not supported For this analysis the mean group size was used 
when available when only a range was given (or deduced) the midpoint of the range was used The 
median repayment rate for programs with an average or midpoint group size under 10 was 91 percent (N = 
3) the median rate for programs with larger groups was 89 5 percent (N = 4) The difference is small and 
in the opposite direction from that prediction The data do not support the hypotheses that smaller group 
size will lead to better repayment rates at least for the range of group sizes considered (5 80)
Gender composition Better female repayment supported One project had 4 percent mixed sex groups but 
repayment rates were not reported separately Groups in a two other projects were presumed to be mostly
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mixed sex but this was not made explicit m the case studies Analysis of same sex versus mixed sex on 
data this shaky seemed unwise
Grameen Bank repayment rates were reported separately for males (97 percent) and females (98 4 
percent) for 1982 In 1982 there were 30 452 borrowers of whom 61 percent were male and 39 percent 
female (United Nations 1985 p 22) A contingency table based on these proportions allows the 
calculation of a chi square value of 58 85 (df = 1) significant at the p < 001 level The case study for 
Zimbabwe also notes that female borrowers had better repayment rates than males but does not give 
percentages The median repayment rate for projects with female groups (including Grameen bank female 
groups) was 93 percent (N = 4) the median repayment rate for the PRODEME program (83 percent male) 
and the male Grameen bank groups was 85 percent (N = 2) The data support the prediction that female 
groups will outperform male groups in repayment
Rural versus urban setting Better rural repayment supported The median repayment rate for the three 
urban programs was 93 percent the mean rate for the four rural programs was 91 percent The difference is 
small but in the predicted direction The hypothesis of better rural repayment rates remains plausible
Frequency of loan payments Data suggestive but inconclusive The only program with seasonal payments 
had a repayment rate of 77 percent The two programs with weekly payments had a median repayment rate 
of 94 5 percent In other programs some members paid daily and some weekly (or in one case some paid 
weekly and some semi monthly) but the data are not disaggregated by payment frequency The median for 
these 3 programs was 91 percent It would be consistent with the theoretical reasoning about habitual 
routines that a frequent regular schedule would be superior to a daily/weekly option (members of the 
same group might choose different options) but details of how people selected among the options are not 
given
Visibility Positive relationship predicted and found For this analysis early and late repayment Figures for 
PRODEME were treated as matching (very roughly) periods with low and high visibility of individual 
payments Programs in which individual members had to make payments before a large group were 
deemed high visibility programs in which individual payments were collected by a leader or president 
who then deposited the collective amount were deemed low visibility The Zimbabwe program in which 
repayment was deducted automatically was also classified as low The median repayment rate for 
projects (or project phases) with a high visibility payment process was 91 percent (N -  3) the median for 
low visibility payment was 84 percent (N = 4) The difference is in the predicted direction supporting the 
association of visibility of payment with higher repayment rates
Discussion
The data from seven case studies of credit programs lend greater plausibility to the following hypotheses
Member training is positively associated with repayment rates 
Females outperform males in repaying their loans but the difference is small 
Rural programs whose clients are more collectivist, outperform urban programs 
Visibility of individual payments improves repayment rates
No support was found for the prediction that smaller groups would outperform larger groups Because of the 
limitations of the data no conclusions are possible on either payment frequency or mixed versus same 
sex groups
What are the implications for policy makers7 The results suggest that member training and high 
visibility payment procedures are a positive feature that should be included in the design of solidarity 
group credit programs The rural versus urban results suggest that cultural factors such as individualism 
versus collectivism may play a role m group performance (However differences in the type of businesses 
that are typical in urban and rural areas may also explain the difference in repayment ) The data provide 
welcome evidence that poor women are not a unpromising clientele for credit Instead their loans perform 
better than loans to poor men
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Finally the data taken as a whole support the emerging notion that very poor people— both women and 
men— are not dismal credit risks at least not when they borrow using a solidarity group structure The 
median repayment rate across the 7 programs considered is 91 percent This is a substantially better rate 
that is typically achieved in loaning to more affluent borrowers in the same regions
In Zambia for example the agricultural finance company (AFC) makes individual loans (no group 
mechanism) to farmers with both small and large farms Although by the 5 C criteria the wealthier 
farmers should be better credit nsks the repayment rates of smallholder farmers for seasonal input loans 
(77 percent) are much higher than the repayment rates of wealthier farmers who averaged 19 percent for 
medium term loans and 29 percent for real estate loans (Due 1983) Another example of excellent 
repayment by poor borrowers who are not organized into solidarity groups is the 98 percent rate enjoyed by 
the Credit Union League of Bangladesh (Remenyi 1991 p 81)
Why do poor people make such good credit nsks7 Apart from the operation of social forces in the 
solidanty groups the nchly detailed qualitative data presented in many case studies suggests some other 
factors that may differentiate the poor from better off borrowers Repaying the loans can be an important 
source of both self esteem and improved status Although from a purely economic point of view parting 
with money to make a payment would be viewed as a loss from a psychological point of view it may 
be highly rewarding Banks are high status institutions and association with this institution (attending 
meetings to pay the bank) can boost the self esteem and community status of otherwise low status 
borrowers One female beedi (handmade cigarette) worker reports
I tell my inlaws I am going to the bank Then they don t try to stop me
Another married borrower reports
Previously my husband used to beat me up regularly Now I tell him you go and drink if you 
want But you can t come home and beat me up I am doing my work and I have to do it 
well or else I won t be able to repay the banks
And finally from a woman glass maker
Our status in the community goes up it s almost as if the people around us feel that these 
people must be something the banks and government have given them some money (All 
quotes from Everett & Savara 1983)
The second of the 5 Cs of credit management— character or willingness to repay the loan may thus 
be unusually high for very poor borrowers for reasons that are social psychological m nature The poor 
have few material goods that can be repossessed by a credit officer However loan default by a borrower 
living on the very margins of survival may remove goods that are more precious to her than existing 
material goods such as cars or buildings are to wealthier compatriots improved status in the community a 
dramatic increase in self respect and hopes for a future free of hunger and desperation The impressively 
good performance of loans to the poor suggest that for this population psychological and social goods 
may be as important (or more) than more traditional types of collateral such as real estate inventory and 
capital reserves
32 Holly Arrow
Bibliography
Asch S E (1951) Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment In H 
Guetzkow (Ed ) Groups Leadership and Men Pittsburgh Carnegie
Baron R S Kerr N L & Miller N (1992) Group Process Group Decision Group Action Pacific Grove 
CA Brooks/Cole
Burgess J W (1984) Do humans show a species typical group size7 Age sex and environmental 
differences in the size and composition of naturally occurring casual groups Ethology & 
Sociobiology 5 51 57
Buvimc M Sebstad J &Zeidenstem S (1979) Credit for Rural Women Some Facts and Lessons 
Washington DC International Center for Research on Women
Byrne D (1971) The Attraction Paradigm New York Academic Press
Calomins C W & Himmelberg C P (1994) Directed credit programs for agriculture and industry 
Arguments from theory and fact In Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on 
Development Economics 1993 (pp 113 137) Washington DC International Bank for 
Reconstruction & Development
Campbell D T & Stanley J C (1966) Experimental and Quasi Experimental Designs for Research 
Boston Houghton Mifflin
Cartwright D (1968) The nature of group cohesiveness In D Cartwright & A Zander (Eds ) Group 
Dynamics Research and Theory (3d ed ) New York Harper & Row 1968
Chen M (1983) The Working Women s Forum Organizing for Credit and Change SEEDS pamphlet No 6 
Available from Ann Leonard SEEDS P O Box 3923 Grand Central Station New York NY 
10163
Due J M (1983) Update on financing smallholders in Zimbabwe Zambia and Tanzania
Earman J (Ed ) (1983) Testing Scientific Theories Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press
Everett J & Savara J (1983) Bank credit to women m the informal sector A case study of DRI in 
Bombay City Manuscnpt research unit on women s studies SNDT Women s University 
Bombay
Festmger L Back W Schächter S Kelley H H & Thibaut J W (1952) Theory and Experiment in 
Social Communication Ann Arbor MI Edwards brothers
Gabrenya W K Jr Wang Y E & Latane B (1981) Social Loafing among Chinese Overseas and U S 
Students Paper presented at the Asian Conference of the International Association for Cross 
Cultural Psychology Taipei Taiwan R O C  quoted in Baron Kerr & Miller (1992)
Gersick C J  G & Hackman J R (1990) Habitual routines in task performing groups Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 47 65 97
Homans G C (1950) The Human Group New York Harcourt, Brace & World
Jackson J (1965) Structural characteristics of norms In I D Steiner & M Fishbein (Eds ) Current 
Studies in Social Psychology New York Holt Rinehart & Winston
Knight G P & Dubro A F (1984) Cooperative competitive and individualistic social values An
individualized regression and clustering approach Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 46 
98 105
Magic Wand or Double edged Sword7 33
Latané B Williams K & Harkins S (1979) Many hands make light the work The causes and 
consequences of social loafing Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 822 832
Levine J M and Moreland R L (1990) Progress in small group research Annual Review of Psychology 
41 585-634
Lott A J & Lott B E (1965) Group cohesiveness as interpersonal attraction A review of relationships 
with antecedent and consequent variables Psychological Bulletin 64 259 309
Lycette M A (1984) Improving Women s Access to Credit in the Third World Policy and Project 
Recommendations Washington DC International Center for Research on Women
Manning F J & Fullerton T D (1988) Health and well being m highly cohesive units of the U S 
Army Journal of Applied Social Psychology 18 503 19
McGrath J E (1984) Groups Interaction and Performance Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall
McPherson J M (1983) the size of voluntary associations Social Forces 61 1044 1064
Millinga, A (1991) Kinondoni Credit Scheme Pilot Project Operating Manual Mimeograph Presidential 
Trust Fund for Self Reliance Tanzania
Millinga A (1994) Personal communication April 6
O Reilly C A & Caldwell D F (1985) The impact of normative social influence and cohesiveness on 
task perceptions and attitudes a social information processing approach Journal of Occupational 
Psychology 58 193 206
Pelto P J (1968) The differences between tight and loose societies Transaction Social Science and 
Modern Society (April) 37-40
Pyle D (1985) Indonesia East Java family planning nutrition and income generation project In C 
Overholt M B Anderson K Cloud & J E (Eds ) Gender Roles in Development Projects (pp 
135 162) West Hartford CT Kumanan Press
Remenyi J (1991) Where Credit Is Due Income Generating Programs for the Poor In Developing 
Countries Boulder Westview Press
Roethhsberger F J & Dickson W J (1939) Management and the Worker Cambridge MA Harvard 
University Press
Sawyer S M «fe Overholt C (1985) Dominican Republic Program for development of micro enterprises 
In C Overholt, M B Anderson K Cloud <fe J E (Eds ) Gender roles in Development Projects 
(pp 215 241) West Hartford CT Kumanan Press
Select Committee on Hunger (1986) Banking for the Poor Alleviating Poverty through Credit Assistance to 
the Poorest Micro Entrepreneurs in Developing Countries House of Representatives Washington 
DC U S Government Pnnting Office
Select Committee on Hunger (1988) Access and Availability of Credit to the Poor in Developing Countries 
and the United States House of Representatives Washington DC U S Government Pnnting 
Office
Stichter S (1990) Women employment and the family Current debates In Stichter S «fe Parpan J 
(Eds ) Women Employment and the Family in the International Division of Labor Philadelphia 
Temple University Press
Stockard J Van de Dragt A J & Dodge P J (1988) Gender roles and behavior in social dilemmas 
Are there sex differences in cooperation and its justification9 Social Psychology Quarterly 51 
154 163
34 Holly Arrow
Tjokrowmoto M (1985) The provincial development programme m East Java Focus on Small Scale 
village credit. In G S Cheema (Ed ) Rural Development in Asia Case Studies on Programme 
Implementation (pp 137 172) New Delhi Sterling Publishers
Tnandis H C (1989) The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts Psychological Review 
96 506 520
Tnandis H C (1990) Cross cultural studies of individualism and collectivism In J Berman (Ed )
Nebraska Symposium on Motivations 1989 (pp 41 133) Lincoln University of Nebraska Press
Tnandis H C (1994) Culture and Social Behavior New York McGraw Hill
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (1985) Bank Credit for Rural 
Women Report on Study Tour of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh
United Nations (1991) The World s Women 1970 1990 Trends and Statistics New York
VonPischke J D (1991) Finance at the Frontier Debt Capacity and the Role of Credit in the Private 
Economy Washington D C The World Bank
Weiner N Pandy J & Latané B (1981) Individual and Group Productivity in the United States and
India Paper presented at the Amencan Psychological Association Los Angeles quoted m Baron 
Kerr & Miller (1992)
Chapter 3
Immigration The Global Context
by Wesley Chapin
Abstract
This paper attempts to accomplish several objectives First to review the theoretical 
constructs used m the literature to examine immigration Two to show that immigration 
is a phenomena endemic to the international system Three to illustrate that the scope of 
the problem is worldwide And four to identify the recurrent problems associated with 
immigration
Introduction
The implications of the new immigration for the politics and policies of the host societies are as 
varied as such a significant movement of population would suggest In domestic politics they touch 
elections party politics and policy making In international politics large scale movements of 
people may affect the relations between sending and receiving societies and may also more 
generally bear on foreign policymaking
(Horowitz 1979)
Horowitz accurately identifies many of the contemporary concerns regarding immigration Nations on 
every continent have been affected Its impact on domestic politics is obvious It is easy to find stones m 
almost any newspaper illustrating the negative reaction that immigration arouses in host countnes 
German Attacks Rise as Foreigners Become Scapegoat Hostility Toward Immigrants Tests Italy s 
Open Arms Ideal Migrants Wear Out Welcome as Numbers Grow in Europe Generosity of Big 
Hearted Danes is Tested by Influx of Refugees Sentiment Sours as Rate of Amval Increases and 
White House Now Focusing on Immigration as a Secunty Concern 1
Immigrants are no longer as welcome in many nations as they once were and many problems have been 
blamed on their presence Immigration impacts on a nation s economic political cultural and even 
religious orders The issue is complex emotional and often divisive presenting persistent problems of 
ethnic strife economic competition cultural clash and integration
At the same time it must be recognized that many of today s most democratic and economically 
advanced nations were built on immigration The United States Australia and New Zealand are the 
examples that typically come to mind More recently the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s in 
Western Europe benefited from the mass recruitment of immigrant labor Yet immigrants are increasingly 
being greeted with hostile receptions even in the traditional nations of immigration
Immigration both provides opportunities for social change and raises fundamental political and ethical 
challenges Determining whether its effects are ultimately positive or not is a demanding task If the latest 
wave of immigration were only a temporary and unusual phenomena the topic would lose some of its 
urgency Problems resulting from it (whether real or perceived) pose challenges for academics and 
policymakers alike that should not and cannot be ignored if we are to find ways for an ever expanding 
world population to live peacefully
Definitions for migrants are identified in the first section of the paper In the second section the 
theoretical constructs used in the literature to examine immigration are examined
1 (Protzman 1992) (D Emilio 1992) (Kamm 1993) (Lafranchi 1993) (Puente 1993) and (Freedberg 1993) respectively
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The third section discusses the scope of immigration and argues that it is a phenomena endemic to the 
international system It is commonly assumed that it affects only the advanced industrial nations of the 
W est In fact immigration touches all regions and continents As a recurrent phenomena its causes and 
effects will remain with us for the foreseeable future This necessitates a better understanding of the topic 
in order to deal with it effectively
The fourth section identifies the problems associated with immigration as well as some of the potential 
political repercussions The conclusion points out theoretical limitations in the research that has been 
conducted to date and calls for further study and greater cooperation to deal effectively with the issue
Defining Migrants
Defining migrants is not as easy as one might think Obviously movement has to be a prime consideration 
Yet, movement alone does not answer the more important questions of when where why and for how 
long9 All migrants are movers but not all movers are migrants Put simply movers are people who change 
their residence while migrants relocate to a residence m a new political unit Demographers have 
simplified the issue by considering migrants to be people who have changed their habitat for significant 
penods of time by crossing a political boundary (Thomlinson 1976)
A secondary issue is that different kinds of migrants exist legal immigrants illegal immigrants 
refugees asylum seekers and contract labor migrants (Meissner 1992) These are largely self explanatory 
but there is a difference between asylum seekers and refugees that is commonly overlooked In the United 
States for example asylum seekers must be on U S soil to make their claim whereas those hoping for 
refugee status are overseas Using this entena a refugee may often be an asylum seeker who simply 
has not yet made it to his or her country of destination
Distinctions exist between the various categones yet they share important charactenstics In each case 
the individuals are crossing national borders They normally bnng a new culture speak a strange language 
and practice an unfamiliar religion They usually look for employment and are sometimes viewed as a 
competitors for jobs as well as housing education and other benefits
For the purposes at hand the five types have been combined In short I believe that the similarities of 
the individuals outweigh the need to place them exclusively into one or another category 2 For example 
the cultural clash that might occur is the same whether the migrant is an asylum seeker or a legal 
immigrant Potential language difficulties are a concern for both contract laborers and refugees And 
housing and other competition can occur regardless of the migrants classifications In addition important 
classification differences for migrants exist between countries as well as over time Unfortunately 
somewhat reliable population statistics are available starting only in the nineteenth century Some form of 
aggregation is almost inevitable if one is to conduct comparative analysis3
Immigration Theory4
In recent years the immigration literature has grown by leaps and bounds yet scholars continue to 
bemoan its theoretical paucity (Heisler 1992) The theoretical explanations of immigration are 
disappointingly myopic James Hollifield (1992) asserts that theorists of international relations have not 
yet developed a framework for understanding it
Henry Fairchild (1925 13-27) constructed perhaps the best known early typology for the analysis of 
migration He used the difference in the level of culture between two states and whether the movement
1  Perhaps more important than a particular migrant classification are the very real differences in culture and so forth that exist 
between immigrants For example one would expect that an immigrant with a religion similar to those of the host nation would 
ex penen ce fewer difficulties than an immigrant with a religion that is unlike any in the migrants adopted land
3 When reference is made to either migrants or immigrants all five categones are included The text will indicate those cases 
where only a category of migrants is used
4 This section is intended to be illustrative rather than exhausuve For a good short introducuon to addiuonal literature not 
covered here see Meadows (1980)
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M ig ra t io n  F ro m M ig ra tio n  To P eac e fu l M o v em en t W a r lik e  M o v em en t
Low Culture 
High Culture 
Similar Culture
High Culture 
Low Culture 
Similar Culture
Colonization
Im m igration
Invasion
Conquest
was peaceful or not to explain migration Warlike migration from a low culture to a high culture is 
considered to be an invasion Peaceful movement from a high culture to a low culture is colonization 
while warlike movement in the same direction is conquest Finally peaceful movement between like 
cultures is immigration5
The first and obvious shortcoming is that two of the types are not filled in Certainly for example 
peaceful movements from low to high cultures have occurred It also seems likely that any attempts to 
define clearly the concepts of high and low culture and peaceful and warlike movements will run into 
difficulty
William Petersen (1970) constructed an improved typology He identifies four classes of migration 
primitive forced/impelled free and mass Pnmiuve migration refers to man s lack of skill m contending 
with natural forces leading to wandering and flight from their lands Forced and impelled migrations result 
from migration policy adopted by the state or some other social institution Under forced migration the 
individuals lose their choice to stay or leave and are either displaced or converted to slaves Impelled 
migration offers some choice such as choosing flight rather than coolie status 6
Free migration refers to pioneers and other individuals motivated to immigrate for the novelty or 
improvement of doing so Free migration becomes mass migration when the pattem of migration has 
become sufficiently large and sustained that transportation systems have been developed and poor 
immigration becomes the motive for current and future immigration
Petersen s (1970 66) typology is much more encompassing than Fairchild s As he states however the 
principal purpose of the typology then is to offer by such an ordering of conceptual types a basis for 
possible development of theory His typology provides a comprehensive base from which to study 
immigration but does not itself provide a theory that will explain the process
One of the first attempts to provide laws of migration was that of E G Ravenstein (1885) He 
identified a number of empirical generalizations attempting to explain migration For example
1 Net migration is a small proportion of the gross migration between two areas
2 For each main stream of migrants there runs a countercurrent which is usually almost
equal m size
3 The natives of towns are less migratory than those of rural areas
4 The majority of migrants move only a short distance
5 Both rural to urban and urban to rural migration tend to proceed by stages
6 The main currents of migration are from farm to town town to small city and small city to
large city
7 The population is shifting toward the great centers of commerce and industry
8 Females are more migratory than males
9 Long distance migrants usually go to large ernes7
These generalizations provide valuable insights but have obvious limitations Economic considerations 
are used to explain most migration while political factors are not stressed
Several of his propositions are also open to serious debate For example the experience of European 
states in the 1960s and early 1970s was that more men immigrated than women It is common for either 
single or married men to immigrate first then send for their families or fiancees This would seem to
5 See additionally Petersen (1970) for a discussion and critique of migration typologies
6 This would include for example indentured servants
7 From Thomlinson (1976 276)
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contradict generalization number eight Perhaps most important is that these propositions do not form an 
overall theory Yet they are useful individually and formed the earliest attempt at theory construction
More recently Everett Lee (1966) formulated a set of eighteen hypotheses regarding migration s 
volume its stream and counter stream and characteristics of migrants Lee makes reference to the 
intervening obstacles that individuals must overcome in order to emigrate He discusses the need to weigh 
the costs and benefits of both staying m his home country and the costs and benefits available in the 
potential host country If the net result is sufficient to overcome intervening obstacles (such as 
transportation costs) then the individual will decide to emigrate
Both Ravenstein s and Lee s works are representative of a tendency m the immigration literature to 
emphasize economic over other factors Immigration is considered to be a result of disequilibrium and 
push pull factors are argued to propel people from one area to another The most important variables are 
either economic including employment (or lack thereof) and income levels (Isaac 1947) or 
socioeconomic including the prospect for social mobility m countries of destination (Heisler 1992)
It is clear that these theories explain a large proportion of immigration but they ignore other elements 
Immigration is often impelled by political forces and governments for reasons that are far removed from 
the economic sphere Even when economic conditions create inducements the government is still 
responsible for deciding whether or not the individuals should be allowed to emigrate (Weiner 1992/1993)
Unfortunately those works that attempt to bring political and other factors into consideration tend to 
have a narrow focus not well suited to grand theory building Much of the literature illustrates this 
propensity Among the studies examining the inducements for emigration are war and ethnic conflict 
(Tilly 1978) (Kulischer 1948) political pressures and revolutions (Koehn 1991) religious and ideological 
persecution (Loescher and Scanlan 1986) environmental and population pressures (Bohmng 1978 Myers 
1989 Sadik 1990 El Hinnawi 1985) and forced migration (Stola 1992)
This review of the theoretical constructs used to explain immigration indicates that there is no general 
theory of immigrant behavior or of immigration There are a large number of descriptions propositions 
hypotheses and typologies The strength of the literature is located in the empirical work that has been 
conducted so far
The Scope and Historical Domain of Immigration
According to some contemporary immigration is unprecedented in its growth and magnitude (Kam 1986) 
There is no doubt that it is large The United States alone accepted over 8 million legal immigrants 
during the 1980s According to the United Nations there are approximately 17 million refugees worldwide 
most of whom are in the Third World Asylum caseloads in all of the advanced industrial democracies 
except Japan have skyrocketed since the early 1980s Millions of contract laborers still reside in host 
nations as evidenced by the more than 2 million workers who streamed out of Saudi Arabia Kuwait and 
Iraq at the start of the Gulf War (Meissner 1992)
Migration is certainly not a new phenomena This section attempts to show that mass movements have 
occurred repeatedly throughout history As such they can be expected to regularly pose challenges and 
problems for host nations and the international system In addition this section also argues that the 
phenomena is not restricted to the advanced industrial democracies of the West but is pervasive 
throughout the world
Unfortunately data regarding migration are sparee and often unreliable It is only in the nineteenth 
century that somewhat reliable records start to become available While discussion based on the available 
records must be careful and precision is problematic it is possible to ascertain the general extent and 
frequency of immigration One of the earliest recordings comes from ancient Greece
the country now called Hellas had in ancient times no settled population on the contrary 
migrations were of frequent occurrence the several tribes readily abandoning their homes 
under the pressure of supenor numbers (Thucydidies 1929 2)
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The Goths Huns and Vandals represent several of the more well known mass migrations of peoples that 
occurred over the last two millenia in Europe More recently the movement of Turks and Arabs across the 
Mediterranean comes to mind Kulischer places the phenomena in perspective
By A D 900 the traditional chapter on great migrations had been closed The various tribes 
had settled in their respective places and Europe had entered the sedentary era Yet at that 
time not one German was in Berlin not one Russian in Moscow not one Hungarian in 
Budapest. There may have been a Slav village on the site of Berlin a Finnish settlement 
where Moscow now is but the emergence of these capitals was a result of subsequent 
populations shifts which radically changed the national and ethnic character of large 
territories Constantinople existed indeed in 900 an important capital with a histone past 
but the only Turks there were a few slaves and mercenaries Madrid was then a Moorish 
settlement. True London stood out as an Anglo Saxon town and there was the Eternal 
City ” But the Bntish and the Italian nations were formed much later and only as the result of 
migrations and invasions which took place after 900 (Kulischer 1948 8)
Since 1500 there have been several major intercontinental streams of immigrants According to 
Thomlinson (1976 285) their probable order of magnitude may have been in order from all of Europe to 
Canada and the United States from southern Europe to Latin America slaves from Africa to the New 
World from China to the rest of the world from India to the rest of the world and from Great Britain to 
Australia and Africa
There is no doubt that the movement to the Americas was particularly important Between 10 and 20 
million slaves were taken between 1550 and 1850 alone It is possible that 80 million Europeans migrated 
to the New World (Ibid)
For the United States immigration statistics first became available m 1820 For Canada they became 
available in 18528 New Zealand from 1854 and the United Kingdom from 1854
Table 3 1 measure immigrants as a percentage of native populations It shows that the peak of immigrant 
flows was achieved in the late 1800s and early 1900s particularly before the first World War
TABLE 3 1 Immigration as a Percentage of Total Population'1,
Country Year Total Population Immigrants Percent o f Population
United States ^ 1820 9638 8 4 0 09
1830 12 866 23 0 18
1840 17 069 84 0 49
1850 23 192 310 1 34
1860 31 443 154 0 49
1870 39 818 387 0 97
1880 50 156 457 0 91
1890 62 948 455 0 72
1900 75 995 449 0 59
1910 91 972 1042 1 13
1920 105 711 430 0 41
1930 122 775 242 0 20
1940 131 669 71 0 05
1950 150 697 249 0 17
1960 179 323 265 0 15
1970 203 212 373 0 18
1980 227 75 ‘7 553 0 24
1987 242 836 525 0 22
1988 245 051 643 0 26
1989 247 350 1 091 0 44
1990 249 924 1 536 0 61
continues
8 These are immigrant amvals Figures for passengers passing through Montreal and Quebec (only) are available from 1827
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TABLE 3 1 (continued)
Country Year Total Population Immigrants Percent o f Population
Umted Kmgdom 1861 20 066 32 0 16
1871 22 712 45 0 20
1881 25 974 52 7 0 20
1891 29 003 103 0 36
1901 32 528 99 7 0 31
1911 36 070 192 7 0 53
1921 37 887 71 4 0 19
1931 39 952 71 4 0 18
1951 43 758 67 7 0 15
1961 46 105 83 7 0 18
1971 48 750 199 7 0 41
1981 49 634 153 3 0 31
1988 57 065 216 0 0 38
Canada 1861 3230 14 0 43
1871 3689 28 0 76
1881 4325 48 1 11
1891 4833 82 1 70
1901 5371 56 1 04
1911 7207 331 4 59
1921 8788 92 1 05
1931 10377 28 0 27
1941 11507 9 0 01
1951 14009 194 1 38
1961 18238 72 0 39
1976 20015 195 0 97
1981 21568 122 0 57
1986 25353 99 0 39
1988 25911 162 0 63
New Zealand 1858 59 7 7 13 05
1861 99 22 22 22
1864 171 21 12 28
1867 217 11 5 07
1871 256 10 3 91
1874 298 44 14 77
1878 412 16 3 88
1881 490 9 7 1 98
1886 577 16 2 77
1891 627 14 2 23
1896 701 17 2 43
1901 773 25 3 23
1906 936 39 4 17
1911 1058 41 3 88
1916 1149 22 1 91
1921 1274 11 0 86
1926 1408 18 1 28
1936 1574 2 8 0 18
1945 1702 4 6 0 27
1951 1939 25 1 29
1956 2174 22 1 01
1961 2415 33 1 37
1966 2677 39 1 46
1971 2863 45 1 57
1976 3110 37 1 19
1981 3125 45 1 44
1986 3248 30 0 92
1988 3292 48 1 46
Notes t  Total population and immigrants are measured in thousands
Source US Canada, and New Zealand statistics are adapted from Mitchell (1983) (USDC 1991) and the United Nations 
Demographic Yearbook (various) UK statistics are adapted from Mitchell (1980) and the United Nations Demographic 
Yearbook (various)
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In terms of gross numbers the recent immigration flows are not significantly larger than those attained 
pnor to the first World War For New Zealand and the United Kingdom the most recent gross figures are 
comparable to those from 1911 For all of the nations immigrants as a percentage of the native population 
have decreased The peak of immigration was reached between 1845-1924 when 50 million people 
mostly Europeans moved to the Western Hemisphere (Widgren 1990) This presents clear evidence that 
contemporary immigration flows are not unprecedented They have occurred repeatedly but it is only 
starting m the nineteenth century that the data to show this are available
The United States United Kingdom Canada and New Zealand have all experienced fluctuations in 
immigrant levels These can be attributed to a number of reasons including but not necessarily limited to 
the following changes in economic conditions changes in entry guidelines and the occurrence of wars 
and famines
One surprise is that the United Kingdom traditionally known as a country of emigration rather than 
immigration has consistently had high immigration levels Of course net migration measures would show 
that it was still a nation of emigration Nonetheless a very large number of immigrants moved to the 
United Kingdom throughout the last 150 years The same is true for other states that are not usually 
considered immigration countries including France Germany Belgium the Netherlands and Austria9 
Unfortunately the immigration figures for these nations are readily available only for the twentieth 
century
The important conclusion to draw from this discussion is that at some time m the future immigration 
rates will likely fall from contemporary levels then increase again This is the pattem m the available 
data At the same time the periodic upsurges are likely to be accompanied again by the problems and 
challenges that are currently being experienced in many nations
It is vital to point out that these problems will not be experienced just by the advanced industrial nations 
of the W est Immigration is affecting all regions and countries of the world One area were data are 
available to illustrate this is refugee flows Refugees are not concentrated primarily m the advanced 
industrial democracies as many presume
Over 90 percent of the world s refugees emigrate from developing nations and move to other developing 
countries According to the United States Committee for Refugees not a single advanced state is listed m 
the top thirty two sources of refugees and asylum seekers This is illustrated in Table 3 2
TABLE 3 2 Principal Sources of Refugees and Asylum Seekers (As of 12/31/93)
Country Numer o f Refugees Country Number o f Refugees
Afghanistan 4 286 000 Iraq 125 900
Palestinian 2 658 000 Georgia 130 000
Former Yugoslavia 1 767 800 China (Tibet) 128 000
Mozambique 1 725 000 Bhutan 95 400
Somalia 864 800 Vietnam 89 900
Ethiopia/Entrea 834 800 M ali 81 000
Liberia 599 200 M oldova 80 000
Angola 404 200 Zaire 66 900
Azerbaijan 350 000 Iran 65 400
Burma 333 700 M auritania 65 000
Sudan 263 000 Tajikistan 52 000
Armenia 202 000 Bangladesh 50 000
Rwanda 201 500 Guatemala 45 750
Sierra Leone 200 000 Laos 43 300
Burundi 184 000 Nicaragua 30 850
Sri Lanka 181 000 Chad 24 000
Western Sahara 165 000 El Salvador 22 800
Cambodia 148 600 Senegal 15 000
Source USCR (1993)
9 See Mitchell (1983)
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The data in Table 3 2 clearly show that most refugees and asylum seekers come from developing 
nations Many of these individuals seek refuge m other developing nations particularly neighboring states 
that can be easily reached A smaller number travels to the developed nations Table 3 3 shows destination 
nations possessing large refugee populations
Most of the world s refugees are concentratèd m Africa the Middle East and South Asia The countries 
of North America and Europe are hosts for much smaller numbers The information that is available for 
immigration figures overall indicates the same trend Table 3 4 provides data for long term immigrants to 
selected states
The data can give us only part of the picture A large number of developing countries are unable to 
provide data. Among many of those that do the figures are sporadic The largest figures m gross terms are 
from the developed states Initially this might seem to indicate that immigration is primarily a problem for 
the West Yet these are the states with the most accurate reporting system and the ones most likely to 
use the reporting categories provided by the United Nations
Despite the reporting problems the data do support the general argument that large numbers do migrate 
to less developed states Brunei Darussalam Papua New Guinea and Venezuela are among those
TABLE 3 3 Areas hosting more than 100 000 refugees (As of 12/31/93)
Continent Country USCR total
Africa 5 698 450
Algeria 210 000
Bunmdia 107 350
Cote d Ivoire 195 500
Ethiopia/Eritrea 416 000
Gumea 485 000
Kenya 422 900
Liberia 100 000
Malawi 1 070  000
South Africa 250 000
Sudan 750 500
Tanzania 257 800
Uganda 179 600
Zaire 442  400
Zambia 155 700
Zimbabwe 265 000
Europe and North America 3 423 600
Armenia 300 000
Azerbaijan 246 000
Croatia 420  000
Germany 536 000
Russian Federation 460  000
Umted States 103 700
Yugoslavia 621 000
Latin America and the Caribbean 107 000
East Asia and the Pacific 398 600
Thailand 255 000
Middle East 5 586 850
Gaza Strip 560 200
Iran 2 781 800
Jordan 1 010 850
Lebanon 322 900
Syria 307 500
West Bank 459 100
South and Central Asia 2 341 700
Bangladesh 245 300
India 378 000
Pakistan 1 577 000
GRAND TOTAL 17 556 900
Source USCR (1993)
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TABLE 3 4 Long Term Immigrants to Selected Countries 1987-88
1987 1988
Australia 221 620 —
Brunei Darussalam 24 801 —
Canada 152 098 161 929
Ecuador 143 585 128 747
France 33 661 39 063
Germany Federal Republic 614 603 903 892
Hong Kong 8 433 9 068
Israel 12 965 13 034
Italy 28 179 —
Japan 68 521 81 664
Korea, Republic of — 72 048
Netherlands 87 653 83 063
New Zealand 41 809 47 844
Papua New Guinea 4 366 55 223
South Africa 7 953 10 400
Spain 26 465 22 884
Sweden 42 666 51 092
Umted Kmgdom 212 200 216 000
Umted States 525 402 643 000
Venezuela 15 417 43 050
Sources (United Nations 1992 USDC 1991)
reporting significant numbers of immigrants If a more liberal definition were used such as arrivals both 
the volume of migrants moving to developing states and the number of developing states receiving 
significant immigration flows would increase dramatically
The important point is that contrary to popular perception the immigration problem is not restricted 
to the First World There is certainly a large and important number of immigrants trying to get into the 
advanced industrial democracies of the West At the same time however the incredibly large number of 
immigrants who travel from and to both Second and Third World nations illustrates the global nature of the 
immigration phenomena It also counters the argument that the challenges of immigration exist only m the 
First World
What has contributed to these mistaken views9 The erroneous belief that mass immigration is a recent 
development might be attributable to short memories From the 1920s to the 1960s immigration numbers 
were relatively modest and were principally from Europe to European outposts or the Western hemisphere 
Since about 1960 however there has been a rapid growth of movement particularly from the developing 
countries This is clearly shown m Table 3 1 Over the last couple of decades each country has 
experienced a relatively large growth in the numbers of immigrants compared to the inter and post War 
years Given the short term decrease in relative immigration figures and the growth in the 1960s a 
generational memory loss seems plausible
On the other hand the fact that major media centers exist in the United States and Europe where 
immigration has become much more politically salient (Messina 1990) could be influencing public 
perceptions It is difficult to ascertain whether the media is influencing or reporting public opinion but the 
potential influence is undeniable This might be especially important given the fact that reporting on 
refugees and asylum seekers in the West is a daily occurrence
In addition it is generally agreed that data and reporting systems m the advanced industrial nations are 
more accurate than those in the developing states It is often mie that the clearest information regarding 
immigration comes from the developed states The perception that immigration is primarily a Western 
concern is not surprising in this light
It is certain that immigration is not a new phenomena and that it is becoming more salient in public 
and political discourse Only 6 4 percent of governments polled m 1976 indicated that their immigration 
levels were too high Yet by 1989 this percentage had increased to 20 6 and 318 percent hinted they 
wanted to stop or slow down immigration (United Nations 1989)
44 Wesley Chapin
The modernization and growth of communication and transportation have certainly contributed to make 
the issue seem more immediate than was the case in the past There has been expansion in all 
international flows including trade information investment capital and more At the very least the 
spread of international communication has resulted m a heightened awareness of economic opportunities 
and differences turning previously potential immigrants into actual immigrants (Weiner 1992)
At the same time natives m host countries are much more quickly informed about the arrival of 
immigrants than was previously the case This can have either positive or negative impacts but the 
potential for isolated or atypical incidents to acquire relatively increased importance seems clear In this 
regard the ability of some sub national and political groups to blame economic crises and high 
unemployment on immigrants has helped lead to the growth of xenophobia and a backlash against 
immigration m many states (Teitelbaum 1984)
The Consequences of Immigration
Regardless of the theoretical concerns it is clear that the consequences of immigration are real The 
repercussions are several The key consideration is that population movements regardless of their cause 
can lead to security and stability loss (Weiner 1992/1993 Widgren 1990)
Host governments are sometimes concerned that immigrants may turn against them or take actions that 
ultimately threaten the host state This is particularly true of refugees seeking to militarily influence then- 
home country via terrorist activity conducted from the host nation Activities such as smuggling arms or 
drug trafficking erode host governments willingness to assist or admit refugees
Both refugee and non refugee immigrants can also be a source of conflict between the receiving and 
sending states Examples are abundant the U S armed contras from Nicaragua Cuban refugees were 
armed to overthrow the Castro regime the Chinese gave arms to the Khmer Rouge to overthrow the 
Vietnamese backed regime m Cambodia and Arabs have given Palestinians support in their attacks 
against Israel Non refugee immigrants such as the Chinese m the United States after Tianamen often 
lobby their host government to withdraw support from their home state (Weiner 1992/1993)
Immigrants are also periodically viewed as representing threats to the culture of the host nation (Ireland 
1991) This is especially evident when the immigrants bnng different religions and ethnic customs In 
France (where the anti immigration Front National under Le Pen has secured a number of impressive 
electoral victories) a 1991 poll showed that 51 percent of all Frenchmen are frightened by Islam (FBIS 
1991) Observations like this suggest that the more foreign the immigrant, the greater the possible 
danger that is perceived by the natives of the host country
Immigrants are also often seen as social or economic burdens These potential threats take several 
forms competition for employment influences on wage levels and living standards potential net welfare 
burdens and possible crime rate increases
The amount of disagreement regarding the economic issues is illustrated by the intentional neglect of 
immigration by most economists (Briggs 1992) Much of the debate that has occurred centers around the 
argument that the refugees take jobs and are a drain on financial resources 10 The evidence for this is 
mixed Sonnen (1990) Marr (1976) and Chapin (1993) argue that the presence of migrants has negative 
impacts on domestic employment levels Other studies including Simon (1989) Grossman (1984) and 
Borjas (1990) argue that it has either negligible or positive effects
Regardless of the mixed results of the economic studies the point is often made that refugees will take 
low paying jobs that natives refuse But the abundance of cheap illegal labor helps keep the working 
conditions and wages from rising to levels that would attract natives The losers are those lower income 
individuals whose wages and working conditions deteriorate or whose jobs are taken by migrants and 
refugees (Murphy and Cancellier 1982 8-9)
10 For the purposes of this section s discussion migrants are the independent variable affecung employment levels This section 
is also intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive
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It has been pointed out that anti immigrant groups also often argue that immigrants lead to higher crime 
rates become net welfare burdens and place strains on housing and transportation (Betz 1990 Weiner 
1992/1993) Whether these claims are true might not as relevant as the fact that large sections of the 
publics in some of these states believe the claims Nationalist anti immigration parties have arisen in 
many countries and there is evidence that they have been able to capitalize on the immigration issue 
(Betz 1990 Chapin 1992)
Basic issues such as human rights economic access and internal conflict are also affected How 
states handle such threats may well go far in determining the type of democracy these nations practice in 
the future It may also influence the future organization of the international system
One must also keep in mind that foreign policy often stimulates international migration Failure to adopt 
policies that might stem population flows such as occurred in Europe between the World Wars and in 
Uganda with the rise of Idi Amin also serves to enlarge populations flows (Teitelbaum 1984 433) Not 
surprising then is that immigration can be used as a justification for intrusions into the affairs of other 
states For example U S Secretary of State Alexander Haig once hoped to rationalize U S foreign policy 
interventions m Central America by reference to their potential effects in preventing migration to the 
United States (New York Times 1982) This calls the sovereignty of states into question because 
immigration that is politically undesirable will create stronger incentives for intervention if cooperation is 
not obtained first
Conclusion
Today s immigrants are motivated by both economic and political factors The processes released by the 
globalization of trade and markets have spurred millions to migrate In the former communist states the 
transition to free markets will continue to lead to unemployment and increase immigration pressures 
Development itself can result m problems since the initial stages provide additional income that makes 
movement economically feasible for many who could otherwise not afford to migrate (Teitelbaum 1984)
In short there are no easy answers Ultimately immigration is a symptom both of the structural 
inequities m the global distribution of resources and of the political and environmental problems facing 
many nations Some form of international cooperation on the issue is clearly needed
A liberal economic order presents one possible solution For example free trade agreements can lead to 
a decrease in migratory pressures particularly if the wage gap between developed and less developed 
areas narrows significantly Yet the establishment of free trade is also not without its domestic and 
international obstacles and drawbacks It will also not address at least in the short run the non economic 
problems that confront many states
First however a greater understanding of the processes at work is required The immigration literature is 
growing but it is still in a relatively immature state The theoretical approaches that are currently 
available possess weaknesses and are more accurately described as typologies or mid level theories at 
best
Specific issues also remain either unanswered or in great dispute There is no widespread agreement 
regarding the economic social and political impacts of immigrants Moral and ethical questions regarding 
immigration policy are unresolved At the same time very real security and stability threats arise from 
immigration
Individual states regions and the international system have been and will continue to be affected by 
immigration These relationships need to be explored further Hopefully solutions will be found that will 
enable nations to deal effectively with immigration and to find solutions to the problems associated with 
it
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Chapter 4
The Phenomenon and Implications 
of Card Based Consumer Behavior
by Andrew T Green
Since the end of the superpower rivalry and the fall of Soviet style regimes two distinct scenarios have 
arisen concerning the future of intra and inter state relations The first draws together three interrelated 
trends the wave of democratization since the 1970s the nse of free market economies and the global 
spread of Western culture This optimistic scenano seems to envision a world of peaceful interdependent 
states made up of fellow mass consumers The second pessimistic scenario is not nearly as interrelated or 
coherent as the first but Süll compnses the same basic features and is distinct almost solely because it 
occupies the negative side of a simplified dichotomy This scenano recognizes the instability or potential 
failure of democratic forms of government the real world nature of so called free market economies 
and the potential globalization of culture among elites only This paper takes as its general theme the 
assessment of these two opposing scenanos for the future
The interrelations familianty and positive message of the optimistic scenario are very seductive 
Scholars from Fukuyama to Rustow to Huntington have noted with approval the increase in the number of 
states adopting democratic forms of government The implication for many of them is a corresponding 
decrease in the outbreak of war or other conflict because democracies do not tend to go to war with each 
other 1 One of the reasons given for this correlation is that democratic governments tend to coincide with 
market oriented systems and the growth of economic interdependence thus making war a costly and 
destabilizing activity The market imperative has also reinforced the quest for international peace and 
stability requisites of an efficient international economy says Benjamin Barber 2 And indeed we do 
seem to be witnessing the adoption of market oriented economic systems and the growth of international 
economic interdependence3 The supra territoriality of corporations international finance and elites is 
making the world a smaller and smaller place Several writers foresee a globalization and homogenization 
of culture as a result of worldwide media acceptance of Western values and economic interdependence 4 
Today s emerging global culture is tied to no place or penod according to Anthony Smith It is 
context less a true melange of disparate components drawn from everywhere and nowhere bome upon the 
modem chariots of global telecommunications systems 5 The future then seems to consist of democratic 
states populated by homogeneous consumers working for stateless corporations engaged in peaceful 
efficient competition for economic growth Wars and other minor conflicts only occur because of the 
decreasing number (and importance) of states who have yet to overcome their past and embrace the future 
of democracy and free market economics
Yet we can have some affinity for the other side of the coin as well It s easy to see that democratic 
forms of government can be fragile and unstable We find explicit recognition of this in Huntington s 
reverse waves of democratization as well as m the studies of democratic institutions democratic 
transitions simultaneous political and economic transitions etc 6 Next, it is hard for those of us in the 
West to reject all of the breast beating about the triumph of free market economics We must remember
1 Zacher Mark Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple in James Rosenau and Otto Czempiel Governance without 
Government Order and Change m World Politics (New York Cambridge UP) p 94
2 Barber Benjamin Jihad vs McWorld The Atlantic March 1992 p 236
3 Zacher Decaying Pillars pp 80-8
4 This perspective on present trends is backed by a number of prominent writers on international business who portray a world of 
increasingly homogenized tastes and the growing prominence of global corporations Zacher Decaying Pillars p 96
5 Smith Anthony Towards a Global Culture7 Theory Culture & Society voi 7 1991 p 177
6 Huntington Samuel The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman OK University of Oklahoma 
Press 1991) pp 13-30 for discussions of democratic transitions see also O Donnell & Schmitter Linz Diamond Stepan Shugart 
& Carey and Przeworski
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however that the term free market economy is a misnomer All of the economies of the major 
industrialized states including the U S have significant government involvement which ranges from 
agricultural subsidies to the tax treatment of research and development from welfare to pollution control 
The fall of centrally planned and controlled economies was not a victory of Hayekian philosophy but a 
rejection of centralized all encompassing authority It is much more accurate to speak of market oriented 
economies with all of the inherent tensions between the efficiency demands of the market and the welfare 
demands of the people As for the globalization of culture Smith Zacher and Barber note that this may 
be among the eûtes only Smith goes on to wonder if we will witness the rise of a partial hybridization 
of culture forming regional culture areas 7 The overview of this scenario is of cosmopolitan elites trying to 
balance the economic demands of different segments of society within the fragile structure of democracy
Both scenarios have some empirical and anecdotal evidence to support them The question is how can 
we mediate or adjudicate between them? Either action would require that we look at existing points of 
commonality (1) the number of states adopting democratic forms of government is increasing (2) the 
number of states adopting market oriented economic systems is increasing and (3) technological change 
has indeed led to some globalization of culture This paper claims that the synergistic combination of 
these three factors has a negative rather than a positive impact on intra and inter state relations thus 
supporting the pessimistic scenario
Technology and Consumption
A common thread through these three factors is technological change 8 Technology spreads ideas and 
thoughts to all comers of the earth whether through telephone television fax or computer It is per 
Barber an ideology at 186 000 miles per second 9 Technology allows for the accumulation sorting and 
transfer of information that drives money movement foreign investment and economic interdependence 
Technology spreads the values of Western culture and economic consumption through satellite television 
and radio
A focus on consumption is justified largely by the important role given to individual consumers in the 
expansion of market-onented systems Centrally planned and controlled economies simply did not meet 
the demands of consumers trying to maximize their current consumption Cynics might even say that 
some of the recent revolutions in Eastern Europe have had as their mie goal not liberty and the nght to 
vote but well paying jobs and the right to shop notes Barber 10 The attraction of market oriented 
economic systems is that relatively more efficient markets should enable consumers to maximize current 
consumption better than before Another justification for a focus on consumption is the benefit it provides 
to economic systems consumption creates jobs spurs manufacturing and promotes imports and exports
The beginning of this paper s argument is that technological change is pushing consumption levels to 
unprecedented heights throughout the world One of the most important technological changes was the 
computerization of accounting functions The application of computers to record keeping meant faster 
more accurate updating and reporting of balances and activity as well as the ability to automatically 
connect accounts and move funds between them The combination of computers and telecommunications 
meant that account information could be accessed and updated from remote locations Finally the 
development of standards for plastic cards with magnetic strips and the global expansion of card based 
payment systems allows gives consumers access to funds from almost anywhere in the world (see 
Appendix 1) The point is that technological change simplifies and speeds access to funds thus making it 
easier for consumers to spend money than ever before in more places than ever before faster than ever 
before Effectively therefore consumers have more opportunity to maximize current consumption than 
ever before For this reason this paper will examine the growth of card based consumer activity After 
reviewing the growth data I will examine the impact that the global expansion of consumption has on the
7 Smith Towards a Global Culture? p 188 Zacher Decaying Pillars pp 95-8 Barber Jihad vs McWorld pp 236-7
8 By technological change I am referring to technological advancements in computers and telecommunications
9 Barber Jihad vs McWorld p 237
10 Barber Jihad vs McWorld p 237
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cultural political and economic orientations of individuals and then derive implications for the future of 
intra and inter state relations
Consumption As A Global Phenomenon
An objection may be raised to the use of consumption data instead of data on credit or savings After all 
true” consumption maximizers move future consumption into the present by drawing on credit or savings 
credit of course is based on projected future income and savings The first response to this objection is 
that credit and savings are terms that are almost meaningless when generalized across many financial 
systems Americans are chastised for their smaller rate of savings compared to the Japanese yet 
ownership of property is much more widespread and significant in the U S Europeans use credit cards less 
than Americans but overdraft and home equity facilities are more common Second the 
interconnectedness of financial accounts that has resulted from computerized accounting functions makes 
such distinctions trivial Different types of financial accounts may exist but they all function the same and 
they are all accessible For example the Japanese have large long term investment holdings but current 
account or charge card balances are cleared against these accounts while in Europe consumers combine 
the options of saving or using credit in an interest bearing account with generous overdraft facilities Thus 
it is far better to think m terms of available funds than credit or savings and the best indicator of the 
use of available funds i e consumption is the expansion of card based consumer activity
Is the use of card based consumption really expanding outside of the U S 9 After all we all know how 
credit happy Americans are but we do not hear much about the use of credit cards in say Europe or 
Japan The answer to this question is yes but the use of card based payment systems outside of the U S 
is expanding differently than in the U S While much of card based consumer activity in the U S is in the 
form of credit card accounts outside of the U S the emphasis is on charge cards account overdrafting on 
line debit cards and check guarantee cards Credit cards are popular m Canada and England and charge 
cards have taken off in France Japan and England 11 Account overdraft mechanisms allow consumers to 
either receive interest on positive balances or overdraw the account and pay interest on the negative 
balance Overdrafting is popular m Germany the Netherlands England and Australia and is becoming 
more common in Norway Belgium Canada and the U S 12 Access to these accounts is provided by on 
line debit or check guarantee cards On line debit cards are popular m the United States Canada 
England France Sweden and Japan 13 Check guarantee cards are popular throughout Europe 14 We can 
see then that we need to consider more than just credit cards
Data from various organizations confirm that card based consumption is increasing globally As seen in 
Table 4 1 global transaction volumes for Visa, MasterCard and American Express have grown during the 
period 1983 1992 at an annual compound rate of 20 3 percent while the number of cardholders has grown 
at a 10 9 percent compound rate 15 Even more impressive are the 27 8 percent annual growth of non U S 
transaction volumes and the 15 2 percent annual growth of non U S cardholders far outpacing U S growth 
Table 4 2 breaks down 1991 1992 Visa and MasterCard data into regions All regions show strong annual 
compound growth with the U S /Canada region lagging behind the others 16 All of this growth is more than 
just more people using cards though— in England credit card transaction volumes have increased from 
£64 billion m 1983 to £31 3 billion in 1992 (19 2 percent growth compounded annually) while credit card
11 Frazer Patrick Plastic and Electronic Money New Payment Systems and Their Implications (Cambridge Woodhead-Faulkner 
Ltd 198S) p 18 Dimitn Vittas Broader Perspectives Payments in the Financial Services Industry o f the 1980s (Atlanta Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta 1984) pp 144-5
12 Frazer pp 212 216-7 George Benston The Effects of Regulation Payments p 127
13 Frazer pp 50-62 Vittas pp 142 146-7
14 Frazer pp 38-49 Vittas p 144
15 Discover is not included here for several reasons (1) it does not issue outside of the U S (2) it was introduced in 1986 and 
(3) Discover statistics from 1986 and 1987 are estimates only Only the three major international card organizations were included 
here but the addition of data for Discover Carte Blanche Diners Club JCB etc would undoubtedly support the data in Tables 1 and 
2
16 I was unable to disaggregate data for the Europe/MidEast/Afnca region Given that Europe like the U S and Canada is 
considered a mature saturated market, it is safe to assume that much of the growth in that region is due to the other two sub regions
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TABLE 4 1 Credit and Charge Card Activity
T ra n s a c t io n V o lum es N um ber o f C a rd s
C o m p o u n d C o m p o u n d
1 9 8 3  1 9 9 2 G ro w th 1 9 8 3 1 9 9 2 G ro w th
Global $158 5 $834 4 20 3% 208 3 529 5 10 9%
U S 109 1 385 1 15 0% 136 6 273 3 8 0%
Visa 47 2 190 4 70 0 149 5
MasterCard 33 0 112 7 53 8 99 5
American Express 28 9 82 0 12 8 24 3
Non U S $49 4 $449 3 27 8% 71 7 256 2 15 2%
Visa 23 5 267 5 34 0 154 8
MasterCard 16 4 146 2 33 2 88 0
American Express 9 5 35 6 4 5 13 4
Source Card Industry Directory (Chicago Faulkner & Gray 1993)
TABLE 4 2 Credit and Charge Card Activity By Region
T r a n s a c t io n  V o lu m e s N u m b er o f A ccoun ts
C o m p o u n d  % T o ta l C o m p o u n d
1 9 9 1  1 9 9 2 G ro w th  T ra n s  1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 G ro w th
Global $614 7 $716 4 16 5% 352 3 385 8 9 5%
Visa 393 1 457 8 221 1 241 2
MasterCard 221 6 258 6 131 2 144 6
Asia/Pacific $68 2 $84 8 24  3 %  1 1 8 ^ 68 9 75 7 9 9%
Visa 37 7 45 6 41 8 46 7
MasterCard 30 5 39 2 27 1 29 0
Eur/MidEast/Af $213 6 $256 6 20  1%  35 8% 75 9 85 7 12 9 %
Visa 145 7 176 6 53 4 59 9
MasterCard 67 9 80 0 22 5 25 8
Latin America $23 2 $ 3 1 7 3 6  6 %  4 4% 19 6 22 6 15 3 %
Visa 1 2 5  18 5 10 4 12 4
MasterCard 10 7 13 2 9 2 10 2
US/Canada $309 7 $343 3 10 8% 47 9% 187 9 201 8 7 4%
Visa 197 2 217 1 115 5 122 2
MasterCard 112 5 126 2 72 4 79 6
Source 4Q 92 & FY '92 Worldwide MasterCard/Visa Final Results courtesy MasterCard International New York
transactions moved from less than 4 percent of total consumer expenditures m 1983 to almost 10 percent 
in 1992 17 Similarly revolving credit use in the U S increased at a 14 6 percent annual rate from 1983 to 
1992 moving from 20 5 percent of total consumer credit to 35 4 percent of total consumer credit18 Finally 
consumer spending in Japan increased over 40 percent from 1985 to 1991 and JCB the largest card issuer 
in Japan introduced a revolving credit card m 1992 19
Debit card use is expanding globally too although data are much more difficult to uncover The use of 
ATM and POS locations has exploded in the U S England and the rest of Europe as more terminals are 
installed and payment networks build stronger ties 20 The number of check guarantee cards in England has 
doubled since 1982 while bank customers in Germany typically receive one card that can be used as an 
ATM card a check guarantee card or a POS card tied to an account with large overdraft limits 21 In 
Japan JCB cards can also be used in ATMs linked with the Zengin on line system to tap into savings and 
investment accounts
17 Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due (London CCRG 1993) p 7
18 Figures taken from Card Industry Directory (Chicago Faulkner & Gray 1993) pp 17-44 unless otherwise noted
19 Figures courtesy of JCB Intemauonal Co Ltd Tokyo
20 Information provided by Card Industry Directory Credit Card Research Group London Jeremy Mitchell Banker s Racket or 
Consigner Benefit A Consumer View o f the Single European Market for Financial Services (London Policy Studies Inst 1991) p 
76 Vittas pp 142 146-7
21 Figures courtesy of Credit Card Research Group London Frazer p 212
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The above statistics show that card based consumption is increasing at rates much higher than inflation 
or population growth and there are strong indications beyond the above trends that this rapid expansion 
will continue New technological developments m POS services m the U S Europe and the Far East will 
soon allow the use of ATM cards at merchant locations worldwide The use of overdrafting is increasing m 
the United States Canada and England and in many other countries checking accounts are directly tied 
to savings or investment accounts As in Germany this will enable banks to easily and effectively market 
unsecured lines of consumer credit to their customers without engaging in direct marketing acuvities 
Indeed attitudes toward consumer credit have been changing outside of the U S in ways reminiscent of 
the U S
The longstanding moral disapproval of credit has wilted as a result of a major change in 
consumer attitudes Traditional proverbs about credit and debt— Neither a borrower nor a 
lender be Out of debt out of danger — have rapidly acquired a musty antiquarian flavour 
which seems to many people to be of little relevance to modem life Any moral stigma 
attached to indebtedness is disappearing in all age groups and all countries and at all levels 
of income Using credit is now an integral and largely unavoidable part of the fabnc of 
life 22
A number of observers have noted a major socio economic shift which is occurring in Japan 
Most of the attention has focused on a phenomenon know as the shinjinrui (translation new 
human beings or new breed ) This generation of young Japanese appears to constitute a 
major break with the past Japan is undergoing a similar expansion [to the U S — AG] in 
buying power and a shift towards more emphasis on consumption by individuals 23
The trends and ongoing technological development point toward an increase in card based consumption 
The effect of this growth will be more than macro economic it will have a strong impact on individual 
orientations in the economic political and cultural spheres Moreover because consumption is a function 
of an individual s economic productive capacity and such capacity is unevenly distributed throughout 
society the ability to maximize current consumption vis à vis future income and savings will be unevenly 
distributed throughout society More than ever before maximizers will be able to quickly and easily tap 
into savings or lines of credit As a result maximizers will be much more attuned to the future and the 
gap between maximizers and non maximizers will widen dramatically It follows then that orientations 
will differ starkly between consumption maximizers and non maximizers This paper is more than just a 
warmed over argument about the haves and the have nots the context has shifted from one of property to 
one of consumption and its explicit ties to psychological orientations and policy preferences The 
argument of this paper is that technological change is causing an irresolvable bifurcation of orientations 
within society which will have a negative impact on intra and inter state relations The following 
discussion of the impact that technology driven consumption has on individual orientations presents what 
may seem to be an overly simplified dichotomy but the reader must keep m mind that technological 
change is eliminating the gray areas by removing obstacles to consumption maximization
Impact on Economic Orientation
This story begins with the standard economic assumption that individuals attempt to maximize utility 
from which we find the general proposition that individual consumption is a function of individual income 
At low levels of income current consumption levels follow current income levels very closely and many 
consumption preferences go unmet During a lifetime of earning at low income levels an individual will 
be able to save little if any money and will be almost fully exposed to economic risks Because 
consumer credit is predicated on future payment for current consumption and low income individuals 
cannot generate savmgs to pay in the future they will not have access to credit either I will term these 
individuals non maximizers Increases in real income (income adjusted for inflation) will allow non 
maximizers to increase consumption by borrowing or spending or perhaps even to save but expectations
22 MilcheU Banker s Racket p 35
23 Anderson Laurel and Marsha Wadkins Japan—A Culture of Consumpuon? Advances in Consumer Research voi 18 1991 
p 129
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of nsmg real income are highly uncertain non maximizers will maintain an economic orientation focused 
on present growth and consumption
At higher levels of income individuals have higher levels of consumption and are able to save 
Individuals will attempt to maintain or increase their level of consumption over their lifetime24 High 
mcome individuals are able to deflect the impact of economic nsks through access to credit or use of 
savings I will term these individuals maximizers Maximizers can maintain or increase consumption m 
the expectation that (1) real mcome will increase (2) the real return of savings will increase and/or 
(3) the real cost of funds will not exceed the real return on savings plus the subjective benefit of current 
consumption Because maximizers are able to diminish the current effects of economic uncertainty 
through the use of credit or saving and consumption patterns are a function of lifetime mcome or net 
worth maximizers will be economically oriented towards future growth and stable consumption 
Technological change gives maximizers more and faster access to larger amounts of funds than before so 
that more maximizers will be more oriented to the future than before
Impact on Political Orientation
Turning now to the impact on political orientation it should be noted that economic orientations do not m 
and of themselves determine political orientations The real connection with politics is the ability to 
implement and enforce policy preferences
We can lay out some policy preferences for non maximizers based upon their economic orientation 
toward increasing current real income Non maximizers will prefer policies that promote economic growth 
as that will increase income through higher wages Maintaining current income growth at levels higher 
than inflation by attempting to control inflation however is difficult to do without killing growth or 
causing unemployment The most common solution is to index wages to inflation so that current income 
stays ahead of inflation rising wage levels will be financed through international lending to or investment 
in states or businesses Non maximizers will also prefer policies of higher social spending on programs in 
which they directly benefit In this way mcome is augmented or cost free goods are provided by 
government social spending 25 Non maximizers will also prefer taxation policies that are progressive as 
long as such policies are accompanied by higher social spending so that the net result is positive for 
them Finally non maximizers will not prefer policies that directly favor business or high income 
individuals at the expense of social spending Any benefits that non maximizers derive from such policies 
will be diffused delayed and diminished In sum non maximizers will prefer government policies that 
allow them to maximize current consumption
Maximizers will also prefer policies that promote economic growth as that will increase income 
through higher wages and higher returns on investment or savings Like non maximizers they will be 
concerned with the level of inflation unlike non maximizers though maximizers are oriented toward the 
future and will not prefer highly inflationary wage index policies Instead they will prefer policies of tight 
monetary control that slow down and smooth out economic growth even if it results in some 
unemployment As another check on inflation maximizers will prefer policies of less government
24 I am attempting here to sidestep a debate raging within economics over lifetime consumpuon behavior In general on one side 
we find claims that consumpuon is constant over a lifeume Modigliani s Life Cycle Hypothesis in which individuals maintain a 
constant level of income with respect to expected lifetime net worth thus saving for a portion of life and dissaving for another 
Duesenbeny s Relauve Income Hypothesis in which individuals attempt to maintain a consumpuon level higher than some reference 
group and Fnedman s Permanent Income Hypothesis which differs from LCH primarily in that it assumes an indefinitely long 
lifetime In all three of these versions however consumpuon is stable On the other side are claims that consumpuon levels are due 
not just to expected income or net worth but to the formauon of consumpuon habits at some point in the individual s lifetime 
Consumpuon increases until habits are formed and then remains stable for the remainder of the lifeume See Franco Modigliani
LifeCycle Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of Nauons The American Economic Review voi 76 no 3 June 1986 pp 297-313 
see also works by Gary Becker or John Muellbauer
25 A subtle point m Kormendi s work on aggregate consumpuon is that transfer payments to populauon subgroups who are 
liquidity constrained i e no savings or access to credit will boost consumpuon by that group See Feldstein Martin and Douglas 
Elmendorf Government Debt, Government Spending and Private Sector Behavior Revisited Comment The American Economic 
Review vol.80 no 3 June 1990 p 591
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spending including deficit spending According to Modigliani and Sterling [expenditures financed by 
deficits tend to be paid for by future generations those financed by taxes are paid by the current 
generation M26 Government spending financed by taxes reduces individual consumption so that a decrease 
m taxes should allow maximizers to maintain or increase consumption 27 Further not only does 
government spending financed by deficits contribute to inflation but it tends to crowd out pnvate 
investment28 On a much broader level maximizers will not prefer policies of higher taxes on themselves 
or businesses because that would reduce the amount of capital available for investment needed for future 
growth It is possible however that maximizers will look favorably on government spending in the form of 
tax policy or subsidies that directly favor businesses since this would essentially substitute for pnvate 
investment anyway In sum maximizers will prefer government policies that do not impinge on their 
ability to maintain or increase consumption over time As the number of maximizers increases so too 
will the bifurcation of political onentations
Impact on Cultural Onentation
The bifurcation of onentations among non maximizers and maximizers continues in the cultural sphere 
Zacher seems to have faith in the gradual movement toward greater homogeneity m cultural values and 
practices but at the same time recognizes that this movement will be uneven throughout the world and 
appears to be concentrated specifically at elite levels i e high income individuals 29 Likewise Barber s 
discussion of the market imperative within the McWorld tendency includes this phrase Market 
psychology attenuates the psychology of ideological and religious cleavages and assumes a concord 
among producers and consumers— categories that ill fit narrowly conceived national or religious 
cultures 30 But he too recognizes that this movement away from religion local culture and nationality 
will be primarily among elites 31 Yet the main thrust of [these] analyses is away from the small scale 
community and towards a world of cultural imperialism based on economic state and communications 
technology and institutions says Smith Whether the imperialisms are ideological or political or 
economic their cultural base is always technical and elitist 32 Maximizers will be able to obtain the 
necessary skills make the necessary international connections and finally actively participate in the 
international culture of consumption
Non maximizers in general will not be able to do all those things thereby suggesting that local non 
elite culture may absorb some elements of international culture but will not become homogeneous Nor 
will it be static if Huntington or Barber are correct Huntington asserts that the processes of economic 
modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local 
identities 33 The vacuum is being filled by religion part of Barber s centrifugal whirlwind of tribalism 
that rages against the forces of McWorld Barber posits a world of parochial hatreds and 
hyperdismtegration along narrowly conceived intolerant ethnic lines 34 My intention here is not to 
denigrate non maximizers as unthinking brutish louts but instead to point out that while they will not join 
whatever global culture exists nor will they be able to retreat into the comfortable recent past What 
then?
26 Franco Modigliani Life Cycle Individual Thrift and the Wealth of Nations The American Economic Review voi 76 no 3 
June 1986 pp 310
27 I am once again stepping into the middle of a dispute within economics On one side is Modigliani s LCH which predicts that 
individual consumption is negatively affected by government expenditures and taxes On the other side is Kormendi s defense of REP 
the Ricardian Equivalence Proposition which posits that consumers regard government spending as the true measure of the 
government s claim on pnvate resources and so do not respond to changes in taxes given spending Modigliani and Arlie Sterling
Government Debt, Government Spending and Pnvate Sector Behavior Comment The American Economic Review voi 76 no 5 
December 1986 p 1168
28 Modigliani Life Cycle p 310
29 Zacher Decaying Pillars pp 97-100
30 Barber Jihad vs McWorld p 236
31 Barber Jihad vs McWorld p 237
32 Smith Towards a Global Culture pp 175-6
33 Huntington Samuel The Clash of Civilizations9 Foreign Affairs voi 72 no 3 Summer 1993 p 26
34 Barber Jihad vs McWorld pp 236 238-240
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Summary of Orientations
The last few pages have covered quite a bit of ground so a brief recapitulation is in order Overall I have 
asserted that differential rates of consumption maximization will lead to divergent orientations in the 
economic political and cultural spheres Maximizers will be onented more towards the maintenance of 
consumption levels over time thus favoring government policies that promote steady economic growth 
and low levels of inflation At the same time maximizers will more fully adopt the values concepts and 
culture of the dominant economic and political powers Non maximizers will be more onented towards 
increasing consumption in the current penod only thus favonng government policies that promote 
economic growth and increasing real current income Unable to fully participate in the culture spawned by 
economic interdependence and telecommunications technology and yet unable to maintain the existing 
local culture non maximizers may be drawn to cultural patterns that are marked by separatism and 
intolerance Technological change is causing a sharp distinction m consumption behavior which translates 
into a sharp irresolvable bifurcation of orientations
Implications for Intra State Relations
The implication for the future of intra state relations should give us pause there is nothing that 
presupposes guarantees secures or ensures the development existence or maintenance of democratic 
forms of government Ideas and values have importance but the acceptance of them changes Given the 
cultural gulf described above we also do not have the luxury of assuming that the ideas and values of the 
industrialized Western states will spread to and take root among all segments of society
For democracy to strengthen and endure all significant societal actors must be committed to resolving 
conflict peacefully within democratic institutions This of course assumes that the design of a particular 
state s democratic institutions does not exacerbate existing divisions within society but that topic is 
outside the scope of this paper There are several reasons why we can be pessimistic about the ability of 
democratic forms of government to endure First the cultural gulf leads us to question the commitment of 
all significant actors to democratic forms of government The absence of ideological commitment does not 
mean that democracy can be established and then flourish on the contrary Spain Poland and Chile all 
began transitions to democracy with the help of actors hostile to democracy In addition commitment to 
democratic forms of government is quite often a learning process over time
Second democracy can fail if significant organized segments of society feel they have no influence 
over government policy In a state where individual orientations are skewed in favor of the maximizing or 
the non maximizing side those representing the minority orientation may be unable to have any effect on 
the policy making process Third commitment to peaceful conflict resolution may be dangerously 
weakened if the costs of policies fall disproportionately on some segment in society especially if that 
segment perceives that it has no influence over policy anyway The failure of democracy could lead to 
civil war and the breakup of the state alternatively failure could lead to the establishment of a 
bureaucratic authoritarian regime headed by elitist economic technocrats à la Singapore Taiwan and 
Chile or else to the establishment of a populist welfare state a la Peronist Argentina It should be noted 
that neither of these regime types are very stable either
More often though we can expect to see democratic institutions and practices muddle along through 
the use of bargaining and compromise between the efficiency demands of international markets and the 
welfare demands of society This is what Robert Gilpin has called the compromise of embedded 
liberalism ” or as John Mayall noted Keynes at home and Smith abroad 35 As Gilpin points out though 
this economic compromise in Western states began to break down in the 1980s as the ability of 
governments to isolate domestic economies from international influences disappeared 36 The industrialized 
states were able to push the costs of their problems onto others through the use of protectionist measures 
Protectionism is an effective short term tool for maintaining economic growth but can have poor long
35 Gilpin Robert The Political Economy o f International Relations (Princeton Princeton UP 1987) p 355
36 Gilpin The Political Economy pp 355-360
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term consequences such as stagnant or declining growth stunted domestic consumption and inflation It is 
unreasonable for us here to assume that states will be able to isolate themselves from international 
pressures so we are left with the question of how to balance between the bifurcated orientations 
developed earlier One possible answer is to go ahead and pursue policies preferred by both orientations 
and then push the social costs onto other states but the proliferation of this strategy among states would 
quickly lead to zero sum mercantilist competition thus cutting short any domestic advantage37 Another 
possible answer is to attempt to compete as successfully as possible in international markets in the hope 
that economic growth will continue and allow the state to fulfill demands for social spending This is not a 
very attractive option either as the large shifts in unemployment and interest rates that the state would 
experience run counter to the desires of either orientation
The third option is to combine elements of the first two options In this option a state could pursue 
sectoral protectionism whereby certain segments of the economy would receive favorable treatment by 
the state and then those segments would be protected through the use of bilateral trade agreements with 
other states This way the state can pursue the steady economic growth preferred by high income 
individuals while at the same time it can maintain some level of government spending and dampen the 
impact of international markets on employment and interest rates38 Will this work as an economic policy9 
If Robert Solow or other growth economists are right about the importance of technological change or 
knowledge for economic growth it is possible this could work Solow analyzed some of the constant 
relationships among factors of economic growth and came to the conclusion that technological change 
was the driving force behind economic growth 39 The implication here is that if (1) a state can develop 
new technologies or bases of knowledge and (2) that state can maintain leadership position in that market 
then the state should experience significant economic growth But given the random nature of discovery 
and the rapid rate of technological diffusion (helped in part by multinational corporations) low levels of 
economic growth are more likely Unfortunately this may be the only viable option Will this work as a 
political policy9 Possibly but its success is dependent on the mix of orientations within society and the 
overall level of welfare demands
In sum democracy is not a given and can be very fragile The endurance of democracy depends on how 
well the policy preferences of various societal segments are met The best way to attempt to do so is 
through the use of sectoral protectionism but this may lead to levels of economic growth insufficient for 
meeting the welfare demands of society We should expect then to see the failure weakening or 
strengthening of democracies and the increasing use of sectoral protectionism
Implications for Inter State Relations
The world will not be made up of increasing numbers of happy secure democracies engaged m peaceful 
competitive trading and populated by happy indistinguishable consumers Far from it Democracy is an 
inherently fragile form of government and we should expect to see the development of bureaucratic 
authoritarian or populist regimes as well as the disintegration of states For his part Barber presents a 
world of tnbalization and disintegration filled with dictatorships military juntas and theocracies 40 In this 
political landscape it seems that plus ça change plus c est la meme chose 41 The larger trend though 
seems to be towards regional cooperation among states Gilpin predicts the rise of regional economic 
cooperation based on trade security and geographic patterns for example the European Community 
NAFTA Caribbean Basin Initiative Japan and the Pacific Basin etc 42 Strategies of sectoral 
protectionism and cartelization which the bifurcated orientations and contraints of international 
economics will encourage will reinforce existing arrangements or promote new ones
37 Gilpin The Political Economy pp 384 388 394 404
38 Gilpin The Political Economy p 403
39 Solow Robert Growth Theory An Exposition (Oxford Oxford UP 1970) p 33-8 this insight touched off research into the 
important role of knowledge and organization
40 Barber Jihad vs McWorld p 239
41 Loosely the more things change the more they stay the same
42 Gilpin The Political Economy pp 397-408
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Another trend that influences inter state relations is the bifurcation of cultural onentauons As noted 
earlier cultural homogenization seems to be occurring among elites but Smith makes a slightly different 
argument. First there seems to be a hybridization of culture not homogenization 43 Second he asserts that 
the partial mixing of cultures the rise of lingua franca and of wider Pan nationalisms though 
sometimes working in opposed directions have created the possibility of families of culture which 
portend wider regional patchwork culture areas Huntington draws together the gist of Gilpin Barber and 
Smith in his assertion that the end of the Cold War signals the beginning of political conflicts among 
civilizations 44 Civilizations are defined by language history religion customs institutions and self 
identification 45 He identifies the industrialized Confucian and Islamic states as the main antagonists 
with Eastern Europe Latin America Turkey and presumably everyone else as bit players 46 We thus 
have regional groupings that are in opposition to each other
The overall picture we should glean from this discussion of inter state relations is that regional groupings 
seem to be developing along economic and cultural lines Perhaps we will see regional groupings based on 
economic lines among most industrializing states in opposition to some cultural groupings with states 
dropping in and out of groupings as domestic politics change
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to make an assessment of two scenarios for the future of intra and inter state 
relations by constructing arguments based on the global phenomenon of technology driven expansion of 
consumption The optimistic scenario seems to envision a world of peaceful interdependent states made 
up of fellow mass consumers engaging in efficient competitive economic activity The pessimistic 
scenano recognizes the instability or potential failure of democratic forms of government the real world 
nature of so called free market economies and the potential globalization of culture among elites only 
After examining the evidence of the expansion of card based consumption I discussed the impact of this 
consumer behavior on the economic political and cultural onentations of individuals This discussion 
found that we should expect to see widely bifurcated antagonistic onentations between consumption 
maximizers and non maximizers
The implication of these orientations for intra state relations supported the pessimistic scenano 
because (1) democratic forms of government were found to be unstable due to the competing demands of 
markets and society (2) market oriented economies with substantial government involvement were found 
to be necessary in order for economic growth to occur and democracy to survive and (3) cultural 
homogenization seemed to occur among elites i e maximizers while non maximizers might be drawn to 
cultural patterns hostile to democracy At the inter state level we discussed the possibility of regional 
groupings of competing or antagonistic states based on common economic or cultural patterns These 
groupings should prove to be sources of great conflict Thus in the end the happy world painted by the 
optimistic scenario is nothing more than wishful thinking
43 Smith Towards a Global Culture p 188
44 Huntington The C ash of Civilizations p 23
45 Huntington The Clash of Civilizations p 24
46 Huntington The Clash of Civilizations pp 39-49 see also Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky The Real World Order Zones
o f Peace Zones ofTurmod (Chatham NJ Chatham House Publishers 1993)
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Appendix 1
Please note that many technical details about specifications protocols and backup processes have been 
left out in order to highlight the basic process of card based access
Credit Card
You decide to pay for a new book at a bookstore in New York with your Visa card issued by First 
Chicago The cashier takes your card swipes it through a slot on a card reading terminal which reads the 
magnetic encoding stripe on the back of the card containing information needed to identify you and First 
Chicago While the cashier is punching in the amount of the sale the terminal dials the number for 
authorization by the bookstore s bank Citibank Once the connection is established transmission 
standards are used to send messages between the terminal and Citibank s authorization system The 
authorization system will process any transactions made with Citibank s cards and send the others to the 
switching system run by Visa Visa will determine which bank issued the card and route the call to that 
bank s authorization system for processing in this case First Chicago First Chicago will send an 
authorization response through Visa and Citibank to the bookstore and will then update your available 
credit limit by the amount of the transaction The entire process from swiping to response takes less than 
15 seconds and works the same if you were in a bookstore in Hong Kong instead of New York At the end of 
the day the bookstore will electronically deposit all credit card transactions at Citibank who will m turn 
send the transactions through to Visa or MasterCard who will in turn send them to the card issuing banks 
for account updating
Charge Card
Same example as above except you are paying with your American Express Gold Card The only 
difference is that Citibank sends all Amencan Express transaction to American Express authorization 
system Citibank will send all American Express transactions in the daily electronic deposit to Amencan 
Express for processing
Off Line Debit
Same example as above except you are paying with your First Chicago MasterCard Debit card The 
process is the same as with a credit card except the transaction settles against your First Chicago bank 
account instead of a credit card account
On Line Debit
You insert your local bank s on line debit card into an ATM punch in your PIN and the amount of money 
from a specific account If you are using a machine operated by your bank the ATM will connect with 
your bank s authorization system If you are using a machine that is not operated by your bank the ATM 
will dial the appropriate ATM network which will route the call to your bank s authorization system The 
bank will validate your PIN and the availability of funds and will then debit your account directly
A more recent development is the use of on line debit cards at point of sale (POS) locations such as 
gas stations convenience stores supermarkets etc The process is the same as if you were at an ATM 
that is not operated by your bank In addition recent network developments enable cardholders to use on 
line debit cards at ATM and POS terminals worldwide
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International Listings
Domestic Market Development or Retardation
by Kent W Hargis
Abstract
The internationalization of emerging equity markets m Latin America provides a unique 
opportunity to investigate how changing regulations information disclosure and 
international financial innovations impact the development of financial markets in 
developing economies this paper extends the literature examining the role of liquidity m 
the endogenous development of financial markets to the case of international listings We 
demonstrate how international listings can shift a local equity market from an equilibrium 
of low liquidity and market capitalization to a market with high liquidity and self 
sustaining growth of actively traded equity Dual listings thereby improve the allocation 
and quantity of investment by lowenng the required rate of return on equity and reducing 
the premium for liquidity risk in the market. In contrast to previous work subsidies to 
either trade or issue equity are not needed The shift to a Pareto superior outcome will 
occur as a response to incentives faced by the firm to list internationally Welfare 
unambiguously improves from the perspective of the firm and the investor
Introduction
One of the most important developments in world financial markets since 1989 has been the rapid growth 
and maturation of equity markets m emerging economies The internationalization of these markets m 
Latin America provides a unique opportunity to investigate how changing regulations information 
disclosure and international financial innovations impact the required rates of return and volaulity of 
emerging markets for equity finance The ability of these forces to lower the premium for a firm s external 
finance by mobilizing a larger pool of saving reducing liquidity risk in the market improving information 
and enforcement of contracts may be substantial The reduction in the premium for external funds 
increases investment and improves the allocation of existing resources Greater liquidity and information 
disclosure enhance the development of local equity markets
This paper extends a line of research by Pagano (1989b 1992) and Allen and Gale (1994) into the role 
of liquidity m the endogenous development of financial markets Liquid secondary markets for risk capital 
have been shown to help allocate savings to the most productive investment increasing the steady state 
rate of growth 1 This is accomplished by the role these markets play in reducing liquidity nsk collecting 
information on risky assets and enabling the diversification of individual firm nsk
However in order to benefit from the roles played by liquid secondary markets these markets must 
exist, a condition met m very few emerging economies until very recently Therefore understanding what 
determines the emergence of financial markets or their degree of development is at least as important as 
assessing their effects on growth Financial systems may be endogenous and change over time Required is 
an understanding of what determines the relative efficiency of a country s financial system and how this 
efficiency may evolve An important dimension of this evolution is the formation of a well functioning 
equity market
This paper examines the role of international listings (American Depository Receipts or ADRs) in the 
development of stock exchanges in Latin America and their future role in relation to domestic equity
1 Bencivenga Smith and Stan- (1992) Levine (1991) Saint Paul (1992) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990)
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markets We argue that international dual listings have been instrumental in the development of liquid 
markets for equities m Latin America increasing information and providing a vehicle to issue shares 
without losing control of ownership The contribution to the literature is to demonstrate a possible channel 
through which a developing country can shift a local equity market from an equilibrium of low liquidity 
and capitalization to a market with high liquidity diversifiable risk and self sustaining growth of actively 
traded equity Dual listings thereby improve the allocation of investment by lowering the required rate of 
return on equity and reducing the premium for liquidity risk m the market It is argued that the opening up 
of equity markets in developing countries may not lead to the development of local capital markets as 
would international listings of domestic equities High transactions costs and illiquid equities could 
prevent foreign investors from entering the market even after investment is permitted Emerging economies 
can help to develop their local capital markets by using the existing liquidity services provided by the 
international capital market Therefore the link to the international capital market may lead to the 
development of the local capital market improving efficiency leading to greater investment lower 
volatility and more rapid economic growth
First the relationship between financial markets and the growth process will be discussed along with the 
role of liquidity in the functioning and development of these markets Second we review recent 
developments m international equity flows to Latin Amenca Third the role of ADRs in reducing the 
return required for equity finance is discussed in relation to the literature in developed markets and 
additional roles provided for firms in emerging markets Fourth the role of international listings m the 
development of local exchanges is presented Fifth the evidence to date of the impact of ADRs in Latin 
American exchanges since 1990 is investigated in terms of the cost of equity liquidity volatility and 
local market development Finally the future role of ADRs and the local exchanges are examined along 
with possible substitutes for domestic equity markets
Financial Markets and Growth
Many influential economists have argued that the evolution of financial markets is an important dimension 
of growth Schumpeter (1911) argued that the services provided by financial intermediaries are essential 
for technological innovation and economic development T he banker authorizes people in the name of 
society as it were to (innovate) (Schumpeter 1911 74 ) The work of Goldsmith (1969) McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) revived the issue and it has been studied extensively for the last two decades By 
mobilizing savings managing nsk monitoring managers evaluating projects allocating resources and 
facilitating transactions financial services significantly influence and are influenced by economic 
development
A positive correlation between growth and indicators of financial development has been demonstrated 
by many authors 2 However the interpretation of this relationship has two key problems First what is the 
causal relationship between financial development and growth? Does financial market development cause 
growth the reverse or some combination? Second if financial development does cause growth does this 
occur by increasing the rate of investment or the efficiency of investment Recent work by Levine (1993) 
finds that financial development is not only associated with current growth but also influences future 
growth investment and the efficiency of these investments
Attempting to explain the above empirical findings Bencivenga Smith and Starr (1992) Levine 
(1991) Saint Paul (1992) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) show how liquid secondary capital 
markets may help to allocate funds to projects with the highest marginal product thereby enhancing 
growth Stock markets improve the productivity of capital by lowenng investors liquidity nsk enhancing 
portfolio diversification and gathenng information on the profitability of nsky assets
Long term investments m physical capital may have higher returns than short term liquid investments 
However investors face unpredictable liquidity shocks which may force the premature liquidation of long 
term investments Stock markets increase the willingness to invest in less liquid more productive
2. See Goldsmith (1969) McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973)
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technologies by allowing these individuals to retain liquidity by selling their shares on the stock market 
The availability of liquid capital markets thereby lowers the cost of capital increases investment m more 
productive long term assets leading to higher rates of economic growth
An equity market encourages portfolio diversification Each firm can specialize which increases the 
firm specific nsk However if this nsk can be shared in the stock market firms may specialize leading to 
increased productivity without an increase in risk Consequently the productivity growth will be higher in 
an economy with a chversifiable equity market Also when banks list on the stock market the portfolio of 
small company loans held by the bank is also able to be diversified more fully Therefore even companies 
without access to the equity market may enjoy the diversification benefits of equity markets This effect 
may be even more pronounced when the international capital market allows nsk shanng of small and risky 
enterprises in emerging markets
The relative size of stock and bond markets m different countries of comparable levels of economic 
development differs significantly (see Appendix Table 5 1) Developed economies do not always have 
strong stock markets while developing economies do not always have weak stock markets Malaysia s 
equity market is larger than the stock market in Italy even though Malaysia s economy is smaller and at 
an earlier stage in the development process Also the size of the equity market does not follow the growth 
of the economy for extended periods During the 1960s and 1970s in Korea the equity market played a 
minor role in the financing of investment However the stock market expanded from $3 billion in 1980 to 
$120 billion in 1989 greatly outpacing the expansion of the economy In 1940 the stock exchange in 
Argentina was a major channel for private savings However by 1985 the market was illiquid and inactive 
The legal and institutional structure of these markets the availability of alternative sources of finance 
along with the industrial structure of the economy may help to explain these features of stock market 
development However the lack of a liquid equity market to place their shares may also have been an 
inhibiting factor in the growth of the market
In attempting to explain these facts Pagano (1989a 1992) argues that stock markets may be subject to 
multiple equilibria Markets may be trapped in a situation of low liquidity and few companies traded This 
becomes a self perpetuating situation In these models participation externalities lead to multiple 
equilibria where high level equilibria Pareto dominate low level equilibria Greater market participation 
makes a market more liquid by reducing the volatility of asset returns due to uncorrelated demands by 
investors (Pagano 1989b) and by decreasing the sensitivity of market pnces to the sale of equity (Pagano 
1989a Kyle 1985 Admati and Pfleiderer 1988) Participation externalities for firms deciding to go public 
may also be present as the benefits of diversification for the owner of the company increase as more firms 
go public (Pagano 1992) Subsidies to either trade equity or issue equity m these markets may shift the 
market to a high level Pareto supenor equilibnum
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) assume the existence of fixed costs m the development of financial 
markets As the number of individuals benefiting from participation in financial markets increases the cost 
of providing these services increases at a lower rate Therefore the overall benefits of financial markets to 
the country may depend on the scale of funds to be invested Financial development also depends on 
public policy Governments may repress the banking system to increase taxes recognizing the negative 
impact on growth This policy may be an optimal short run policy to raise revenues but could be harmful in 
the long run
Much of the previous work has used aggregated indicators of financial intermediation However the 
effect of the stock market bond market and insurance market may differ greatly Access to household 
credit may decrease saving leading to lower growth rates Bank lending and stock market development 
may promote investment thereby enhancing growth Therefore aggregate figures may lead to ambiguous 
conclusions This study concentrates on the role of the stock market and how it may influence the growth 
process
We argue that the development of emerging stock markets may be subject to multiple equilibria The 
market may be trapped in an equilibnum with low liquidity and few companies listed Low trade and high 
volatility reduce the demand for equity raising the cost to the firm of issuing equity This higher cost of
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equity capital reduces the number of suppliers of equity thereby lowering the diversification benefits of 
investment in the stock market As a result low trade and high volatility will be a self perpetuating feature 
of the market International listings provide a mechanism to shift emerging equity markets to a Pareto 
superior outcome In our model no tax or subsidy is needed to achieve this outcome It will occur as a 
response to new incentives which induce firms to list internationally and to excess returns provided to 
investors investing in liquid international markets during the period of transition
Role of Liquidity in Asset Pricing
The variance in the pnce of a stock in traditional asset pncing models is a response to new information 
which leads investors to revise expectations of future returns However stock pnces will not accurately 
reflect future returns if liquidity is not present or transactions costs are significant. These are two common 
features of emerging equity markets One asset is more liquid than another if it is more certainly 
realizable at short notice without loss (Keynes 1930) This means that the absence of a market to absorb 
the purchase and sale of equity without large pnce changes may raise the premium required to attract 
investment and keep some potential investors out of the market Consequently market thinness can 
increase the cost of capital for firms in these countnes Market thinness can be proxied by the size of the 
market for equity or the value of shares traded In addition it may depend on the amount of cash available 
to absorb these trades even in large and diversified equity markets
Investors many times face liquidity shocks which force the liquidation of their investment holdings for 
cash If these liquidity demands are independent and the number of traders is large the variance induced 
by liquidity traders should be low However in a market with a limited number of participants an 
abnormally large demand for a stock may affect the price substantially as the random demands for 
liquidity do not cancel each other out in the short term Higher returns to providing liquidity may not be 
sufficient if funds are previously committed to other investments This can increase substantially the 
market volatility of the asset
Refemng to the crash of 1987 Grundfest (1991) argues that the uncertainty about the demand for short 
term trading may have increased the volatility of equity pnces while Grossman and Miller (1988) claim 
that part of the crash may be attnbutable to the lack of immediate funds to respond to the large demand 
for liquidity Higher returns to providing liquidity may not be sufficient if funds are previously committed 
to other investments Therefore liquidity may not always be present m the most developed markets in 
times of cnsis
Pagano (1989b) shows how independent disturbances to individual endowments increases the vanance 
of equity prices by inducing noise into the aggregate demand for equities This variability in aggregate 
demand for equity and the corresponding pnce of equity declines as the number of traders in the market 
increases Allen and Gale (1994) argue that when liquidity is scarce equity pnces may be determined by 
the amount of cash available It is the relative variation in the amount of the long asset and cash supplied 
to the market that is important for pnce volatility
Also in a market with a small number of traders and independent errors made by market participants 
about future earnings of the company the mean prediction error will decline as the number of participants 
increases Therefore these independent errors may induce larger volatility in reaction to new information 
than a market with a large number of investors
Finally in many emerging capital markets the shares of only a small number of companies are 
available to be purchased Therefore investors are not able to diversify their portfolios to eliminate all of 
the idiosyncratic risk of an individual stock Consequently this nsk will be paced Even in well developed 
equity markets with a large number of traded equities transactions costs may keep investors from fully 
diversifying their portfolio These costs are likely to be nonnegligible in the early stages of development of 
capital markets increasing the price of individual company risk
Vanous empincal studies verify the theoretical argument stressed above that thin markets are more 
volatile than deep ones (Tauchen and Puts 1983 Cohen et al 1976) and can be inefficient (Butler and
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Malaikah 1992) Therefore these factors may lead to a higher cost of capital as the nsk of holding the 
equity increases The difference m pnce received for a company which trades m a broad and deep equity 
market and has a active market in own equity may be significantly different than one in a thin speculative 
market Consistent with this theory Navm and Sears (1955) claim the presence of an active secunty 
market in textiles enabled these companies to receive more than double the pnce per earnings of 
industnal companies in nineteenth century United States
In volatile and illiquid equity markets the benefits to investors who face fixed transactions costs of 
entenng the market may not exceed the cost of entering The fixed cost of entenng the market may reflect 
the cost of learning about the structure and how to trade equities in the market Therefore the lack of 
liquidity may keep many participants out of the market Chuhan (1994) finds that m surveys of market 
participants regulations in the investor countries are not as crucial in impeding foreign investment to 
emerging markets as factors in the host countries The most frequently cited impediments to investing in 
emerging markets were the perceived riskiness of these markets limited information on these markets 
and liquidity problems arising from smallness of markets
The Current and Future Role of Cross Exchange Listings in the 
Re Emergence of Portfolio Equity Flows to Latin American Stock Exchanges
The possible role of international listings and foreign investment in reducing the cost of market thinness 
and the development of emerging equity markets is much more than theoretical First our analysis 
demonstrates that the international listing of a small number of domestic equities may lead to significant 
benefits for the development of the market Therefore many countries which still restrict foreign 
investment in the domestic market may reap most of the benefits solely by allowing a small number of 
equities to list internationally Second cross border trading of equities from emerging markets has become 
significant and is likely to expand rapidly m the future as a result of recent regulatory changes in Latin 
America Global cross exchange3 trading of equities has expanded rapidly from $100 billion in 1986 to 
$764 billion in 1991 4 The countries of Mercosur (Brazil Argentina Uruguay and Paraguay) now allow 
member countries to list local equities on any member stock exchange under the same regulations as 
domestic equities YPF the Argentine oil company and largest equity listed in Argentina is also traded in 
Brazil the United States and London In 1993 the Mexican stock exchange allowed trading of foreign 
equities on its exchange In an attempt to attract more international business proposals have been made at 
the New York stock exchange to trade equities in different currencies thereby eliminating the costs of 
foreign exchange conversion These forces are likely to expand the role of cross border trading of equities 
The implications of these changing regulations and cross exchange trading for the pricing of equities and 
the development of Latin Amencan stock exchanges is the subject of this research
Private portfolio flows of both bonds and equity to developing countries have grown explosively from 
1989 to 1994 These flows which averaged under US $6 billion a year in the period between 1982 and 
1988 were estimated at US $34 billion in 1992 In 1993 Barings Sécurités estimates the global net inflow 
to emerging markets to be $37 billion double that of 1992 5 In Latin America portfolio investment 
increased from $1 4 billion in 1989 to $19 2 billion in 1992 (see Appendix Table 5 2)
Equity portfolio flows to Latin Amencan countnes have become significant only since 1989 These flows 
can take the form of direct purchases by investors m the host stock markets investment through country 
funds and the listing of equities of Laun American companies in the United States (American Depository 
Receipts) Until 1991 closed end country and regional funds were the main vehicle for participation by 
foreigners m Latin Amencan stock markets In 1989 $416 million of the $434 million invested was 
through these funds However beginning in 1991 the use of international share offenngs has become the 
major source of flows In 1992 $4 4 billion of the $5 6 billion in foreign equity flows to emerging markets
3 Cross-exchange trading means trading in foreign securities on a domestic exchange as opposed to cross border trading meaning 
trading by foreigners in domestic securities
4 Kleidon and Werner (1993)
5 Emerging Markets Facibook (1994)
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in Latin America were through American Depository Receipts listed in the United States During 1993 
Latin American companies issued over $5 2 billion in equity m international markets (see Appendix 
Table 5 3)
In 1988 only three Latin American equities were available to be traded in the United States However 
by June 1994 fifty four Mexican equities representing 75 6 percent of Mexico s share index 51 percent of 
the Argentine share index seven of the thirteen largest companies listed in Chile and fifteen Brazilian 
equities were available for trading in the United States (see Appendix Table 5 3) This trend is worldwide 
as thirteen Chinese firms are now listed internationally with most in Hong Kong The balance of foreign 
equity investment in these markets has expanded rapidly reaching $48 billion in Mexico by Apnl 1994 
and $13 44 billion in Brazil by June 1994 after over $16 billion was attracted by these two markets in 
1993 In Argentina over half of the outstanding free float is estimated to be in the hands of foreign 
investors These facts demonstrate the importance of analyzing the impact and potential benefits provided 
by international listings and cross border equity flows
In the past decade these international equity flows parallel and have complemented the development of 
equity markets m developing countries Between 1984 and 1993 the total market capitalization of 
emerging equity markets expanded from $146 billion to over $1 636 billion increasing their share of world 
equity market capitalization from 4 percent to 12 percent6 The Mexican Malaysian Korean and 
Taiwanese stock markets rank among the fifteen largest stock markets in the world with capitalization 
surpassing exchanges such as Italy and Spain In 1990 the joint market capitalization of the top four 
equity markets in Latin Amenca was just $66 billion By 1994 their capitalization reached $442 billion 
(see Appendix Table 5 4) In 1993 Mexico alone traded more than five times the joint total of all seven 
markets in 1980 Taken together the top seven now trade nine urnes more
From the perspecüve of a international portfolio investor in 1913 these recent patterns in pnvate sector 
portfolio flows would not be considered unusual In 1913 45 percent of the total United Kingdom pnvate 
portfolio investments were overseas while 87 percent of new overseas issues from 1865 to 1913 were 
outside of Europe 7 However most of these flows went into securities listed only m London and did not 
have a sustained impact on the development of local equity markets of Latin Amenca in contrast to the 
current expenence One reason may be that dual listings and cross exchange trading did not occur in Laun 
Amencan markets m the nineteenth century as m the past five years 8
Role of ADRs in Reducing the Cost of Equity Finance Developed Markets
Although the ADR was created m 1927 its use has only gained populanty since 1985 in developed 
markets and since 1991 m Laun Amenca Literature in developed markets has stressed the ability of 
mtemauonal lisungs (ADRs) to lower the premium for equity finance This results from access to a larger 
pool of investors enhanced liquidity and greater information disclosure of equiUes which trade in the 
United States In addiuon if markets are segmented international listing changes the equilibrium asset 
pncing relationship of the stock m both the domestic and foreign market
If investment barriers existed between the domestic and foreign market due to legal restrictions 
informauon and transactions costs the cost of capital for the internationally listed firm will fall as the 
premium required to compensate investors for these barriers would be eliminated This results from a 
change in the equilibrium asset pncing relauonship (Alexander Eun and Janakiramanan 1986 Errunza 
and Losq 1985) The difference m expected return reflects two effects First when the stock is listed m the 
foreign market the systemaüc nsk represented by the covanance of the stock s return with the foreign 
market is introduced Second the domesüc covariance nsk changes Before the dual lisung only domesuc 
investors shared the nsk of the domesuc market After dual listing investors m both markets share the nsk 
thereby lowenng the domestic covanance nsk premium Assuming that the covanance of the domestic
6. Emerging Markets Factbook (1994)
7 Edelstein Michael Overseas Investment in the Age o f High Imperialism
8 However cross border exchange trading was significant between the U S and U K The implications of this trading on the 
development of the U S market may be an interesting parallel to the current situation
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stocks with the foreign market is less than the covariance with the domestic market and risk aversion 
coefficients of domestic and foreign investors are the same the required rate of return will decrease after 
international listing In addition firms which are not dual listed are traded more like international assets 
and benefit from integration without incurring the costs of international listing or allowing foreign 
ownership This results from the spillover effect from internationally traded assets indirectly integrating 
securities traded only m the domestic market The magnitude of the spillover depends on the correlation of 
the nontraded asset with the traded asset and the correlation of the traded asset with the country market 
portfolio (Eun Claessens and Jun 1993) These effects on the prices of internationally listed equities 
have been found m many empirical studies including Foerster and Karolyi (1993) and Damodaran Liu and 
Harlow (1993)
ADRs help companies to widen their base of shareholders If barriers of any kind exist between the 
United States and Latin American equity markets international listings will increase share prices by 
accessing a larger pool of investors thereby lowering the cost of capital For example many pension and 
mutual funds in the U S prohibit ownership of foreign equities However ownership of ADRs is not 
prohibited Trading ADRs in the United States lowers many costs to investors in the United States The 
nsk that the investor faces with respect to the company currency fluctuations and market risk of trading 
can be condensed Since ADRs are traded in dollars there is no need for currency conversions Risks of 
trading are reduced because it is no longer necessary to understand regulations and details of the foreign 
equity markets
The option of listing internationally may also lead to greater disclosure of information as the benefits of 
a larger investor base and liquidity of trading may now exceed the perceived costs of divulging 
information If only domestic investors can be reached the benefits to releasing information may be less 
than the perceived costs of information disclosure keeping information from being divulged More 
efficient pncing will result as more information is available to judge the future earnings of the company
Finally ADRs provide a vehicle to issue shares without losing control of ownership Most ADRs have 
full economic rights but do not have voting privileges thereby eliminating the extra danger of losing 
control of the company and reducing the perceived cost to the issuing company Therefore all of these 
factors lead to a lower cost of capital for the firm
Role of ADRs in Reducing the Cost of Equity Finance Emerging Markets
In addition to the role of ADRs discussed above common to both developed and emerging markets the 
impact of international listings (ADRs) m emerging markets is likely to be magnified by the 
underdevelopment of the domestic stock market International listings will not reduce firm specific risk or 
market nsk However they provide several reductions m risk for investors in emerging stock markets
Many developing countnes do not have a liquid market to place equity Therefore the premium that 
investors demand for not being able to liquefy their holdings may be formidable International capital may 
be needed to place large privatized companies in the equity market as the pool of savings available to 
invest in the stock market may not be sufficient to fund the placement of these companies such as 
telecommunications and oil (see Appendix Table 5 5) Therefore a larger reduction m the cost of raising 
equity capital may result by accessing the well developed markets in the United States and Europe
Most international equity trades are accompanied by a trade in the foreign exchange market 
Government involvement in the foreign exchange market which is prevalent in developing countnes and 
procedural nsks of settling foreign exchange transactions are avoided if the security is traded in dollars 
ADRs are deposited with a depository institution in the United States thereby avoiding the need for 
foreign custodial arrangements Depository nsk is reduced in the United States by vanous insurance plans 
and regulations of depository trust companies In emerging markets depositories are not as well regulated 
and delays often occur m the receipt of the purchased secunty
In the course of trading clearance and settlement m underdeveloped equity markets investment capital 
may be lost or delayed This may occur when emerging markets are discovered increasing the volume
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beyond the capacity of existing settlement process Therefore the reduction in the cost of capital for firms 
in emerging markets will be more significant than those in developed countries
Costs of issuance domestically or internationally include underwriting fees monitoring costs due to the 
separation of ownership and control underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and indirect costs 
resulting from financial information disclosure The costs to issuing equity m the United States include the 
listing and introduction fees paid to the exchange and the legal costs associated with SEC registration 
Differing costs of raising equity for each level of ADR are presented m the Appendix Table 5 6 with a 
cost of raising equity on a national exchange reaching $500 000 These costs are higher than would be 
necessary to list on the domestic exchange
For domestic initial public offerings (IPOs) in Brazil Chile and Mexico in the 1980s the cost of 
underpricing was found to be significant Initial one day mean returns were found to be 78 5 percent 16 7 
percent and 2 8 percent for Brazil Chile and Mexico respectively (Aggerwal Leal and Hernandez 1993) 
Perceived costs also include a danger of losing control of the firm through hostile takeovers and greater 
information disclosure Financial disclosure is costly because of implications for corporate tax evasion 
regulators and potential competitors Rice (1990) finds that the loss in market value as a result of 
mandatory financial disclosure laws for Korean firms m 1975 to be in the range of 2 8 percent and 12 
percent The costs of disclosure are higher in the United States as firms must conform the United States 
accounting standards which are the stricter than those present in developing economies The firm must 
therefore examine the tradeoff between the benefits and costs of international domestic or no listing
Model Before International Listing
In the model there are two countries in the world the domestic country (D) and the foreign country (F) 
Initially it is assumed that there are no internationally tradable assets for either the domestic or foreign 
country It is also assumed that the capital markets are completely segmented The lack of liquidity cost 
of transacting in emerging equity markets and the fixed cost of entering the market outweigh the possible 
portfolio diversification benefits of entering the foreign market The model could be modified to allow to 
ability of foreign investors to enter the domestic markets as in Stulz (1981) and making the cost of 
investing m the foreign market prohibitively high
Assumptions
1 No taxes or costs to trade equity exist in either country after the fixed cost to enter the 
market or float the company s shares is paid
2 No restrictions exist for short sales by domestic or foreign investors in either the domestic 
or foreign country after entry into the market
3 We assume a fixed exchange rate and that the nsk free rate in both currencies is the same
4 Investors have homogeneous expectations in the domestic and foreign market
5 The secunty pnces have a joint normal Gaussian distnbution with finite first and second 
moments
We use the following notation
K f Kd = vector of the number of shares of pure domestics equities held by the domestic investor a 
a e D  and the number of shares outstanding
kp Kf = vector of the number of shares of pure foreign equities held by foreign investor b 
b e  F and the number of shares outstanding
k f Kj = vector of the number of shares of internationally traded equities held by investor a 
a e D  F and the number of shares outstanding
Ka = H X1 vector of zeros and the number of shares of individual a outstanding 
ß D ß F Pj -  vectors of the expected value of gross returns of each equity
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PD Pf? P¡ = vectors of current pnces of pure domestic pure foreign and internationally traded assets 
ND Nf Nj = H T and I dimensional vector of the number of shares of pure domestic pure foreign and 
internationally traded equities
Tj, Tf T¡ = H x H  covanance matrix of the prices of pure domestic equities 
T X T covanance matrix of the prices of pure foreign equities and 
I x l  covanance matrix of the prices of internationally traded equities
r di Tpi = H x I  covanance matrix of the pnces of pure domestic equities and internationally traded 
equities
T x l  covanance matrix of the prices of pure foreign equities and internationally traded equities
In our model there are H individuals m the domestic economy and T individuals m the foreign 
economy Each is endowed with equity in a risky project Individuals live for two periods In penod 0 
individuals decide whether to float their endowment of equity on the stock market and choose their 
optimal portfolio The individual must pay a fixed cost (0 to float his shares
All dividends and returns are paid to equity holders in period one All companies are assumed to be of 
equal size K with companies indexed by a=l H in the domestic market and b=l T in  the foreign 
market These are indexed the same as the individuals in each market The expected gross returns ßD ßF 
¡x¡ to each individual company and expected variance a 2 are equal for all nsky projects It is assumed that 
individuals are not able to borrow to purchase equities Therefore the individual can invest in other 
equities only if he decides to float part of his endowment
All individuals have identical Arrow Pratt measures of risk aversion (b) and preferences This measure is 
held constant during the individuals investment horizon Each individual maximizes a mean variance 
utility function in final period wealth ( w  ) After floating his shares on the market the individual invests 
his proceeds on the market Individuals will only enter the market for equity if the expected return is 
sufficient to compensate them for the level of nsk and the costs of issuance Individuals have constant 
absolute risk aversion Therefore the utility function affects the scale of portfolio demand but not the 
composition of the optimal portfolio
The owner of the firm chooses in period 0 whether to enter the market assuming he will maximize his 
portfolio choice problem for the equities expected to be available He expects H firms to go public 
regardless of what his decision is as he assumes that his choice to go public will not affect the decisions 
of other individuals The choice problem of the individual is to determine whether the portfolio weights 
that maximize his certainty equivalent of wealth exceed the cost of listing If it does the individual will 
enter the market Therefore the portfolio choice problem for the individual is
(1) M « E [u ( * a )] = E [-A e"W ] í  I wa ^ k “(nD ~ RPD) +RPaKa - f j l a +ß aKa ( \ - Ia )for a = l H
where Ia equals 1 if individual a decides to float his endowment and 0 otherwise R is the return on a nsk 
free bond
If we assume normally distributed returns this problem can be restated as
(2) Max E[í/((¿„)\ = E(wa)-Var(wa)
Substituting into the above equations yields
(3) M < ut{v{*.)] = [kl(pD-RPD) + R P . K . - f \ . + l i . K . ( l - l . ) - [ ( k i r Dk l+  )]la for a = \ H
where ^represen ts the vanance due to changes in information about future dividends and T d = ——- is  a
decreasing function of the number of individuals in the market This represents the extra risk induced in 
the market as a result of market thinness The theoretical reasons for the inclusion of this term as 
discussed previously is that in absence of a market to absorb the shocks of random liquidity traders the 
volatility and the uncertainty of future realizable asset prices will increase Pagano (1989) denves a 
similar model assuming uncorrelated returns and shows how independent endowment shocks will increase
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the volatility of prices To make the model more tractable given the multitude of reasons believed to be 
causing this increase m nsk we model this term simply as a function decreasing in the number of 
individuals in the market This term therefore captures the effect that a low number of individuals 
(equities) in the market in hypothesized to represent
The first order condition with the respect to for each individual is
(4 )* 2 = 0 } 0=1 "
Aggregating the demands across all investors gives
(5) k d = £ ¿ 2  
TO frP ~ T n K6 ( r D+ r J )
H H 1 
where f  -
O a=\0
because all investors are assumed to have identical measurer of risk aversion
Therefore the corresponding equilibrium pnce of the company s shares would be
(7) />«=i[^-|-[(r«+r«)K]
Inserting the equilibrium price (7) and demand for equity (4) into the expected utility function (3) yields
(8) £(I/K ) ]  = |- [ [ r í, + rí]íír0] ^ - | [ ^ - [ r 0 + r í ] ^ - ] + [ / r - | : [ r D + rL]Ar0 K . - f
(?) = + +ßK° + KK - f
This can be rewritten as 9
(10) p K - ^ j j ^ o 2 + (o2f 'jK2 +!ljp-(oae + (oac)T')K2^ - f
where o2 is the vanance of an individual equity and is the covariance between a and domestic 
equity c
The benefits of going public are increasing in the number of companies listed (H) The first term shows 
that as the number of companies increases the idiosyncratic nsk of the company approaches zero The 
second term demonstrates the importance of the correlation between the returns of different firms Since 
there are H 1 covariance terms all of the benefits of diversification will disappear if all of the firms are 
perfectly correlated
The expected utility of remaining pnvate is
(11) £ [£ /K ) ]  = mK0 - K „ V
The benefits of going public are analyzed under two possible cases
1 The returns of all equities are perfectly correlated
2 The returns of all equities are perfectly uncorrelated
When the returns to all equities are perfectly correlated the change m expected utility of going public is
(12) A E[C/K )] =  - | ( ( a 2) % ( < 7 j T) - /
With perfectly correlated returns the benefits of diversification disappear In addition the increased 
vanance induced by the thinness of the market will lead to a higher variance in final penod wealth for the
9 H vanance-covanance terms of value cr exist in the first term while only H vanance covanance terms exist in the second 
term as we are summing over only one equity
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individual who lists than the one who stays pnvate Therefore even without the cost of listing the benefits 
of listing are negative
When the returns of all equities are perfectly uncorrelated the change m expected utility is
(13) = = ƒ
The first term shows that with uncorrelated returns the firm can diversify away nearly all of the risk of 
the asset The second term demonstrates the importance of liquidity of the market If there is a low number 
of participants m the market this will increase the risk of not being able to liquefy his portfolio and 
decrease the benefits from listing With no liquidity nsk and no correlation of returns between the assets 
the benefits of diversification of risk depend on how large the endowment of units of real capital (K) and 
the size of the variance related to changing information a2 This indicates that large companies and 
riskier projects will be more likely to pay the fixed cost to list their shares than smaller companies as the 
benefits to doing so are higher If the riskiest projects are the most productive the existence of the equity 
market will increase the productivity of capital
The model shows how the number of participants in the market affect the decisions of others to enter the 
market If a small number of companies are in the market the diversification of risk available may not 
worth the cost of listing Also if the number of participants in the market is low the risk of not being able 
to liquefy your holdings increases reducing the benefits of listing However if the expected number of 
individuals and equities in the market is large the risk of liquefying your portfolio will be lower while the 
diversification benefits are higher This will lead to more companies listing in the market This results from 
the complementarity of individual decisions as the participation of each additional individual in the 
market affects the benefits of entering the market for other individuals The contribution of this paper is to 
show that international listings can transform the market from the equilibrium with low liquidity and 
companies traded to an equilibrium with high liquidity and a large number of traded companies
Model After International Listing
International listing affects the asset pricing of both the equity listed in the foreign market and the pricing 
of domestic equities leading to the development of the local exchange With the option to list 
internationally the choice of the individual to list is altered First dual listing improves liquidity The 
number of individuals m the market for the individual s endowment increases as a large number of 
participants already exist m the foreign market Therefore the liquidity nsk and vanance of the pnce of 
equity due to the thinness of the market is reduced substantially increasing the pnce received for the 
individual s endowment10 Second the additional risk premia associated with trading in underdeveloped 
markets discussed above will be lessened such as limited information foreign exchange nsks and the lack 
of insider trading regulations Finally by changing the equilibrium asset pncmg relationship of the firm 
the equity s pnce should increase and the required return should decline with the decline m the covanance 
nsk of the equity All of these factor lower the cost of capital of the firm As a result of these changes in 
incentives more firms will now list internationally It also changes the cost of debt versus equity for firms 
already listed leading more companies to issue equity for new investment and to retire old debt for equity 
As the supply of equity increases the pnce of equity should not decline significantly This will result if we 
assume a relatively elastic demand for an individuai equity market This assumption seems reasonable 
given the small relative size of the emerging equity markets in relation to the market capitalization of the 
United States or world equity markets
The problem facing the foreign investor now changes as the additional fixed costs of becoming 
associated with trading on the foreign market are eliminated for the internationally listed equity The 
equities of the foreign market are now available m the market which the individual is participating
10 In our model this nsk decreases to zero as H+T becomes sufficiently large However even with a large number of market 
participants cash may not be available to offset a large selling pressure
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Therefore all of the individuals m the foreign market will reoptimize their portfolio including the equity of 
firms formerly available only in the domestic market
Does this reduction in liquidity risk benefit only the internationally listed securities or the entire 
domestic market7 The above argument shows that the option to list internationally will induce more firms 
to issue equity in foreign markets and will lead to a larger demand for equity from emerging markets at a 
given pnce However this may not result in local capital mobilization or local equity market 
development The key lmk to domestic market development is that both domestic and foreign investors 
can arbitrage pnce differences adjusted for costs of transactions between the two markets 11 Assuming no 
remaining arbitrage opportunities between the two markets leads to liquid pncing in the domestic market 
As a result the liquidity nsk for these shares will decrease in the domestic market as well as in 
international markets Firms in Latin America that list internationally are always listed on the domestic 
exchange Therefore an increase in the quantity of internationally listed equities also leads to a more 
diversified local equity market Second the improved marketability of some domestic equities has lead to 
the entrance of many foreign and domestic investors into the local market The benefit of entering the 
market for foreign investors may now be larger than the cost as the number of individuals participating in 
the domestic market has expanded This has increased the liquidity of many equities that have not listed 
internationally 12 The onginal equilibrium of low trading and high volatility in domestic markets will be 
shifted to a market of high liquidity and low volatility indirectly through arbitrage with the market for the 
equity traded in international markets The change results from the strategic complementarity between 
traders Each additional trader exerts a positive externality to other traders by providing additional liquidity 
and reducing nsk
The choice for agents m the domestic market with the option of international listing is
(14) Max e[i/(*„)] = [kD(md -R P d ) + k,(ß, -R P ,) + RP - c ] / .
- 1  \{k irDk‘D + kfr ,kf + 2 kDr Dlkf)\i k> 2](i-/„)
where Ia equals 1 if the individual decides to float his endowment and zero otherwise The individual may 
now choose to optimal portfolio of domestic and internationally traded equities Before the individual 
could only choose from domestically traded equities The problem facing the foreign investor is
(15) Max E[u(w„ )] = (nF -  RPF )kF + (ß, -  RP, )k, + Rw> -  | ( * £ r FkbF + + 2kbFTF,kbF )
Define
(16)
r
r mr
DI
DI1 I
-1
= v  = Vp Vdi 
Vd iV,
(17) r r '  r « r
1 Lr FI^I J l*Fl*I J
The first order conditions for the optimal portfolio yield the demands for each secunty by foreign and 
domestic investors
(18a) k i  
(18b) kf 
(18c) kbF
I
b
b
J_
b
ßp~R P p  | Hi -R P j 
. V d Vdi
ß p -P P p  | Hi -R P / 
Vp, v 1
Hf -  PPf ! Hi ~PPi
*F *FI
11 ADRs will trade at a discount in the United States due to capitalization of future transaction costs foreign exchange conversion 
costs and custodian fees
12 This comment is based on conversations with many market participants in Mexico
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(18d) k} . l l fr.zJ&. + EjÆL 
b[  0 ; F <bj J
The aggregate demand for each security equals the market value of the security in equilibrium 
(19a) KD= £ k a
a- 1
(19b) Kf = £**
b=1
(19c) UTi = £ * . +  £*»
a=l b=l
From the optimal portfolios m equation (18) and the market clearing condmons (19) we can restate these 
conditions as
(20a)
b
(20b) Kf = 1-
O
ß p -R P p
S VD 
P f ~ r p f
<t>F
(20c) K , = j P d ~ r p d
. yD,
, P ,~ Rpi '
y  pi ) 
, V i- R P i '
Pf ~ RP F H+ — )+ I fJ b 1 Vi ,1 H
n , - Rpi )
*F J
Solving these equations for the pnces of domestic foreign and internationally listed assets gives 
(21a) P' = 1 [ víd — ± ^ [ k dCov (R. RD) + KFCov (R Ä ,) ] - -¿-[[Vd ][Ar0 ] ] - JCDCov (R. * D)]
(21b) r t  = ± ( v , - ^ j [ l C DCov {R„ RD) + KFCov*(Rb R ^ - ^ ^ K ^ - K f C o v  {R„ Ä ,)]]
(21c) P, -  ))
where Cov (Ra RD) = <Jao Dpa]pID where T = VJlV¡DKD 
Cov (Ra RF)= (7a(JFPaiP¡F where T = VJ% JF<i>F
The benefits of listing are analyzed m two different cases First we analyze when all internationally 
listed equities are perfectly correlated with all equities from their respective countries (including 
internationally tradable equities) but are perfectly uncorrelated with all equities from the foreign country 
(including internationally tradable equities) For simplicity we assume that the number of firms in each 
country which are tradable is equal In the case when only firms in the developing country allow their 
shares to be traded the benefits will be greater than in the case presented Therefore the benefits from 
international listing presented are a base from which benefits may increase if very few or no firms from the 
foreign market are internationally tradable If short selling is allowed the individual deciding to list can 
effectively hold the world market portfolio The individual will purchase shares in the internationally listed 
security with value equal to the proportion of the foreign market in the world market portfolio 13 The 
expected utility of the individual if he floats his endowment on the market is
(22)
_ b
2
^ y H+<s>HT]KF}Ka
where VH represents the covanance matrix of equities from domestic individuals (including 
internationally tradable equities) represents the covanance matrix of equities from foreign individuals
13 In the two country case this is simply the value of the domestic market plus the value of the foreign market
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(including internationally tradable equities and Owr represents the covariance matrix of equities from the 
domestic country and equities from the foreign country (including internationally tradable equities)
The first two terms represent the income from holding equities from the domestic country (H) and from 
the foreign country (T) The next two terms show the nsk of holding these equities and the final term gives 
the revenue received from listing the shares in the market Under the assumption that the covariances of 
equities m each country are perfectly correlated while the equities of each country are perfectly 
uncorrelated with equities in the other country this becomes
(23) = bK2<rx W
(h + t Y  (H + T y
bK2c 2 H 2 T2
2 (H + T)2 (H + T)1
+flK- bK^ y L . \
This results because there are H2 variance covariance terms for domestic assets of <r2 (including 
internationally tradable equities) while there are T2 variance covanance terms of a 2 for foreign equities 
(including internationally tradable equities) The other variance covanance terms were assumed to be 
equal to zero
After some algebra this yields
(24) - f iK a -
bK2 (H2 + 2 H T -T 2) 
2 (H + T)2
b _2 . b f,2 _2( 2 5 ) = ^ - - K V + - ^  L(// + r)2
Therefore the gain in expected utility from floating the endowment is 
T2
(26) = |  K W
{H + T f
Companng this result to equation (12) illustrates the different decisions faced by the individual with and 
without the option to list internationally In both equation (12) and (26) all of the domestic equities are 
perfectly correlated However in the case where the individual floats his shares domestically the benefits 
of listing may be negative With perfectly correlated returns no diversification benefits are present while 
transactions induced variance may actually increase the nsk In the case where the option is to list 
internationally the covariance risk of the market may be reduced substantially In addition with a large 
number of demandera for the individual s equity the transaction related vanance is also reduced 
significantly
The value to list increases as the size of the foreign market increases Therefore m the case of a 
relatively small emerging market the ability to hold a relatively large part of your portfolio m equities 
which have little or no correlation with the domestic assets will lead to a significant reduction m the nsk 
of the individual s portfolio This extreme case is more realistic than it would seem For the five year 
penod ending in 1991 thirteen of the twenty emerging markets followed by the IFC had a correlation 
coefficient of less than 2 14 In addition as macroeconomic factors are more important in the pncing of 
equities in emerging markets the correlation coefficient of individual equities within each market is 
higher than that in the developed world Therefore the benefits to the domestic individuals m this case 
may be substantial even if only a small sample of equities is listed m the international market The 
difference between domestic and internationally listed firms can be interpreted as the difference in 
benefits for small and large firms Large firms may receive enough benefits to listing internationally while 
for smaller firms the costs may exceed the benefits
The second case we look at is when the internationally traded asset has no spillover benefits for the 
domestic equity market We assume that internationally listed securities of the domestic market are 
uncorrelated all other domestic foreign and internationally traded equities The same assumption is made 
for foreign internationally tradable equities Therefore no benefits are obtained for the pncing of the
14 Emerging Markets Factbook (1992)
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domestic equities and no benefits are received by purchasing internationally listed equities of the foreign 
market versus tradable equities of the domestic market Therefore the expected utility of the individual is
(27) E[u(wa) ] ^ [ V D + VD '] [ ^ }  + - ^ l Vi° + V' { ^ ]
Since the covariance of the internationally listed equity is zero the second and fourth terms disappear 
Therefore the expected utility associated with listing internationally is 
b H2(28) -------
2 (ƒ /+ / ) 2
Therefore the change m expected utility is 
2 {H + I)2
Pure domestic equities would gain no pricing benefit in terms of a reduction in covariance nsk Also if the 
number of internationally listed equities (I) is low the benefits to listing are also small
For entrepreneurs that previously would not have entered the domestic market the benefits of listing are 
now increased as the number of domestic traders has increased This may induce firms for which the 
benefits to list internationally are exceeded by the larger costs If H+T is sufficiently large in the domestic 
market the extra costs of listing m the foreign market may outweigh the benefits In addition as more 
firms list the benefits to other firms listing also increases
In summary pnor to the option to list internationally the costs to enter the market by foreign and 
domestic individuals were less than the benefits received because of the small number of companies 
listed The benefits of listing by the domestic companies were small because of the small number of 
traders in the market The option to list internationally changes the incentives to list for the individual The 
increase in the number of individuals further improves the benefits of entry leading more investors to enter 
while the asset pricing relationship reduces the covariance nsk of the equity Consequently the benefits of 
listing domestically by smaller companies improves leading to more domestic equity issuance The result 
is more traders and equity issued on the domestic market before the option to list internationally became 
available Welfare improves unambiguously from the perspective of the international investor and the 
individual floating his endowment The market value of the endowment is increased due to the increase in 
share pnces International investors are now allowed to diversify their portfolio into emerging markets 
more effectively The welfare of individuals who were already participating m the equity market increases 
as the pnce received for their equity will increase relative to the pnce received before the option to list 
was made available
In the model beliefs are consistent with the actual outcome If everyone believes that the market will 
be thm it is in the best interest of individuals not to enter the market Firms will not issue equity because 
the costs of issuance are higher than the perceived benefits to the owners However if everyone believes 
that the market will be liquid and deep it is m the best interests of individuals to enter the market and for 
firms to issue equity Therefore expectations of market thinness based on the history of the market will be 
self fulfilling The trading of the equity in a deep equity market in the United States may help develop 
liquid trading of the stock thereby changing expectations of future market liquidity which become self 
perpetuating
Given the above result the liquidity nsk of trading in the two countries would be equalized If the 
charactenstics of investors and the equity markets involved were identical the two markets would 
essentially become one market and the choice of where to trade would not be important However 
investors m the two countnes do not consume goods in the same currency and other charactenstics of the 
market may differ Investors in the United States will still concentrate their trades in the United States to 
avoid costs of foreign exchange transactions and other problems associated with trading in emerging 
equity markets discussed previously Nevertheless this may not lead to a decrease m trading in the
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domestic market The development of local institutional investors such as pension and mutual funds may 
lead to a larger amount of trading on the domestic market Domestic investors will prefer to trade in the 
domestic market as long as foreign exchange transaction costs and nsk outweigh other costs of investing 
in the local market Arbitrage transactions by local and foreign investors may also be significant in 
increasing trading volume Finally the additional equity issued in the domestic market from companies for 
which is it not advantageous to incur the extra costs of international listing will increase trading volume 
Consequently trading could increase in the domestic market
The existence of an international market for equities from emerging markets does not guarantee that 
liquidity nsk will be eliminated If perfect arbitrage does not allow the market to absorb trades without 
adverse pnce movements the location of trade will depend on whether the trader is a pnce taker in the 
market If we assume foreign investors are larger traders the capacity of the market to absorb trades is a 
more important factor for choosing in which market the trade is executed Large mutual funds such as 
Fidelity will concentrate their trades on the more liquid market in the United States These effects will be 
more prevalent in market downturns such as the crash m October 1987 and the assassination of the 
presidential candidate in Mexico in March 1994 The premium required for this lack of absorptive capacity 
for Mexican investors (assumed to be executing smaller trades) will be lower as their trades may not lead 
to significant adverse movements in the price Therefore it is more likely for foreign exchange nsks to 
exceed nsks of the absorptive capacity of the market for smaller domestic investors
Impact of ADRs on the Cost of Capital Volatility Information and Liquidity 
Latin Amenca 1990-1994
The opening up of equity markets m Latin Amenca to foreign investment has induced a surge in pnces 
across the region Pnce/Eammgs ratios have increased sharply after foreign investment restnctions were 
liberalized In Mexico the ratio increased from 5 04 before market opening in May 1989 to 20 96 m 
January 1994 In Argentina the P/E ratio increased from 3 11 before the opening of the market m October 
1991 to 64 59 in January 1994 This could partially reflect the prospect of improved earnings m the future 
after privatization and liberalization of these economies However infrequent trading limited information 
and insufficient regulations m local equity markets were key factors m the depressed ratios prior to market 
opening
The demand for information by investors in the United States has had an impact on the disclosure of 
information by companies in Latin America Before 1990 a large percentage of the equity was not traded 
and changes in pnces were based largely on rumors speculation and inside information Therefore 
brokerage research based on fundamentals was not in high demand However by listing in the United 
States firms in Latin Amenca must comply with all SEC regulations including Generally Accepted 
Accounting Pnnciples Also firms not registered with the SEC have become more responsive to requests 
of investors m the United States to disclose information
ADRs have provided liquidity for companies that have interlisted Trading volume has increased 
significantly for equities listed internationally and domestically Telmex was among the three most 
actively traded equities on the New York Stock Exchange in 1993 while YPF the Argentine oil company 
was listed as one of the twenty most actively traded during the last sixth months of 1993 Nevertheless if 
equity is placed solely in the United States with little trading in the domestic market this may inhibit 
rather than enhance the development of the local exchange However when an ADR is issued in the 
United States it is almost always accompanied by a domestic offering which broadens the domestic 
market Consequently domestic as well as international equity placements have expanded in the past two 
years Domestic trading volume has also increased because of arbitrage between the two markets
The value traded in the Mexican market has increased from $6 2 billion in 1989 to $63 5 billion in 1993 
The volume of Telmex (the largest Mexican equity) traded in Mexico was $4 4 billion for the first six 
months m 1993 while the trading on the New York Stock Exchange reached $113 billion These figures 
compare to $18 9 billion traded on the entire stock exchange in Mexico Therefore we find that 
international listings have increased trading volume in both Mexico and the United States This result is
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consistent with a study of international listings by Canadian firms in the United States by Foerster and 
Karolyi (1993) They find that domestic trading volume increased by 26 percent in the first three months 
after dual listing while the total volume on both markets increased by 127 percent
Volatility of equity markets has also declined significantly after liberalization of foreign investment 
(Hargis 1994) The standard deviation of the Argentine market index fell from 30 percent during the penod 
from 1978 to 1991 to 12 3 percent during the period after liberalization while this measure for the Mexican 
equity market declined from 14 4 percent before liberalization to 7 9 percent after liberalization This 
result is consistent with other studies that show a decline m volatility after market opening (Kim and 
Smgal 1993) This may also be due to greater macroeconomic stability in these countries and the absence 
of any heterodox stabilization plans in Brazil However the argument presented here may also be a 
significant factor 15
Impact of ADRs on the Issuance of Equity 
and Local Market Development
Empirically the argument stressed above should see the listing of a larger number of companies following 
the relaxation of regulations in the United States The pnce of these equities should increase after 
international listing Second after the listing of some of the larger firms we should see smaller firms 
begin to raise more equity domestically and on international exchanges
This is precisely what has happened in the Mexican market In both 1989 and 1990 less than $200 
million m equity was raised in the stock market The opening up of the stock market m 1989 to foreign 
investors did not lead to an expansion in the placement of equity However after changes in regulations in 
the United States in 1990 relaxing requirements for equities traded in the private placement market and 
the international listing of Telefonos de Mexico (Telmex) m 1991 the placement of equity expanded 
dramatically In 1991 $5 1 billion was placed by Mexican companies of which $3 4 billion was placed in 
international markets During 1992 twenty one companies raised equity worth $4 7 billion including ten 
international offerings of $3 5 billion From 1991 to March 1993 thirty four Latin American equity issues 
have raised over $114 billion Over twenty five Latin American equity issuers have raised $6 7 billion in 
unregistered equity placements while eight SEC registered equities have raised $4 7 billion
In 1992 and 1993 the issuance of Mexican equities m the United States averaged 6 percent of domestic 
fixed investment representing 60 percent of equity raised For Chile this figure reached 8 percent m 1993 
This rate of international equity issuance is larger than the 5 percent average rate of equity issuance to 
domestic fixed investment for OECD countries from 1960 to 1991
Many of the early offerings reflected the privatization of previously state owned companies such as 
Telmex However since 1992 many smaller firms have begun to list in the United States and 
domestically In 1994 Grupo Modelo raised $530 million placed solely in the Mexican market in contrast 
to the usual one third domestic two thirds international issues for many previous Mexican issues This 
illustrates the expansion m offenngs on the domestic market as well as in the international market
Are Emerging Equity Markets Necessary7
The argument presented above shows how international factors may affect the development of the local 
equity market However is there a future role for domestic stock exchanges m Latin America with the 
existence of the international capital market7 If firms can get capital and liquidity from foreign 
exchanges why spend all of the human capital to develop one locally7 This paper argues that as these 
markets mature exchanges in Latin America may play two distinct roles First similar to role of regional 
exchanges in nineteenth century England local markets will become important for smaller firms for which
IS I currently have data on individual stock pnces and volume for the fifty firms in Mexico that listed in the United States and 
fifteen Brazilian firms that listed in the United States Comparing the volatility and liquidity of these pnces before and after the 
international listing will provide more specific evidence of the factors proposed for the decline in volatility over the past three years 
in Latin American equity markets
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information may be better at the local level and for companies where is not advantageous to incur the 
costs of listing in the United States The impact of these factors has been found to be significant in the 
historical development of equity markets in Brazil and Mexico (Haber 1993)
Second while a substantial part of the trading m larger equities will move to most efficient and liquid 
markets internationally local investors will continue to trade domestically as long as liquidity nsk is not 
outweighed by the transaction costs of foreign exchange conversion fees of depository banks and 
exchange rate risks of investing in a foreign currency while consuming goods measured in the domestic 
currency Therefore as domestic pools of saving increase through pension and mutual funds along with 
greater liquid wealth of local individuals trading domestically will increase This situation may be similar 
to the development of securities markets during the nineteenth century in the United States where trading 
of many of the larger railroads was dominated in London while trade in the smaller firms was larger m the 
United States
Finally there are spillover benefits to smaller firms for which the benefit of listing internationally is less 
than the cost The pricing of some of the larger companies as international equities may lead to a lower 
cost of equity for the smaller companies by indirectly integrating these domestic securities into the 
international market Firms which are not dual listed are traded more like international assets and free ride 
on the listing of other firms If only a few firms are listed internationally but these firms can mimic the 
domestic market portfolio and correlations between nontraded and traded assets are high domestic firms 
may be traded as international assets Therefore international listing may not be required
Are these benefits sufficient to recommend the development of equity markets in Eastern Europe and 
China or the continuing existence of equity markets in Latin America9 The answer depends on the 
availability of other sources of domestic finance The problem of raising finance for small firms may be 
alleviated if the country has an efficient banking sector However if the banking system is highly 
regulated as in many developing economies this may not be an option for many firms These questions 
demonstrate the necessity to look at the entire financial system of a country in evaluating the benefits or 
costs of any one individual market The possible effects of the development of equity markets on the 
banking system and the potential of the banking system to substitute for the above benefits of a domestic 
stock market are left for future work
Conclusion
This paper extends the literature examining the role of liquidity in the endogenous development of 
financial markets to the case of international listings We demonstrate how international listings can shift 
a local equity market from an equilibrium of low liquidity and capitalization to a market with high 
liquidity and self sustaining growth of actively traded equity Dual listings thereby improve the allocation 
and quantity of investment by lowenng the required rate of return on equity and reducing the premium for 
liquidity nsk in the market In contrast to previous work subsidies to either trade or issue equity are not 
needed The shift to a Pareto superior outcome will occur as a response to incentives faced by the firm to 
list internationally Welfare unambiguously improves from the perspective of the firm and the investor
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Appendix
TABLE 5 1 Ratio of Market Capitalization to GDP
1810 1850 1913 1950 1978
Canada — — — 59 41
France — 12 65 25 39
Germany — 6 37 13 24
Italy — 11 6 19 10
Japan — — 41 24 39
U K 13 74 121 110 76
U S 7 23 95 58 57
Source Raymond Goldsmith 1985 Comparative National Balance Sheets
TABLE 5 2 Portfolio Investment in Latin America by Type (millions of US dollars)
1989 1990 1991 1992
Equity Investment 434 1 099 6 228 5 570
Country Funds 416 575 771 293
ADRs — 98 4 697 4 377
Direct equity investment 18 426 760 900
Bonds 833 2 673 6 848 11 732
Commercial Paper 127 — 1 212 840
Certificates of Deposit 0 0 670 1 100
1 394 3 772 14 958 19 243
Source World Bank
TABLE 5 3 Capital Raising ADRs (millions of dollars)
1991 1992 1993
M exico 3 433 3 558 2 138
A rgentina 60 313 2 098
Chile 27 129 248
Brazil 0 135 0
Venezuela 0 175 42
Peru 0 0 26
Colom bia 0 0 83
3 520 4 310 4 635
Source Latin Finance
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TABLE 5 4 Evolution of Latin American Equity Markets (Currency Amounts m Millions End of Year)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
M exico
M arket Capitalization 
Trading Value 
Turnover Ratio percent
8 371 
15 554 
179 3
13 784 
5 732 
51 7
22 500 
6 232 
33 3
32 725 
12 212 
44  0
98 178 
31 723 
47 9
139 061 
44 582 
37 0
197 953 
63 589 
37 45
Argentina
M arket Capitalization 
Trading Value 
Turnover Ratio percent
1 519 
251 
14 7
2 025 
593 
28 9
4 225 
1 916 
24 5
3 268 
852 
33 6
18 509 
4 824 
45 3
18 633 
15 679 
83 9
43 967 
10 338 
33 04
Brazil
M arket Capitalization 
Trading Value 
Turnover Ratio percent
16 900 
9 608 
41 5
32 149 
17 979 
37 8
44 368 
16 762 
17 9
16 354 
5 598 
23 6
42 759 
13 373 
22 0
45 261 
20 525 
31 5
99 430 
57 409 
32 58
Chile
M arket Capitalization 
Trading Value 
Turnover Ratio percent
5 341 
503 
10 6
6 849 
610 
10 1
9 587 
866 
9 9
13 645 
783 
6 3
27 984 
1 900 
8 8
29 644 
2 029 
6 7
44 622 
2 796 
7 41
Umted States 
M arket Capitalization 
Trading Value 
Turnover Ratio percent
2 588 890 
2 423 066 
93 6
2 793 816 
1 719 731 
61 6
3 505 686 
2 015 544 
57 5
3 089 651 
1 815 476 
58 8
4 180 210 
2 254 983 
53 9
4 757 879 
2 678 523 
56 3
Umted Kmgdom 
M arket Capitalization 
Trading Value 
Turnover Ratio percent
680 721 
389 829 
57 3
771 206 
579 171 
75 1
826 598 
320 268 
38 7
867 599 
280 655 
32 3
1 003 184 
317 866 
31 7
838 579 
382 996 
45 7
Source Emerging Markets Fact Book
TABLE 5 5 Largest Companies Market Capitalization (Jan 31 1994)
M exico $Bn Brazil $Bn Argentina $Bn Chile $Bn
Telmex* 38 14 Petrobras 16 45 YPF* 9 99 Telefonos 6 74
GF Banacci* 14 91 Electrobras 14 89 Telefonica* 9 34 Endesa 4 64
Cifra 11 08 Telebras 14 45 Telecom* 7 19 Enersis 3 17
Carso* 10 31 Telesp 8 64 Perez Companc 3 31 Copec 3 14
Televisa* 9 96 Vale do Rio Doce 6 13 Banco Frances 1 79 Cartones 2 18
Notes * IPOs or Privatized smce 1990 with share offermgs m the United States and Europe
International Listings Domestic Market Development or Retardation 81
TABLE 5 6 Comparing ADR Facilities
Type Act Disclosure Approximate Cost Listing Raise Capital
Unsponsored 1933 None 0 o r e No
1934 None
Sponsored 1933 None $15 000 o r e No
Level I 1934 None
Sponsored 1933 None $75 000 National No
Level lí 1934 Detailed Exchange
Sponsored 1933 Rigorous $500 000 National Yes
L ev e lm 1934 Detailed Exchange
Listing Requirements of Stock Exchanges m the United States
NASDAQ AMEX NYSE
Minimum Market Value of 
Publicly Held Shares
$1 000 000 $3 000 000 $18 000 000
Total Number of Publicly 
Held Shares
100 000 500 000 1 100 000
Tangible Net Worth $2 000 000 $4 000 000 $18 000 000
Sponsored ADR Level I are initiated by the issuer but can only be traded over the counter and cannot be 
listed on a national exchange (AMEX NYSE NASDAQ) A depository agreement is signed with a 
depository bank m the United States The responsibilities of the depository include mailing annual reports 
maintaining shareholder records and responding to investor inquiries
Sponsored ADR Level II are initiated by the issuer and can be listed on a national exchange A public 
offering is not permitted under a Level II program The company must comply with SEC s full registration 
and reporting requirements including submission of annual reports in accordance with GAAP (Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles)
Sponsored ADR Level III are initiated by the issuer and can be listed on a national exchange The issuer 
is allowed to raise capital under a Level III program The company must comply with SEC s full 
registration and reporting requirements including submission of annual reports in accordance with GAAP
Rule 144A ADRs are placed and traded in accordance with Rule 144A which was introduced by the 
SEC in April 1990 to stimulate capital raising m the United States by foreign issuers Some restrictions on 
the resale of privately placed securities were eliminated if the sale is made to qualified institutional 
buyers (institutions which own and invest on a discretionary basis over $100 million) These ADRs are 
traded on the Portal system established by the National Association of Securities Dealers m June 1990
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Regionalism as an Instrument to Promote Multilateralism 
The Role of APEC
by Rhenald Kasali
During the cold war the emphasis of American policy in the Pacific was on political and security issues 
Economic relationships were seen as merely part of a policy to defend the expansion of communism in the 
Asia-Pacific countries 1 In order to defend the Pacific from the spread of communism the United States 
did not only send technical assistance which resulted in increasing competitiveness of East Asian2 
industries but also guaranteed its market access3
With the end of cold war the political and economic structure m the Pacific changed dramatically 
China was no longer viewed as a threat for most Asian nations as well as United States Then flow of trade 
and investment from and to China increased very quickly Japan and the Newly Industrialized Economies 
(South Korea Taiwan Hong Kong dan Singapore) were no longer perceived as the United States allies in 
order to defend against the spread of communism in Asia Bergsten and Nolan notes that the end of cold 
war has pulled the security blanket aside and makes conflict—which was avoided on the anti Communist 
alliance system during the cold war—much more possible 4
The United States then requested the Japanese and other East Asian nations to reduce their trade surplus 
with the United States Pressure from the United States could not be understood by Asian leaders because 
along with such pressure the U S created North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) which does not 
include East Asia It was perceived by the Asian leaders that the United States was no longer maintaining 
its commitment to multilateralism 5
Thus when the United States created NAFTA in 1990s talks about regionalism have arisen m the 
Pacific However when Asian leaders proposed the creation of a narrower geographically defined Asian 
regionalism which NAFTA concept has encouraged the United States opposed this plan The U S 
opposition to this concept raises a question what kind of economic cooperation satisfies all the players in 
the Pacific9 Can APEC be a vehicle for promoting multilateralism9 And what are the global advantages 
and disadvantages if it does evolve9
In the concept of cooperation which will be discussed later conflicts are not perceived as obstacles to 
cooperation Thus in cooperation conflicts can be tolerated as long as the players want to reduce negative 
consequences for others Using this theory /my paper will answer questions above It is my hypothesis that 
APEC could be a good supporter of multilateralism if APEC can go further in its evolution process as an 
institution from just an informal forum to be a formal cooperation In my analyses I will use cooperation 
as a dependent variable and number of players and degree of interaction among the players as 
independent variables
The paper is divided into two parts The first will discuss the concept of cooperation using the two 
independent variables The second will discuss the future of multilateralism in international trade The
1 Frank Gibney The Pacific Century America and Asia in a Changing World New York Macmillan 1992 pp 512-533 
2. In this paper East Asia is defined as countnes consisting of Japan South Korea China Taiwan Hong Kong Indonesia 
Malaysia Thailand the Philippines and Singapore
3 Hugh Corbet Trade Strategy and the Asum-Pactfic Region London George Allen and Unwin 1970 pp 109-50 Nam Duck 
Woo Changing Patterns of Trade and in Trends in Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region m Paul F Hooper Building a Pacific 
Community Honolulu East-West Center 1982 pp 119-38
4 C Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System Washington D C Institute for 
International Economics 1993 p 4
5 Jaune De Melo and Arvind Panaganya New Dimensions in Regional Integration Cambndge Center for Economic Policy 
Research 1993 pp 3-21
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paper concludes that m terms of number of players though APEC consists of many players with a wide 
gap in cultures values and level of economic development APEC might evolve further However there 
is a serious problem in terms of the degree of interaction particularly the concentration of trade in the 
subregionals
The Concept of Economic Cooperation
There are many types of economic cooperation and integration among nations in the world Although 
members of each cooperation group collaborate with each other in order to increase their welfare or of the 
world as a whole the type of cooperation they engage in might be different Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) for instance is different from the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the 
European Union (EU)
I classify the difference of each type of economic cooperation by their evolution process of 
institutionalization At the beginning the parties involved come together to discuss something They start 
with informal talks Then a forum for consultation is established Whenever all parues agree to use this 
forum as a consultation body they may meet regularly This forum may go further when each party s 
behavior is directed toward some goals and when each party Finds the similar pressure from other actors or 
other cooperauve group(s) This is what Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has done since it 
was established in 1989
The next step if needed this forum could be enlarged by bringing in more actors (expand horizontally) 
or including new areas of cooperation (expand vertically) The North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
for instance may be expanded through an accession clause to other Latin American countries NAFTA 
could also go beyond provisions for the lowenng or elimination of intrarégional barriers for example 
establishing common external tariffs
The final type of the economic cooperauon is called a union of which all members agree to harmonize 
their monetary policies taxation and government spending In addiuon a common currency would be used 
by all members For instance the European Economic Union which has evolved since sixteen European 
Naüons signed an agreement to form the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 
Pans in July 1948 6
Cooperauon according to Axelrod and Keohane 7 is not parallel to harmony Harmony needs undivided 
idenuty of interests but cooperation can only take place m circumstances that contain a combinauon of 
conflicting and complementary interests Axelrod and Keohane defined cooperauon as occurring when 
actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others (p 226) In order to achieve 
this situation there must be a process of policy coordination of which each participant has to reduce their 
negative consequences for the others
Thus in cooperation while conflict exist each member suppose agree to reduce their negative impact 
for other nations Helen Milner contrasts this definition with competition which presuppose goal seeking 
behavior that tnes to reduce the advantages available to others or to block their want fulfillment8
In this paper I assume that there are at least two independent variables which affect the future of 
economic cooperation (1) the number of players (or states) and (2) the degree of interaction among 
members These two independent variables will affect the future of economic cooperation m Asia-Pacific 
particularly APEC since the number of players has been enlarging in a very short time while the degree of 
its interaction is rather complex
6 Herbert E Weiner America s Role in the Founding of the European Community in Richard S Belous and Rebecca S Hartley 
(Eds ) The Growth o f Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy Washington the National Planning Association) 1990 pp 
57-61
7 Robert Axelrod and Robert O Keohane Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy in Kenneth A Oye Cooperation Under 
Anarchy Princeton Princeton University Press 1986 pp 226-254
8 Helen Milner International Theories of Cooperauon Among Nations in World Politics 44 (April 1992) pp 466-96
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Number of Players
Before APEC was created the Japanese had proposed The Pacific Free Trade Area in 1968 which would 
contain only five nations The United States Canada Japan Australia and New Zealand The Japanese 
government started this idea using an informal forum which included developing nations of the region as 
associate member9
They started to develop this idea with a Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) during 
January 1968 in Tokyo and then moved the conference to another country in the Pacific for the next 
consecutive year There were no clear ideas about how many associate members should be included since 
the region was separated by communist capitalist blocs However this proposal stopped before a free trade 
area was established In its intoductory notes De Melo and Panaganya states that there were two waves of 
regional trading arrangements first m the 1960s and 1970s and second m the 1980s (see the second part of 
this paper)10 However the first waves failed to integrate because they were not endorsed by the most 
influential actor the United States due to its commitment toward multilateralism 11 Thus that is the U S 
who discouraged the creation a formal and exclusive trade bloc (see part 2 of this paper) during the 1960s 
and the 1970s
In 1989 Datuk Sn Mahatir Mohammad Malaysian Prime Minister proposed East Asia Economic 
Caucus (EAEC) which excluded the United States Canada Australia and New Zealand This Asia based 
trade bloc was supposed to include 12 Asian nations six Asean countries China Taiwan Hong Kong 
Vietnam South Korea and Japan However before this proposal was getting support Australia had 
proposed Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which would include 10 countries six Asean 
nations Australia New Zealand South Korea and Japan The U S which was excluded in this economic 
group then reacted unhappily because it speculated that the group would be a fortress Asia which would 
be dominated by Japan 12 U S diplomats then pressed Tokyo which then urged Canberra to include 
Washington and Ottawa Since APEC is winning support from Japan and the United States Mahatir s idea 
then should be integrated m APEC 13 This means that all players (states) should integrate in one 
institution namely APEC
What is interesting in this economic cooperation group is that the number of the players in APEC is 
expanding while they have not yet moved towards a formal trade bloc within which the cooperation policy 
could be imposed upon each member After including the U S and Canada China Taiwan and Hong Kong 
were included m the group in 1991 In 1994 and 1995 three new members will be included Chile Papua 
New Guinea and Mexico 14
In terms of number of players this large number of participants of course implies opportunities as well 
as problems APEC could be the largest trade bloc in the world with a share about 49 percent of world 
trade at the end of the century15 and with a total combined of GDP about $ 13 trillion 16 As a market 
Asia s part of APEC will be the most attractive m the world with an expected 3 5 billion people of the 
world s 6 2 billion at the end of the century 17 As a comparison NAFTA has 360 million people and a
9 Kiyoshi Kojima Economic Cooperation in a Pacific Community in Paul F Hooper (Ed ) Building a Pacific Community 
Honolulu The east-West Center 1982 PP 22-37
10 Jaime De Melo and Arvmd Panaganya New Dimensions in Regional Integration New York Cambndge University Press 
1993 p 3
11 Jagdish Bhagwati Regionalism and Multilateralism An Overview in De Melo and Panaganya (Eds ) New Dimensions in 
Regional Integration Cambndge Cambndge University Press 1993 pp 22-50
12 Uncommon Bonds m Far Eastern Economic Review 18 November 1993 pp 16-20
13 See Everybody Needs Good Neighbors in The Economist December 11 1993 West Chided for Opposing East asían 
Grouping Rich Man Poor Man in Far Eastern Economic Review 3 October 1991 p 13
14 Uncommon Bonds m Far Eastern Economic Review 18 November 1993 pp 16-20
15 Peter Drysdale and Ross Gamaut The Pacific An Application of a General Theory of Economic Integration in C F Bergsten 
and M Noland (Eds ) Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System Washington Institute for International Economics 
1993 pp 183-224
16 International Financial Statistics 1991
17 A Billion Consumers The Economist Survey of Asia The Economist October 30th 1993 pp 1-22
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combined GDP of US$ 6 2 trillion or 5 percent larger than the European Union 18 However APEC has big 
differences in language culture ethnicities and history as compared with either NAFTA or EU
As Oye19 Ends the prospects for cooperation are becoming weak as the number of players increases He 
argues that at least three important factors affect the prospect of cooperation when the institution must 
deal with a large number of players (1) cooperation mandates acknowledgment of opportunities for the 
advancement of mutual interest as well as policy coordination once these opportunities have been 
identified Policy coordination in turn indicates that the policies of each player have been conformed to 
diminish their negative consequences for other players Increased number of players implies that 
transaction and information costs might increase (2) As the number of players increases the cooperation 
behavior which depends upon calculations of expected utility would be greatly varied among the players 
And as the expected utility vanes the prospects for reciprocal cooperation may decline (3) As the 
number of players increases the feasibility of sanctioning defectors diminishes Strategies of reciprocity 
become more difficult to implement without tnggenng a failure of cooperation
Moreover dealing with a large number becomes more difficult when the players are heterogenous 
Heterogeneity m APEC can be viewed m several aspects such as civilization groups20 level of economic 
development political and humanitarian systems and demographics Due to this diversity theory of 
international cooperation suggests that two is the most ideal number of players m a cooperation 21 In the 
creation of NAFTA for instance the cooperation started with two players i e the United States and 
Canada which created the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) before Mexico joined in
Agreeing to limit the number of players at the beginning of the process of cooperation Richard Higgott 
argues that a small number of players tends to lead to constructive coalition building the creation of 
information trust transparency and confidence building 22 However in some instances the cooperation 
can also be started with more than two participants like the establishment of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) m 1968 which started with five players namely Indonesia Malaysia the 
Philippines Singapore and Thailand
If a smaller number of players is better than suddenly involving so many players in the beginning of the 
process can APEC move further toward a formal community9
Richard Higgott23 argues that APEC has no theoretical constraints in its evolution process but he agrees 
that APEC has senous practical constraints that might inhibit cooperation m 1990s Those practical 
constraints are based on the lack of quality of information which policy coordination depends upon The 
absence of quality information concerning the domestic economic policies and strategies of member states 
is clearly a source of uncertainty and misunderstanding in the Asia-Pacific region For example the 
information about how the business sectors relate to the government of each country and how the 
economic deregulation moves toward the economic integration among the participants of the trade bloc
While the theory of cooperation suggests that smaller numbers of players are better I argue that to some 
extent APEC can move toward a formal cooperation Five reasons support my argument
18 International Financial Statistics 1990
19 Kenneth A Oye Cooperation Under Anarchy Princeton Princeton University Press 1986 PP 18
20 Samuel Huntington m his amele The Clash of Civilization (Foreign Affairs Summer 1993 pp 22-49) predicted that the 
fundamental source of conflict m this new world will not be primarily ideological but cultural He divided the civilizauon in the world 
into eight big groups Western Confucian Japanese Islamic Hindu Slavic-Orthodox Latin Am encan and possibly African 
civilizauon In the new formulation of APEC the civilizauon in this group will include at least five of those eight civilizations the 
Japanese Western (the Umted Slates Canada Australia and New Zealand) Confucian (China Hong Kong Taiwan Singapore) Latin 
America (Mexico and Chili) and Islamic (Indonesia and Malaysia)
21 Helen Milner Intemauonal Theories of Cooperauon Among Nations in World Politics 44 (April 1992) p 473
22 Richard Higgott Competing Theoreucal Approaches to Intemauonal Cooperauon Implicauons for the Asia-Pacific in R 
Higgott R. Leaver and J Ravenhill Pacific Economic Cooperation in 1990s Cooperation or Conflict Boulder Lynne Rienner 
Publisher 1993 pp 290-311
23 Richard Higgott, Economic Cooperauon Theoreucal Opportunities and Practical Constraints in The Pacific Review Voi 6 
No 2 1993 pp 103-17
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First the evolutionary process of this economic cooperation cannot be viewed as starting with the 
creation of APEC in 1989 The process itself began in 1968 when the Japanese proposed the Pacific Free 
Trade Area (PAFTA) Kojima24 notes that the Pacific Basin cooperation concept was intended to promote 
cooperative relations within the region and to maximize benefits of the area s rich potential not only for 
the countries in the region but also to strengthen the prosperity and well being of all peoples in the world 
Through Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) the idea has been widely discussed and 
accepted by politicians intellectuals and leaders within the Pacific region 25
Second APEC consists of several smaller subregional groups which have collaborated for years In Asia 
there are two groups ASEAN countries (comprised of Indonesia Malaysia the Philippines Singapore and 
Thailand) and the Greater South China (GSC) Economic Zone (comprised of the economies of Hong 
Kong Macau Taiwan and two provinces of southern China Guangdong and Fujian) Before these 
cooperations were formalized each state in those subregionals had been connected by the Chinese 
overseas network which was dispersed in almost all East and South East Nauons 26 In Oceania there is 
the Closer Economic Relations (CER) group comprising Australia and New Zealand In the North Amenca 
there is North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and in South Amenca there was Latin Amencan 
Free Trade Association (LAFTA since 1960) replaced by Latin American Integration Association (LAIA 
in 1980) and Central American Common Market (CACM) which formed in 1961 Thus each part of this 
region is connected by other subregional commonalities 27 The creation of APEC can be viewed as a 
horizontal expansion of each subregion in the Pacific
Third while the creation of NAFTA caused some antagonisms28 m East Asia APEC may have the 
effect of strengthening the relationship between East Asia and North Amenca Eden and Molot29 warn that 
there are five basic issues facing the Pacific Rim countnes with the creation of NAFTA (1) the potential 
loss of access to North Amencan market by Asian firms if NAFTA becomes Fortress Amenca (2) the 
increase of competition ASEAN multinational enterprises (MNE) may face with North Amencan firms in 
global markets (3) the impact of the expansion honzontally and vertically of NAFTA on MNE locations 
and trade patterns (4) the potential weakening of the U S commitment to multilateralism and (5) the 
potential impact on Japan-U S relations Thus the creation of NAFTA can be a dnving force for Asia- 
Pacific nations to collaborate senously in APEC
Fourth the conclusion of Uruguay Round m December 1993 has resulted in diminishing trade barriers m 
many countries particularly in the Pacific Between the establishment of GATT in Geneva (1947) to the 
close of the Tokyo Round (1979) the average U S tariff declined by nearly 92 percent On the eve of the 
Uruguay round in 1987 the average tariff for the United States was 4 9 percent and for Japan it was 5 4
24 Kiyoshi Kojima Economic Cooperation in A Pacific Community in Paul F Hooper Building a Pacific Community 
Honolulu East-West Center 1982 p 23
25 See Hadi Soesastro Implications of the Post Cold War Politico Secunty Environment on the Pacific Economy in C Fred 
Bergsten and Marcus Noland Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System Washington D C Institute for International 
Economics 1993 pp 365-88 H Edward English and Murray G Smith The Role of Multilateralism and Regionalism A Pacific 
Perspective m Mohamed Anff (Ed ) The Pacific Economy Sydney Allen and Unwin 1991 pp 253-75 Gerardo P Sicat ASEAN 
and the Pacific Region in Paul F Hooper Building a Pacific Community Honolulu East-West Center 1982 pp 55-62
26 See John Kao The World Web of Chinese Business m Harvard Business Review March-Apnl 1993 pp 24-36 The 
Overseas Chinese A Dnving Force The Economist July 18th 1992 pp 21-24 Murray Weidenbaum Greater China The Next 
Economic Superpower7 St Louis Washington University Center for the Study of Amencan Business Contemporary Issues Senes 
57 February 1993 pp 2-3
27 See Samuel P Huntington p 28 Chía Slow Yue and Lee Tsao Yuan Subregional Economic Zones A New Motive Force m 
Asia-Pacific Development m C F Bergsten and M Noland Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System 
Washington D C Insolute for International Economics 1993 pp 224-69 Soogil Young East Asia as a Regional Force for 
Globalism in K Anderson and R Blackhurst Regional Integration and Global Trading System New York St. Martin s Press 
1993 pp 126-43
28 The creation of NAFTA has been perceived by the Asian leaders as the U S would abandon the principle of multilateralism and 
the U S market would be more protective and more discriminatory
29 L  Eden and M A Molot Fortress or Free Market7 NAFTA and Its implications for the Pacific Rim in R Higgott R Leaver 
and J Ravenhill Pacific Cooperation in 1990s Cooperation or Conflict pp 201-22
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percent30 On the closing date of the Uruguay Round last December all countries agreed to cut tariffs 
substantially on many commodities31 the anticipated result is that duty free imports to developed 
countries will double to 43 percent from 20 percent for developing countries it will rise to 45 percent from 
22 percent.32 Thus with lower barriers of trade existing in many countries it is not a big deal for APEC s 
members to promote trade among themselves
Fifth theoretically the number of actors hypothesis which presupposes the fewer the actors the better 
the prospects for cooperation attracts some arguments (1) if one of the players is interested in more than 
just cheating such as whether a balanced agreement can be boycotted a larger number of players may be 
better since it provides more chances for exchanges and side payments (2) the number of actors may not 
be a structural prerequisite but rather may be a strategic one that can be orchestrated by the players 
themselves In such cases circumstances involving large numbers can be broken down into circumstances 
involving fewer numbers (3) recent research in game theory finds that the prospect of cooperation m 
relatively advantageous circumstances can be strengthened by increasing the number of actors33 Oye34 
notes that reductions in number of players can usually be obtained at the cost of the magnitude of benefits 
from cooperation The advantages of subregional openness are smaller than the advantages from regional 
or global openness35 Moreover reductions in the number of players generally causes considerable costs on 
third parties 36 These externalities may encourage third parties to sabotage the limited area of cooperation 
or may serve as an catalyst for a third party to enlarge the area of cooperation
Thus I conclude that m terms of number of players while APEC has involved so many players since 
beginning there is no senous problem to evolve as a formal institution However besides number of 
players the prospect of an economic cooperation will also depend on the degree of interaction among the 
players in the region and the degree on interaction among the players inside the region with the players 
outside the region I will discuss this interaction next
The Degree of Interaction
The prospect of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation is dependent upon how the eighteen nations of APEC 
interact internally particularly the dominant global players today That interaction can be analyzed 
through the flow of trade (export and import) the flow of investment (foreign direct investment and 
portfolio capital flow) and other non trade investment interaction such as social and political interaction 
However my analyses will be limited to the flow of trade import and export
I will discuss (a) interaction among the dominant players in general (b) interaction trans Pacific 
particularly between Asia and North America and (c) interaction among nations in Asia especially 
between Japan and other Asian nations
Interaction Among the Dominant Players The dominant players in APEC can be seen from each country s 
share m international trade (import share and export share) Those shares can be seen in Table 6 1 
(Appendix) which classifies APEC into six economic subgroups These are North America (particularly
30 Jaune De Melo and Arvind Panaganya New Dimensions in Regional Integration Cambndge Center for Economic Policy 
Research 1993 p 3
31 At the end of Uruguay Round members of GATT agreed to cut tariffs substanually on chemicals wood and aluminum Most 
tariffs on microprocessors would remain at zero but those on memory chips and others would drop to 7 percent from 14 percent 
Industrial tariffs would be reduced from 4 7 percent to 3 percent In agricultural products they agree to reduce subsidies by 21 percent 
over six years Japan and Korea will permit nee import for the first urne after war Members of GATT also agree to open their markets 
to foreign financial services and to limit subsidies for research in such goods See Wall Street Journal December IS 1993
32 Goodbye GATT in Far Eastern Economic Review 30 December 1993 & 6 January 1994 pp 79-80 After Years of Talks 
GATT is at Last Ready to Sign Off on a Pact in Wall Street Journal December 1993 p 1 The World Trade Talks The Uruguay 
Round s Key Results Wall Street Journal December IS 1993
33 Helen Milner World Politics pp 473-74
34 Kenneth A Oye Cooperation Under Anarchy pp 21-22
35 Also see Peter Drysdale and Ross Gamaut The Pacific An applicauon of a General Theory of Economic Integration in C 
Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland Pacific dynamism and the International Economic System Washington D C Institute for 
International Economics 1993 p 187
36 Kenneth A Oye pp 21-22
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the United States and Canada together with Mexico) whose exports to the world in 1991 were US $
570 22 billion and imports were US $ 663 90 billion) Japan (exports to the global market about US $ 315 
billion and imports about US $ 235 billion in 1991) the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs 
particularly S Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong whose exports to the world were about US $ 230 billion 
and import about $ 250 billion m 1991) the ASEAN 4 (Indonesia Malaysia the Philippines and Thailand 
whose exports together were about US $ 96 billion and imports about US $ 103 billion in 1991) China ( 
whose exports to the world was US $ 72 billion and imports from the world about US $ 64 billion in 1991) 
and Australia and New Zealand (whose exports together to the world market were US $ 50 billion and 
imports were US $ 48 billion in 1991)37
Data in Table 6 1 (Appendix) show that interacuon on one hand mostly occurred among ASEAN-4 
NIEs Japan and North America Exports from ASEAN 4 for instance mostly goes to Japan (23 3 percent) 
North Amenca (more specifically the United States about 20 percent) and NIEs (about 20 percent)
Export shares from NIEs mostly go to North Amenca (about 25 percent) Japan and ASEAN-4 (each about 
10 percent) Also exports from Japan mostly go to North America (about 32 percent) NIEs (about 15 
percent) and ASEAN-4 (about 8 percent) While the United States is a good place for exports from Asian 
countnes exports from US to this region are not proportional Table 6 1 shows that U S exports to this 
region are only about 21 percent with half of that going to Japan (9 7 percent) On the other hand exports 
of China mostly go to NIEs (about 56 percent) particularly to Hong Kong
Australia a strong supporter and founder of APEC together with New Zealand is not a potential place 
for trading for most of Pacific nations Their exports to Australia and New Zealand m 1991 were not 
significant (between 0 8 percent to 2 42 percent) But for Australia Asia-Pacific is very important About 
80 percent of Australian exports go to this region particularly to Japan (25 percent) China (24 percent) 
North America (12 8 percent) NIEs (11 5 percent) and ASEAN 4 (6 6 percent)
Trade flow analyses of this region show that the players of Asia-Pacific have interacted intensively for 
more than a decade While exports of the United States into this region are not significant (between 2 3 
percent to 9 7 percent) imports are significant (between 3 4 percent to 15 9 percent) This causes 
speculation that the size and the purchasing power of the consumers in this region were not big enough to 
absorb the U S exports Two explanations could be denved regarding this
First U S policy dunng the cold war which emphasized political and secunty issues has resulted in the 
improvement of productivity of industry38 in this region and in turn this industrialization process has 
encouraged those nations to develop their economies based on exports Their exports to the U S market are 
mainly labor intensive goods m which they have high competitive advantage
Second the size of Asian market clearly is not small together with China it is expected to have 3 5 
billion people (of the world s 6 2 billion) in the year 2000 One study finds that by the year 2000 there will 
be about 250 million middle class households (or about 1 billion individuals) m Asia (excluding Japan)39 
The reason why US exports into this region are insignificant is because of (1) political constraints (such as 
embargoes to Vietnam China etc) which limited the movement of the U S corporations (2) 
inflexibility40 of the U S corporauons in expanding their operation in this market and (3) before the U S 
corporations entered the market there were European companies which had been there since colonization
37 United Nations 1991 International Trade Statistics Year Book
38 Between 1945-1990 the United States contributed some $ 71 billion m development aid loans technical assistance and 
other means of economic support to the Asian nations on the western side of the Pacific Rim As a comparison Marshall Plan 
provided some $ 13 billion in assistance to Europe from 1948 to 1952 or approximately $ 53 billion in 1988 dollars see Herber E 
Werner The Growth o f Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy p 59 Some documents shows that such assistance helps the 
modernization of automotive industry in Japan Korea and Taiwan
39 A Billion Consumers The Economist Survey of Asia The Economist October 1993 pp 1-22
40 Smce the U S corporations have grown large the structure of the firms tend to be bureaucratic and not responsive to the local 
conditions On the other hand most Asian firms are based on family and small business type which tend to be more flexible to take 
any opportunity than the U S corporations
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The end of cold war the persistent deficit of the U S trade the development of regionalism m the 
world along with the growth of Asian market has driven the U S corporations to expand their operations m 
Asia For instance together with abandonment of embargo to Vietnam m 1994 some U S multinationals 
expanded their operation in this region The United States has also adopted Asian export strategy (pro 
business government) which support its industries in order to compete with local companies in other 
nations
Thus while the U S exports to this region were insignificant in the near future we can expect the U S 
interaction in the economies to be more active
Trans Pacific Interaction By trans Pacific interaction I mean the trade flow between North America to 
Asia As discussed above the interaction among countries m the Asia-Pacific region has worked 
intensively for decades except from the North America to Asia The trade imbalance between the U S 
and Asia has been a source of conflict for a decade and could be an obstacle for the prospect of economic 
cooperation of APEC
In 1970 the U S trade deficit with Asia was about $ 2 billion but in 1990 it became $ 86 billion or 
about 90 percent of the total U S trade deficit with the Pacific region41 (Appendix Table 6 2) The main 
contributors to this deficit in 1990 were Japan (52 percent) Taiwan (14 percent) and China (13 percent)
Of the APEC countries only with Brunei does the U S have a surplus While the trade deficit could be a 
source of conflict between East Asian countries and the United States I argue that this conflict will not go 
further to be a more senous trade war between them The reasons are (1) m general the U S economy 
between 1985 and 1993 declined As can be seen in Table 6 2 in 1990 U S trade surplus with EC also 
declined from $ 18 873 millions to $ 2 541 millions and trade deficit with Canada was increased Thus as 
a whole U S imports were skyrocketing in the 1980s and at the beginning of 1990s due to the inability of 
US firms to compete with the foreign firms It took about ten to fifteen years42 for the U S firms to 
restructure their production facilities and to redesign their organizational structures before they could fight 
back with their foreign competitors (2) It is taking time to open the Japanese market (as a main source of 
deficit) until they began to restructure their economy distribution systems and production facilities43 (3)
It will take time to apply the agreement of the Uruguay Round (which ended December 1993) in the Asian 
nations (4) Asian consumers are not ready to purchase from the international market until they reach a 
certain level of economic well being China for instance just permitted foreign investors to produce for 
the Chinese market last year Before 1993 foreign investment in China was targeted for export 
industries44 prospects for trade between North America and East Asia tended to increase from 1970 to 
1990 when intra North Amencan trade—as a share of intra Pacific trade—was declining (Appendix Table 
6 3) Data in Table 6 3 show that the share of intra North Amencan trade decreased as a percentage of 
intra Pacific trade from 36 2 percent to 24 5 percent but the share of trade between North Amenca and 
East Asia of intra Pacific trade increased from 30 6 percent to 34 7 percent
Thus while conflict between the United States and Japan has escalated in the past ten years we could 
hope that conflict would not mitigate the prospect of economic cooperation of APEC
41 Calculated by Hadi Soesastro from International Monetary Fund See Hadi Soesastro Implications of the Post Cold War 
PoliUco-Security Environment for the Pacific Economy m C F Bergsten and M Nolan Pacific Dynamism and the International 
Economic System Washington D C Institute for International Economics 1993 pp 365-88
42 In the late 1980s some big U S corporations restructure their firm from vertical to horizontal They called this process as 
reengineering Ten to fifteen years is the expected result of their effort to bring back the firms from loss to be profitable Some
corporations promise that their effort would be rewarded in this coming year See the 1991 Annual Report o f General Electric 1993 
Company Profile o f AT&T 1993 Annual Report o f Xerox and 1992 Annual Report o f DuPont Also See Payoff from the New 
Management Fortune December 13 1993 pp 103-110 Welcome to the Revolution Fortune December 13 1993 pp 66-77 
Reengineering the Hot New managing Tool Fortune August 23 1993 pp 41-48 How to make Reengineering Really Work 
Harvard Business Review November-December 1993 pp 119-131 The Horizontal Corporation BusinessW eek  December 20 
1993 pp 76-81
43 According to Bergsten and Nolan (1993) the real barriers in Japan are not official tariffs of non tariffs but a traditional system 
such as keiretsu (p 8)
44 Asia s Giants Leam to Waltz BusinessWeek March 14 1994 pp 40-41
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Intra Asian Interaction Table 6 3 provides information that intra Asian trade increased significantly from 
17 3 percent in 1970 to 30 5 percent of total intra Pacific trade in 1990 Table 6 1 also shows the 
importance of intra Asian trade Export shares of ASEAN-4 Japan and China to the NIEs vary from 15 4 
percent to 56 percent of their total exports The same significant shares can be seen in their exports to 
Japan (from 10 percent to 25 percent) The importance of intra Asian trade can also be seen by the 
perceived structure relations among a group of neighboring countries As Hadi Soesastro has observed
The term East Asia for instance once referred to Northeast Asia alone but it now 
encompasses Southeast Asia as well This is perhaps mainly due to increased economic 
interaction between the two subregions and the development of a greater sense of affinities 
(perhaps formed from their mutual experience as targets of U S trade policies 9)45
Cohesiveness of East Asian nations of course can threaten other subregions in Asia-Pacific particularly 
Australia and the United States Australia fears to be left out because culturally they are Western but 
geographically they are not located in the Europe so that It is left out by EU 46 For the United States it 
creates problem if this cohesiveness would be dominated either by the Japanese or by the Chinese so that 
it influence diminishes m Asia
There are at least two components which hold the Asian nations together (1) the role of overseas 
Chinese merchants (2) the creation of the Yen Bloc in Asia
The Role o f the Chinese Overseas Merchants There are about 55 million Chinese overseas i e ethnic 
Chinese living outside China (see Appendix Table 6 4) Except for those in Hong Kong (6 million) and 
Taiwan (21 million) the majority of these Overseas Chinese are living in Southeast Asia (23 3 million) 47 
Typically the Chinese are merchants and their families are spread out in the world including in Canada 
the United States Australia and New Zealand As merchants they are connected with their extended 
families living abroad The Chinese in Thailand for instance usually are interconnected with their 
families in Taiwan and their families in Taiwan are interconnected with other families in Indonesia 
Malaysia Singapore California or any other place in the world 48 John Kao of Harvard has observed
What we think of as Chinese now encompasses an array of political and economic systems 
that are bound together by a shared tradition not geography For many generations emigrant 
Chinese and entrepreneurs have been operating comfortably in a network of family and clan 
laying the foundation for stronger links among business across national borders And Chinese 
owned businesses in East Asia The United States Canada and even farther afield are 
increasingly becoming part of what I call the Chinese Commonwealth 49
Recent studies of the role of the overseas Chinese in Asia indicate that (1) Chinese culture particularly 
Confucianism generates economic dynamism when it is hybridized50 The principle of Confucianism is 
centered on loyalty and mutual obligation within the Chinese extended family John Kao argues that this 
principle has strengthened the relationship among the overseas Chinese because as ethnic strangers they
45 Hadt Soesastro Implications of the Post Cold War Politico Security Environment on the Pacific Economy in C F Bergsten 
and M Noland Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System pp 380
46 See Samuel P Huntington The Clash of Civilization Foreign Affairs Summer 1993 pp 22-49
47 The Overseas Chinese The Economist July 18th 1992 pp 21-24
48 Joel Kolkm The New Yankee Traders in Pacific Inc March 1986 pp 25-8 Yuan lí Wu Chinese Entrepreneurs in 
Southeast Asia in American Economic Review 73(2) p 113-115 The Overseas Chinese A Driving Force The Economist July 
18th 1992 pp 21-24 Lee A Williams Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia Explorations in Economic History 1st. senes 
5 (1 ) pp 34-60 ReddingS G What Makes a Chinese Business Thick? Asian Business and Industry March 1979 pp 68-72
Fnends of the Family m Far Eastern Economic Review 7 February 1991 pp 48-50* The New Pacific Capitalism Chinese 
Families are Changing Business on Both Sides of the Ocean in Asian Business August 1992 pp 18-22 S G Redding Culture and 
Entrepreneurial Behavior Among The Overseas Chinese mimeo paper conference of Memonal T B Simatupang 2 Jakarta March 4 
1992 Benjamin W K To and Kendnih M Rowland Sr From Family Busmess to Managenal Enterpnse A Comparative 
Framework in Van Miller (Ed ) Midwest Review o f International Business Research Proceedings o f the 1991 Academy o f 
International Business Midwest Regional Meeting Chicago Apnl 1991 pp 6-14 Gary Coull A Giant Spiderless Web in Fcr 
Eastern Economic Review June 11 1987 pp 105-8
49 John Kao The Worldwide Web of Chinese Business m Harvard Business Review March-Apnl 1993 pp 24-36
50 Bryce Harland Wither East Asia? in The Pacific Review Voi 6 No 1 1993 pp 9-16
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always expenence uncertainties such as political upheavals social jealousy and ana Chinese movements 
PoliUcal upheavals natural disasters wars and other disasters were the source of the Confucian idea 
which suggested the ües of individual family and society could reduce the social chaos51 During the 
cold war relauonships between the overseas Chinese and their families in their hometown m mainland 
China were cut because most of their new homes were in nations against Communism Thus for more than 
forty years since the end of World War II the overseas Chinese have hybridized the principles of 
Confucianism with tradiuons of their new nations These mixed values have created what people call 
Confucianism today which resulted from a survivor mentality and dependency upon their network 
parucularly the extended family network 52 (2) The overseas Chinese merchants in Asean countries have 
played important roles m moderaung China s isolation53 The overseas Chinese have conünued to invest in 
China and trade with China while Western nations imposed sanctions against this nation due to human 
rights violauons (the June 4 1989 event) Chen Jie argues that this support was due mainly to the belief 
that any attempt to isolate China again because of the Tienanmen crack down could only increase 
uncertainaes in China s regional policy and that they rather than western naüons would be the first to 
bear the brunt (p 227)
Since most of the mtemaüonal trade flow is from traders to traders (rather than from government to 
government) there is a possibility that the Chinese traders prefer to trade among themselves This 
preferenüal aade pracüce can be viewed as an implicit indirect and invisible aade bloc in Asian nations 
Thus the United States government might not use traditional ways to pressure its Asian partners regarding 
their behavior that is related or not related to aade For instance aade embargoes would no longer be a 
good idea to pressure those counaies regarding their behavior in human rights property rights labor rights 
or even in order to open their domesuc markets Recent pressure from the United States to Japan and 
China for instance has resulted in increasing aade between Japan and China for instance m 1993 the 
bilateral aade between the two countries grew by 31 percent to $37 8 billion54 This indicates that presure 
from outsiders (out of Asian) would not be supported automatically by other Asian nauons like what 
happened during the cold war
The Creation of the Yen Bloc in Asia With the end of the ana communist Cold War Japan together with 
other Asian naaons are no longer able easily to expand their market into the U S The persistent U S aade 
deficit has escalated conflict between U S and Japan This conflict m turn could force Japan to 
saengthen its aade relationship with other Asian counaies For instance m 1987 the Minister of 
Intemauonal Trade and Industry (MITI) Hajime Tamura visited several Asean countries and encouraged 
Asian leaders to pursue a formal economic cooperation based on Asian race55
That idea then was developed by Malaysia s Prime Minister Mahatir Mohammad who proposed the East 
Asia Economic Group which was supposed to be an economic regional bloc Mahaür contended that East 
Asian counaies need to secure their stakes by having their own economic grouping56 Though this proposal 
is no longer popular (because APEC has been winning support) Hadi Soesasao observed that the idea 
remains alive m nongovernmental circles (such as intellectuals) m Asia including in Japan 57
Jeffrey A Frankel of the University of California at Berkeley also finds evidence that the yen is playing 
an increasing role in aade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region Table 6 5 (Appendix) shows his 
finding which indicates that holdings of yen have increased in the Asian central banks58 Frankel finds that
(1) foreign exchange market aading in the regional financial centers of Singapore and Hong Kong though 
sail overwhelmingly conducted m dollars now shows a much higher proporaon of aading in yen than is in
51 John Kao The Worldwide Web of Chinese Business in Harvard Business Review March-Apnl 1993 p 25
52 John Kao p 25
53 Chen Jie Human Rights ASEAN s New Importance to Chma The Pacific Review Voi 6 No 3 1993 pp 227-36
54 Asia s Giants Leam to Waltz Business Week March 14 1994 pp 40-41
55 Survey of Yen Bloc supplement in The Economist July 15 1993 pp 8-12
56 Hadi Soesastro in Bergsten and Nolan Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System p 378
57 Hadi Soesastro m Bergsten and Nolan Pacific Dynamism and the international Economic System p 379
58 Jeffrey A Frankel Is Japan Creating a Yen Bloc m East Asia and the Pacific7 San Francisco Cerner for Pacific Basin 
Monetary and Economic Studies Economic Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco mimeo Pacific basin 
Working paper Senes April 1992
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the case in Europe (2) The yen is also being used more widely in bank credits and trade m Asia The 
countries that incurred large international debts m the 1970s and early 1980s subsequently shifted the 
composition away from dollar denominated debt and toward yen denominated debt
In other research Frankel comments
Japan is in fact unusual among major countries in not having preferential trading 
arrangements with smaller neighboring countries But the hypothesis that has been put forward 
is that Japan is forming an economic bloc in the same way that it runs its economy by means 
of policies that are implicit indirect and invisible Specifically the hypothesis is that Japan 
operates by means of such instruments as flows of aid foreign direct investment and the 
other forms of finance to influence its neighbors trade toward itself This is a hypothesis that 
should not be accepted uncritically but rather needs to be examined empirically 59
Thus though Asian leaders have already chosen APEC instead of other region based or racially based 
trade blocs which exclude North America and Australia the conflict of interests might weaken the 
cooperation Whether the conflict between the United States and East Asian Countries (particularly Japan 
and the NIEs) could escalate or not will be dependent upon the readiness of the two parties to reduce their 
negative consequences for the others As I mentioned in the beginning of this paper the theory of 
cooperation states that cooperation can only take place in situation that contain a mixture of conflicting 
and complementary interests
Regionalism as an Instrument to Promote Multilateralism
In this part I will discuss why regionalism has emerged m the Pacific region or more specifically what 
will the future be m the Asia-Pacific region7 Economic cooperation or economic conflict7
In order to answer this question first I want to limit the meaning of regionalism In this paper 
regionalism is defined as preferential trade agreements among a subset of nations 60 Thus any 
preferential trade agreements which involve two or more nations can be viewed as regionalism Types of 
such regionalism could be a free trade area a customs union a common market or an economic union In 
a free trade area all barriers to trade among member countries are removed while in a customs union the 
organization moves one step forward by establishing a common trade policy with respect to nonmembers 
This arrangement could move further by allowing the movement of factors of production which the 
common market does And finally such arrangement could integrate all their economic policies or even 
their political institution into a union 61 The EU NAFTA and APEC are examples of regionalism of 
different types
Multilateralism as opposed to regionalism does not permit any discrimination or preferences m 
international trading The spint of multilateralism which is the foundation of the General Agreement on 
Tanff and Trade (GATT) is the spirit of free trade By free trade (global free trade) I mean that the flow 
of goods and services moves freely from one country to other country without any preferences Because 
under regionalism goods and services moves freely among the country members only it is 
discriminatory 62 As mentioned in the first part of this paper the development of regionalism (trade blocs) 
in Europe (EU) and North America (NAFTA) has created fear in Asia that the trade blocs might turn
59 Jeffrey A Frankel Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc Exchange Rate Policies o f the East Asian Economies San Francisco Center for 
Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies Economic Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco mimeo 
December 1992 p 10 Also see Rudiger Dornbusch The Dollar in 1990s Competitiveness and the Challenges of New Economic 
Blocs in Monetary Policy Issue in 1990s Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 1989
60 Jagdish Bhagwau Regionalism and Multilateralism in Jaune De Melo and Arvind Panaganya New Dimensions in Regional 
Integration Cambridge Center for Economic Policy Research 1993 p 22
61 Michael R Czinkota Pietra Rivoli and ükka A Ronkainen International Business Fort Worth Texas The Dryden Press
1992 pp 112-14
62 Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panaganya New Dimensions in Regional Integration New York Cambndge University Press
1993 P 4
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inward and erect high barriers against nonmembers For many politicians this movement was viewed as 
the weakness of GATT which could not enforce its members to promote multilateralism
This development raises a question Is regionalism complement to multilateralism or substitution9 For 
the pesimists and those who oppose regionalism it is clear that regionalism is substitute to 
multilateralism However for the optimists regionalism might be viewed as a vehicle to promote 
multiraleralism or m other word it is a complement to multilateralism Because of this ambiguity opinion 
it is useful to trace back the history of GATT which prohibits discrimination but allows trade blocs
As Finger mentions when GATT was established m 1947 regional arrangements in reality already 
existed in the world and could be expected to continue to be a part of international commercial 
arrangements 63 For example there were commercial treaties between Spain and Portugal between US 
and Cuba and between Belgium and the Netherlands as well as between Western countries and their ex 
colony territories This historical background caused GATT permits regional arrangements (particularly 
custom unions and free trade area) in its policies As Article XXIV of GATT states
The provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent the formation of a custom union or of a 
free trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a 
customs union or a free trade area 64
However in addition to that clause GATT specifies that the duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in 
products originating m such territories 65 This implies that the creation of trade blocs might increase the 
flow of goods and services (by eliminating barriers to trade among participants completely) and at the 
same time they might not increase the duties and other regulations of commerce affecting imports from 
third countries 66 Thus indirectly regionalism helps GATT by supporting its goal i e increases certainty 
of future market access 67
Though regionalism is allowed by GATT since 1950s there were no regional arrangement survived 
before 1980s except EC The attempt of some Latin American countries to integrate in LAFTA m 1960s 
and then in 1970s for example failed before the formation Even the North Atlantic Free Trade Area 
integrating some European Countries and the United States which proposed in 1960s failed before 
organization Jagdish Bhagwati claims that there is the U S which controls the development of such 
integration Before 1980s the attempts failed because the U S was firmly dedicated to the multilateral and 
non discriminatory approach and did not endorse the regional approach except m the case of the EC 68
However m the 1980s the idea of regionalism has come back and seems more durable than before (in 
the 1960s or in the 1970s)
The most important actor in this period again is the United States Jagdish Bhagwati notes 69
The main driving force for regionalism today is the conversion of the United States hitherto 
an abstaining party to article XXIV Beginning with the FTA with Israel (a reflection of the 
special relationship between the two nations and hence of little general value) the NAFTA is 
being negotiated with Mexico70 and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) 
envisages more FT As with the nations of South Amenca with Chile at the head of the line 
(P 29)
63 J Michael Finger GATT s Influence on Regional Arrangements in Jaime De Melo and Arvrnd Panaganya New Dimensions 
in Regional Integration Cambridge Center for Economic Policy Research 1993 p 130 
64J Michael Finger p 131
65 Paragraph 8 Article XXIV of GATT
66 Richard Blackhurst and David Henderson Regional Integration Agreements World Integration and the GATT m Kym 
Anderson and Richard Blackhurst Regional Integration and the Global Trading System New York St Martin s Press 1993 p 419
67 Richard Blackhurst and David Henderson ibid
68 Jagdish Bhagwati Regionalism and Multilateralism an Overview in Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panaganya New 
Dimensions in Regional Integration New York Cambndge University Press 1993 p 28
69 Jagdish Bhagwau ibid
70 At the end of 1993 Mexico was approved to be a member of NAFTA
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Why does the United States convert its strategy from dedicating itself to multilateralism into 
regionalism in the 1980s7 One answer is because the United States is frustrated with the slow progress of 
GATT 71 Paul Krugman argues four causes why the GATT moves so slow m the 1980s 72 First the 
participants of the multilateral negotiations (GATT) have grown large so that it is difficult to reach an 
agreement As the Number of Players theory (see part 1) suggests the prospects for cooperation are 
becoming weak as the number of players increases GATT faces this problem as well Second as the 
number of participants increases the character of trade barriers has also changed While tariff barriers 
decline non tariff barriers exist and have increased dramatically started from bureaucratic inspection to 
the voluntary export restraints (VERs) and Orderly Marketing Agreements (OMAs) Third the declining 
influence of the United States in the world weaken its ability to run the system Krugman refers to the 
hegemonic stability theory of political science which suggests that some dominant power should be 
there to enforce the rules of cooperative game (p 74) And finally there are institutional differences 
among major countries Some major players are pioneer in the free trade but others are dominated by 
cartels or regulated by informal understandings These four problems caused the multilateral negotiations 
under GATT more complicated and more difficult to reach such agreement than before
However beside the slow progress of these negotiations the U S conversion to regionalism was also 
enforced by the extension of the regionalism in Europe (EC) which brings more members and tend to be 
more protective to outmembers 73
With the creation of EU and NAFTA today the world is divided into three economic groups European 
bloc (EU) American bloc (NAFTA) and the nonblocs Fear of being left out Australia and New Zealand 
had proposed the creation of APEC which includes the major players the United States and Japan (see 
part 1) However the historical background of the participation of the United States both in NAFTA and m 
APEC teaches us that the involvement of the United States in NAFTA and then the active participation of 
the United States in APEC is no more than the continuation of the spint of free trade which today 
promoted through regionalism Thus using NAFTA and APEC the major player (in this case the United 
States) might bnng the spirit of the free trade in a more controllable group which fewer number of players 
than the world as a whole involved This approach is consistent with the theory of cooperation (number of 
players theory) which discussed in the first part. In addition as Krugman observes the absence of 
cooperation in a large blocs tends to impose higher tariffs than small players 74
Based on this review I conclude that the development of regionalism today would speed up the 
multilateral process The center of this process is sail the United States and with the creauon of APEC 
hopefully the economic cooperaüon can be achieved instead of the destrucuve conflicts paracularly 
between the United States and Japan
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to examine the meaning of regionalism under the provision of GATT For 
some poliücians regionalism is viewed not less than a substitute to multilateralism It creates preferences 
and is discriminatory It might turn inward and erect high barriers against non members However by 
examining the historical background this paper finds that GATT could use regionalism to promote 
mulülateralism Under regionalism country members might solve conflicts among themselves than under 
the mulülateral agreement m large And finally regionalism might accelerate the progress towards global 
free trade
71 Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panaganya New Dimensions m Regional Integration New York Cambridge University Press 
1993 p 5
72 Paul Krugman Regionalism versus Multilateralism Analytical Notes in Jaune De Melo and Arvind Panaganya New  
Dimensions in Regional Integration New York Cambndge University Press 1993 p 74
73 Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panaganya New Dimensions in Regional Integration New York Cambndge University Press 
1993 p 6
74 Paul Krugman Regionalism versus Multilateralism Analyucal Notes in Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panaganya New  
Dimensions in Regional Integration New York Cambndge University Press 1993 p 73
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In the first section of this part I use the concept of cooperation in order to examine the meaning of 
regionalism by looking at structures bellow APEC—countries subregions the overseas Chinese network 
and the yen blocs And finally the second part of this paper talks about structures beyond APEC mainly 
GATT the dominant players (the United States) EU and NAFTA
By looking at the structure below APEC I find that APEC might evolve further from just an informal 
forum to be a trade bloc like NAFTA and EU Without involvement of the United States m APEC there is 
a possibility that APEC would be dominated by Japan and other East Asian nations There is a strong 
indication that countries in East Asia prefer to trade among themselves rather than with the North America 
or Australia Thus without a strong commitment to involve East Asia m this effort, the world would be 
divided into three blocs i e European bloc (EU) American bloc (NAFTA) and Asian bloc (dominated by 
Japan) instead of two (Asia Pacific and the Europe) Potential conflict in the three blocs system seems 
more likely than in the two blocs system because each of this three blocs are different m institution goals 
and histoncal background
And finally by looking at the structures beyond APEC I find that by integrating into a regional 
arrangement countries are more likely to cooperate than conflict This arrangement in turn would 
accelerate the progress toward global free trade
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Appendix
TABLE 6 1 Asia Pacific Trade (In Billion US $ 1991)
Players ASEAN-4 NIEs China
Australia- 
New Zealand Japan
North
America World
ASEAN-4 2 38
Export 18 91 2 28 1 81 22 32 18 70 95 7
Im port 15 74 2 76 2 27 26 73 15 84 103 1
X share 19 8% 2 4% 1 9% 23 3% 19 5%
M share 15 3% 2 7% 2 2% 25 9% 15 4%
NIEs
Export 22 66 28 56 4 31 22 78 56 62 229 1
Im port 19 60 43 46 5 81 51 50 39 67 247 5
X share 9 9% 12 5% 1 9% 9 9% 24 7%
M share 7 9% 17 6% 2 4% 20 8% 16 0%
China
Export 2 00 40  40 0 6 10 21 6 7 71 8
Im port 2 73 19 50 1 8 10 03 9 6 63 8
X share 2 8% 56 3% 0 8% 14 2% 9 3%
M share 4 3% 30 5% 2 8% 15 77 15 7%
Aust-NZ
Export 3 30 5 73 12 10 12 50 6 41 50 0
Im port 1 88 2 95 1 60 8 10 12 40 48 0
X share 6 6% 11 5% 24 2% 25 0% 12 8%
M share 3 9% 6 2% 3 3% 16 9% 25 9%
Japan
Export 25 33 48 40 8 60 7 60 99 60 314 4
Im port 26 90 17 80 14 20 14 10 61 50 234 1
X share 8 0% 15 39 2 7% 2 4% 31 7%
M share 11 5% 7 60 6 1% 6 0% 26 3%
N-Amenca
Export 13 05 34 09 7 95 10 14 55 47 570 2
Im port 22 46 41 32 22 30 6 51 105 9 663 9
X share 2 3% 6 0% 1 4 7 1 8% 9 7%
M share 3 4% 6 2% 3 4% 1 0% 15 9%
Note Export (FOB) and Import (CIF)
Source Authors calculations based on the idea of Eden and Molot p 216 and based on data from United Nations 1991 
International Trade Statistics Year Book
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TABLE 6 2 U S Trade Balances with the Pacific 1970-1990 (millions of dollars)
Country 1970 1980 1990
Brunei na -2 2 3 A l
Indonesia 71 -3  994 -1  784
M alaysia -2 2 0 -1  351 - 2  071
Philippines -1 3 3 86 -1  451
Sm gapore 154 1 048 - 2  077
Thailand 44 397 - 2  597
China na 2 591 -1 1  489
Hong Kong -5 9 7 - 2  341 -3  110
South Korea 244 252 - 4  888
Taiwan -5 6 - 2  561 - 1 2  357
Japan -1  588 - 1 2  183 -4 4  485
East Asia Total - 2  081 -1 8  279 -8 6  262
Australia 336 1 311 3 704
New Zealand -1 0 1 -1 9 8 -1 9 4
Canada - 2  695 - 6  604 - 1 0  821
APEC Total - 4  519 -2 3  770 -9 3  573
Chile 137 795 101
M exico 405 2 311 2 422
Peru -1 4 8 -2 7 1 - 7 4
Papua New Gumea 5 -1 9 - 3 2
Russia* 41 1 029 1 920
Cambodia 1 26 na
Laos 8 -1 1
Myanmar 10 20 - 3
Vietnam 351 1 7
M ongolia -1 - 2 - 2
North Korea na na na
Colom bia 109 409 -1  371
Ecuador 11 - 8 9 -8 6 7
Total Pacific - 3  612 -1 9  561 -9 5  951
European Commumty(Ec) 1 500 18 873 2 541
Total World 779 -3 6  178 -1 2 3  914
Notes na= not available * figures refer to the former Soviet Union
Source Hadi Soesastro Implications of the Post Cold War Politico Security Environment on the Pacific Economy 
m C F  Bergsten and M Nolan p 378 Source of his calculation is International Monetary Fund Directory o f Trade 
Statistics (various issues)
TABLE 6 3 Intra Pacific Trade 1970-1990 (in billion US $)
1970 1980 1990
Intra Pacific Trade 60 94 377 99 939 34
Intra North American Trade 22 08 102 22 229 86
Share o f Intra Pacific Trade 36 2% 27 0% 24 5
Trade Between North America and East Asia 18 65 118 64 325 93
Share o f Intra Pacific Trade 30 6% 31 4% 34 1%
Intra East Asian Trade 10 55 100 74 286 33
Share o f Intra Pacific Trade 17 3% 26 7% 30 5%
Source Hadi Soesastro Implications of the Post Cold War Politico Security Environment on the Pacific Economy
m Bergsten and Nolan p 382 His source is International Monetary Fund Direction o f Trade Statistics various
issues
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TABLE 6 4 Overseas Chinese Diaspora
Ethnic Chinese (Overseas Chinese) in M illions % o f Population
Indonesia 7 2 4%
Thailand 5 8 10%
M alaysia 5 2 30%
Singapore 2 0 80%
Burma 1 5 3 4%
Vietnam 0 8 2%
Philippines 0 8 1 3%
Rest of Asia and Australia 1 8 na
United States 1 8 0 7%
Canada 0 6 2 1%
Latin America 1 0 na
Europe 0 6 na
Afinca 0 1 na
Source Overseas Chinese Economy Yearbook, 1992
TABLE 6 5 Share of the Yen in Debt Denomination and Official Reserve Holdings (in %)
Year Indonesia
Yen Share 
Korea
in external debt o f Five Countries
Malaysia Phil Thailand
Yen share in Official Holdings 
Totalof 5 Asia World
1980 20 0 16 6 19 0 22 0 25 5 19 5 13 9 4 4
1981 19 3 14 1 16 9 20 6 23 2 17 8 15 5 4 2
1982 21 0 12 3 13 3 19 2 24 0 17 2 17 6 4 7
1983 23 3 12 5 14 2 20 0 27 3 18 5 15 5 5 0
1984 25 0 12 8 21 2 20 0 29 2 20 3 16 3 5 8
1985 31 7 16 7 26 4 24 9 36 1 25 8 26 9 8 0
1986 33 9 22 0 30 4 25 5 39 9 29 3 22 9 7 9
1987 39 4 27 2 35 7 35 2 43 1 36 0 30 0 7 5
1988 39 3 29 5 37 1 40 5 43 5 37 9 26 7 7 7
1989 35 2 26 6 36 6 32 6 40  9 35 7 17 5 7 9
1990 17 1 9 1
Source George Tavlas and Yuzuru Ozeki The Internationalization o f Currencies An appraisal o f The Japanese Yen
Occasional Paper 90 Washington D C International Monetary Fund (January) p 39
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Democratization And International Cooperation 
A Comparative Analysis of Ukraine’s and Kazakhstan’s 
Responses to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime
by Alexander V Kozhemiakin 
Abstract
The primary purpose of the following study is to explore the relationship between the 
process of democratization and international cooperation Suggesting the futility of any 
attempt to mechanically extend the democratic peace argument to the countries which 
expenence the process of post authoritarian transition the study holds that the spread of 
democratic procedures has conflicting effects on the maintenance and expansion of 
international regimes Thus while admitting the long term benefits of liberal democracy 
for international cooperation it is argued that under the conditions of transitional crisis 
and in the absence of consolidated democratic institutions and liberal norms the process 
of democratization makes governments more vulnerable to the radical pressures from 
below thus inhibiting their ability to comply with those international regimes which are 
at odds with domestic preferences Empirical evidence in support of this argument is 
provided through the systematic comparison of Ukraine s and Kazakhstan s policies with 
respect to the Nuclear Non Proliferation regime
The third and the latest wave of democratization that started with the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 
1974 has covered more than thirty countries in Europe Asia and Latin America 1 This histone 
development creates an urgent theoretical as well as policy imperative to investigate the effects that the 
process of democratization might have on the patterns of international cooperation The focus on domestic 
factors in explaining the dynamics of international conflict and cooperation appears to be quite fruitful As 
noted by Helen Milner the currently prevalent theories of international cooperation face senous 
limitations because of their neglect of domestic politics 2 Similarly Peter Evans points out that the role of 
international and domestic factors in shaping the bargains between nations is simultaneous and mutual3
In recent years international relations scholars have witnessed the nse of the literature on democratic 
peace which breaking the rigid assumptions of the realist paradigm elaborates the Kantian insight 
concerning the inhibited propensity of democracies to fight each other This study however attempts to 
broaden the focus of the existing works from the analysis of well established liberal democracies to the 
examination of the international behavior of democratizing states Thus moving beyond a mere war/no 
war dichotomy the study analyzes the general predisposition of countries undergoing the process of post 
authoritarian4 transition to cooperate on the international arena
* Author s note I would like to thank Roger E Kanet Edward A Kolodziej and the participants of the Ford Foundation 
Interdisciplinary Research Seminar on Regional and Global Issues for their helpful comments and criticisms None is responsible for 
errors of fact or opinion
1 For the discussion of the third wave of democratization see Samuel Huntington The Third Wave Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century (Norman and London University of Oklahoma Press 1991)
2. Helen Milner International Theories of Cooperauon Among Nations Strengths and Weaknesses World Politics 44 (April 
1992) pp 466-96
3 Peter Evans Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics Reflections and Projections in Peter 
Evans Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam eds Double Edged Diplomacy (University of California Press 1993) pp 397-430
4 Although the terms post authoritarian and democratizing are used interchangeably in this study the former is more appropriate 
since it does not imply that the end point of the transition process will necessarily be a consolidated democracy
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Pacific Union
One of the most persistent empirical regularities in international relations is the fact that democracies do 
not fight each other5 Based on the ideas of| Immanuel Kant who develops the concept of the pacific 
union the current literature on democratic peace distinguishes between structural and cultural 
explanations of the democracy/war relationship 6 According to the structural model it is democratic 
institutional constraints that prevent democracies from fighting with each other 7 Briefly summarized this 
model states that in democracies the constraints of checks and balances the need to mobilize public 
opinion m order to obtain legitimacy for their actions slow down the decisions to engage in large scale 
violence and reduce the likelihood that sucn decisions are made Moreover leaders of other states will 
perceive leaders of democracies as so constrained Thus as Bruce Russett emphasizes leaders of 
democracies will expect in conflicts with other democracies time for processes of international conflict 
to operate and they will not fear surprise attack8
In contrast the cultural model posits that an outbreak of war between democratic states is prevented by 
deeply rooted democratic norms operating in the political process of these states Thus for example 
William Dixon postulates that democracies Iwith norms of using third party intervention for peaceful and 
non coercive resolution of conflict internally will carry those norms into management of their 
international conflicts with other democracies 9 Having conducted an empirical test of these models 
Russett finds strong evidence in support of the cultural model and some weaker but still considerable 
support of the hypothesis that underscores the effects of institutional constraints 10
It appears however that the existing literature on the democratic peace is somewhat narrow in its 
analytical focus While providing the intuitively appealing explanation of the relationship between 
consolidated liberal democracies and peace I it completely ignores the international effects of the process 
of democratization Nevertheless paraphrasing Samuel Huntington who argues that while modernity 
breeds political stability modernization leads to political decay 11 it is not unreasonable to suggest that 
while democracy promotes peace (with other democratic regimes) democratization may often lead to the 
increase m international conflicts 12
Expanding The Pacific Union9
The difficulty if not futility of applying the pacific union argument to democratizing states stems from 
the following two critical factors
Institutional Differences
As the third wave of democratization suggests the implementation of the procedural requirements for 
democracy does not necessarily mean that liberal institutions let alone liberal norms are also being
5 Depending on one s classification of cases ihe democratic peace argument can be stated as democracies rarely fight each 
other It should be emphasized however that in their relations with non democratic regimes democracies fight and inmate wars as 
often as do other types of sutes
6. See e g Bruce Russett Grasping the Democratic Peace Principles for a Post Cold War World (Princeton Princeton University 
Press 1993) Rudolph Rummel Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations Journal o f Conflict Resolution 
29 no 3 (1985) pp 419-55 Clifton Morgan Democracy and W ar Reflections on the Literature International Interactions 18 
no 3 (1993) pp 197-204
7 Clifton Morgan and Sally Campbell 
no 2 (1991) pp 187-211
8 See Russett (fn 6)
9 William Dixon Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of Intemauonal Conflict 
(March 1994) pp 14-32
10 See Russett (fn 6)
11 Samuel Huntington Political Development and Political Decay 
Comparative Political Change (Wadsworth 1967) pp
12 Note that the emphasis on intemauonal conflicts 
fremi a mere war/no war dichotomy
DomesUc Structure Decisional Constraints and War Journal o f Conflict Resolution 35
American Political Science Review 88
in Claude Welch ed Political Modernization A Reader m
207-46
(either m ihunzed or non miliunzed) broadens the scope of research agenda
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developed 13 The mere occurrence of periodic free elections does not lead to a liberal democracy Liberal 
democracy presupposes a large number of other characteristics including the rule of law an effective 
court system and a cultural support for the position that minorities (political ethnic or religious) have the 
nght to speak out and insist on their views 14 When these requirements are not satisfied it would be 
dangerously misleading to portray post authoritarian regimes as liberal And yet as emphasized above it 
is exactly on liberal institutions and norms which absorb radical foreign and domestic policy preferences 
that the pacific union is based
Differences in the Seventy of Social Problems
Moreover in contrast to well established liberal democracies many of the countnes encompassed by the 
process of democratization experience severe political socio economic ethnic and secunty problems In 
this situation radical foreign policy preferences are quite likely to gain populanty among masses as well 
as elites As the diversionary theonsts postulate under the conditions of crisis political leaders are 
likely to embark upon the adventurous foreign policy in order to distract popular attention away from 
internal social and economic problems and consolidate their own domestic political support15
Take for example the turmoil in post communist Russia that provides fertile soil for the rise of power 
hungry demagogues and political con artists who promise the confused and suffering nation easy solutions 
to complex problems 16 The results of 1993 Russian Parliamentary elections indicating the victory of the 
ultra nationalist bloc and the progressive toughening of Yeltsin s foreign policy suggest what often has 
gone unnoticed in the West it is exactly the seventy of Russia s problems at home that has been dnvmg 
Russia to behave aggressively abroad 17 Implementing a successful foreign policy campaign to defend the 
national interest is likely to be more realistic and much more politically profitable than any inevitably 
painful attempt to resurrect the collapsed economy
Thus on the basis of the preceding discussion a reasonable argument can be made that in 
democratizing states which are faced with a large number of intense social problems the nascent liberal 
norms and unconsolidated democratic institutions are not strong enough to preserve the pacific union 
Most importantly however it appears that the process of democratization can actually be responsible for 
the increase in international conflicts
The spread of democratic procedures to the countries experiencing severe political socio economic and 
secunty problems creates a potentially dangerous situation Under the strong authoritarian rule 
governments always have an option of suppressing pressures from below Once in the process of transition 
however democratizing governments essentially lose this luxury As long as such pressures are not 
directed at the radicalization of foreign policy they do not present any considerable threat to international 
cooperation However as noted earlier this is not always the case
In fact intensified by severe social problems domestic preferences may quite often contradict the 
established rules principles and norms on the international arena Under these conditions the 
maintenance of international cooperation is clearly in danger since the spread of democratic procedures 
makes governments more vulnerable to the pressures from below thus inhibiting their ability to comply 
with those international regimes18 which are at odds with domestic preferences
13 According to O Donnell and Schmilter the procedural minimum of democracies consists of secret balloting universal adult 
suffrage regular elecuons partisan competition associational recognition and access and executive accountability See Guillermo 
O Donnell and Philippe Schmilter Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies 
(Baltimore and London The Johns Hopkins University Press 1986)
14 Paul Goble Briefing on the Situauon in Russia Implementation o f the Helsinki Accords (October 1993)
15 For the detailed discussion of the diversionary theory of war see Jack Levy The Diversionary Theory of War A Critique 
in Manus Midlarsky ed Handbook o f War Studies (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press 1993) pp 259-88
16 Alexander Yanov The Zhirinovsky Phenomenon RCDA 31 no 4 (1992)
17 See Goble (fn 14)
18 Steven Krasner defines international regimes as sets of implicit or explicit principles norms rules and decision making 
procedures around which actors expectauons converge in a given area of lntemauonal relations See Steven Krasner International 
Regimes (Ithaca Cornell University Press 1983)
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In other words any government—the country s leadership capable of making decisions which are 
binding upon all segments of the population—can be considered as constantly balancing between the rules 
of international regimes and the demands of the domestic society When domestic and international 
interests collide the government weighs thje costs (political economic or military) of breaking 
international rules against the domestic repprcussions of non compliance with societal demands 19 By 
implication authoritarian governments quite ironically have a greater potential to cooperate on the 
international arena since they do not risk tneir own political survival by suppressing societal preferences in 
order to accommodate international interesa
In contrast, due to the spread of democratic procedures the governments of democratizing states 
become more accountable and therefore more vulnerable to the radical domestic pressures which flourish 
under the conditions of transitional crisis and m the absence of liberal institutions and norms Therefore it 
can be argued that when democratic procedures are extended to the countries whose domestic preferences 
are not compatible with international regimes the historically persisting instances of voluntary 
defection from international agreements are likely to be supplemented with the cases of involuntary 
violations in which the democratizing governments perceiving long term interests in being part of the 
society of states20 are nevertheless forced 
pressures 21
to defect primarily because of the unleashed domestic
To illustrate such a process of involuntary defection of a democratizing government this study 
compares the policies of two post Soviet republics—Ukraine and Kazakhstan—towards the international 
regime created by the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) From a methodological perspective the 
comparison is based on a most similar system design in which otherwise similar countries differ with 
respect to some characteristic (ì e the rates of political participation) the impact of which is being 
studied 22 The focus on the NPT is explained by the utmost policy importance of the problem of nuclear 
proliferation in general and the future of the post Soviet nuclear arsenal in particular
Ukraine Kazakhstan And The NPT Regime
After the break up of the former Soviet Union its nuclear stockpile became divided into four unequal 
parts each owned by one of the newly independent republics (see Table 1)
As a legal successor to the Soviet Union and the owner of the largest share of the former Soviet nuclear 
arsenal the Russian Federation has channelled its every effort to ensure the nuclear free status of Ukraine
Kazakhstan and Belarus Such a policy has 
in the interest of both the United States and
been actively supported by the United States government It is 
Russia that no more than one nuclear power (ì e Russia) 
emerge from the former Soviet Union and that the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine Kazakhstan 
and Belarus take place as soon as possible
In their demands the United States and Russia rely on the international regime created by the Nuclear 
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) As noted above the concept of regime refers to the set of rules
19 Note that, unlike J P Netti and Theda Skocpol in the discussion of the nexus between the society of sutes and domestic 
society this study relies on the concept of government |rather than on the more encompassing notion of the state This is done 
primarily because only few sute institutions can be truly considered as gatekeepers between mtrasocietal and extrasocietal flows of 
actions In fact it is only the country s top leadership (1 e its government) that consistently plays such a role Moreover as the 
example of Gaidar s cabinet m Russia has recently demonstrated the preferences of the government can be fundamentally at odds with 
those of the rest of the sute apparatus (the latter are included in the broad category of domestic demands ) See J P Netti The Sute 
as a Conceptual Variable World Politics 20 (July 196^) pp 559-92 and Theda Skocpol States and Social Revolution A 
Comparative Analysis o f France Russia and China (New York Cambndge University Press 1979)
20 For the discussion of the emerging society of states in which member sutes perceive themselves as being bound by a common 
set of rules and institutions see Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society (New York Columbia University Press 1977)
21 Even though volunury and involuntary types of defection may be quite difficult to disentangle in some mstances the 
underlying logic as emphasized by Robert Putnam is quite different Voluntary defection refers to reneging by a rational egoistic 
government in the absence of enforceable contracts Ini contrast involuntary defection mstead reflects the behavior of the 
government that is unable to deliver on a promise because of the domesuc constraints See Robert Putnam Diplomacy and Domestic 
Politics The Logic of Two Level Games International Organization 42 (Summer 1988) pp 427-60
22 Giovarmi Sarton Comparing and MiscompanJg Journal o f Theoretical Pol a ics 3 no 3 (1991) pp 243-257
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TABLE 1 Deployment of Strategic Nuclear Weapons after the Break up of the Soviet Union
R e p u b l ic S ites o r  Bases L a u n c h e r s W a rh e a d s
Russia
ICBM 24 1 064 4 278
HB 4 122 367
SLBM 2 940 2 804
Ukraine
ICBM 2 176 1 240
HB 2 101 168
Kazakhstan
ICBM 2 104 1 040
HB 1 40 320
Belarus
ICBM 2 54 54
Notes ICBM— intercontinental ballistic missile SLBM— submarine launched ballistic missile HB— heavy bomber 
Source Evidence accompanying the START Treaty
principles and norms that govern an international issue Like other aspects of international law the basic 
norm m the non proliferation regime restricts the a priori assumption that in a world of sovereign states 
any measure of self defense is legitimate 23
More precisely the NPT forbids nuclear weapon states (defined as those that manufactured and 
exploded a nuclear device prior to January 1 1967 i e United States Soviet Umon/Russia Britain 
France and China) to assist any nation in acquiring nuclear weapons and forbids non nuclear weapons 
member states from acquiring them All parties must agree to use the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and its system of full scope safeguards to assure accountability of all nuclear weapons related 
matenals 24
In fact the NPT can be seen as one of the latest assertions of a supenor right to secunty by great 
powers As emphasized by David Gillard throughout history great powers have believed that they have a 
supenor nght to security and therefore a right to expect that weaker neighbors should contnbute to that 
secunty even at the expense of their own by accepting limitations on their freedom of action 25 In the 
context of the NPT and the post Soviet nuclear arsenal such a limitation means the acceptance of a 
nuclear free status by Ukraine Kazakhstan and Belarus In return however while promising financial 
assistance to help the republics with the process of dismantlement of their nuclear stockpile the United 
States has not made any clear commitment to other forms of economic aid
Before proceeding to the analysis of the Ukrainian and Kazakh responses to the superpower pressure to 
disarm it is important to underline the similarity in the intensity of secunty threats that these two 
countnes are facing 26 Unequivocally both republics have the fear of Russia s impenal encroachments 
upon their sovereignty as their major security concern Such a fear is not unsubstantiated Thus for 
example as former Russian Vice President Rutskoi put it the histoncal consciousness of the Russians 
will not allow anybody to equate mechanically the borders of Russia with those of the Russian Federation 
and to take away what constituted the glorious pages of Russian history 27 Even President Yeltsin who 
impresses the West with his pro democratic stance tends to make similar statements (though using a
23 See Joseph Nye Diplomatic Measures in Robert Blackwill and Albert Camesale eds New Nuclear Nations (New York 
Council on Foreign Relauons Press 1993) pp 77-96
24 While Israel India and Pakistan have not declared their nuclear status they are generally recognized as being beyond the 
nuclear threshold The upcoming 1995 NPT Review Conference might consider a one time admission of these three countnes to the 
Treaty in return for a strengthened prohibition against the transfer of weapons or technology to non nuclear sutes and for increased 
transparency for all nuclear programs See Paul Doty and Steven Flank Arms Control for New Nuclear Nations in Roben Blackwill 
and Alben Camesale eds New Nuclear Nations (New York Council on Foreign Relations Press 1993) pp 53-76
25 David Gillard Bntish and Russian Relauons with Asian Governments in the Nineteenth Century in Hedley Bull and Adam 
Watson eds The Expansion o f International Society (Oxford Clarendon Press 1984) pp 87-98
26 This study does not consider the case of Belarus since despite its declarauon of independence the republic essenually remains 
in a position of a satellite of the Russian Federauon
27 Pravda (30 February 1992)
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different vernacular) the time has come for distinguished international organizations including the UN 
to grant Russia special powers of a guarantor of peace and stability in regions of the former USSR 28
It should be emphasized that both Kazakhstan and Ukraine are hosts to the largest Russian minorities in
the former Soviet Union Currently ethnic 
one quarter of the republic s population29
Russians number 11 4 million in Ukraine compnsing almost 
Similarly at the beginning of 1993 364 per cent (more than 7 
million) of Kazakhstan s population identified themselves as Russian 30 Most importantly together with 
such large groups of Russians both republics harbor the same paralyzing fear that members of the Russian 
minority can potentially form a Fifth Column loyal to Moscow s interests thus threatening the 
republics sovereignty31
Kazakhstan s and Ukraine s insecurity is further intensified by the major concerns for the inviolability of 
their borders For example in Ukraine the ¡question of control over the Crimean peninsula which used to 
form part of Russia until 1954 has emergedjas one of the major security issues Actively supported by 
Moscow the increasingly powerful Russian nationalist circles in the Crimea have recently demanded the 
peninsula s re incorporation into the Russian Federation Similarly in Kazakhstan m the heavily 
Russified north western region of Uralsk the Union of Russian Cossack Forces insists on their territory s 
reunion with Russia |
Thus it appears that it would not be unreasonable to argue that security threats faced by Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan are to a large extent similar And yet as the discussion below indicates the Ukrainian and 
Kazakh responses to the superpower pressure to abandon their share of the post Soviet nuclear arsenal
have been quite different The key to such a 
participation in each republic
divergence lies primarily in different levels of political
Unlike Kazakhstan Ukraine has introduced substantial political freedoms This however has not 
ameliorated grave socio economic problems of the country In fact the current situauon m Ukraine is 
characterized by mass disenchantment with the reforms falling economic production and rising crime 
rate Under such conditions it is not surprising that nationalist sloganeering has an extremely powerful 
appeal Indeed the nationalist mantle and ml particular the tough stance on the issue of the ownership 
of nuclear weapons has become a necessary requirement for domestic political legitimacy
It is exactly the question of ownership of p lst Soviet nuclear weapons (to keep or not to keep7) that 
evolved into a central political issue activating many constituencies Ukrainian nationalists wasted no 
time augmenting the perception of a security |threat stemming from Russia thus molding the public 
opinion against signing the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty as a non nuclear state As a result such 
societal preferences were determining the government s foreign policy for about two years
Finally however under the extensive pressure from the United States and Russia Ukrainian President 
Kravchuk announced at the Winter 1994 summit m Moscow that Ukraine had agreed to send its strategic 
nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantlement And yet immediately afterwards Ukraine s parliament 
asserted that Kravchuk lacked the authority to make such a deal32 This action on Kravchuk s part 
combined with his agreement to trade the Ukrainian portion of the Black Sea Fleet to Russia for the 
forgiveness of the republic s oil and gas debt—almost resulted in his downfall Eventually he was forced 
to agree to early presidential and parliamentary elections
In contrast in Kazakhstan political participation has remained quite limited The Kazakh government 
being completely controlled by former communists has managed to slow down the rate of political 
change Thus for example all public demonstrations in the republic have been outlawed by presidential 
decree It should also be emphasized that in Kazakhstan the political groups opposing communism
28 Quoted in Russia Has No Special Minority Rights Claim The Christian Science Monitor (14 April 1993)
29 Anthony Hyman Russians Outside Russia World^Today 49 (November 1993) pp 205-7
30 Neil Melvin Russia and the Ethno Poliucs of Kazakhstan World Today 49 (November 1993) pp 208-9
31 See Hyman (fn 29)
32 Dunbar Lockwood Purchasing Power The Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists (April 1994) pp 10-12
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virtually did not exist before the fall of the communist regime in Moscow Opposition movements have 
had little time and have made little impact on the mentality of the majority of the republic s population33
Under such conditions the Kazakh government compared to its Ukrainian counterpart is much less 
dependent on popular preferences In fact political conservatism m Kazakhstan has played a major role m 
suppressing the rise of nationalist sentiments This allowed Kazakh President Nazarbayev to succumb to 
the American and Russian pressure quite easily and publicly agree to the elimination of the republic s 
nuclear arsenal without any significant repercussions for his political career
The preceding discussion of the Ukrainian and Kazakh cases suggests an interesting pattern Both 
Presidents who by virtue of their position are strongly oriented towards their respective republic s 
integration into the world economy and into the civilized international community (1 e society of states) 
are willing to adopt a pragmatic foreign policy and make concessions on their security interests in order to 
avoid international tensions and clear the way for potential foreign aid and investment Moreover it should 
also be emphasized that both Ukrainian and Kazakh Presidents perceive cooperation with the United 
States and other Western democracies as a means of legitimizing their own political regimes
Nevertheless in Ukraine with its increased level of political participation prompted by the process of 
democratization the President was forced to adopt for a substantial period of time a tougher foreign 
policy violating the established international regime in order to bolster his domestic political status Only 
after the extensive international pressure did he succumb In contrast m more authoritarian Kazakhstan 
President Nazarbayev having an advantage of essentially independent foreign policy formulation made 
an early (though sometimes inconsistent) commitment to nuclear disarmament
Thus unlike Kazakhstan Ukraine is undergoing the process of democratization of diplomacy or 
opening up of the foreign policy formulation to broad societal demands This affects the ability of the 
republic s government to be flexible and make compromises on the international arena In game 
theoretical terms the Ukrainian leadership is forced to play a classical two level game 34 At the 
national level domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt certain 
policies and the government attempts to secure its power by meeting the demands of those groups At the 
international level however the national government simultaneously seeks to minimize the adverse 
consequences of foreign pressures to which by virtue of its position the top leadership is extremely 
sensitive In contrast for Kazakh President Nazarbayev the non proliferation game is played primarily 
at the international level As a result his ability to adhere to the NPT Treaty and accept a non nuclear 
status has been much stronger
Conclusion The Dilemma Of Transition
As the comparison of Ukraine s and Kazakhstan s nuclear policies suggests the process of 
democratization of diplomacy can under certain conditions be quite detrimental with respect to the 
establishment and maintenance of international regimes in general and the Nuclear Non Proliferation 
regime in particular Besides its policy importance the preceding analysis of the relationship between the 
rates of political participation and governments international behavior has significant theoretical 
implications Most importantly it suggests the following fundamental dilemma
On the one hand it is not unreasonable to argue that the spread of liberal democracy all around the 
world can in the long run contribute to the convergence of domestic societal preferences thus minimizing 
the potential for conflict between international regimes and domestic societies As the proponents of such 
an optimistic scenano of the development of international relations postulate the spread of liberal ideas
33 Oleg Puzanov Quiet Tensions The Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists (October 1993) pp 30-32
34 See Putnam (fn 21)
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as well as the expansion of capitalist marl 
between domestic societal preferences36
:ets of people goods and capital35 slowly erases differences
Note for example that Karl Deutsch s notion of peaceful change —the resolution of social problems 
between states without resort to large scale physical force—depends largely on the convergence of 
societal preferences37 Deutsch argues that peaceful change cannot be assured without we feeling 
between nations the sense of community involving partial identification in terms of self images and 
interests the creation of what can be called an international civil society It is important to emphasize 
that only liberal democracies with their support for civil societies at home can allow for the convergence 
of civil societies at the international level j 8
On the other hand however the third wave of democratization extends democratic procedures to the 
politically unstable countries characterized j by severe socio economic problems Under these conditions 
and m the absence of consolidated democratic institutions as well as liberal norms the spread of 
democracy (at least in the short run) makes governments more vulnerable to the radical pressures from 
below thus inhibiting their ability to comply with those international regimes which are at odds with 
domestic societal preferences
The principal message of this dilemma juxtaposing the short term against long term effects of the spread 
of democracy for international relations in the post Cold War era is quite clear With the recent collapse 
of authoritarian and communist regimes the process of democratization of diplomacy that started m the 
nineteenth century is likely to continue its triumphant march thus allowing for more and more intrusion of 
domestic politics into the conduct of international relations Given the expanding number of procedural 
democracies covenng a wide variety of different countries and peoples it will become increasingly 
difficult to sustain those international regimes that do not take into account basic domestic concerns of 
their member states In other words if the conflict between international regimes and immediate societal 
preferences exacerbates then the historically persisting instances of voluntary defection from 
international agreements are likely to supplemented with the cases of involuntary violations in which 
the democratizing governments perceiving long term interests in being part of the society of states are 
nevertheless forced to defect primarily because of the domestic pressures intensified by transitional crisis
And yet the spread of democracy can m the long run actually contribute to the convergence of societal 
preferences This is most likely to happen under the conditions of the effectively functioning free market 
economy and the successful development of Jdomestic civil societies and liberal norms It will not be too 
far fetched to argue that international regimes created as a result of such a convergence are likely to be 
much more durable than those which are based on cooperation of national governments alone
35 For the discussion of the historical interplay between capitalist development and democracy see Dietnch Rueschemeyer 
Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago Umversity of Chicago Press 1992)
36 For an extreme version of this optimistic scenario see Francis Fukuyama The End of History National Interest 16 (Summer
1989) pp 3-17 I
37 Karl Deutsch et al Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton Princeton University Press 1957)
38 Another factor that can be highly conducive to the | con vergence of domestic societies at the international level is a common 
religion And yet, since today s world is characterized by a variety of different (often mutually hostile) religions it can be argued that 
the in group cohesion among several nations bound by a common religion does not prevent and in some cases actually exacerbates 
their conflict with an out group For the discussion of such a pessimistic scenario see Samuel Huntington The Clash of 
Civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993) pp 22-47
Chapter 8
The Expansion of the Democratic Peace9 
A Case Study of Russia
by Nathaniel P Lane
Since the fall of the imperialistic regime m Portugal the world has experienced a tide of transitions from 
authoritarian rule [Huntington 1991] A large body of literature upholds the near absence of militarized 
disputes between democrauc states m the post World War II period 1 Thus the possibility of the 
consolidation of democracies brings with it the Kantian hope of an international system increasingly 
characterized by peace
Unfortunately nothing insures that emerging democracies will adhere to the norm of democratic peace 
The literature demonstrating peace between democracies covers bounded temporal domains (usually after 
1945) and does not address changes in norms of democratic peace If new democracies rule out the use of 
military force m their relations with other democracies the norm of democratic peace will be 
strengthened However as Russett [1993 136] admits Norms may be violated and break down
This paper will address the question of whether the norm of democratic peace is spreading globally It 
will be shown that peace is not intrinsic to relations between democracies but instead that peace relies on 
acceptance of norms Russia will be examined to provide evidence on whether a state that has undergone 
a recent transition from authoritarian rule adopts norms of democratic peace It is hypothesized that based 
upon their bnef but violent experience with democracy Russians will not exhibit the norm of peace 
between democracies A longitudinal analysis of Russia s foreign policy will compare penods in which the 
level of institutional constraints differed Russian foreign policy has eschewed peaceful dispute settlement 
when democratic institutions were strong thus supporting the hypothesis that democratic norms that would 
constrain conflict do not yet exist in Russian society
The Normative Basis of the Democratic Peace
The idea that peace between states could eventually encompass international society is as old as 
Immanuel Kant Currently a strong consensus agrees with the proposition that democracies do not fight 
wars with one another 2 In fact the relationship has been described as the one closest to a law m the study 
of international relations [Levy 1989] Gleditsch [1992 370] goes so far as to argue that all research 
on the causes of war in modem times will be regarded as suspect if it is not first corrected for [nonwar in 
democratic dyads]
Attempts at explaining the lack of war in democratic dyads fall into two empirically overlapping but 
yet analytically distinct categories The first explanation points to the institutional constraints present in 
democracies Leaders who might otherwise initiate war or take actions that might lead to war are often 
blocked by institutional obstacles peculiar to democracies according to this explanation The most obvious 
institutional constraint is elections Leaders that involve their country in an unpopular war are unlikely to 
be re elected3 More immediate constraints include competition from political opposition and the extent to 
which decisionmaking power is dispersed [Morgan & Campbell 1991 190-2]
1 R J  Rummel (198S) provides an inclusive review of studies up until the publishing date of his amele For a review of more 
recent literature refer to Russett (1993)
2 See Gleditsch (1992) for analysis on why political scientists took so long to agree on this relationship
3 Morgan and Campbell (1991) note that although this is the constraint most commonly focused upon by the democracy and war 
literature it is probably the least important because it is less immediate than other constraints Another reason why elections may not 
be particularly important in preventing decisions for war is that a leader in any system faces the possibility of removal if an ill 
considered war is entered into (Beuno de Mesquita Siverson & Woller 1992)
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The second type of explanation for the < 
governance This explanation which is bes
iemocratic peace relies on norms associated with democratic 
it expressed by Dixon [1993 1994 Maoz & Russett 1992]
focuses on the norms of negotiation and non violent settlement of differences present in democracies 
Dixon writes that democracies will attempt to extend their non violent methods of conflict resolution into 
the arena of international relations Because reaching a negotiated settlement requires the participation of 
all sides to a dispute Dixon argues for a weakest link conceptualization of international negotiations in 
which even the participant least disposed to non violent conflict resolution must agree not to escalate
Russen [1993 35] presents an additional proposition closely related to those of Dixon Russett writes 
that decisionmakers will expect decisionmakers m other states likewise to follow the same norms of 
conflict resolution as have been developed within and characterize those other states domestic political 
processes ” This means that democracies wjill feel little threat of war from other democracies 4 The 
expectation that other democracies will follow peaceful procedures is closely tied to the behavioral norm 
of actually following these procedures In the modem age leaders must demonstrate some imminent threat
to justify war A democracy cannot plan fc 
expect that other democracies will wish to
)r war against other democracies precisely because its citizens 
resolve differences through peaceful means5 As Ray [1992 
422] writes in a world in which ethica norms against war initiation are very strong suspicions that 
one s state is about to be the victim of attack will eventually lose their logical base and accusations 
regarding imminent attacks will lose their credibility
Although there is some support for the institutional explanation of the democratic peace the normative 
explanation is more powerful First, the institutional explanation encounters some difficulty m accounting 
for the fact that democracies are just as likely to initiate and fight in wars as non democracies If 
decisionmakers in democracies are constrained from initiating war democracies should be expected to 
fight in less wars The ad hoc answer to this flaw is that leaders may initiate attacks against non 
democracies because of the threat of surprise attack [Russett 1993 40 Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 
1992] This answer in effect reverts to the normative explanation i e non democracies are not restricted 
by norms against violence so democracies should not be bound to uphold their commitment to 
nonviolence6 Second as Morgan and Campbell [1991 208-9] point out in cases where the public is more 
jingoistic than governments institutional access can actually increase belligerency The analytical 
objections are upheld by the empirical evidence While Russett and Maoz [1993] provide evidence to 
support both explanations they find that the normative explanation is the stronger of the two Morgan and 
Campbell [1991] are even more skeptical of the institutional argument after their research found that 
institutional restraints inhibited war only among the great powers and there is no theoretical reason why 
restraints should effect only these states
One weakness in the literature on the democratic peace is that it does not recognize the joint necessity 
of democratic norms and democratic institutions in the production of the democratic peace The finding by 
Morgan and Campbell [1991] that institutional constraints do not significantly reduce conflict can be 
explained by the fact that institutional constraints are meaningless without democratic norms Institutional 
constraints merely give influence to those beyond the leader s immediate circle of power If those wielding 
the influence given to them by institutional jconstraints do not hold peaceful norms they are just as likely 
to push for war as for peace Similarly a citizenry typified by the norm of democratic peace means little if 
the leader is not bound by any democratic constraints
4 Another implication of this argument is that democracies in a dispute attempt conflict resolution more quickly because each side 
recognizes that the other side will negotiate While not directly testing the onset of negotiations Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 
(1992) find that disputes in democrauc democratic dyacs are settled more quickly than in other dyads which offers supports the 
suggestion that each side is amenable to compromise within these dyads
5 This is not to say that democracies have never developed plans for war against other democracies For example Richard Ned 
Lebow (1974) provides a description of plans developed by Ireland to seize Deny and Belfast in Northern Ireland This example tends 
to support the illegitimacy of a democracy attacking another democracy First the plans called for the staging of a border incident as 
a pretext for the attack Secondly news of the plans precipitated a cabinet crisis Third the state of democracy in Northern Ireland is 
seriously compromised by the withdrawal of home rule! Lastly the plan assumed noninterference by the British Army meaning that 
Ireland would not consider an actual war against democratic Britain
6. This is reminiscent of Hobbes s fundamental law of nature That every man ought to endeavor Peace as farre as he has hope of 
obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of Warre (p 92)
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The Expansion of Norms Promoting the Democratic Peace
The overwhelming evidence that democratic states have not fought other democratic states since World 
War II sull leaves much room for skepücism about the expansion of democratic peace Because norms are 
dynamic [Axelrod 1986 Goertz and Diehl 1992] there is no inherent reason why the norm of democraüc 
peace should automaücally expand to new democracies Norms change over üme If actors begin to ignore 
norms and they are not punished previously established norms can break down [Axelrod 1986] On the 
other hand increasing adherence to norms can enhance the power of norms by creaüng the expectaüon 
that norms will be followed [Goertz and Diehl 1992]
There are several reasons to believe that the norm of democraüc peace may also be subject to future 
change The correlaüon between democracy and peace while demonstrated for the Western countries 
during the penod of the Cold War may not be generalizable to other spaüal or temporal domains To 
begin with the empincal support for the norm of democraüc peace is temporally limited Because the vast 
majority of democraüc dyads have only been in existence after World War II the absence of wars 
between democracies before this penod could be purely coincidental7 Indeed an examination of an 
mtemaüonal system from another era fails to uncover convincing evidence of the democraüc peace In 
analyzing the relations between polmes in the Ancient Greek system Russett and Antholis find that 
aggregate quantitaüve analysis neither clearly confirms nor clearly disconfirms the hypothesis (of 
democraüc peace) In other words wars between democratic dyads in the Greek system were roughly as 
frequent as wars within other dyads Attempts to explain deviant cases are ad hoc because wars between 
democracies are clearly not deviant in Ancient Greece
Moreover the democratic peace may be spatially limited to Europe or countries with heavy European 
influence The international relations literature based upon data sets could not support the generalization 
of the democratic peace beyond these societies simply because they compromise the vast proportion of 
democraüc states Some anthropological evidence suggests that the democratic peace may hold in other 
tradmonal cultures [Russett Ember & Ember 1993] but it is not empirically demonstrable that this is true 
for naüon states
The expansion of the democratic peace depends m large part upon the recognition of the absence of 
wars between democracies If leaders of democracies believe that other democracies are trustworthy and 
peaceful then the democratic peace will become a self fulfilling prophecy because democraüc states can 
escape the security dilemma vis a vis one another Unfortunately the establishment of the democratic 
peace as an empincal fact is inhibited by the many possible explanaüons of the absence of war among 
democracies that do not allow for democraüc dyads being intrinsically peaceful Although and Maoz and 
Russett [1992] find that democratic dyads are significantly more peaceful than expected after taking into 
account alliances contiguity wealth and political stability few outside of quantitative social science are 
likely to reject these alternate explanations and completely trust democracies Russett hopes that social 
science can create reality [1993 136] by demonstrating the existence of the democratic peace but this 
gives social science too much credit for influencing immediate policy Social scientists cannot reassure 
policymakers because of the gap between academics and policymakers No political scienüst can 
guarantee a leader of a democracy peaceful behavior by other democracies 8
The central quesüon in assessing the potential for a relatively peaceful mtemaüonal system based upon 
the expansion of democracy is whether norms of democratic peace will be adopted m emerging 
democracies Getting at the transmission of norms is confounded by the lack of attention m the literature 
on the democraüc peace to what exactly is meant by a norm Dixon s explanaüon of the democraüc peace 
corresponds most closely with norms as habits In the same way that drivers form habits of obeying traffic 
lights (except when they are yellow) decisionmakers in democratic states form habits of compromise and 
nonviolence Under this conceptualization of norms it then becomes natural to conduct diplomacy 
according to these habits This conceptualization runs counter to the observaüon that democracies cease
7 Moreover the absence is only relative not absolute because of the War of 1812
8 Neustadt and May note that in conversations with government officials academics know too much and may well have trouble 
saying anything without qualification Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis (1987 3)
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this habitual behavior in cases where militarized disputes with non democracies occur Moreover it is 
likely that decisionmakers can separate their habits of compromise from the cold calculations of seeking 
the national interest in international relations9
Another conception of norms entails conformity to ideals This conception is also consistent with the 
normative explanation of peace Decsionmakers in democracies may idealize compromise and the 
peaceful resolution of conflict Under this conception of norms leaders are not necessarily motivated out of 
habit as by a belief that peaceful compromise is to be valued as a means to settling conflict However 
this conception of norms is insufficient to explain when peaceful compromise succeeds and when it fails 
As with norms conceived of as habit the fact that democracies engage in war as frequently as non 
democracies means that the ideal of compromise is not ovemding
The potential for some democracies failing to heed the norm of democratic peace means that all 
democracies must have some recourse to the use of force in the interest of self preservation As Ray [1992 
422] wntes because of the security dilemma in the international system and because of the lack of a 
central authority to enforce adherence even to widely agreed upon norms an aggressive state could if it 
chose put its peace loving counterpart in situations m which it has only the choice between fighting a 
war and ceasing to exist This problem is compounded by the inability to determine precisely which 
states accept the norm of peace between democracies and which states remain potentially aggressive
Because of the imperfections in utilizing t^he above conceptions of norms to explain the democratic 
peace a third conception of norms is preferred This is the conception of norms as rules that are followed 
out of long term self interest Decisionmakers m democracies will follow the rule giving rise to the 
democratic peace (ì e do not initiate the use of force against another democracy) as long as this is 
perceived as being in their long term interest This is not to deny the possibility that leaders personally 
accept ethical norms and are sometimes swayed by them The element of self interest is necessary merely 
because as discussed above the ideal of peaceful settlement of disputes is not an absolute especially in 
international politics Leaders will not risk national sovereignty over principles As Morgenthau puts it 
[1985 (1948) 12] The individual may say 'for himself Fiat justitia pereat mundus (Let justice be done 
even it the world pensh) but the state has no nght to say so in the name of those who are in its care
If norms of democratic peace relate to sel 
if they are to be maintained [Axelrod 1986]
' interest there must be some mechanism to enforce the norms 
There are two logical and possibly mutually reinforcing
sources of enforcement of the norm of democratic peace domestic society and the international system
(or at least the subsystem of democratic states) The potential power of both of these sources of normative
enforcement is noted by Ray [1992 414] In 
Union s and Slavery stance was formulated
discussing the American Civil War he notes that the 
to cultivate domestic and international political support based 
on the belief that slavery was wrong The bulk of the democracy and peace literature sides with 
domestic societies as the enforcers of the democratic peace Decisionmakers m democracies cannot make 
war against other democracies because theirjown society will not accept it An alternative source of 
enforcement is the international system Democracies that obey the norm of democratic peace may 
sanction democracies that defect from adherence to the norm Enforcement of the norm of democratic 
peace at the international level could take th'e form of supporting the democracy that is perceived to be 
the victim of aggression or treating the aggressor as a state with a reputation for aggressing in the future
Difficulties with enforcement on the international level confirm the wisdom of explaining the 
democratic peace by reference to domestic pjolitics The first problem with international enforcement is 
that it might involve the use or threat of force by democracies against other democracies thus 
undermining the very norm the enforcement seeks to uphold Moreover precisely because there are so few 
examples of militarized conflicts between democracies there is little opportunity for democracies to 
demonstrate their resolve to punish violations of the democratic peace These problems are compounded 
for explaining how norms expand Norms might be maintained because of fears that violating them would 
result m expulsion from a security community However emerging democracies may not be certain that 
they will be included in a security community even if they obey norms of democratic peace
9 Individuals can compartmentalize modem rational processes and habits stemming from tradition Cf Banvazizi 1987
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Thus explaining the expansion of norms of democratic peace necessitates the examination of political 
culture [Chan 1993] This paper will examine the expansion of the norm of democratic peace with 
reference to the Soviet Union and its mam successor state Russia It will be argued that Russians are 
unlikely to associate democracy with peace and thus the norm of democratic peace is not yet present 
The case of Russia is chosen because it is the most significant for the future of the democratic peace If 
democracy in Russia is consolidated but the norm of democratic peace is rejected it will make the 
acceptance of the norm of democratic peace in the other ex republics of the former Soviet Union a 
distinction without a difference It would be dysfunctional for other states to maintain that democratic 
states are peaceful states if the nuclear power on their border is the exception to the rule Under this 
scenano the other former republics would be forced to fight another democracy or see their sovereignty 
restncted or even lost A perhaps more likely scenario is that a belligerent Russia would mean the failure 
of democracy m many of the other ex republics thus stemming the democratic peace by preventing the 
consolidation of a substantial portion of the third wave [Simes 1992]
Russian historical experience and democracy
A not insignificant number of Russians are unimpressed by democracy 10 Of course these people cannot 
be expected to protest the use of force against democracy But if those opposed to democracy have no 
definite opinions on how foreign policy should be conducted and those supporting democracy hold the 
norm of democratic peace it is still possible that Russian foreign policy will be constrained against the 
use of force and threats against other democracies As noted above the establishment of norms of 
democratic peace is highly dependent upon the expectation that other democracies will also obey these 
norms A primary method of evaluating whether other democratic states might obey the norm of 
democratic peace is judging whether it has been obeyed in one s own state i e Russians evaluate the 
intentions of other emerging democracies in part based upon their own experience [Russe« 1993 31-32]11
To begin with Russia although certainly not a consolidated democracy can be labelled democratic 
Elections are not a sufficient condition for a representative democracy [Schmitter & Karl 1991] but they 
are a necessary condition Przeworski [1992] has identified uncertainty as the key element of democracy 
In a nondemocratic regime those heading the regime are able to know with a large degree of certainty 
that policies they favor will be adopted In a democracy there is uncertainty because who represents the 
people is determined by election and in many cases because democratically elected bodies must 
compromise to determine policy 12 Until the December 1993 elections for parliament it could be argued 
that Russia was not democratic because many members of parliament were chosen under rules that 
favored Communists Now despite some electoral regularities Russia meets the procedural requirements 
of a democracy
One measure of the consolidation13 of democracy is that major actors compete for political power solely 
within the confines of the democratic rules of the game The behavior of actors m Russia has been 
questionable in large part because the rules of the game were not settled until the December elections 
Yeltsin s Decision to dissolve parliament was clearly extra Constitutional but the Constitution itself was a 
patchwork document that still referred to the Soviet Union After the elections and the referendum on the
10 A recent poll by the weekly Moskovskn Novosti (Mar 20-27 1994) reported that in response to the question Under present 
conditions does Russia need strict order (a dictator) (parentheses in original) 44 percent responded no 24 percent yes and 32 
percent said it was difficult to answer The survey had 2005 respondents and was conducted by VTsIOM The results of a survey 
announced on the news program Vesti (RFE/RL Daily Report Aug 18 1994) largely confirm those reported in Moskovskn Novosti 
In the Vesti survey (conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center with Argumenty i Fakty) about half of the respondents said that 
they believe democracy is necessary for Russia while about a quarter said that Russia does not need democracy
11 Russia s first experience with a liberal regime under Kerensky ended in a violent revolution and a bloody civil war The brevity 
of this experience and the fact that it occurred more than three quarters of a century ago likely diminish its significance in the 
formation of present day attitudes about democracy thus it is ignored in the treatment of experiences with democracy in this paper
12 A delegative democracy in which the president is essentially given a mandate to rule as he or she wishes with minimal input 
from other bodies can meet the procedural requirements of democracy although chances for consolidation are slim See Guillermo 
O Donnell (1994)
13 Consolidauon has many different operational measures such as the alternation of power to a second party or the existence of 
democracy for a certain length of time but essentially it denotes that major political actors play by the rules of democracy
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for a similar dissolution of the legislative b
lable to gamer political support domestically or internationally 
iranch in the future
While the above analysis delineates present day Russia from the Russia of a year ago the difference is 
not necessarily clear in the minds of Russians The violence that ensued after demokratizatstya first m the 
coup attempt in 1991 and then in the breakdown of democratic institutions in 1993 may be seen by 
Russians as indicative of democratic politic's Even since the storming of the Russian White House 
behavior within democratic bodies themselves has not always been characterized by non violent 
deliberation as witnessed by such events as members of parliament getting in a fist fight over a place in 
lunch line Political developments in regions of the Russian Federation outside of Moscow have seen their 
fair share of violence as well Most recently the President of the Chechen Republic and his family were 
the target of a car bomb [RFE/RL News Bn'efs 1994]
The experiences of Russia s neighbors might also cast doubt in the minds of Russians on the relationship 
between democracy and peace The former Soviet Union abounds with ethnic clashes brought on in part by 
the election of nationalist leaders Violence] continues in Georgia between Armenia and Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabakh (there have also been reports of fighting spreading to Nakhichevan the region of 
Azerbaijan cutoff from the rest of the country by Armenia) and in Tadzhikistan (where full scale war has 
given way to a senes of assassinations) Violence in the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova has ceased but 
only with the continued presence of the Russian 14th Army lead by General Lebedev The exact 
relationship between democracy and these clashes is not so important as the easily drawn implication that 
the move away from the Soviet dictatorship has created violence While Russians may not believe that 
democracy is the cause of these disputes tney are unlikely to accept arguments that democracy and 
peace go hand in hand
Given the opportunity for Russians to associate democracy with conflict rather than peace it is 
hypothesized that at this time Russians who favor democracy do not connect democracy with peaceful 
external relations If domestic practices are earned over into external relations as the theoretical 
foundation for the norm of democratic peae î holds then Russian external relations should not be peaceful 
toward other democracies even when Russian leaders are most affected by democratic domestic politics
Democracy and Russian Foreign Policy
Unfortunately there are at present apparently no surveys of Russians that directly assess the relationship 
between democracy attitudes and support for the use of force against democracies Surveys measure 
development of democratic attitudes (e g Gibson & Duch forthcoming Finifter & Mickiewicz 1992 and 
less academically onented surveys such as Moskovsku Novosti 1994) or attitudes toward foreign relations 
(e g CBS News/NYT/Soviet Institute for Sociological Research 1988) but not both Zimmerman [1994] 
connects attitudes toward foreign affairs with general stands on domestic issues However the questions on 
foreign affairs in his survey fail to distinguish between democracies and nondemocracies as the objects of 
Russian policy
Until this weakness is resolved the sole method of evaluating the impact of democracy on Russian 
foreign policy is to observe Russian foreign policy under penods m which the impact of democracy 
differed While the deaths m the 1993 dispute between the parliament and the presidency were tragic the 
ensuing consolidation of power by Yeltsin and the strong showing of anti Yeltsin parties m the December 
election are useful from the point of view of social science Until the parliamentary forces in the Russian 
White House were crushed by military forces the situation in Russia resembled that of a democratic 
republic despite the flaws m the constitution] and the prior election of the members of the Congress of 
People s Deputies 14 The power of the parliament to impede Yeltsin actually prevented many policies that 
ran against the interests of constituencies such as clamping down on credits from the Central Bank of 
Russia to inefficient state industries
14 Roeder (1994) classifies Russia as a balanced republic from the time of Russia s independence until the ensis
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In the process of closing down the parliament Yeltsin was able to clamp down on opposition in an 
autocratic fashion 15 In addition to jailing the main opposition figures including Khasbulatov and Rutskoi 
Yeltsin censored critical press coverage banned opposition parties and political demonstrations removed 
elected local leaders who were disloyal to him during the crisis disbanded the Constitutional Court and 
extended the powers of the Moscow police
If norms of democratic peace had spread to the Russian populace then the turn toward autocracy should 
have allowed more conflictual behavior toward other democracies 16 In fact Russian foreign policy 
following the concentration of power m the hands of the presidency exhibits that opposite tendency 
Yeltsin behaved more consistently with norms of democratic peace during this period of power 
concentration with respect to Japan and the former Yugoslavia
Russian Foreign Policy toward Japan
In October of 1993 Russia s relations with Japan still hung under the cloud of World War II Unlike 
democracies pursuing negotiation Russia and Japan have not formally signed a peace treaty The inability 
of democracy m Russia to improve the situation was demonstrated in 1992 when Yeltsin unexpectedly 
called off a visit to Japan in the face of increasing criticism from conservatives over foreign and 
economic policy [because he] could not afford to be seen making moves toward handing over any territory 
considered part of Russia [Sanger 1993a] Likewise a trip planned for May of 1993 was cancelled
After his consolidation of power Yeltsin finally made good on his offer to visit Tokyo even though the 
situation in Moscow would have excused another cancellation That the tnp took place at all was 
unexpected m Tokyo where even before Yeltsin disbanded parliament only particularly credulous people 
believed the tnp would go ahead as planned [Izvestiya 1993] While the sensitive issue of the Kunls was 
not discussed the fact that the trip took place was seen as the basis for a new advanced foundation for 
negotiations by Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa [Sanger 1993b] Foreign Minister Kozyrev agreed 
stating that
We have made the first positive move the problem of the Russo-Japanese relations has 
been resolved It has been transferred from the stage of blind confrontation which blocked the 
national state interest of the Russian Federation in the Far East to the stage of a constructive 
calm dialogue [Interfax 1993]
In addition Yeltsin announced that Russia was complying with a plan for the eventual settlement of the 
Kunl issue which included withdrawing most troops from the islands making the South Kunls a free 
economic zone and allowing travel between the islands and Japan without visas [ITAR-Tass 1993] Japan 
also was able to extract a long awaited apology for the deaths of more than 60 000 Japanese pnsoners of 
war who died in Sibena after World War II
That norms of democratic peace are not in place m Russia was further underscored by the changes in 
the policies mentioned above after the constraint of a democratically elected parliament with substantial 
opposition to Yeltsin was in place The results of the December 1993 elections were an unpleasant surprise 
to Yeltsin The final polls before the election predicted that the most pro Yeltsin party Russia s Choice 
would gain the largest share of the votes with 30 percent [RFE/RL News Briefs 1993a] Instead the 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia lead by virulent nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky took the top spot 
with nearly 23 percent Zhirinovsky voiced strong nationalist rhetoric which forces Yeltsin s government to 
be more outspoken in defending Russia s interests as perceived by nationalists even if this means 
reversing early policies that were more in line with norms of democratic peace As Romashkevich [1994]
15 Roeder (1994) holds that Russia should be reclassified as an autocracy for the period between October and December of 1993 
See also Reddaway (1993) for a portrait of Yeltsin s actions following the crisis as dictatorial
16 The conclusion that more conflict would be present dunng this period is wrong Theoretically the norms of democratic peace 
among the Russian population would prevent militarized disputes with other democracies before the cnsis Thus after the cnsis 
Yeltsin would be free from this constraint i e he would have the opportunity to initiate conflict with other democracies if he had the 
willingness (Most and Starr 1989)
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writes foreign policy populism has given the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia political support without 
it having to address difficult economic issues
Japan did not escape Zhirinovsky s verbali wrath A few weeks after the elections he told Japanese 
reporters We 11 drive everyone out of the Sea of Okhotsk—the Japanese the Koreans the Filipinos the 
Sea of Okhotsk will be a closed Russian se'a We 11 establish a 200 mile zone and you 11 be fishing in 
Australia [Interfax 1994] The same day it was reported by Ostankino [1994] that [Zhinnovsky] 
planned to occupy the position of Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and as his first step in the ministerial 
post intended to invite Tokyo to sign a peace treaty If it refuses Zhirinovsky promises to use the Russian 
Navy to blockade all the Japanese islands i
Following the elections Russian-Japanese relations quickly deteriorated Zhinnovsky was apparently 
successful at putting the issue of fishing water disputes on the political agenda 17 Meetings on the 
preparation of a peace treaty originally scheduled for the end of January were postponed until late in 
February Even after the meeting Russian-Japanese relations regressed The troop withdrawal that Yeltsin 
announced after the October visit to Japan was changed to a schedule for withdrawing troops in the 
event of unforseen circumstances [Komosolskaya Pravda 1994] This announcement came after chief of 
the State Duma Security Committee accusejd Yeltsin of scheduling the withdrawal of the border patrol 
which was not included even in the original October announcement
Russian Foreign Policy toward the former ugoslavia
Because the republics of the former Yugoslavia are not established democracies like Japan the norms of 
democratic peace are not as directly applicable to the ongoing war m the former Yugoslavia However the 
theoretical explanations for why democratic norms of negotiation should not transfer to relations with a 
nondemocracy focus on the threat that the nondemocracy poses through deception In the case of the 
Yugoslavian conflict no side can be construed as posing a military threat to Russia Thus democratic 
pressures m Russia would if anything support negotiation if norms of democratic peace were present
But as with its foreign policy towards Japan Russia has been less apt to support negotiation in the 
Balkans in the periods when democracy has been strongest The recent acceptance of the UN brokered 
peace proposal by the Bosnian Muslim lead government and rejection by the Bosnian Serbs confirms the 
Western argument that it was the Serbs who needed to be pressured into negotiation all along 18 As a 
diplomat in Zagreb noted It is axiomatic that generals who are losing like to negotiate while those who 
are winning often prefer to keep fighting [Kmzer 1994] The strong position of the Bosnian Serbs did not 
prevent Russia from opposing strong measures against the Yugoslavian rump
After the violent defeat of his parliamentary opponents m the Russian White House Yeltsin s policy 
toward Bosnia changed even more markedly toward supporting negotiation over territorial issues in 
Yugoslavia than it did with respect to the Kurils Yeltsin ended his opposition to Western strategy of 
pressunng the Serbians into negotiation After this change the UN Security Council voted to extend its 
peacekeeping mission m Croatia for six months that was intended to prevent Serb gains from the use of 
force In effect Yeltsin abruptly dropped his opposition to an American backed plan to put more 
pressure on President Slobodan Milosevic o t Serbia to end the civil war in Croatia [Lewis 1993]
After the December elections Russian policy on Serbia changed again At first Russia sought to defuse 
pressures in the West for further action on tie  crisis by calling for talks between the foreign ministers of 
the permanent members of the UN Security Council [Cohen 1994a] Russia also sought recognition of its 
nght to veto airstnkes against the Serbs However the British French and Americans all concurred that
17 Although not a scientific sample searching the conjunction of the subjects Russia Japan and territorial disputes in the FBIS— 
SOV index yielded only one reference to Japanese violations of waters claimed by Russia in the period from the attack on the Russian 
White House to the December elections and this was n¡ear the election (Nov 29) The same search from the elections to the end of 
March (the most recent month available) shows six articles on this topic (Jan 12 24 (2) and 27 Feb 4 and 10
18 The Bosman government later reversed ns acceptance of the agreement but only after the Bosman Serbs had officially declined 
to join in the agreement
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Russia had no veto [Lewis 1994] Tensions were temporarily defused when the Bosnian Serbs finally 
heeded calls to end their siege of, Tuzla
Russian objections became more forceful when NATO threatened airstrikes on Serbian forces 
surrounding Sarajevo On February 9 NATO presented the Bosnian Serbs with an ultimatum to withdraw 
heavy weaponry and mortars to a distance of at least 20 kilometers from the center of Sarajevo by 
February 21 Breaking a period of relative silence on Bosnia President Clinton said Nobody should doubt 
NATO s resolve NATO is now ready to act [Cohen 1994b] The NATO countries were caught by surprise 
when Russia challenged the use of air strikes Kozyrev quickly stated We say Yes to a security zone 
Yes to withdrawal of artillery and heavy weapons from this security zone but No to escalation of the 
conflict by resorting to air strikes [Erlanger 1994] Yeltsin also requested that Russia be brought into the 
negotiations asking would there be a full scale war m Europe if NATO earned out its threatened 
airstnkes [Sciolino 1994]
The response by Russia was considered to be largely influenced by increased political competition in 
Russian domestic politics Typical was Erlanger s [1994] report that
Russia s anger over NATO s decision was aimed partly at mollifying the new Russian 
Parliament and averting criticism from the ultranationahst leader Vladimir V 
Zhinnovsky who argues that a bomb dropped on the Serbs is a bomb dropped on Russians 
Moscow has also found Bosnia a comfortable issue on which to challenge Washington 
affording Foreign Minister Andrei V Kozyrev an opportunity to defend himself against 
charges of submissiveness toward the West
The question of whether NATO would have defied Russian threats by bombing Serb positions near 
Sarajevo became moot when the introduction of Russian peacekeeping troops allowed the Serbs a face 
saving way to withdraw heavy weapons and artillery However the Bosnian Serbs are still defying 
attempts to negotiate an end to the conflict in Bosnia Because of the split between Belgrade and the 
Bosnian Serbs Russian democratic pressures may not prevent future attempts to persuade the Bosnian 
Serbs to come to the negotiating table The government can now tell its critics it is supporting traditional 
Serbian allies (ì e Serbia) while allowing the West to step up measures against the recalcitrant Bosnian 
Serbs
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
The existence of peace between democracies results from the combination of democratic institutions and 
the acceptance of norms of democratic peace among societies m democratic states Thus the expansion 
of the democratic peace depends m part upon what norms anse with the emergence of democratic 
institutions The evidence from recent Russian foreign policy supports the hypothesis that the violent 
history of Russia s brief expenence with democracy has inhibited the developed of the norm of democratic 
peace in Russia When Yeltsin consolidated his power through undemocratic means Russian foreign 
policy was based upon pursuing and fostering peaceful negotiations When the opposition to Yeltsin was 
too strong to prevent dictatorial repression Russian foreign policy has backed away from negotiation and 
allowed territorial disputes to continue unabated
Because of the brevity of this expenence it is too early to state whether norms of democratic peace 
might eventually develop if the behavior in the new Russian democracy starts to shy away from violent 
conflict and look to the peaceful resolution of conflicts Unfortunately the longer democratic expenence is 
associated with violence and emerging democracies shy away from negotiation on sticky issues the less 
reason citizens in these states will have to adopt norms of democratic peace The norm of democratic 
peace flounshes only when citizens in democracies feel that other democracies can be trusted so 
prolonging conflictual policies only serves to weaken the basis for the norm
The findings of this study are based solely upon case studies of contemporary Russian foreign policy 
The conclusions drawn here could be subjected to further scruüny with experimental surveys in Russia and 
other newly democratic states [e g Mintz & Geva 1993] Future research should also seek to uncover
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changes in the acceptance of the norm of democratic peace rather than simply its presence or absence as 
this paper has been limited to because of the newness of Russian democracy
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____________________Chapter 9___________________
Economic Interdependence and Political Antagonism 
Franco-German Relations before World War I
by Donald K Litteau
Discussions of the emerging global economy are generally based on several key pieces of evidence— 
expanded international trade increased capital flows across borders broader sources of investment and 
financing international technology and information flows and greater international labor mobility While 
not denying the validity of this analysis it is important to remember that evidence of these trends has 
existed for other eras and that the condition of economic interdependence is hardly new for most states 
Self sufficiency has seldom been an attractive option Economic prosperity has always depended on 
access to markets and resources outside of national borders However the nature of economic interaction 
between states has changed over time ranging from protectionist and aggressive to liberal and free 
trading The crucial question for political economy is under what conditions do increased economic flows 
create more cooperative and stable realtionships between states
The pre World War I economy m Europe has been noted m particular as one which exhibited many of 
these features of an emerging international economy Strong economic growth m most countries was 
accompanied by a sharp increase in international trade and investment One scholar Carl Strikwerda has 
even suggested that only with the European Community s 1992 project for economic integration and the 
collapse of the Eastern bloc is Europe beginning to approach the level of implicit unity which existed 
before the shattenng experiences of two world wars and the Great Depression 1 The notable feature of pre 
war economic interdependence was that it even existed (and was noticeably increasing) between 
countries that were generally recognized as political antagonists Specifically economic ties between 
France and Germany clearly grew in the two decades before 1914 despite repeated diplomatic clashes 
and both countries enjoyed increasing economic prosperity
This paper will examine that relationship between growing economic bonds and political relations 
between the two states in the decade and a half before World War I First it will show how economic 
financial and industrial bonds really did grow dramatically in the pre war years so that one could describe 
the two economies as mutually dependent Second it will look at diplomatic attempts to establish better 
relations between the two countries partially on the basis of mutual economic interests a process which 
reached its apex with the Franco-German Accord of February 1909 Finally it will examine why genuine 
cooperation failed to develop
While this is primarily a historical case study m Franco-German relations it will also comment on the 
possibilities for regular economic interaction to be translated into stable integration and political 
cooperation In the pre war era there were leaders on both sides who recognized the value of some level 
of cooperation but even they sought to limit interdependence between the states No one advocated any 
liberal interdependence removing state controls over the national economy trade and investment This 
type of maximum free market liberalism was seen not only as inherently unstable but also as potentially 
dangerous to national interests At best interdependence was something to be managed through trade 
legislation or cartelization with each interest hoping to manipulate conditions m its own favor
Integration indicates a greater level of coordination than interdependence and it implies that the states 
support the combination of national economies or economic sectors No one before 1914 contemplated 
integration as it proceeded in the years after World War II The idea of surrendering partial sovereignty 
over policy or resources (as occurred with the European Coal and Steel Community) in order to foster 
economic cooperation and growth would have been unimaginable Welfare concerns were not a top
1 Carl Strikwerda The Troubled Origins of European Economic Integration International Iron and Steel and Labor Migrauon in 
the Era of World War I American Historical Review 98 (1993) p 1107
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priority for either state and certainly neithe 
economic integration and possible foreign c
r government would nsk national security by allowing 
ontrol of vital economic resources Hence despite the fact that
the two states were dependent on one another for continued economic growth there was no political will 
to establish conditions for full integration
The clearest evidence of increasing interdependence between France and Germany is in their trade 
Both countries had abandoned liberal free trade policies during the late nineteenth century recession and 
despite economic recovery they both raised1 tariff duties significantly in the early twentieth century 
(Germany in 1902 and France in 1910) Nevertheless exchange between the two states soared in the pre 
war years In 1898 French imports from Germany and German imports from France stood in rough balance 
at around 330 million francs each This waslthe consistent value of bilateral trade over the 1890s 
However by 1913 German imports of French goods exceed 700 million francs and French imports of 
German goods were over a billion francs 2 This rapid increase in foreign trade was responsible m large part 
for economic growth in both states France s| ratio of exports to gross national product was 16 9 percent 
and Germany had a ratio of 17 9 percent3 Hence access to the other state s market on the most favorable 
terms was imperative France was Germany is best continental customer and Germany was second to 
Belgium among France s continental customers Another aspect of the expansion of trade in the pre war 
years was its breadth Although growth did not increase evenly across economic sectors it did grow in all 
sectors (agricultural products raw materials and manufactures) for both states 4 Theoretically this meant 
that all sectors had an interest in maintaining cooperative trade relations between the states even though 
uneven growth never promoted a consensus on developing cooperation
Finance was another area of economic interdependence and financiers were generally seen as leading 
promoters of economic collaboration because of its profitability5 However financial relations were more 
indicative of direct political rivalry than trad|e relations Although both states raised tariffs and competed 
vigorously as exporters to third countries they also maintained most favored nation trading status with one 
another until the war Financial discrimination was clearer The French government would not allow 
German securities to be listed on the Pans Bjourse despite repeated pleas by the German government and 
by German business as well as some sympathy from French finance Also although French banks invested 
enormous sums of capital abroad (France had 42 billion francs in total foreign investment in 1914) only 
short term loans were made m German markets 6 French bankers did place a billion francs a year in short 
term German loans in order to take advantage of higher German interest rates and these funds did ease 
liquidity problems in German markets 7 However these short term loans made German markets vulnerable 
because this capital tended to be withdrawn in times of diplomatic trouble French and German banks did 
participate jointly in foreign loan and investment syndicates for the purpose of lending to third countries
foreign lending as a means of advancing national trade and 
financial collaboration between German and French banks 
and sometimes even encouraged it For example the German government repeatedly solicited French 
financial participation m the Baghdad railway project
Although government officials generally saw 
influence they usually did not interfere with
Ententes were also formed among industrial companies for the purpose of establishing operations m third 
countries Industrial ententes did involve greater cooperation than simply pooling capital as bankers did 
and they do show evidence of Stnkwerda s nation of complex integration allowing businesses to move 
operations over borders or merge with foreign firms as opposed to simple integration the free flow of 
goods and capital across borders8 Several large metallurgical firms including vigorous armaments 
competitors like Krupp and Schneider established the Société d etudes de 1 Ouenza in 1902 for the
2 Raymond Poidevin Les Relations Economiques et Financières entre la France et l Allemagne de 1898 a 1914 (Pans 1969) p 
885
3 Alan Mil ward and S B Saul The Development o f the Economies o f Continental Europe 1850-1914 (Cambndge 1977) p
469 I
4 Poidevin Relations Economiques et Financières p 886
5 Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Banety Les Relations Franco-Allemandes 1815-1975 (Pans 1975) p 180
6 Milward and Saul The Development o f the Economies o f Continental Europe p 127
7 Raymond Poidevin La Question d un Rapprochement Economique et Financier entre la France et 1 Allemagne de 1906 a 1909 
Revue d Allemagne 4 (1972) p 482
8 Cari Stnkwerda Troubled Ongins of European Economic Integration p 1108
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purpose of developing iron mines in North Africa9 Industrial coalitions of French German and Belgium 
firms also played key roles in industrial development in western Europe especially in Luxembourg
Combinations for the purpose of developing mining concessions were not the only or the most important 
indicators of integration Firms also made direct investment in the other country either establishing their 
own subsidiaries or acquinng partial ownership of another company As a result of the 1871 shift of the 
border the de Wendel firm effectively became a multi national enterprise with operations on both sides of 
the Lorraine border Thus while de Wendel was a leader in French metallurgy it was unique m that the 
majority of its business and markets were in Germany De Wendel also had its own secure supplies of coal 
from mines in Germany 10 However it was in the last decade and a half before the war that direct 
investment soared and it was German firms that led the movement investing m mines and even 
establishing faetones and plants Many firms participated in this type of activity German electncal and 
chemical companies (Siemens AEG Bayer Hoechst) all established subsidianes m France and 
Michelin and Renault had operations in Germany (the automobile industry was the one new industrial 
sector in which France possessed comparative advantage over Germany) Still heavy industry led the 
movement in direct investment and coal iron and steel understandably receive the bulk of attention in 
studies of pre war integration
The development of European metallurgy based on possession of complementary resources—French iron 
and German coal—only began after the turn of the century with the opening of the iron basin in French 
Lorraine (Meurthe et Moselle departement) Prior to this development France had not only been 
dependent on German coal but it had also been a net importer of iron ore and consequently had a lagging 
steel industry The industrial development of French Lorraine thus played a key role for French and 
European trade and economic growth in the pre war years While French iron ore exports to Germany 
amounted to less than 50 000 tons of ore in 1901 exports had grown to nearly a million tons m 1908 and 
nearly four million tons in 1913 11 Vast expansion of iron ore supplies also allowed France to increase its 
own iron and steel production since greater iron exports could allow for greater coal imports the mam 
commodity of which France had a critical shortage Hence French cast iron production grew from 1 9 
million tons in 1890 to 4 million tons in 1910 and steel output grew from 1 4 million tons in 1890 to 4 
million tons by 1913 12 One notable feature of this rapid expansion was the extent to which German firms 
participated m it Most of the major Ruhr steel makers participated in iron mining in French Lorraine and 
German firms held over 10 percent of the mining concession areas m the region 13 The international 
character of industry m Meurthe et Moselle was accentuated by the predominance of Italian workers in the 
region In Longwy and Bney over 61 percent of the workers were Italian and less than 27 percent were 
French 14 Two historians even remark that the growth of iron industry m French Lorraine was making 
national frontiers absurd 15 German firms also completely led the way in developing the iron basins m 
Normandy
Germany s domestic sources of iron only covered about three quarters of its industry s needs thus 
vertically integrated firms were actively seeking mining concessions in many locations (Lorraine and 
Normandy Algeria Morocco) However foreign firms m France did not simply mine ore for transfer to the 
parent company back in Germany They also built new iron and steel mills to process French ore on site 
Attempts by French firms to vertically integrate across borders were less numerous but several were able 
to purchase ownership in German coal mining operations
Industrial interpenetration was also evident m the intercorporate arrangements that existed to organize 
heavy industry m the pre war years By virtue of their participation in French mining or processing
9 Poidevin La Question d un Rapprochement Economique et Financier p 484
10 Michael Jared Rust Business and Politics in the Third Republic The Comité des Forges and the French Steel Industry 1896- 
1914 (Ph D dissertation Princeton 1973) p 81
11 Raymond Poidevin Relations Economiques et Financières p 887
12 Milward and Saul The Development o f the Economies o f Continental Europe p 78
13 Guy Greer The Ruhr-Lorrame Industrial Problem (New York 1925) p 59
14 Carol Kent Camille Cavallier and Pont a Mousson An Industrialist of the Third Republic (Ph D dissertation St. Anthony s 
College Oxford 1972) p 203
15 Milward and Saul The Development o f the Economies o f Continental Europe p 28
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operations German firms also joined in the many cartel arrangements (comptoirs) that were designed to 
maintain pnces for vanous products as well as protect the overall vitality of the industry The Comptoir 
Métallurgique de Longwy which effectively set prices for pig iron in all of France had in its directorship 
representatives of two major Ruhr industrial firms—Rochlmg and Gelsenkirchener 16 Thyssen was 
represented in the Comité des Forges the primary interest group for all of French metallurgy French 
representation in the pnmary German cartels was less important because of lower French direct 
investment in Germany De Wendel was represented m the Stahlwerksverband the principle association of 
German steel makers In the final years before the war French and German industrialists did create 
international cartels for several key iron and steel products With the expansion of international trade 
market stability (the primary goal of cartel arrangements) could only be achieved if all producers 
regardless of nationality participated and cooperated 17
Thus one can note a high level of economic interdependence in Franco-German relations and a degree 
of actual integration in their industries Both! countries increasingly relied on trade with the other for 
economic growth and there were definite real incentives to continue and increase cooperation m 
industrial development One can sull question how well political leaders recognized these trends and how 
much value they put on them Also if there| was a certain recognition in both countries that economic 
prosperity was dependent on economic relations with the other this makes it necessary to explain why 
hule was done politically to recognize and reinforce that fact
Nauonalist sentiment did nse m France and Germany m the pre war years but it did not preclude any 
meaningful cooperation Those who did seek better relations between the two states saw that economic 
relations were precisely an area where the two countries had mutual interests that could form the basis of 
a rapprochement Even French hopes to reclaim the annexed provinces was not seen as an absolute bamer 
to Franco-German agreements The German ambassador to Pans von Radolm strongly stated the case 
that French officials were not motivated by ¡revanchism and that m fact revanchism had been long dead in 
official circles 18 Also even though colonia; competition particularly in Morocco played an enormous 
role in Franco-German diplomatic discord in the pre war years it was actually French colonialists who 
were some of the strongest advocates of improving relations between the two states Leaders of the parti 
colonial like Rene Millet and Eugene Etienne proclaimed the possibility and desirability of peaceful 
relauons such as those France had with Britain after 1904 19 Etienne probably the most rabid imperialist 
in French politics openly talked with the Kaiser about the possibility of better relations and even a 
limited alliance 20
The German government led by Chancellor von Bulow did repeatedly make overtures to the French 
about the possibilities of colonial collaboration These efforts were strongest right at the turn of the century 
when France was still alienated from Great ¡Britain because of the Fashoda incident but the French 
government resisted Bulow s vague proposals primarily because of a lack of faith in the offers since the 
Germans were concurrently negotiating witfi Great Britain on several overseas issues The French 
Ambassador to London Paul Cambon was explicit m stating that the government should not be duped 
into believing that the Germans would ever brm an entente with the French for the purposes of opposing 
England 21
Eventually France chose to resolve its colonial problems through improved relations with Britain not 
Germany by forming the entente cordiale in 11904 In the first decade of the twentieth century Britain 
concluded several alliances to reduce imperial conflict with other expanding powers (France in Afnca 
Japan in the Far East and eventually Russia in Central Asia) German competition was more global than 
specific and there was no region where Germany had a large number of colonial spoils that it could divide 
with Britain Meanwhile France received support for its policy in Morocco and Delcasse the foreign
16 Stnkwerda Troubled Origins p 1117
17 Michael Jared Rust Business and Politics in the Third Republic p 168 178
18 Von Radolm to Von Bulow 9 January 1909 Die Grosse Politik der Europäische Kabinette 1871-1914 XXIV No 8481
19 Rene Millet L accord Franco-Allemand Revue Poluique et Parhamentaire v 59 (1909) pp 453-455
20 Jules Cambon to G Louis 18 July 1907 Documents Diplomatiques Francais 2e sene (1901-1911) XI No 79
21 Paul Cambon to Delcasse 1 December 1899 Documents Diplomatiques Francais Ire sene (1871-1900) XVI No 17
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mininster who championed the entente definitely hoped to expand the colonial agreement into an alliance 
so that Britain would support the French in their continental rivalry with Germany The most the French 
would offer to the Germans regarding Morocco was an assurance that commerce would remain free and 
that German economic interests would not be threatened 22 Conflict erupted over respective rights in 
Morocco in 1905 which eventually ended with a diplomatic defeat of the German position at the Algeciras 
conference in 1906 However despite the setback and arguments by some German nationalist circles that 
the Bulow government was not doing an adequate job m defending commercial interests it was in the 
following years 1906 through 1911 that Franco-German political as well as economic relations were most 
congenial The bulk of German investment into France occurred m these years with the establishment of 
French subsidiaries by German chemical and electrical companies as well as the direct acquisition of 
French mines and plants by German heavy industry It was also in these years that French firms (Aciéries 
de Longwy Pont a Mousson Micheville) did acquire ownership m German coal fields m the Aix la 
Chapelle region 23
Political relations did complement economic collaboration to a limited extent The Franco-German 
Accord of February 1909 marked the apex of pre war diplomatic agreement Specifically this agreement 
only addressed the Moroccan question and m essence it upheld the principles of the Algeciras Act 
France vowed to respect the independence and integrity of Morocco as well as the equality of German 
economic interests Germany recognized France s political position in Morocco especially its appointed 
role in maintaining peace and order 24 Despite the limited nature of this colonial agreement some 
officials did hope that it would lead to expanded collaboration The value of an accord like the 1909 one 
was that it would build regular points of cooperation between the two states that could ameliorate the 
sense of antagonism
Chancellor Bulow espoused such a view as early as 1906 remarking to a French official that Germany 
wanted an accord not a war with France and that he felt the best means to achieve this would be to build 
regular points of entente based on regular commerce and colonial relations He even specifically noted 
that French and German capital were already prone to unite in various joint efforts and that it was only the 
diplomats who lagged in maintaining antagonism 25 Bulow blamed French public opinion and its effect on 
the government as the mam obstacle to agreements He saw Morocco as proof that the two states could 
work together but he felt that French officials could not publicly admit that the two states had other issues 
in industrial enterprises and financial relations on which they could form agreements Hence Bulow 
openly separated what was possible from what was desirable in Franco-German relations 26
The French official who was the most fervent in the belief that Franco-German relations could and 
should be improved was Jules Cambon who was appointed Ambassador to Berlin in Apnl 1907 and served 
there till the outbreak of hostilities m 1914 Cambon expanded on Bulow s ideas of how political 
cooperation could be built between the two states He specifically advocated the utility of building better 
relations through limited ententes and expressed regret that the German Chancellor and Foreign Office did 
not have more confidence in this tactic 27 He also had to convince other French officials that trivial issues 
like Morocco were not worth a major diplomatic dispute and that Germany actually had valid complaints 
about French conduct28 Financial collaboration was the area where most Germans hoped Franco-German 
relations could be improved after the agreement on Morocco and German recognition of France s superior 
position there Access to the Pans Bourse was a definite goal for both the German government and 
business and French officials wary of Franco-German relations cautioned that an Accord on Morocco was 
just a ruse to gain better access to French capital29 The German government also wanted French 
participation in the Baghdad railway project
22 Delcasse to Bihourd 27 March 1904 Documents Diplomatiques Francais 2e sene IV No 368
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26 Bihourd to Pichón 11 November 1906 Documents Diplomatiques Francais 2e sene X No 281
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Jules Cambon argued that a policy of economic appeasement was a natural extension of the Morocco 
Accord and that the condition of positive diplomatic relations between the states should be used to ease 
economic tensions particularly those over tariff duties30 These ambitions were never realized and even 
the crux of the accord the arrangement on Morocco collapsed within a couple of years The Second 
Moroccan Crisis in 1911 ended any notion cjf official cooperation in northwest Africa One historian 
Raymond Poidevin who has analyzed Franco-German economic relations simply notes that after 1911 
politics had the upper hand and that the crisis effectively ended an era of Franco-German financial 
collaboration around the world31
Other areas of Franco-German economic relations received less of a direct impact Trade sull conunued 
to nse despite the diplomane ensis and a significant increase in French tariff duües m 1910 32 German 
direct investment m France did not cease and several firms conunued to build and modernize plants 
across the border The diplomane crisis did have an impact on the willingness of French bankers to make 
short term loans m German markets As French banks retired their loans and withdrew their funds a minor 
crisis developed in German equity markets although German banks eventually intervened to maintain 
liquidity and prevent any real panic33 Also | although the tariff increases by France did not reduce German 
exports to France they did dampen economic goodwill The Germans complained that France tended to 
be discriminatory and arbiuary in applying their duties against German goods Jules Cambon specifically 
argued that these economic matters should be addressed since commercial affairs could not be isolated
from political relations34 However Cambon
Raymond Poincare asserted control over foreign policy direction Poincare trusted the efficacy of the
Triple Entente to protect French interests as 
prevent any weakening of the Triple Entente 
Franco-German rapprochement35
and Germany Raymond Poidevin s study of 
John Keiger s study of France s diplomacy) 
states were allowed to collaborate until poli
s influence on French policy notably decreased after 1911 as
well as uphold European peace and he definitely worked to 
which might happen as a result of Cambon s plans for
Thus one finds two different versions of the evolution of pre war economic cooperauon between France
economic and financial relations (which is complemented by 
emphasizes the extent to which economic interests in the two 
ical hostiliues developed in 1911 Meanwhile Carl 
Stnkwerda argues that despite diplomauc antagonism economic integration continued until the outbreak 
of war An issue that needs to be stressed with respect to either interpretation is that international 
economic policy was rarely a simple choice between cooperation or opposiuon although actors tend to be 
divided into free trading pro integration and ¡protectionist pro autarky camps In the Franco-German case 
even those who desired better relations and Understood the necessity of continued economic interaction for 
prosperity also wanted to place clear limits on collaboration and were committed to protecting certain 
elements of national policy
In the diplomatic sphere nearly everyone relieved that there were limits to any real partnership 
Poincare may have been the most adamant about upholding the Triple Entente over any other relationship 
but everyone responsible for foreign policy accepted the basic idea that France s security rested on its 
ententes with Russia and England (after the First Morocco Crisis) Jules Cambon who constantly argued 
for improving Franco-German relations explicitly stated his opinion that the two mam alliance blocs 
needed to be maintained for the peace of Europe He even stressed this point to Chancellor Bethman- 
Hollweg although Cambon did add that outside agreements could still be reached36
German diplomats equally felt that it was this alliance system that was working against German 
interests as evidenced in Morocco German leaders were incensed that German policy in Morocco was 
criticized by the French and English after 1906 even though Germany had followed the Algeciras Act
30 Jules Cambon to Pichón 15 August 1910 Documents Diplomatiques Francais 2e sene XII No 549
31 Poidevin Relations Economiques et Financières I p 812
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33 Jules Cambon to Selves 9 September and 11 September 1911 Documents Diplomatiques Francais 2e sene XTV Nos 296 and
303 I
34 Jules Cambon to Cruppi 15 May 1911 Documents Diplomatiques Francais 2e sene XIII, No 302
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more closely than the French 37 Part of the motivation for the 1909 Accord in Germany was to prevent 
German exclusion from Morocco altogether a fear that increased after 1911 Few French officials 
recognized that the Germans might have any legitimate complaints in international relations and even 
those who did could not offer any positive remedies For example Cambon s analysis of German policy 
continued to be sober until 1914 His interpretation of Germany s military build up in 1913 was prudent m 
recognizing that the decision to enlarge the army did not represent a conclusive decision by Germany to 
go to war He even rejected the notion that Germany viewed its policy choices as war or peace Instead 
Cambon argued that Germany wanted to build a superiority of forces so that it could achieve its goals 
without using force The Second Moroccan Cnsis had proven to German leaders their inability to negotiate 
without force38 Cambon had no other recommendation other than France s need to follow suit since 
Germany only had respect for force Hence in the political sphere even if national antagonisms were not 
always at the fore the idea that the two nations were competitors in a hostile alliance system was never 
reduced by growing economic relations For France in particular alliances were viewed as a necessity not 
only to maintain French security but also to prevent French dependence on Germany
Since political leaders had to be conscious of possible threats to national security and sensitive to any 
compromise of sovereignty they were largely non receptive to any notion of real integration between the 
two states and were wary of growing interdependence However real commitment to internationalism — 
building a truly open unregulated international economy or integrating economies so that markets lost their 
national identity—was equally lacking among economic actors even though many reaped the benefits of 
an international economy Aside from the few interests who did genuinely want autarky other economic 
interests recognized and eagerly sought the benefits of an open interdependent economy—greater access 
to resources markets labor and capital However everyone sought to avoid the costs—increased 
competition and market instability—which accompanied a liberal economy
States sought increased economic growth but growth was desired under condiuons of stability in 
economics as well as politics The inherent instability of a liberal free market economy not only 
threatened a nation s trading position but it also hindered its ability to deal with pressing domestic 
concerns like long term pressures on agricultural producers and the rising demands of working class 
organizations 39 Tariffs were one means to sausfy certain core constituents agricultural and industrial 
which would allow for stable political leadership and a national economy which could compete 
internationally 40 Indeed it was those countries that adopted the greatest measures of protectionism which 
also expenenced the most rapid growth in trade 41 Expanding trade does show that at a certain level the 
two economies were growing closer but rising tariffs also indicate that there were limits to the degree any 
state would expose its economy to international forces
Increasing state protectionism was only one means developed in the late nineteenth century to regulate 
what was regarded as an inherently unstable international economy Private interests made attempts to 
stabilize output sales and prices for various industrial products by combining in cartels In Germany 
cartel obligations were considered legally binding after 1897 and French industry eventually developed 
similar instruments 42 Ruhr industrialists over the years 1893 to 1904 established the principal cartels 
regulating German coal iron and steel Accompanying this trend of cartelization was an effort at vertical 
expansion by many of the principal industrial firms which again represented an attempt to avoid reliance 
on market conditions Though cartels might have foreign participants (as a result of subsidiary operations) 
their whole purpose was to regulate the national market—reducing competition setting domestic pnces 
and promoting growth through exports (often subsidized or dumped )
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German industry was larger more efficiei 
Germans controlled the most critical raw m 
economy there was little to stop German in 
the wave of German goods and capital that
it and better organized than their French counterparts and the 
atenal coal In an open interdependent international 
dustry from overwhelming its less efficient competitors and 
did come into France between the two Moroccan Crises was
often denounced as a German invasion 43 Tne success of German firms obtaining mineral concessions was 
understandably a particular concern and the French state did eventually revise concession laws beginning 
m 1911 to restrict foreign control44 Organization of French industry in their own less rigid cartel 
arrangements (comptoirs) and in industrial lobbying groups like the Comité des Forges was in large part a
response to the danger of complete German domination of heavy industry
French industrialists like Robert Pinot head of the Comité des Forges appealed to the government for 
state aid to protect France s security and French industry s ability to compete against international rivals 
French officials largely shared the view altnough there was reluctance to let the state interference m 
economic affairs beyond the tariff increase of 1910 and the revision of the concession laws in the pre war 
years 45 It was through these organizations (the kartelle and comptoirs) which were specifically designed 
to promote national industry that a few attempts were made at international organization which might 
show the clearest evidence of integrated institutions
The International Syndicate for Rail and Beams formed m 1904 was the first attempt to divide markets 
on a transnational basis Basically the syndicate allowed for each national cartel to hold a monopoly in 
its own market and it designated export shades based on production capacity Although the syndicate did 
indicate the ability of firms to cooperate it really did not reveal any commitment to integration since its 
specific purpose was to protect home markets In the interwar period which was notable for its utter lack 
of international economic cooperation and integration an even more successful international steel cartel 
emerged on a similar basis with protected domestic markets and divided export shares Stabilization and 
secure markets were again the goal and thej international economy was simply treated as a burden to be 
managed 46 Also the pre war cartels starkly revealed the asymmetrical position of French and German 
industry Since shares were divided on production capacity German industry had an immense advantage 
Germany s allocated share of rail exports was six times that of France and its share of beam exports was 
even higher 47 France did receive a more proportionate share in the international iron syndicate However 
all the syndicates clearly showed France s subordinate position in the pre war international economy
France s war policies show that officials bjoth recognized France s inferior position and the amount of 
government intervention that would be needed to make France s position in the international economy 
bearable France s war aims eventually involved not only recovering territory from Germany but also 
permanently structuring the international economy m favor of France through a discriminatory tariff 
system 48 It was plans for this type of integration which Clemenceau advanced at Paris He called for 
peace based on coercive restrictions on Germany s political and economic sovereignty (specifically over 
its coal)49 No such forceful policy was advocated or even really contemplated before the war but the
that Franco-German integration based on pre war conditions 
German industrial superiority
proposal does reveal that French leaders felt 
would only make France more vulnerable to
It is not difficult to understand why French industry might resist integration and certainly the idea of 
free competition with Germany However German industrialists displayed a similar lack of commitment to 
either an open free market economy or to building real integration One leading example is Emil Kirdorf
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who was director of the mammoth firm of Gelsenkirchen with plants and mines m Germany and France as 
well as the co founder of the Stahl werksverband and the manager of the Rhine-Westphalian Coal 
Syndicate Kirdorf and the organizations he represented were among the greatest beneficiaries of the 
existing international economy which permitted German companies to invest in and export to France 
However Kirdorf also supported the Pan-German League a vociferous political interest group in Germany 
which officially espoused the idea of a Mitteleuropa directed economy and he even used the massive 
resources of the coal syndicate to rescue the league from financial collapse in 19 1 0 50 Kirdorf was not 
alone since most of the major German industrialists supported nationalist or pro militarist organizations
Industrialists had domestic reasons for supporting such organizations they definitely sought means to 
combat the growing demands of workers and the nsing strength of the Socialist party Stnkwerda argues 
that these economic actors lacked the maturity to recognize that their economic and political positions 
were incompatible He even suggests that had the war not happened these individuals would have been 
forced to make a clear choice between their dependence on an international economy and their support for 
national chauvinist organizations presumably in favor of the former51 Indeed there was some recognition 
that focusing the German economy on central Europe would have ruinous consequences After the war 
broke out the principal German industrialists save Fritz Thyssen argued that German should re establish 
its position as an exporter m an international economy rather than try to construct a Mitteleuropa52 Still 
support for nationalist organizations even aggressive ones like the Pan German League also square with 
the view that industry required a strong state especially one that could defend and promote its 
international interests Shipping even more than heavy industry required a functioning international 
economy for its prosperity but one can find examples of aggressive nationalist policy m this sector as 
well Albert Ballin who operated the Hamburg-America shipping line (the world s largest) and was 
influential in imperial politics not only argued for higher German tariffs53 but also urged the German 
government to take provocative measures in Morocco to defend German interests which eventually 
prompted the Second Moroccan Crisis in 191154 Again one does not see a desire to dismantle the 
international economy but there is the idea that the nation state needs to adequately uphold its economic 
interests
Full acceptance of integration or liberal interdependence would mean accepting fixed limits on the 
state s ability to act in favor of national economic interests The primary political and economic interests 
in France and Germany never accepted such a policy War quickly destroyed the patterns of trade and 
investment that had been allowed to develop as well as pre 1914 levels of economic growth The interwar 
period featured extremely low levels of economic cooperation and even the international cartel that 
developed for steel and iron served to minimize the effects of the international economy through 
production limits and market division
After 1945 France and Germany did achieve economic integration as well as inaugurate mutual high 
levels of economic growth One must then answer what specific changes in the global environment 
encouraged this achievement Obviously the military diminution of the old European powers played one 
crucial role In a divided and occupied Europe neither power was m a position to carry out policies based 
on the possession of military force For most French officials before 1914 the secunty risks of integration 
outweighed any potential economic gains France would only find integration tolerable if restraints were 
placed on Germany limiting its potential industrial and military superiority French plans for restonng 
economic relations after 1918 involved placing restricuons on Germany s key industrial resources 
principally coal as well as restricting German armaments55 Plans for integration following the second 
world war were less one sided but the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
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p 227
51 Cari Stnkwerda Troubled Origins p 1124
52 Soutou L Or et le Sang pp 103-104
53 Bihourd to Delcasse 16 January 1904 Documents Diplomatiques Francais 2e sene IV No 188
54 Lamar Cecil Albert Ballin Business and Politics in Imperial Germany 1888-1918 (Pnnceton 1967) p 178
55 Walter McDougall Political Economy versus National Sovereignty p 11
136 Donald K Litteau
also provided France a means of control over German industrial development and rearmament56 
Integration before 1914 would not have provided any of these checks on German power
Another factor that differed significantly «iter 1945 was the attitude of other countries toward Franco- 
German cooperation and integration International support of Franco-German rapprochement was notably 
absent prior to the First World War Francej s principal allies Britain and Russia expressed misgivings 
about any growing collaboration between France and Germany57 This only further encouraged the view 
that integration with Germany would increase France s vulnerability After 1945 outside powers 
especially the United States encouraged the process of integration and other European states joined m 
the project so that post 1945 integration was not a bilateral affair
The establishment of favorable international economic regimes was another positive factor for which 
neither France nor Germany were responsible A stable international monetary structure and an 
internationally established system of non discriminatory tariffs encouraged international trade and 
investment These measures did restore in many respects the conditions of the pre 1914 world economy 
with fixed exchange rates and mutual recognition of most favored nation status A major difference was 
that the post war states assumed vastly greater functions in promoting domestic welfare and economic 
growth Post war integration was thus in part a means to reconcile those two activities of re establishing an 
open international economy with greater state intervention in the domestic economy Integration began 
with French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman s proposal for a coal and steel community in 1950 In 
Schuman s proposal the ECSC would not only stabilize conditions in heavy industry but also make war 
politically unthinkable and economically impossible 58 Regulation of coal and steel had occurred before 
but it was always done through national organizations or weak associations of national bodies (the inter 
war International Steel Cartel) It was only after the disastrous period 1914-45 that statesmen recognized 
that the prospenty of the national economy and even the viability of the nation state depended upon 
surrendering sovereignty over certain elements of the economy59
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Research Proposal
The Development Of A Sociometrie Model For Selecting Contact Farmers
byEllardS Malindi
Introduction and Study Overview
This study aims to ascertain whether contact farmers accelerate adoption desenbe their desirable 
characteristics as perceived by farmers and develop a sociometrie model for their identification and 
selection
Statement of Problem
Despite the availability of numerous appropriate agricultural innovations a wide technical gap exists 
between productivity at research stations and in farmers fields in Malawi (Ministry of Agriculture 1993) 
In recognition of this problem the World Bank m collaboration with the government of Malawi introduced 
the training and visit (hereafter t and v) extension approach on pilot basis m 1987 to accelerate the 
adoption of recommended technologies by smallholder farmers The key element of the extension 
approach entails the selection of a group of contact farmers by the extension workers with whom they have 
frequent interactions for agricultural education and demonstrations on the use of new technologies The 
contact farmers subsequently use their mini plots to demonstrate the use of recommended innovations to 
other farmers The extension worker is compelled to devote all his time to extension tasks and leave him 
without time for non extension tasks
Thus the contact farmer is a key link between the extension worker and the farmers in the community 
and also a multiplier and trickle down effect The contact farmers are selected on the basis of their 
willingness to use their fields for demonstrations (Duradec 1992) Hitherto the effectiveness of the contact 
farmers m accelerating the diffusion process has not been evaluated in Malawi Evidently an appropriate 
model for the selection of effective contact farmers is needed and lacking Therefore this study attempts 
to develop a model for the selection of effective contact farmers
Purpose and Objectives
The purpose of this study is to develop a model for the selection of effective contact farmers in order to 
improve the training and visit extension approach currently being implemented m Malawi and other 
developing countries The specific objectives of this study are
1 To desenbe the role performance of currently practicing contact farmers
2 To describe the charactenstics of effective contact farmers
3 To define the desirable attributes of effective contact farmers as perceived by farmers in the 
community
4 To compare two sociometrie techniques for selecting contact farmers namely peer and key 
informants sociometrie choices and
5 Based on 1 to 4 above develop a sociometnc model for selecting effective contact farmers 
Research Questions
There are five research questions for this study namely
1 Do practicing contact farmers accelerate the adoption of innovations by smallholder farmers in 
Malawi using the two communities as a case in point9
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2 What are the distinguishing characteristics of effective contact farmers9
3 What are the desirable attributes of effective contact farmers as perceived by local farmers9 and
4 Can the two sociometrie techniques peer and key informants nomination techniques be used to 
select contact farmers9
Significance of Study
The results of this study will help various people in many ways as follows
1 Extension workers to select effective contact farmers and overall planning and implementation of 
agricultural educational and extension programs
2 Research scientists may use the contact farmers during the development adaptation and trial stages 
of innovations
3 Planners will be able to identify and 
of new innovations
4 Salespersons will be able to identify 
marketing campaigns
use the opinion leaders to assess the prospects of acceptance 
information pathways and facilitate better targeting of
5 Researchers m communications may find the results of this study useful in increasing their 
understanding of communication structures and assist them in planning their research programs
6 Community leaders will be able to understand patterns of coordination and alignment and the 
degree of influence of certain individuals and topics
7 Policy makers managers administrators and other rural development planners will be able to 
understand better cleavages cliques and social boundaries that are vital for the planning of future 
rural development programs
8 The model will be specifically useful in promoting the diffusion of technical packages
9 The model will be useful for introducing new farm inputs practices and enterprises to new areas 
and specific farm households target clientele
Definition of Terms
The following terms will be used in this study
Change agent An advocate and promoter of an innovation
Contact Farmer An farmer who is designated the responsibility of demonstrating the use of 
agricultural innovations to other farmers on a regular basis
Extension worker An officer of the ministry of agriculture whose responsibility it is to promote the 
utilization of agricultural innovations by farmers
Formal leader a local resident who occupies a formal position in the community such as a chief 
village headman counsellor political party official
Informal leader A local resident who influences the decisions of others
Innovation An abstract or real idea practice product or any object that is perceived as new m a 
given locality or by some people
Opinion leader An individual who is sought by others for advice or information and is held in high 
regard.
Program leader an employee of any organization whose job is to promote the utilization of any 
innovation
Training and visit extension approach A type of extension management style which emphasizes 
regular training sessions of contact farmers by agricultural staff follow up visits by the extension 
workers and the involvement of extension workers in technology transfer duties only to the exclusion 
of credit marketing and others
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Measurement of Variables 
Dependent Variable
1 Sociometrie score Number of times a respondent is mentioned as a source of advice and 
information or as an influential person Each mention will earn a point
Independent Variables
2 Social status Ownership of capital items such as a car work oxen bicycle radio house with iron 
sheets bnck house and being married will get a one point score each
3 Participation in social organization Attendance of meetings payment of subscription committee 
member and office bearer will earn 1 -4 points respectively
4 Cosmopoliteness Visits to local service center municipal center township and city will earn a 
point each
5 Mass media exposure Radio ownership radio listenership attendance to movies videos 
agricultural shows and field days will earn one point each
6 Innovativeness The adoption of elements of the recommended innovations will be score a point 
each
7 Contact with change agents Contact with a change agent in the form of a meeting course 
demonstration home farm or office visit Each contact will get a score of one point
Assumptions
The study will be conducted under the following assumptions
1 The respondents will provide accurate answers to the survey questions
2 The enumerators will conduct the personal interviews professionally as trained
3 The Malawi government and the World bank will continue to support agricultural research and 
extension
4 Should the household head not be available for what ever reason the spouse or oldest child above 
18 years will be substituted Otherwise repeat calls will be made or substitution
Limitations
The researcher is faced with time and resource constraints Therefore two research sites will be used one 
a matrilineal and one patrilineal community m Malawi for data collection
Summary
Previous agricultural development efforts have had limited impact in increasing agricultural production in 
Malawi and many developing countries The suitable technologies that have been developed and adapted 
to the micro environment have not been adopted widely A wide technical gap exists between yields 
obtained at research sites and in farmers fields The rate of adoption of the available suitable innovations 
by small farmers has been slow In cognisance of this problem many countries have introduced the 
training and visit extension approach in order to accelerate the innovation diffusion process
This study is undertaken primarily to develop a model for the selection of effective contact farmers in 
order to accelerate the innovation diffusion process amongst smallholder farmers in Malawi
Dissertation Organization
The first section presented the introduction of the study The second section reviews the relevant literature 
It particularly desenbes two sociometrie techniques for identifying potential contact farmers The third will 
deal with the methodology procedure for the data collection and analysis and the specifications of the 
sociometrie model for selecting contact farmers
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Literature Review
Introduction
The previous section presented the purpose objectives rationale and significance of the study This 
section presents the literature review of research on opinion leadership mainly done here m the united 
States It deals with the evolution of diffusion research and meta analysis of previous studies The 
literature review deals with opinion leaders even though the study is on contact farmers A contact farmer 
is a special case of the opinion leader therefore the literature on opinion leaders is deemed relevant to the 
purpose of this study This is a pioneer study on diffusion research in Malawi
Evolution of Diffusion Research
The work of leading sociologists like Rogers (1983) and Fliegel and van Es (1983) contributed a great 
deal towards the diffusion research literature in the United States Attempts to transfer the dominant 
diffusion model (Rogers 1983) to the third jvorld met with limited success Some of the reasons are that 
face to face rather than mass communication was and still is the most important medium for information 
flow in the third world there was innovation bias and the farmers were perceived as passive actors in the 
diffusion process availability of suitable mr ovations credit land and labor were taken for granted
A Survey of Sociometrie Studies
This study will focus on four versions of others designation technique namely choices by program 
leaders formal local leaders informal local leaders and the entire population of farming households Each 
respondent will be asked one by one to name those individuals they would seek information or advice 
from on a specific topic Other versions include asking a panel of key informants local leaders or program 
leaders singly or m various combinations of the community only to provide names of the members of the 
community they considered as influential in providing advice and information on a specific subject Those 
that are named the most are then considered as opinion leaders those with average choices are followers 
and those who are not chosen are isolates (Hollander 1964)
The following selection of sociometrie stud 
Champaign campus It is intended to show the
Fourteen studies qualified for inclusion in 
descriptions The average concentration of o;
TABLE 10 1 Survey of Various Sociometrie Studies
íes was obtained from the University of Illinois at Urbana 
characteristics of the studies and conclusions
the meta analysis because they had clear methodology 
pinion leaders is 35 percent and ranges from 12 to 78 percent
Author N 1 Respondents %Leaders %Non Leaders
Kim 1986 602 Dentists 78 22
Coleman et al 1956 125 Physicians 71 2 28 8
Webb 1964 187 Naval Cadets 55 7 45 3
Gaikwad et al 1972 68 Indian farmers 47 53
Gaikwad et al 1972 101 Indian Farmers 39 61
Dickerson & Bertrand 1969 144 Tree farmers 38 62
Rogers et al 1970 1142 Nigerian farmers 34 66
Gaikwad et al 1972 142 Indian Farmers 31 69
Haider 1990 602 Health C leaders 30 6 69 4
Chirasopone 1984 101 Thai villagers 26 74
Villareal 1971 240 Dorm girls 20 80
W ilkenson 1961 53 Irrigation farmers 20 80
W ilkenson 1961 73 Pasture farmers 17 5 82 5
W ilkenson 1961 65 Dairy farmers 12 6 87 4
N=14
Mean 243 35 59
Range
SD
53 1142 
301
12 78 
19
22 82 
19
Development o f a Sociometrie Model 145
The average distribution of non leaders is 69 percent ranging from 22 to 82 percent Farmers generally 
seem to be less connected Most of the studies were done in the US three each in India and Australia one 
each in Africa and Thailand to identify opinion leaders amongst farmers health personnel foresters and 
for the formation of task teams m the military Five studies have sample sizes in the 1 100 range and six 
studies in 101 200 range
The studies have used different entena for designating leadership Roger s et al (1965) study had 33 
respondents with at least 3 choices called leaders 56 respondents who received 1 2 choices as followers 
and 36 received no choice as followers also Most studies lumped together communicators with less 
choices than the minimum criteria choice and non communicators as followers (Wilkenson 1961 
Gaikwad et al 1972)
There is great need to standardize and be consistent with the leadership and followership criteria or at 
least assess vanation m choices that may be introduced by different fixed choices
Companson of Self Group and Population Sociometrie Techniques
Hollander (1964) assessed the intercorrelations between the three sociometrie techniques namely self 
group and population designation techniques using 210 naval cadets The results showed most of the 
studies have low intercorrelations as shown
(l) self esumate vs group estimate r= 37
(n) population estimate vs group estimate r= 40 and
(in) population estimate vs self estimate r= 39
There was considerable variation m the estimates The mtercorrelations of the group and population 
are higher than either compared to self estimate This is due to the penetrating quality of pooled 
judgements the more the better
Reliability
Reliability provides a measure of accuracy internal consistency and stability of scores over time 
(Cronbach 1947) The calculation of single stage reliability or internal consistency of peer nomination 
score is done by an odd even split of the raters within the group The Spearman Brown formula is used 
widely to estimate the reliability when the scale of measurement is ordinal but assumes that the two 
even odd splits have the same variance (Hollander 1964) The second concern for researchers is the 
consistency of the sociometrie choices over time as reflected by repeated administrations A low level of 
correlation between scores yielded by two administrations of the same peer nomination is evidence of 
unstable group pattern or unstable individual behavior (Hollander 1964 p 113)
In six studies done involving 1 463 naval cadets Hollander (1964) found a high consistence between 
early nominations and later nominations at zero three and six weeks
Characteristics of Opinion Leaders
There is overwhelming agreement amongst numerous researchers on the distinguishing characteristics of 
opinion leaders (Chirasopone 1984 Gaikwad et al 1972 and Dickerson and Bertrand 1969) The 
characteristics include exposure to mass media cosmopoliteness contact with change agents social 
participation social status and innovativeness
The Training and Visit Extension Approach
In the 1970 s many developing countries introduced the training and visit extension approach Currently 
there are about fifty countries in pilot and full implementation of the new approach with 30 of them in 
Africa alone 7 and 23 respectively (Bagchee 1994) The T and V was introduced in Malawi in 1987 in 
order to strengthen the existing Block Extension approach (Darudec 1992) It focussed on focussing on the
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selection of a number of contact farmers 
worker The contact farmers were chosen pi 
extension workers in establishing mini pic 
would be demonstrated (p 430) While this
m a geographical area under the jurisdiction of an extension 
imarily on the basis of their willingness to cooperate with the 
ts within their own gardens and on which new technology 
has improved contact between farmers and extension workers
some deficiencies are apparent The demonstrations are attended by a decreasing number of farmers who 
are predominantly amongst the better off farmers and smallholder agricultural credit recipients The key 
elements of the training and visit extension approach are
1 Extension workers single line of command
2 Single function dissemination of innovation
3 non extension tasks like data collection credit administration input procurement should be divorced 
from extension
4 Regular training sessions of contact farmers and follow up visits to farmers by extension workers 
preferably fortnightly
5 The contact farmers should hold regular demonstrations of the new practices with their group of
follower farmers
Availability of attractive innovations for dissemination and adoption by farmers
Favorable pnces for the farm inputs and produce
8 Effective linkages between extension and research
Under the t and v approach the extension workers are expected to work full time on technology transfer 
by structunng a senes of regular visits to groups of contact farmers and leaving them no time to dnft back 
to non extension tasks The visits involve communication and demonstrations of specific technical 
practices to farmers The question arises as jto whether indeed extension can be a full time job under the 
one rainy season situation except on irrigated nee schemes where double cropping is possible per 
agncultural year
The contact farmer s role is essential m providing a link and multiplier effect of extension service at a 
lower cost The procedure for the selection !of contact farmers has not been clearly documented but the 
sparse literature suggests that they are selected by extension workers on the basis of anticipated 
cooperation to comply (Darudec 1992)
The selection process is biased in favor of those farmers who are homophilous with the extension 
workers and more progressive than the majority of farmers in the community Therefore this study 
proposes to address the following questions
1 Are currently practicing contact farmers effective in promoting innovation adoption amongst 
smallholder farmers9
2 What are the distinguishing characteristics of effective contact farmers9
3 What desirable characteristics should contact farmers have as perceived by smallholder farmers9
4 Can sociometrie techmque(s) and information obtained from 1 3 above be used to develop a model
for selecting effective contact farmers9
Methodology
The previous section presented an analysis of two sociometrie techniques peer and key informants 
designation This section will deal with the Purvey procedure and data analysis The research procedure 
will include the research design variables population and instrumentation data analysis and the 
sociometrie model for selecting contact farmers
Research Design
This study is ex post facto and descriptive i  will attempt to assess an important aspect of the training and 
visit extension approach in two communities in Malawi The prevailing high illiteracy level has compelled 
the use of personal interviews
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Population and Sample
The population for this study will consist of all farming households in two sections of Blantyre agricultural 
development division in Malawi central Afnca Two different sociological sites will be selected one 
matrilineal and the other patrilineal Both research sites will have to have active development programs in 
agriculture The most recent household listings from the evaluation section of the agricultural development 
division will be the sampling frame It will be updated by consultation with change agents and local 
leaders in the area.
The sample size has been computed using a formula presented by Krejcie and Morgan (1970) This 
formula gives an estimate of the sample size when the
(a) total population is known N 1
(b) a specified confidence level ( e g  95) associated with a chi square statistic for one degree of 
freedom and
(c) the designated degree of accuracy as reflected by the amount of sampling error d that can be 
tolerated The formula is as follows S = X2 NP (1 P/ d2 (n 1) + X2 P(1 P) in which
S = required sample size
N = the given population size I
P = population proportion that for table construction has been assumed to be 05 as this magnitude 
yields the maximum possible sample size required i 
d = the degree of accuracy as reflected by the amount of error that can be tolerated m the function 
of a sample proportion p about the population proportion P the value for d being 05 in the 
calculations for entries in the table a quantity equal to + or 1 96 o 
X = table value of chi square for one degree of freedom relative to the desired level of confidence 
which was 3 481 for the 95 confidence level represented Iby entries in the table
The sample size was computed to be 390 and was rounded off to 400 farming respondents which will 
be divided as follows
(i) 200 households where both husbands and wives will be interviewed separately fifty in patrilineal 
and fifty in matrilineal communities I
(n) 100 households unmarried single or widowed women and 
(in) 100 households unmarried single or widowed men
Variables
The first dependent variable is the number of sociometrie choices | received by a respondent or the 
frequency of being named as a source of advice and information on a specific agricultural innovation The 
second set of dependent variables will consist of those factors perceived as desirable attributes of effective 
contact farmers by other farmers in the community The seven independent variables include 
innovativeness cosmopoiiteness frequency of contact of the respondents with change agents mass media 
exposure participation in organizations and social status and gender (Rogers 1963)
Enumerators
i
Five expenenced enumerators and a supervisor will be borrowed from Blantyre agricultural development 
division for the survey under the leadership of the author The enumerators will undergo an orientation 
course in using the questionnaire to make sure that accurate data jare obtained
Instrumentation
Three questionnaires will be developed and used in this study namely a General Household Survey 
(GHS) Contact Farmers Attributes Survey (CFAS) and Program Leaders Survey (PLS) The GHS is for 
all the 400 household respondents and is intended to provide sociometrie data About 70 farmers will be 
subjected to the CFAS to discern their perceptions of desirable attributes of contact farmers The PLS
II
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questionnaire is aimed at obtaining sociometrie data from program leaders The three questionnaires will 
be prepared by the researcher improved anil validated using the assistance of a panel of experts from 
University of Illinois (student s dissertation! committee) Bunda college of agriculture (3) Lilongwe 
agricultural development division (4) and me ministry of agriculture (1)
The GHS and CFAS questionnaires will be translated into the local language Chichewa by a language 
expert and translated back to English by another language expert until congruency is achieved The GHS 
questionnaire will secure data on the following variables social status participation of social 
organizations cosmopoliteness mass media exposure innovativeness contact with change agents 
gender household locality and adoption scores The CFAS questionnaire will obtain data on the attributes 
of contact farmers perceived to be desirable by other farmers The PLS questionnaire will identify 
individuals considered by program leaders to be influential in the community
Pilot Studies
Two pilot test villages will be chosen within the neighborhood of the study area to be used for training 
enumerators improvement of the questionnaire determination of measurement error and reliabilities of 
the two sociometrie techniques Forty households ten percent of the population of the study will be used 
in each village Enumerators will be trained to ask questions professionally with a pleasant tone that 
conveys assurance and interest and speed of speaking to be about 2 words per second The questionnaire 
will be improved for eligibility to respondents language accuracy semantics ethics and designed for the 
interview penod to last about half an hour The questionnaire will be administered to the same respondents 
in one village two times two weeks apart to minimize carryover effects and the Guttman split method will 
be applied to test the stability accuracy and measurement error (Guttman 1945)
Focus Groups
A small selection of members of the following groups will be made
1 Program leaders agricultural staff mainly
2 Formal local leaders
3 Informal local leaders
4 Selected contact farmers
5 Follower farmers
6 Isolates
and subjected to an unstructured in depth personal interview by the researcher to probe and verify their 
perceptions on the training and visit extension approach and the assignment of contact farmers The data 
and information gathered this way will be triangulated with data from the surveys (GHS CFAS and PLS)
Data Analysis
Data analysis will be done using the SPSSj (Statistical Packages for Social Sciences) Descriptive 
statistics will be done to assess the differences among groups and associations among variables Multiple 
regression analysis and factor analysis will ibe performed for predictive and explanatory purposes 
Descriptive statistics will be used for description of the population and groups of respondents
Comparison of two sociometrie techniques The reliabilities of the peer nomination and key informants 
nominations of contact farmers will be compared using the Guttman split half method The Schefe method 
will be used to compare and contrast between high medium and low contact farmers i e
(a) high contact farmers are those whose sociometrie scores are at least one standard deviation above 
the mean
(b) Medium Contact Farmers are those whose sociometrie scores are within one standard deviation 
below or above the mean and
(c) Low Contact Farmers are those whose sociometrie scores are below the mean
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Characteristics of contact farmers Regression analysis will be used to assess the relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables Partial regression will provide the direction and 
magnitude of between variables singly and in sets This will also provide the degree of determination and 
predictive values of the independent variables
Development of the sociometrie model for selecting contact farmers From 1 and 2 above plus the farmers 
perceived attributes of an effective contact farmers i
(a) The sociometrie technique(s) selected should have a reliability of at least 0 70 using the Guttman 
split half method and the sociometrie technique should draw contact farmers from a cross section of 
the community
(b) The potential contact farmers must possess the attributes of an effective contact farmer as 
perceived by farmers in the community and
(c) The selected individual should be willing to serve as a contact farmers
Summary j
A contact farmer is an opinion leader who is designated to demonstrate the use of modem technologies to 
other farmers on a regular basis In order to encourage the use of the sociometrie model a nationwide 
training program will be launched covering extension staff and other relevant agricultural professionals 
There is the potential of increasing the percentage of small farmers m the use of modern technologies from 
the current 20 percent to about 50 percent primarily those households with more than 1 hectare land 
holdings Since the concentration of contact farmers may be lower in lower social groups deliberate 
attempts will have to be made to recruit proportionately more contact farmers from such farmer categories
The training and visit extension approach aims to increase agricultural production by increasing the 
number of farmers adopting modem farm inputs and practices and' raising the levels of adoption The 
extension workers and contact farmers will intensify campaigns to promote the utilization of purchased 
farm inputs and practices In addition the training and visit extension approach will be used to introduce 
new agricultural enterprises into new areas Non monetary farm inputs such as quality of seed seed rates 
seedbed preparation timing distance depth and method of sowing or planting seeds early land 
preparation correct ridge spacing and alignment weeding and water conservation techniques manure 
application and compost making The training and visit extension japproach will promote the following 
purchased inputs certified seeds fertilizers pesticides farm implements such ploughs harrows 
cultivators fertilizer drills seed planters and sprayers/ dusters for plant protection In addition work oxen 
training will be intensified
Some farmers may not be able to afford to purchase high quality hybrid certified seeds for their 
farmlands This applies to particularly those households with less than 1 hectare of land It is proposed that 
such farmers should grow improved open pollinated maize varieties on about 1/25 part of their land and 
save it for use in the following season If this procedure is followed year after year such smaller farmers 
will have the opportunity to use improved high quality composite maize seed
In conclusion this sociometrie model for selecting contact farmers has great potential First it will 
ensure maximum participation of the farmers in the community in selecting their own respective contact 
fanners Second it is cost effective and will enable the extension service expand and intensify its 
coverage at a relatively little additional cost Third it takes into account the community s existing norms 
values and taboos defining the interpersonal communication network Founh it takes advantage of the 
most important and least resistance medium for information pathways in the community
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Chapter 11
Strengthening Women’s Contribution To Malawi’s Food Security 
An African Response To A Global Problem
by Grace Margaret Mahndi
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of Malawi s efforts m increasing 
participation of rural women in the mainstream of development particularly food 
production under the National Rural Development Program
A histoncal approach is used to review past efforts Elements of gender analysis and 
analyucal systems models have been used to review present efforts in increasing 
participation of women in rural development programs by the Malawi government through 
the Ministry of Agnculture The following areas are reviewed (1) a concept of rural 
development that provides the context of this paper (2) national and household level 
characteristics which determine the nature of rural development programs (3) effects of 
structural transformation on rural women (4) a rationale for including women as a target 
client in the participauon of rural development programs based on their status and role 
(5) Malawi s efforts in the involvement of women through the National Rural 
Development Program (NRDP) phases (6) suggested strategies for improving 
parucipation of rural women in rural development programs m Malawi
Introduction
I
Every country strives to balance its food production and the demands of its population for food and good 
health A country like Great Britain in the 19th century had its population growing four fold yet its 
national product grew fourteen fold Despite populauon explosion the fast rate of technology turned around 
the bleak situation to a rise of output that flowed from the industrial and scientific revolution (Kennedy 
1993) The same power of science and technology that counteracted the Malthusian trap of malnutrition 
starvation resource depletion unrest enforced migration and armdd conflicts for countries like Great 
Britain did not have the same the impact for a country like Malawi a former Bntish colony Because of 
the new technology efficient systems of production and the rapid spread of its economic reach Britain 
was able to boast of its cornfields in North America and Russia granaries in Odessa and Chicago the 
Umber forests in Canada and the Baltic sheep farms m Australia herds of oxen in Argentina and the 
Northern American Prairies silver from Peru gold from South Africa tea from the Hindus and Chinese 
coffee sugar and spices from the Indies Vineyards m France and Spain and fruit gardens m the 
Mediterranean and the cotton fields in the Southern United States(Kennedy 1993)
But for a country like Malawi the impact of technology on the interrelated issues such as food 
insecurity overpopulation pressure upon the land and health is affected by more adverse factors than its 
colonizer The differences include limited economic and technological resources which lead to low levels 
of investments in research scientist staff development for technology development and dissemination 
(Swanson et al 1986) The differences are also aggravated by not having a full understanding of Malawian 
rural households particularly women m relation to technology adoption The context of rural development 
is given m order to understand rural women within their own environment
i
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The Concept of Rural Development
Previously rural development was considered to be synonymous to agricultural output and statistics of farm 
production were used as main indicators for measuring rural development However Coombs et al (1974) 
suggests a broader view
which equates rural development with far reaching transformation of social and economic 
structures institutions relationships and processes in any rural area It conceives the goals of 
rural development not simply as agricultural and economic growth in the narrow sense but as 
balanced social economic development | with emphasis on the equitable distribution as well 
as the creation o f benefits Among the goals are the generation of new employment more 
equitable access to arable land more equitable distribution of income widespread 
improvements in health nutrition and housing greatly broadened opportunities for all
through education and a strong voice for all rural 
people m shaping the decisions and actions that affect their lives as well as the creation of 
benefits (p 13)
The concept of rural development within the Malawi s context is reflected in the Malawi national 
development policies which emphasize increased agricultural productivity for small holders and improving 
their level of living This concept is much narrower than that of Coombs et al above this will be 
discussed in detail later Some data from the National Statistical Office (NSO) on national household 
characteristics and agricultural production complement the policies in portraying the context of rural 
development
National and Household Level Characteristics
In most developing countries rural people who are the potential clients of rural development programs 
comprise the majority of the population Approximately 95 percent of Malawi s eight million population 
Uve in the rural areas There are seventy four people per square kilometer with an annual birth rate of 3 2 
Total fertility rate is 7 0 per woman Children under fifteen years old constitute 48 percent of the 
population and those between 15 and 44 years of age make up 40 percent Eighty five percent of the rural 
population live on poverty line (World Bark Report 1990 & UN Statistical Office 1991)
The following factors contribute to the poverty conditions of most rural households Malawi is 
landlocked with a relatively small but rapidly growing population rate (3 2 percent per annum)
Agriculture contributes 90 percent of foreign exchange with 3 mam cash crops (tobacco tea and sugar) 
accounting over 80 percent of total exports I Agriculture is the main employer accounting for 87 percent of 
total employment mainly as small holder and the rest on estates (World Bank Report 1989) The 
smallholder sub sector accounts for 85 percent of agricultural production providing almost all of the food 
crops (maize cassava sorghum millet potatoes beans groundnut vegetables livestock and livestock 
products The majority of the rural population (95 percent) are engaged in smallholder agriculture using 
traditional technologies According to World bank report (1989) the smallholder production has been 
plagued by negative economic developments related to international commodity prices political struggles 
in Mozambique transport disruptions and an in flow of refugees Besides low levels of mineral resources 
Gulhati (1989) claims that the stock of human capital is extremely underdeveloped even when compared 
to other similar low income countries Enrollment rates for primary and secondary school and for higher 
education have nsen from very low levels but still remain relatively low (Primary school enrollment 
increased from 44 percent in 1965 to 66 percent in 1987 secondary school enrollment increased from 2 
percent in 1965 to 4 percent m 1987 and tertiary enrollment from 0 percent in 1965 to 1 percent in 1987 
(World Development report 1990)
Although life expectancy has nsen (from 
lowest in the world Malawi has 48 percent
38 years in 1960 to 48 in 1987) it sull remains one of the 
of its population within the age structure 0 to 14 years of age 
implying a high dependency factor as the majority cannot contribute to the labor force This is one of the 
reasons Malawi s GNP annual growth rate(l 1 percent) and GNP per capita ($170) is one of the lowest in 
the world (World Development Report 1990) The growth in population is putting a lot of pressure on
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available arable land and the economy in general The average land holding size for smallholders is 1 1 
hectares Thirty five percent of rural households have less than 0 7 hectares who cannot satisfy subsistence 
requirements with present levels of technology Only 40 percent of smallholder have more than 0 7 to 1 5 
hectares of land which can modestly satisfy their subsistence requirements With such shortages of land 
and financial hardships mostly men migrate from rural areas to urban areas or outside the country in search 
of paid employment The effects of this move are discussed under structural transformation
Effects of Structural Transformation
A structure of production and labor force data are used to determine the pattern of structural transformation 
m Malawi As defined by Johnson and Kilby (1975) structural transformation starts with surplus production 
of the primary sector for Malawi s case it is agriculture leading to specialization of product output 
Eventually most people within the agricultural sector shift to industry or services Malawi s data sets from 
UNDP(1990) World Development Report(1990) and World s Women (1990) indicate a similar pattern of 
structural transformation The structure of production is depicted by a decrease of percentage of GDP from 
agriculture (from 50 percent in 1965 to 37 percent in 1988) to an increased percentage of GDP from 
industry (13 percent in 1965 to 18 percent in 1988) and services (37 percent m 1965 to 44 percent in
1988) There has also been a decrease of the labor force m agriculture 92 0 percent in 1965 to 83 4 in 1988 
On the other hand there has been an increase in the labor force m industry from 3 0 percent in 1965 to 7 4 
percent m 1988 and services (5 0 percent in 1965 to 9 3 percent in 1988) The present migration rate of 
men from rural areas to urban is 63 percent Although there has been a shift from the agricultural sector to 
industry the degree of transformation has not been as intense as other developing countries due to the 
slow growth of industry and the rapid growth of population The population size is a strain on production 
expansion given the limited land available hence the low annual rate of economic growth The shift of the 
labor force from agriculture to industry and in fact the entire structural transformation has implications m 
gender role differentiation and stratification In extreme cases it leads to feminization of poverty 
Women are left to do most of the agricultural work while men migrate to urban areas for paid wages in 
government institutions and industries This phenomena contributes to Malawi s considerable high 
percentage (29 percent) of the female headed households Besides other household burdens such as child 
care they take over field operations for which m most cases they are not technically prepared Boserup 
(1970) states that
usually all or nearly all the family enterprises that succeed growing into more productive 
and remunerative capitalist enterprises are those managed by men with women and other 
men as assistants When transformation of some family enterprises turns into large capitalist 
enterprises creates an increasing economic gap between persons belonging to different 
families the traditional age sex race hierarchy is transformed into as age sex race class 
hierarchy with positive results for some women and negative results for some women (p 20)
Chipande (1987) in his study of Phalombe also found that m the mid 1980s outward male migration 
accounted for 60 percent of the female headed households (FHHs) m that area Peters et al (1989) found 
that of the 35 percent of households in their sample headed of by women 25 percent were de facto FHHs 
where the husband had either migrated to South Africa to take up ' wage labor or he was employed away 
from the village and absent for most of the year In a recent study Davidson (1992) similarly found that 45 
percent of the women interviewed in Zomba district headed their own households with 204 percent being 
de facto FHHs '
Pala (1976) argues that an adequate conception of rural development in Afnca today must consider that 
rural farm families men women and children do not experience rural change in a uniform manner 
Therefore a focus on the roles and status of women helps to determine what development programs are 
appropriate to rural women
i
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The Role and Status of Rural Women in Malawi 
Rationale to Participation m Rural Development Programs
David Hirchmann s study (1984) helps to locate women m the national economy Women in the rural 
areas are normally involved in many types Jof economic activity (crop production poultry and vegetable 
raising trade and marketing food storage and preparation home and family management brewing labor
provision etc Ninety two percent of women 
m subsistence and significant cash cropping
who live in the rural areas are involved on their own holdings 
Slightly under 6 percent provide part time labor on
intermediate enterprises and smallholder jotjs One percent are full urne estate employees in lower paid 
unskilled jobs Two and one half percent are considered to have no economic activity outside the house 
while 1 5 percent are in non agricultural family business
Women in Malawi just as Cloud writes
play multiple roles in the world s agricultural systems They may be mothers housekeepers 
wage laborers agricultural processors market women and entrepreneurs as well as 
agricultural producers Most rural women make constant tradeoffs in allocating labor time and 
productive resources among their roles and obligations Most farming systems display mixed 
patterns of women s agricultural responsibilities combining production cycles where one sex 
is primarily responsible with crops where responsibility is shared (p 21)
Women comprise 50 to 70 percent of the smallholder agncultural production in Malawi Clark (1975) 
found that 50 percent to 70 percent of all farming activities are done by women Studies by Cad and 
Christianson (1982) Spring Smith and Caini (1983) also found similar results on a greater proportion of 
work done by women than men A good example of the proportion of work done by rural women 
specifically on the division of labor in Maize production is that done by Hirschmann and Vaughn (1984) 
as seen in Appendix Table 11 2 A most recent study by Davidson (1992) see Appendix Table 11 3 for 
more data which sull reflect that women arej major contributors to agricultural production
From studies done on Malawi women s roles are viewed m three major paradigms First women are 
responsible for household tasks Women take care of household and family members Research studies by 
Clark (1975) found that women spend 23 percent of their time in domestic acuvities Second women are 
viewed as major subsistence farmers In most of the households in Malawi women do more of the 
subsistence (as already cited in studies by Clark Hirschmann and Davidson) Third women do not only 
work on subsistence crops but also on cash crops with a substanual contribuüon to skilled field operauons
For example Spnng Smith and Cam(1983) found that women take part in the production of turkish
tobacco nee and spraying of cotton Women spend 20 percent of their urne on farm work With the 
involvement of such vaned tasks it is inevitable that women are also highly involved m making decisions 
on both the farm and household The situation is more so for FHHs Mkandawire et al (1988) Sigman 
(1993) found that FHHs have smaller land foldings plant later space incorrectly and weed less frequently 
and own less livestock Yet these FHHs are making complex decisions regarding the management of the 
farming activiues and are carrying out the farming practices as best as they can
The high incidence of FHHs is one of the Lajor factors for low participauon of women in rural 
development programs Berger Delancey and Mellencamp (1984) indicate that lack of land limited 
economic and pohucal power as well as outnght discrimination were used to explain women s low 
participauon m extension programs FHHs do not have access to credit because of their low resources 
they have labor constraints for both agncultural and household tasks and therefore have no time to attend 
development programs Culler C (1987) also summanzes women s restneted access to such programs as 
follows
often women do not have utle to the land they farm and thus cannot qualify for credit 
women with legal and land rights their fields may be smaller and more distant and are not 
viewed as good potential clients by the extensiomsts
limited cash income hinders their ability to purchase agricultural inputs or to hire needed 
labor to implement new technologies encouraged by extension workers
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because of their dual household and productive responsibilities rural women already work 
longer hours than men and cannot adopt new agricultural techniques that require greater 
amounts of time women also lack time to attend agricultural courses
education improves farmers abilities to innovate and make accurate agricultural decisions 
yet fewer females than males are literate or attend school
agricultural organizations which provide inputs education and credit tend to restrict 
membership to farmers who own land or head households thereby excluding many women 
farmers
the political structures of villages and nations are dominated by men resulting in the 
unequal distribution of resources and influence in favor of male farmers even when women 
play significant agricultural roles (p 29) 1
Hirschmann s study also revealed that previous programs established by the Ministry of Agriculture had 
agricultural training and extension directed at men while the training which women received consist 
primarily of home economics This means that field staff of the Ministry dealt primarily with male farmers 
(Table 11 1)
However the Ministry of Agriculture has made increasing efforts m giving attention to the participation 
of rural women in rural development The efforts are discussed in ¡the next section under the National Rural 
Development Program (NRDP)
Efforts to Increase Participation of Women through the NRDP
In 1966 the government of Malawi established an integrated rural development program with four projects 
Shire Valley Development Project(1968) Lilongwe Land Development Project (1968) Central Region 
Development Project (1972) The purpose of the projects was to train manpower and to expand domestic 
export crops According to Muwila (1986) two lessons were learned from the ten year s experience of 
development work (1) Integrated rural development was an expensive approach and (2) it was not 
replicable in all geographical areas The lessons led to the establishment of the five phased National Rural 
Development Program in 1978 Participation of rural women in the first four phases was still very limited 
This statement is supported by Hirschmann s study on plans and policies relating to women The study 
revealed that in all of the project summaries women are mentioned only once and that is under the 
National Resources which promised an intake of farm home instructors He also discovered that a key 
document on National Rural Development Program for 1971/80 providing a broad national blueprint for 
agricultural development and covering strategies objectives and structures had no significant attention 
given to women In a nutshell efforts through the first four phases were designed to provide better adoption 
and diffusion of approaches Phase 1 of the NRDP funded by World Bank was mainly a pre investment 
phase in which infrastructure was established and staff recruited Phase 2 placed high investments on 
extension training and credit services Phase 3 focused on intensive agriculture soil conservation and 
irrigation Phase 4 was a consolidation phase However phases one through four provided few opportunities 
for improving management and supervisory capabilities ineffective management of planning of extension 
and training activities inadequate provision of budgetary resources and low acceptance rates by farmers 
were considered possible risks at the beginning of phase five
TABLE 111 Frequency of Visits by Agricultural Extension Worker
Visits FHH Wives Husbands Total
Within last 2 weeks 13% 17% 27% 20%
W ithin last 3 months 16% 19% i 25% 21%
Over three months ago 19% 13% 18<7 17%
Never 53% 52% 30% 43%
Source MOA National Survey of Women in Agriculture (1989)
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Present Efforts under NRDP 5 m Increasing 
in Rural Development Programs
Participation of Women
Several projects under NRDP 5 were initiated m order to minimize these risks The projects included the 
National Agricultural Research Project (NARP) Malawi Agricultural Extension and Planning Support 
Project (MAEPS) and the Malawi Agricultural Research and Extension Project (MARE) Efforts to 
mcrease women s participation in rural development were primarily through the MARE project Therefore
the review will focus on the MARE project 
women s participation (2) delivery systems
under the following issues (1) setting an agenda for increased 
for increased women s participation and (3) barriers to 
increased women s participation Various approaches have been used to analyze each issue The projects 
analysis profile the systems approach and n e  systems flow analysis have been used to review each issue 
respectively
Setting an Agenda for Women s Participation in Rural Development
A major achievement by the MOA in increasing participation of rural women m rural development was the 
establishment of the Women s Program Section in 1981 under NRDP 5 within the Extension and Training 
Division The section dealing with Women s Programs was previously called Farm Home Economics 
depicting the notion that women needed to [concentrate on home based activities such as home 
management child care etc and not much on agriculture With introduction of the MARE project the 
Women s program was considered one of the priority areas in order to avoid further neglect of women from 
agricultural research and extension The agenda setting will be reviewed using some elements of Projects 
Cycle Analysis Profile adopted from Cloud [(1985) because efforts for increasing rural women s 
participation under the MARE project are basically through projects The project design therefore 
suggested ways m which female smallholder farmers and their needs could be addressed through the 
training research and extension components Thus involvement of the Adaptive Research Teams (ART) 
as a strategy for providing baseline data for promoting parucipation of female farmers both from female 
headed households and male headed households was considered important right from the beginning of the 
project According to the MARE Mid term evaluation report the onset of the Women s program lacked a 
strong program despite the emphasis on women s role in farming as well as in the home The women s 
Program section did not do a lot of work wilth ARTs until 1987 because of delays in getting full adaptive 
research teams On assessing women s opportunities Women s Program Officers (WPO) work with the 
ARTs in order to ensure participation by women farmers in identifying problems and needs Diagnostic 
surveys were conducted m all Agncultural Development Divisions (ADDs) except Kasungu ADD Informal 
studies were also done m Blantyre Lilongwje and Kasungu ADDs with assistance of Women s Program s 
staff These studies have been done in response to inadequate information collected for good decisions in 
programming and to assess the rural women! s low participation
Although the ARTs are incorporating genjder analysis in their surveys adaptive research mals have 
negligible numbers of women farmers The reason given for low participation in the research mals is that 
male extension workers have fewer contacts with female farmers particularly low resource farmers Thus a 
danger of missing the opportunity of identifying appropriate development agenda for crucial target groups 
The Mid term evaluation report also shows [that most commodity research teams did not include gender 
analysis into their research agendas except horticulture and agro forestry Additionally a report on the 
Mzuzu Pilot Project Baseline Survey provides data that are not desegregated by gender yet this is a 
major communications pilot project crucial to the participation of rural women through block meetings 
groups clubs and mass media
In the absence of complete baseline data from ARTs the Women s Program Section initiated efforts to 
collect data through formal and informal surveys and workshops in order to develop the first three year 
work plan The five year work plan (1990-1995) was based on the same sources of information besides the 
MARE project focus which is strengthening the Women s Program Section and increasing production of 
small holder female farmers (The women s dimension in project implementation will be discussed in 
detail under the issue of delivery systems for increased women s participation) At this point it has been 
noted that the process of setting women s agenda for increased participation m rural development is on
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going A National Survey of Women in Agriculture in Malawi by Culler C Patterson H and Chikagwa 
I (1990) is a one of the major contributions to setting the agenda I for increased women s participation in 
rural development The study was aimed at collecting information about extension and training needs of 
rural women from the women themselves and extension staff In a nutshell the study revealed that seventy 
one percent of seasonal agricultural work was done by women Female headed households (27 percent) 
are more at risk with low resources yet they are confronted with tough decisions on their complex 
management of farm and household activities Most of the women have inadequate farm implements 
small land holding size consequently engaged in crop diversification and inter cropping In male headed 
households women assisted m deciding which crops to raise yet both categories of women are not fully 
supported with the appropriate messages and services Eighty percent of income was indicated to be from 
other sources than crops and livestock sales Problems faced by vyomen were as follows 80 percent health 
50 percent agricultural and 39 percent food supply related Household tasks such as family care were 
considered deterrents for women in increasing their agricultural production Appendix Tablet shows 
constraints faced by women which limit agricultural production
One of the recommendations from the study concerning agenda setting emphasized topics to be 
considered as priorities for training courses and workshops which are crop production livestock 
management home economics nutrition and credit The delivery and application of such content for 
increased women s participation in rural development is discussed further in the following section
Delivery System for Increased Women s Participation in Rural Development
Some elements of the Systems Analysis Model adopted from INTERPAKS of the University of Illinois 
has been used m order to map and easily identify the organizational structure and function in the process 
of reviewing the delivery system Under the MARE project, the MOA aimed to address the needs of 
female farmers in three components training agricultural research and extension services Thus MOA is a 
macrosystem with various subsystems The subsystems included within the MOA in this review are 
Policy Research Extension and Utilization \
i
The Policy Subsystem A recently published policy and implementation manual has been one of the 
significant efforts in increasing women s participation within rural development The policy was put 
together after several reviews and revisions The Women s program stated objectives are
1) to increase women s participation in extension programs and services m order to optimize 
adoption and agricultural productivity 2) to increase household income through income 
generating activities related to agriculture or agri business 3) to improve home and farm 
management skills and utilize available resources m order to improve family health and well 
being
The objectives emphasize increased participation in agricultural home based and income generation 
which provides an opportunity for women to have a broad based! program The objectives are also 
congruent and consistent with rural development principles of aiming at equity and reducing poverty
Through the MARE project s fund there has been commitment in achieving the goals through training 
income generating activities and laying the foundation for a sustainable program Although there are 
commendable policy directions related to strengthening linkages among the Women s Program s section 
ARTs AGREDAT and Commodity teams there are no clear strategies for maximizing the linkages which 
benefit rural women A further discussion under the research subsystem will give more details on this 
concern
The Research Subsystem Within the MARE project design the AGREDAT ARTs Commodity Research 
teams which are within the research component are to integrate efforts with Women s program in 
addressing the need to reach low resource women AGREDAT helps in financial and economic analysis for 
experimental work general assessments of adaptability of technologies to farmers objectives provides 
economic information to commodity teams and establishing a computer data bank for past and current 
research According to the Mid term evaluation report establishment of some the activities within
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AGREDAT particularly establishing the data bank was deferred due to unclear objectives However 
AGREDAT has jointly worked with Women s program in a cassava trial at Salima Although the ARTs 
have also worked jointly with the WP during the diagonistic surveys and have good structural and 
functional potential in increasing the participation of rural women the commitment is not clear on a long 
term basis (MARE Mid term evaluation report 1989)
Commodity teams generally have not focused their full attention on rural women s needs despite 
exceptions with a few teams For example the Agro forestry team has shown direct support to the 
participation of women m improved agricultural production through cultural practices such as mter 
cropping acacia albida with maize The Horticultural team is also working with WPOs and other Subject 
Matter Specialists in developing appropriate cultural practices on indigenous vegetables and fruits 
besides the exotic vegetables However the team s efforts on production of tree nuts has proved to be too 
high in costs for most smallholder farmers particularly the low resource farmers In general it has been 
noted that the research subsystem is still concentrating at capacity and institutional building so much that 
efforts at farmer s participatory levels are still low The extension subsystems which facilitates the 
research subsystem in responding to rural women s needs is discussed next
The Extension Subsystem One of MOA s efforts to increase rural women s participation m rural 
development is strengthening the extension subsystem through the Mzuzu Communication Pilot Project 
The communication approach is based upon jan infusion diffusion model and is aimed at enhancing the 
existing organizational structure to promote better two way communication among researchers extension 
workers and smallholders to increase the productivity quality of life and income of farmers (MZADD 
Pilot Communication Handbook Jan 1989 ) The approach is first being tested in Mzuzu ADD with the 
hope of replicating the approach in all ADDsJ if the ideas work The approach had been reported to have 
been taken with enthusiasm by both farmers and extension workers According to the mid term MARE 
project report previous extension efforts were not very successful in making technology accessible to 
smallholder farmers considering the limited generation of technology and ineffective one way 
communication in the interaction of researchers to farmers through extension Through present efforts there 
has been increased women s participation m jblock meetings groups clubs and credit programs See 
Appendix Tables 2 and 3 for details on women s participation in Seasonal Credit Programs 1982/83 
-1987/88) and Women belonging to Clubs in! June 1988 Swanson and Peterson (1989) argue that access 
to agricultural extension depends on the interaction between agricultural research and extension 
subsystems including the capacity and ability of extension particularly subject matter specialists to 
access technology from research According to the Mid term evaluation report The Pilot Communication 
Project approach is seen as having potential for improved two way communication among farmers 
researchers and extension personnel stronger linkages between research and extension by involving both 
subsystems in the problem identification and I the message development production and delivery process 
by providing field staff with up to date technically accurate and locally appropriate information to be 
delivered to farmers using improved communjication /education techniques In the absence of the final 
recommendations from the Pilot project for maximum delivery of technologies to rural women the WP 
has initiated the following activities m order to promote participation of rural women in rural development
1) Developing and maintaining support system of the WP at headquarters ADDs and field 
levels* specifically towards information dissemination developing training matenals 
training courses the formulation of development plans section actions and directions 2)
Developing methods of increasing women |s participation in extension activities through credit 
demonstrations and income generating acuvities 3) Coordination with other sections in the 
Ministry and with other governmental and^non governmental bodies in reaching women farmers 
and 4 Developing systems of monitoring and evaluation of extension activities with reference to 
women farmers (Mid term evaluation report 1990 p 48)
Given such diversity of activities in strengthening the programs for rural women the situation requires 
adequate trained personnel which is a major constraint affecting both the research and extension 
subsystems Although there is a human resource development component within the MARE project, the 
problem is compounded with limited creation of new posts Capacity building efforts are underway through
Stengthenuig Women s Contribution to Malawi s Food Security 161
long term and short term courses upgrading of Farm Home Assistants (FHAs) who used to be trained more 
in home economics than agriculture Despite such training efforts sustainability and adequacy of such 
efforts is questionable considering elaborate structures involved right from the blocks sections projects 
and division areas in relation to detailed processes involved in programming dissemination of 
technologies (Mid term evaluation Report 1989)
Utilization Subsystem Without undermining the importance of the utilization subsystem this paper will not 
fully discuss participation of women m food production Reason being human capacity and institutional 
building efforts seem to be still dominating the actual activities enhancing adoption of various 
technologies by rural women This subsystem will jointly be discussed under the linkage and flow of 
technology to rural women
Summary of Barriers to Increased Rural Women s Participation and 
General Recommendations for Optimum Rural Development
In summary the barriers and general recommendation have been viewed following the issues addressed m 
this paper which are (1) setting the right agenda for addressing women s needs and problems using gender 
analysis and related frameworks and (2) appropriate delivery systems for ensunng increased participation 
General recommendations for increased women s participation m rural development are considered in the 
context of rural development concept complemented by national and household characteristics The 
recommendations will also follow the same order of the issues being addressed in relation to equity ( equal 
distribution of resources and increased benefits) and efficiency, which includes adequacy appropriateness 
management and sustainability of joint efforts at various subsystems levels Refer to Appendix Figure 111 
for a Gender based Systems Analytical Framework
It is important to view these barriers m a flow system analysis for the sake of having a comprehensive 
and clear view of complex situations with which the rural women are faced besides having a baseline for 
more broad based and integrated interventions
In this paper MOA was considered as a macrosystem the Policies Extension Research and the 
Smallholder farmers (at Utilization level) as subsystems The MARE project design originally aimed at 
strengthening linkages among the subsystems as noted from the Mzuzu Communications Pilot Project 
Therefore formal contacts and potential strong linkages for supporting rural women exist m theory in all 
the subsystems within the MOA macrosystem
Agenda Setting
I
Although the MOA has created an excellent policy system concerning women which has the potential for 
strengthening linkages among concerned subsystems there are still deficiencies and lack of long term 
goals and strategies for joint efforts at various subsystems One of the major barriers is noted between the 
Extension and Research subsystems m relation to agenda setting for increased women s participation in 
rural development Joint efforts of ARTs Commodity research teams subject matter specialists in 
extension in relation to situation analysis which facilitates better understanding of needs and problems of 
the rural women within the context their environments are still weak Due (1988) also reported similar 
experiences in Tanzania Zambia and Malawi whereby farming systems research and extension that do not 
have any person on the team who is sensitized to gender issues will miss important information Spnng 
(1988) also reports of researchers who did not consider women s roles in agriculture in relation to division 
of labor the semi autonomous nature of different family members the differential access to land labor 
and capital or the fact that women are becoming more involved in the smallholder sector in some 
developing countries because of extensive male migration (p 407)
Most of the commodity research teams as already noted are still not addressing the needs of rural 
women The recommended prioritized areas for training courses and workshops ( agriculture home 
economics nutrition and credit) from the recent national survey may be subject to blanket and 
sweeping diagnosis The listing of content areas such as home economics nutrition credit do not
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directly address productive activities goods and services In agreement with Saito s (1992) 
recommendation diagnosis of the opportunities and problems of different categories of women farmers 
should be conducted at project preparation a!nd as an ongoing activity ensuring addressing the differing 
needs of male and female farmers maximizing use of gender desegregated data and analyses The content 
areas can then be integratively and appropriately matched with the group s and individual needs
The following parameters for basing key indicators on primary information needs adopted from Cloud 
(1985 ) are recommended for providing a more broad based agenda
(1) Agricultural production the output of crops and livestock for home consumption and for 
market sale (cereals vegetables tree crops livestock dairy products poultry)
(2) Household production goods and services produced within the household for home 
consumption of market sale (food processing and preparation provision of household water 
and cooking fuels laundry cleaning health care and the transmission of skills and 
knowledge
(3) Human capital production childbearing child care and the transmission of skills and 
knowledge
(4) Self employment m the informal market sector off farm activities such as marketing and 
personal services
(4) Wage labor paid labor paid employment whether in agriculture or other sectors (p 23)
The parameters given would provide gender desegregated baseline data in relation to access to 
produce and control of products This is necejssary for making sense of the available data using holistic 
approaches in order to develop appropriate agpnda for meaningful programs With changes in policy 
within the WP section to focus on more agricultural production activities there is a danger of overlooking 
some household productive activities which are of great value to individual households This leads to 
violation of to the rural development principles of ensuring increased benefits for the target clientele A 
commendable approach is that adopted for the National Food Security and Nutrition policy statement 
(Chipande 1990) The food security and nutrition policy has adopted the growth through poverty 
reduction” approach The general strategies include (1) production improvements for smallholder sector 
through cultivation intensification use of improved varieties fertilizers credit facilities and irrigation (2) 
improve infrastructure (3) increased incomes through input and output pricing policy and expansion of off 
farm employment opportunities (4) the development of labor saving technologies to ease women s time 
constraints in light of their vulnerability and th'e important role of women as farmers home providers and 
child caretakers Specific strategies for the smallholder subsector to achieve increased productivity are 
given according to each household functional groups such as (1) very smallholders with less than 0 J  of a 
hectare (2) medium smallholders with between 05 to 1 0 of hectare (3) large smallholders with more than 1 0 
hectare (4) estate wage employees (5) estate tenants and (6) low income urban dwellers Issues being 
addressed besides the household food availability are improving the nutritional status health levels through 
maternal child care health services as well as environmental conditions through the multi sector approach
Specific objectives for achieving the strategies 
emphasis on holdings with less than one hectare
include (1) increased agricultural productivity with special
(2) increased employment opportunities to enhance incomes
(3) improved human resource development and (4) increased income transfers to the vulnerable segments of 
the society on the short term until the above longer term objectives have been achieved In setting the 
appropriate agenda for increasing women s participation in rural development the approach adopted for 
the food security and nutrition policy has the potential for yielding programs that are well focused and 
appropnately prioritized according to various household functional groups and within the context of rural 
development principles which emphasize poverty reduction with efficiency and equity in distribution of 
scarce resources
Another major notable barrier is between the Extension and the Utilization subsystems m relation to 
delivering technologies to rural women Specific major constraints are as follows
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(1) Although the MOA has introduced a variety of activities to ensure maximum participation 
of rural women such as demonstrations m clubs groups credit income generation activities 
etc the human capacity level in quantity and quality is not adequate to ensure viable and 
sustainable programs for women Specifically missing are trained persons to manage 
farmers/women group dynamics and functions and some of the activities already itemized 
above
(2) Most of the training staff still lack suitable skills for approaching and training various 
categories of their clients for example male extension workers in relation to women 
farmers
(3) Another constraint is relation to sustainability of resources in the facilitation of delivery of 
services to rural women such as transportation credit administration stationery training 
materials etc
Delivery Systems
Considenng the reviewed constraints the context of rural development national and household 
characteristics the reviewed role and status of rural women in Malawi it is recommended that full 
inclusion of women in the mainstream of development efforts be optimally considered using holistic and 
integrated approaches According to the most recent Survey of Women in Agriculture in Malawi agriculture 
was shown as not the only source of income 80 percent of cash income was from other sources and 
problems faced by women and families were not only m agriculture but even more so in health (89 
percent) food supply related problems (39 percent) and agricultural related problems (50 percent) Thus a 
further justification for a more integrated approach besides having baseline for establishing appropriate 
agenda for increased participation in rural development programs One of the recommended approaches in 
improving delivering structures is adopted from the Farming Systems Research (FSR) Hansen (1985) 
gives the basic elements of FSR as pulling together various research disciplines and extension in a 
cooperative series of research and development activities understanding the complexities and 
interdependencies of localized smallholder economies and ecosystems smallholder participation in 
diagnosing planning testing and evaluation of programs gradual modification of existing farming 
systems cost benefits and testing innovations under actual smallholder conditions and management A 
modified Farming Systems Research type approach would be commendable considering multiple tasks 
and decision complexities with which the rural women are faced In this paper the approach is considered 
modified because non farm systems are also included with emphasis on the household informal market 
and wage labor systems within the context of rural intrahousehold dynamics
Delivery of information requires the systemic approach The reviewed subsystems policy research 
extension and smallholder farmers (rural women) which are elements of the total MOA s system need to 
be linked by the use of generation and diffusion of knowledge and information The Mzuzu 
Communications Pilot Project is commended for expansion and modifications and maximally harnessed to 
benefit the critical rural masses in all Agricultural Development Divisions In addition to these efforts the 
organizational principles and functional mechanisms as suggested by Saito (1992) should be deployed 
Organizational principles include situation specificity project flexibility farmer participation 
mainstreaming women s programs Functional mechanisms include diagnosis feedback and information 
transfer Outreach strategies for reaching more women including through male extension personnel should 
be considered (Spring A 1988 Saito K & Weideman J 1992) In summary improving delivery systems 
for increased participation by rural women would generally involve a genuine understanding of rural 
women s activities using various specialist perceptions for area group and individual specific needs 
continuous collection and processing of gender desegregated data skills m analyzing data m unbiased 
modes making sense of the data for meaningful appropnate and comprehensive programs with the right 
pnonty agendas for rural women creative and efficient delivery skills within acceptable cultural socio 
economic and political standards and efficient accountability of programs which feed into future 
programs Specific recommendations for improving delivery systems would entail improving the quality 
and quantity of the following (1) targeting appropriate clientele by household functional groups (2)
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outreach delivery systems by making use of lessons from the Mzuzu Communication Pilot Project,
(3) supply o f information and technology, through commodity and research teams and the extension staff
(4) employ booster mechanisms in various v)omen s projects through pnce incentives appropriate credit 
packages support networks and linkages training for both staff development and farmer training 
maximizing on the Agricultural Training Branch program momtonng and evaluation and information 
management and utilization systems and (5j resource accessibility management and sustainability 
strategies, through income generating activities and project s revolving funds recycling and pooling of 
resources strategies
In conclusion this paper reviewed Malawis efforts in increasing participation of rural women in the 
mainstream of development under the NRDP by using historical perspectives for the past efforts and 
elements of gender analysis and analytical systems models for the present efforts In response to studies 
and information on rural women s low participation due to problems with availability of land labor 
income lack of education involvement in mjulti tasks coupled with complex decision making and unequal 
distribution of resources in favor of men MOA through the MARE project has significantly been involved 
m addressing the right agenda (e g income ¡generating activities credit and demonstrations in women s 
clubs and groups) and improving delivery systems for increasing the women s participation m rural 
development However there are weaknesses Ifrom both past and present efforts which need to be 
addressed following the some recommendations given in this paper The recommendations were given m 
view of the concept of rural development wh ch gave the context of this paper as well as the 
national/household characteristics and constraints faced by rural women
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Appendix
TABLE 112 Constraints Faced by Women Which Limit Agncultural Production
Topics by Position No o f Responses
Extension Staff 11
Lack o f training 31
Lack o f inputs 25
Domestic responsibilities 19
Lack of labor 14 1
Lack of implements 12
Child care responsibilities 11
Lack o f land 9 i
Husbands disapproved 8
Social responsibilities 5
No female field staff 5 i
Other 6
Local Leaders
Child care responsibilities 20
Domestic responsibilities 19
Lack of inputs 15
Lack of training 12
Lack o f ]land 10
Lack of implements 9
Lack of labor 8
No female field staff 5
Other 5
Source MOA National Survey of Women m Agriculture in Malawi (1989)
TABLE 113 Farmers Participation In Seasonal Credit Programme (1982/83 To 1988/89 Seasons)
Season Clubs Men Women Total % Women
1982/83 6 654 — — 156 703 NA
1983/84 7 191 153 221 27 035 180 256 15 00
1984/85 8 148 177 497 34 273 1 211 770 16 18
1985/86 8 259 167 617 40 379 1 207 996 19 41
1986/87 8 045 153 908 52 501 206 409 25 44
1987/88 9 129 170 935 72 543 243 468 29 80
1988/89 10 849 210 343 74 808 285 151 26 23
Note Disagragation of men and women in 1982/83 was not done 
Source SACA
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TABLE 114  Women s Programme June 1989 (incomplete)
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sfha 1 3 3 2 5 1 ? 0 17
FHA 12 ’ 7 ’ 4 17 65 31 40 16 )£7
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FA 124 ’ 47 1«6 173 ¿77 270 ’78 n o 875
OA 0 5 0 0 7 l 0 0 13
TOTAL 140 287 239 193 460 ¿08 327 «0 194
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FIGURE 111 Gender Based Systems Analytical Framework 1
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___________________________________Chapter 12____________________________ _
Industrial Development, Class Configurations, 
and the Transition to Democracy
by Lisa M Milligan
The recent democratic transitions in the newly industrialized countries of South Korea and Taiwan pose 
some interesting questions for comparativists A cursory analysis of various indicators would seem to 
suggest that both countries have achieved the necessary preconditions for democracy Forty years of 
authoritarian rule m South Korea and Taiwan were characterized |by rapid industrial development marked 
rises in per capita income increased urbanization a burgeoning middle class and widespread literacy 
For modernization theorists such as Lipset who contend that societies must attain a minimum threshold of 
economic and social development in order for democratic values ito take ro o t1 these countries would 
appear ripe for a transition from authoritarian rule Given the dynamism of the South Korean and 
Taiwanese economies during the last two decades analysts embracing conventional modernization theory 
should wonder why democratic transitions did not occur earlier
Sadly as O Donnell reminds us socioeconomic development and structural economic transformations 
do not always sow the seeds for democratic durability In his study of modernization and bureaucratic 
authoritarianism he demonstrates how the perceived need on the part of Argentine and Brazilian military 
generals for continued industrial growth and deepening spurred them to oust their populist predecessors 2 
His general argument is that the military s desire for increased investment and the development of heavy 
industry required that they depohticize the masses and implement restrictive labor policies Though South 
Korea s experience with democratic governance has been fleeting and Taiwan s nonexistent prior to the 
late 1980s O Donnell s structural analysis of Latin American bureaucratic authoritarianism may provide 
some insight as to why authoritarian elites and industrial capitalists in these countries resisted for so long 
democratic reforms
i
As most comparativists are aware however structural economic and class configurational theories of 
regime transitions are no longer as fashionable in social science circles as they were during the 1960s and 
1970s Structure oriented analysts of political change typically assume that the alternatives available to 
authoritarian rulers and opposition movements are constrained by historical circumstance As such for 
these analysts the pivotal actors in democratic transitions are driven by narrow political and economic 
interests which for the most part are assumed to be unchanging Indeed the recent emergence m 
comparative politics literature of process oriented analytic frameworks3 can be construed as a response to 
the predictive errors and general overdeterminism of structural approaches Process oriented or 
contingency models of political change typically treat structural economic and class configurational 
variables as given and instead focus upon the dynamic nature of actors preferences and perceptions 
Analysts adhering to this latter theoretic current thus contend that the menu of options available to 
governments and oppositions is wide actors can manipulate their adversaries cognitions and that the 
character of the new regime is often the unintended consequence of bargains and pacts between 
government reformers and opposition leaders While in contradistinction to structural approaches process 
oriented models account for actors cognitions and the trial and error nature of regime transitions they can 
nonetheless be faulted for failing to explain fully the presumably dynamic interaction between economic 
exigencies social class configurations and government and other elites perceptions of these conditions
1 Seymour Martin Lipset Political Man (Garden City Doubleday 1960) chapter 2
2. Guillermo A O Donnell Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism Studies in Latin American Politics (Berkeley 
Institute of International Studies 1973)
3 The best examples of process oriented or contingency models of democratic transitions are Guillermo O Donnell and Philbppe 
C SchmiUer Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1986) and Adam Przeworski Democracy and the Market Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America (Cambridge Cambndge University Press 1991
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In other words although process onented theorists correctly insist that choice is always available to 
authoritarian governments and opposition leaders they accord insufficient attention to the degree to which 
the menu of choice is conditioned by socioeconomic context
In keeping with the foregoing observation^ this paper proposes a structured choice 4 framework for 
analyzing the democratic transitions in South Korea and Taiwan A structured choice framework represents 
a hybrid of structural and process onented models and thus compensates for the weaknesses of many 
studies which employ one or another in isolation The following section provides an overview of the modes 
of authontananism m South Korea and Taiwan and the industnal development strategies which 
accompanied them The third part of this paper outlines bnefly the modes of transition in South Korea and 
Taiwan in the late 1980s and explores in some depth the question of legitimacy crises It is argued that 
when examining transitions from authoritarian rule analysts should be keenly sensitive to the relationship 
between modes of production and repression the dynamic nature of class relations class alignments to 
authoritarian states and the economic agendas of opposition movements
Structure Versus Process in Regime Transitions 
Implications fJr the Analysis of East Asian NICs
The global wave of democratization has spajwned a renewed interest among comparativists in identifying 
the determinants of democratic transitions Unlike earlier deterministic analyses which focused upon 
social and structural economic factors more recent literature reflects analysts sensitivity to the presumed 
autonomy of political variables and the probabilistic character of transition processes Writing in the 
1960s Moore argued that democratic transitions are most likely m societies where bourgeois interests 
supersede those of the landed aristocracy anjd where the peasantry is not subject to oppressive feudalists 
methods of agricultural production 5 The vast literature which emerged during the late 1980s conversely 
treat Moore s structural economic and class configurational variables as constants and instead focus upon 
the dynamic interactions between governing elites and oppositions That more contemporary models are 
probabilistic suggests that analysts have become increasingly aware of the extent to which strategic 
choice and maneuvering on the part of elites and oppositions can have a decisive impact upon both the 
character and duration of the transition and the subsequent institutionalization of democratic procedures
Contrary to structuralists who employ a ijroad macro level approach to political change process 
onented analysts prefer to disaggregate democratic transitions For this latter group transitions are a two 
stage process wherein state easing of repression and recognition of civil freedoms frequently leads to the 
application of the citizenship principle to formerly authoritarian political institutions and the expansion of 
issues subject to citizen scrutiny 6 In their much heralded Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain 
Democracies O Donnell and Schmitter hypothesize a relationship between strategic decisions of 
softlmers in authoritarian governments ana subsequent steps toward democratization Recognizing that 
democratization in its various political social and economic manifestations can result from both 
revolutions from below and military defeats I they nonetheless contend that the typical democratic
transition scenario is one in which pacts are 
elements of the opposition In that pacts are
formed between reform minded softlmers and moderate 
generally negotiated against the wishes of hardliners it is 
essential that reformers both placate conservatives within the regime and see to it that liberalization does 
not lead to mass politicization 7 So long as the organized opposition is willing to moderate its demands 
and so long as the resurrecuon of civil society does not engender excessive social unrest reformists can 
comfortably assume that hardliners will allow the transition to follow us course
4 I should be noted that several analysis have employed such a framework Among them are Terry Karl in Dilemmas of 
Democratization in Latin Amenca Comparative Politics voi 23 no 1 (1990) and Robert R Kaufman Liberalization and 
Democratization in South Amenca Perspectives from tne 1970s in Guillermo O Donnell Philippe C Schmitter and Laurence 
Whitehead eds Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press 1986)
5 Barrington Moore Socuil Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston Beacon Press 1966)
6 O Donnell and Schmitter (fn 3) pp 6-11
7 Ibid especially chapters 3 and 4
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Granted while this nutshell synopsis hardly captures the complexity of O Donnell and Schmitter s 
model of transitions from authoritarian rule one obvious question is left unanswered Though they contend 
that cleavages between hardliners and softliners generally develop when the regime is not doing well and 
that domestic factors typically instigate the initial transition from authoritarian rule they provide no 
substantive indication as to what these factors might be While they refer periodically to a perceived 
legitimation crisis the reasons for this alleged crisis are left unexplained Are legitimation cnses which 
lead to cleavages within the authoritarian government related to economic performance9 Bourgeois 
dissatisfaction9 Such questions are not addressed by O Donnell and Schmitter who commence their 
inquiry at that juncture where softliners break from their more authoritarian counterparts
In the accompanying Comparative Perspectives volume however Przeworski and Kaufman each 
struggle with the questions of why nfts develop within authoritarian regimes Przeworski s main 
contribution is that a regime begins to crack if some members of the ruling bloc [1 e softliners] go 
outside [1 e to groups within civil society] for support 8 He justifies this on the grounds that highly 
cohesive authoritarian governments need not worry about establishing a societal support base Now even 
the uninitiated reader should detect the chicken and egg problem here Softliners would not appeal to 
groups within civil society—indeed they would not be defined as such—if the authoritarian regime were 
not cracked in the first place Even if one were to accept as valid Przeworski s reasoning left 
unanswered is the logical question why some members of the authoritarian bloc feel compelled to appeal 
to outsiders
Kaufman s attempt to tackle the question of why authoritarian regimes liberalize is more impressive in 
part because he includes m his analysis the calculus of economic actors aligned with though nonetheless 
outside of ruling coalitions His study of four South American countries begins with the premise that 
social economic setting has significantly limited the kinds of options available to democratizing elites 9 
With reference to the Latin American experience he observes (as Idid O Donnell in 1973) that 
bureaucratic authoritarian regimes were supported by a tenuous alliance of military bourgeois and certain 
white collar middle class interests which united initially around the perception of threats to the system of 
property relations That such an alliance is inherently shaky Kaufman underscores for bourgeois and 
middle class support for the regime is contingent upon its capacity to deliver m the economic domain His 
disaggregation of the politics of liberalization is innovative and yields some implications for the analysis 
of democratizing East Asian NICs
For Kaufman political liberalization is a three phase process wherein declining fear on the part of 
softliner military generals capitalists and middle class groupings of mass politicization and 
accompanying threats to class relations leads eventually to their willingness to unleash the liberalization 
tide 10 That declining fear is an intrinsic feature of bureaucratic authoritarianism Kaufman treats as an 
assumption and his analysis proceeds on the premise that the crises which engendered the transition to 
authoritarian rule are no longer as intense His second phase in the politics of liberalization involves a 
struggle over the rules of the game At this juncture the middle classes who initially supported the coup 
become politically activated and press the government to extend the liberalization process While this is a 
heterogeneous grouping composed of diverse interests and while some of its components profited from 
bureaucratic authoritarianism like its capitalist counterparts it is W|dl positioned to occupy some of the 
political institutional spaces opened by the military The final phase involves hardliners and capitalists 
calculus of the costs and benefits of political liberalization Hardliners and capitalists will concede to 
pressures for liberalization so long as the civilian opposition is sufficiently moderate and wields no 
extremist economic agenda What distinguishes Kaufman s framework from unadulterated process oriented 
ones is that politics are not viewed as being wholly autonomous and actors nsk calculus is defined by 
socioeconomic context 1
8 Adam Przeworski Some Problems in the Study of the Transitions to Democracy in O Donnell Schmitter and Whitehead (fn 
3) p 56
9 Kaufman (fn 4) p 85
10 Ibid pp 91-100
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The implications of Kaufman s framework for the analysis of democratizing South Korea and Taiwan are 
manifold First though this bnef summary scarcely captures the depth of his study he does demonstrate 
how modes of repression (and eventual liberalization) are related to prevailing modes of production In 
South Korea export onented industrial development was facilitated by close political relations between 
the state and industrial capitalists while in [Taiwan the institutionalized Kuomintang (KMT) regime 
remained insulated from the particularistic demands of export industrialists While in the former country 
labor repression was accomplished through [state corporatist mechanisms small and medium size firms 
handled this task in the latter Second Kaufman s contention that while the middle class exercises the 
swing vote for liberalization the bourgeoisie and authoritarian leaders ultimately have the last word is 
especially fitting for the South Korean liberalization trajectory While the South Korean middle class 
joined the proletarian and student opposition following the assassination of President Park Chung Hee in 
1979 it was not until large segments of the| chaebol class of industrialists defected that the regime finally 
opted for liberalization in 1987 Finally and related to the preceding point his framework is useful for 
reconstructing the cost/benefit calculus of bloth state reformers and influential segments of civil society 
Indeed in both of these countries authoritarian governments liberalized under the premise that existing 
political elites and official state parties would maintain prominent positions in the new regime
On the Characterization of Authoritarianism in South Korea and Taiwan 
Modes of Production and Repression
That South Korean authoritarianism exhibited many of the characteristics of South American bureaucratic 
authoritarianism several analysts have observed 11 The archetypical South American bureaucratic 
authoritarian regime it is argued emerged in response to populist governments inability to respond to the 
structural economic exigencies posed by the exhaustion of import substitution industrialization (IS I)12 
Recognizing the need for industrial deepening and the development of competitive export sectors military 
generals (at the behest of transnational capitalists) ousted populist governments and installed in their 
place technocratic bureaucratic authoritarian ones which could presumably enjoy greater latitude in 
implementing industrial development policies The political exclusion of the popular sector the economic 
exclusion of small and medium size businesses and continued cultivation of a transnational bourgeoisie 
were among the key mechanisms employed by South American military rulers to achieve their industrial 
development objectives 13 With reference to the South Korean case the 1961 ouster of the democratically 
elected Chang Myon government and the subsequent consolidation of military rule under the aegis of 
Major General Park Chun Hee coincided wjith South Korea s transition from ISI to export oriented 
industrialization (EOI) The 1972 promulgation of repressive Yushin constitutional reforms and the 
subsequent formalization of an authoritarian system under Major General Chun Doo Hwan s leadership in 
turn coincided with South Korea s dnve toward heavy industrialization 14
Taiwan s forty year expenence with authoritarian rule differs somewhat in part because the incumbent 
KMT enjoyed uninterrupted dominance of [the political system throughout the country s transition from ISI 
to EOI and subsequent industrial deepening Formally reorganized along Leninist party lines on the 
Chinese Mainland during the 1920s the KMT was well positioned to take charge of both the political 
system and local economy when it retreated to Taiwan in 1950 Based upon Sun Yat sen s three 
principles of the people KMT political economic ideology embodies diffuse elements of nationalism 
limited pluralism and a modified form of [state capitalism 15 Indeed following market saturation balance 
of payment difficulties and other inevitable exigencies associated with protracted ISI KMT appeals to 
nationalist sentiments combined with their success in demobilizing politically the working class 
enhanced considerably their capacity to implement those economic policies conducive to export onented
11 See for mstance Brace Cummings “The Aboitive Abertura South Korea in Light of the Latin Amencan Expenence New Left 
Review (Jan-Feb 1989) p 6 and Hyun Chin Lim Dependent Development in Korea 1963-1979 (Seoul Seoul National 
Umversity Press 1985) pp 31-58
12 O Donnell (fn 2) pp 57-66
13 Ibid pp 85-91 and Fernando Hennque Cardoso On the Charactenzation of Authontanan Regimes in Latin Amenca in 
David Collier ed The New Authoritarianism m Latin America (Pnnceton Princeton University Press 1979) pp 49-54
14 This observation is made by Cummings (fn 11) p 6
15 Tun jen Cheng Democratizing the Quasi Leninist Regime in Taiwan World Politics vol XLI no 4 (1989) p 476
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industrial development This is to be contrasted with the South Korean experience where popular ISI 
strategies would likely have continued had the military not intervened in politics
These observations notwithstanding what is apparent to most political economists is that structural 
economic adjustment policies have the effect of both altering the constellation of social forces and 
eventually becoming embedded m them 16 The transition from ISI to EOI for instance requires that states 
insulate themselves from the demands of state protected ISI capitalists and other groupings supportive of 
an inward looking development strategy and then cultivate both economically and politically an 
entrepreneurial class committed to industrial change Table 12 1 depicts the economic and political 
components of the EOI strategies pursued by states in South Korea and Taiwan While the South Korean 
approach to industrial development resulted in a society with a rigid class structure and a highly 
concentrated business sector the approach in Taiwan created a society with fluid social classes and a 
sizeable small and medium business sector
The means through which developmentalist states in South Korea and Taiwan economically cultivated a 
class of export industrialists have been examined extensively17 and warrant in this paper no elaborate 
description Following the ouster of the Chang government in 1961 (which was servile to the demands of 
ISI industrialists and organized labor) the South Korean military junta swiftly formulated an EOI strategy 
which would drive economic development for the next two decades Aspiring export industrialists were 
granted low interest government loans and the state assumed am aggressive posture in determining which 
sectors of industry would be promoted Indicative plans during the next decade and a half emphasized the 
development of labor intensive light manufacturing industries wherein South Korea with its abundant 
supply of low wage labor possessed an obvious comparative advantage By granting competitive firms 
access to soft government credit and by discouraging foreign direct investment EOI strategies during the 
Park era (1963-1979) had the two pronged effect of subsidizing the largesse of chaebol conglomerates and 
cementing big business support for the military regime 18
Responding to increased protectionism in the West competition from aspinng NICs m Southeast Asia 
and a dwindling labor pool the Park government initiated its heavy industrialization plan concurrently 
with its repressive 1972 Yushin reforms Eighty percent of industrial investment funds were earmarked for
TABLE 12 1 Political and Economic Components of Export Oriented Industrialization
Objective South Korea Taiwan
Political Demobilization 
o f Labor
State corporatist controls involving the 
bureaucratic encapsulation of organized labor 
into state sanctioned trade unions
Enterprise level corporatism operating 
within a framework of small and medium 
size firms
Economic Cultivation o f 
Industrial Bourgeoisie
Political Cultivation o f 
Industrial Bourgeoisie
Political Cultivation o f  
Middle Class
Devaluation selective liberalization and 
credit allocation to large internationally 
competitive export firms 1
Functionally differentiated state licensed 
business associations granted 
representational monopoly within a 1
corporatist framework 
A strategy not pursued Low levels of social 
welfare expenditure and absence of !
democratic institutions l
Devaluation selective liberalization and 
fiscal incentives to small and medium size 
export firms
Economic elites coopted in local elections
A strategy not pursued Low levels of 
social welfare expenditure though local 
elecuons provided for some middle class 
representation
16 See for instance John Wateibury The Pohucal Management of Economic Adjustment and Reform in Joan M Nelson ed 
Fragile Coalitions The Politics o f Economic Adjustment (Washington Overseas Development Council 1989) pp 39-40
17 See for instance Gordon White ed Developmental States in East Asui (New York St. Martin s Press 1988) Robert Wade
Governing the Market Economic Theory and the Role o f Government m East Asian Industrialization (Princeton Princeton 
University Press 1990) and Leroy P Jones and D Sakong Government Business and Entrepreneurship m Economic Development 
the Korean Case (Cambodge Harvard University Press 1980) ,
18 This observauon is made by Peter Evans The Sute as a Problem and aiSolution Predauon Embedded Autonomy and 
Structural Change in Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufman eds The Politics o f Economic Adjustment International 
Constraints Distributive Conflicts and the State (Pnnceton Princeton University Press 1992) p 157
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chaebol firms 19 and leading business groups were granted privilege to form general trading companies 
which had immense credit facilities Unabl^ to secure soft government loans and compete in an 
international environment characterized by growing protectionism numerous small and medium size firms 
were absorbed into the chaebol via the general trading companies 20 Increased class conflict and social 
unrest which could presumably arise from the distributional consequences of Park s heavy 
industrialization plan were mediated by thejYushin reforms which insulated the President and his 
economic planning apparatuses from all electoral constraints
The KMT s strategy to cultivate economically export capitalists differs from Park s with respect to both 
the policy instruments employed and the structure of industry which the state envisioned While the Park 
government relied upon Western commercial banks to finance the development of huge industrial 
conglomerates the KMT used fiscal incentives to forge a new class of export entrepreneurs Investors in 
export industries were granted tax holidays and transnational corporations were given access to Taiwan s 
numerous industrial estates In that all able bodied entrepreneurs could take advantage of the state s 
incentive system petit industrialists were at no disadvantage 21 In fact the KMT s more pragmatic 
approach to industrial development can be construed as a compromise between conservatives demands 
for national economic self sufficiency and war preparedness and technocrats calls for limited state 
intervention 22 As a result of the incentive schemes employed by the KMT small and medium enterprises 
flourish in Taiwan and opportunities for upward mobility abound Indeed in part because of the 
institutionalization and bureaucratic insularity of the KMT regime and in part because of the fluid class 
structure of Taiwanese society structural adjustments associated with industrial deepening during the mid 
1970s resulted in no heated class conflicts which the state might have to mediate
While South Korean President Syngman R'hee (1948-1960) is alleged to have had close ties with 
business it was not until Park assumed the presidency that the state undertook coherent actions to 
cultivate politically the industrial bourgeoisie After taking office Park and his economic planning 
ministries reorganized business associations within a corporatist framework While South Korea boasts
which ostensibly possess consultative powers m state 
Korean Industry (FKI) has proved to be most influential 
Comprised primarily of chaebol business magnates the FKI performed a key role in defining the grandeur 
of South Korea s drive toward heavy industnalizauon in the late 1970s 23 Given their access to soft 
government loans and other perks associated ^vith state aspirations for EOI and deepening it is not 
surprising that chaebol support for Park and the military coup after his assassination was nearly unanimous 
It was not until Chun unilaterally implemented industrial retrenchment measures that big business support 
of military rule eventually waned
over 200 state licensed business associations 
economic decision making the Federation of
While political cultivation of the industrial
itself from the interests of producer groups it
bourgeoisie may be viewed as somewhat antithetical for the
Leninist KMT regime which though committed to the virtues of guided capitalism preferred to insulate
did nevertheless implement some safeguards to ensure
continued tacit bourgeois and middle class support of the regime Since 1950 direct elections for 
executive and council positions at the county township and village levels have allowed for limited 
citizen representation and members of the provincial assemblies have been popularly elected since 1959 
Though 25 percent of the seats in the Legislative Yuan have been reserved for democratically elected 
officials since 1969 because of its organizational and financial resources as well as its strict control of the 
media the KMT had little difficulty in capturing this small segment of the legislature during the 
subsequent period of softened authoritarianism 24 While the KMT generally dragged its feet in responding
19 See Tun jen Cheng Political Regimes and Developmental Strategies South Korea and Taiwan in Gary Gereffi and Donald L. 
Wyman eds Manufacturing Miracles Paths o f Industrialization in Latin America and East Asui (Princeton Princeton University 
Press 1990) p 159
20 Ibid p 167
21 Wade (fn 17) p 268
22 Cheng (fn 19) p 155
23 Moon Kyu Park Interest Representation in South 
(August 1987) p 906
24 Cheng (fn 15) p 479
¡Corea The Limits of Corporatist Control Asian Survey voi 27 no 8
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to intellectuals demands for democracy at the national level it did take steps to appease both 
economically and politically the native Taiwanese population With respect to economic concerns 
Taiwanese industrialists enjoyed the same fiscal incentives as their Mainland counterparts and with 
respect to the political domain beginning in the 1960s the KMT has attempted to recruit into its ranks 
educated Taiwanese This latter legitimation strategy seems most consistent with the institutional and 
organizational objectives of a Leninist regime
That the political demobilization of labor was a critical component of East Asian states dnve toward 
EOI many analysts of the region have argued In contrast to the South Amencan experience where 
protracted ISI policies of populist governments encouraged the development of militant unions organized 
labor m the East Asian region has historically been weak Committed to promoting national solidarity and 
industrialization in face of a perceived military threat from the North the Park government dismantled 
existing unions and reorganized industrial labor within a corporatist framework The Federation of Korean 
Trade Unions (FKTU) a peak association in South Korea s corporatist system of producer group relations 
was the key institutional mechanism through which the Park and Chun governments moderated rank and 
file demands implemented government policy and depoliticized the industrial labor force Appointed by 
the Ministry of Labor (m consultation with relevant business interests) union leaders throughout the period 
of authoritarian rule tended to passive conformists susceptible to government maneuvering 25 Assuming 
that the key objective behind corporatist controls was the maintenance of working class docility through 
strict state oversight of labor unions the FKTU could boast only moderate success Despite laws 
prescribing lengthy procedures for government conciliation and mediation of labor disputes strike activity 
gradually increased during the period of industrial deepening and exploded following both the Park 
assassination and the political crisis preceding the 1987 liberalizing reforms Similarly in spite of 
legislation granting the FKTU a virtual monopoly on industrial worker representation the Federation often 
failed to control the activities of its local branches 26 While labor militancy and social unrest was a key 
factor instigating the military to step in after Park s death it later had the reverse effect of prodding 
Chun s appointed successor Roh Tae Woo to implement liberalizing political reforms
In part because of the institutionalization of the KMT regime and in part because of existing labor 
legislation enacted within the Mainland context of a protracted civil war the political demobilization of 
labor was not so problematic for the state m Taiwan as it was in ISouth Korea Labor legislation enacted on 
the Mainland prohibited strikes through mandatory arbitration of disputes restricted wage bargaining on 
the part of unions and subjected all union activities to strict state supervision Following Taiwan s dnve 
toward EOI and the accompanying proliferation of small and medium manufactunng firms however labor 
disputes—which were comparatively infrequent—tended to be handled at the enterpnse level thus 
obviating the need for direct state intervention 27 Indeed the gradual transition from state to enterpnse 
level corporatism in Taiwan can be viewed as the logical manifestation of the mdustnal development 
strategy which the KMT pursued By encouraging the growth of small (and frequently family run) firms 
KMT industrial policies had the indirect effect of creating a rather docile politically acquiescent labor 
movement on the island While Taiwan s working class had few venues through which to channel 
complaints dunng the four decades of authontanan rule one can assume that laws requinng employers to 
provide welfare housing and other forms of employee assistance helped moderate labor discontent28 
Such laws were later expanded following Taiwan s drive toward industrial deepening That the working 
class was for the most part removed from the political opposition which developed in the 1970s suggests 
both that the regime was at least somewhat legitimate in the eyes of the proletariat and that class conflict 
was unlikely to reach crisis proportions (as it had m South Korea by the end of the Park era)
Now let us summarize briefly the social conditions which emerged from EOI in these countries and the 
legitimacy bases upon which these authoritarian developmentalist regimes rested As a result of
25 For a detailed study of South Korean labor relations dunng the Park era see Jang Jip Choi Labor and the Authontanan State 
Labor Unions in South Korean Manufactunng Firms 1961-1980 (Seoul Korea University Press 1989)
26 Park (fn 23) p 912
27 See Fredenc C Deyo The State and Labor Modes of Political Exclusion |in East Asian Development in Fredenc C Deyo 
ed The Political Economy o f the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca Cornell University Press 1987) p 185
28 Ibid p 187
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government policies which favored the expansion of big business obstructed channels of upward mobility 
and bureaucratically encapsulated organized] labor into large industry wide unions South Korea at least 
by the end of the Park era had a fairly rigid class structure Industrial capitalists viewed the regime as 
functional to their interests to the extent that it provided a cheap source of credit and guaranteed for them 
strict state controls on the activity of organized labor That South Korea s corporatist framework enabled 
business associations to participate actively m the formulation of economic policy would seem to suggest 
that relations between the state and industrial capitalists were somewhat more than congenial While the 
working class vehemently opposed both the Park and Chun governments its capacity to mount a viable 
front against these regimes was stunted by Yushin laws prohibiting political protest Although no 
systematic research has been conducted on middle class attitudes toward the Park regime data collected 
during the latter years of Chun s rule suggest that democratic reform was at the top of this rather 
fragmented class agenda 29 This observation notwithstanding the middle class remained rather passive 
until the 1987 political cnsis surrounding Chun s succession
Export oriented industrial development in Taiwan conversely created a fluid class structure with no 
discernible class alliances with the state While the KMT offered an assortment of fiscal incentives to the 
expanding industrial class its objective was] to deter the development of immense conglomerates and 
hence the accumulation of wealth (and possibly opposition political power) in the hands of an 
oligopolized bourgeoisie State insulation from the interests of industrial capital was mirrored by its 
relations with the working and middle classes With reference to the former the KMT relegated the task of 
disciplining and appeasing an already docile] labor movement to individual capitalists With reference to 
the latter elections at the local levels provided for at least minimal representation of middle class 
interests Despite however the apparent institutionalization and organizational capabilities of the Leninist
regime an opposition movement committed 
a topic to which we now turn
to national level democratic reforms did emerge in the 1970s
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 
Structural Constraints on Strategic Choice
Why did authoritarian regimes in South Korea and Taiwan eventually opt for liberalization9 What was the 
character of opposition movements which emerged in these countries and why were they successful in 
persuading authoritarian leaders to implement liberalizing political reforms9 What socioeconomic 
variables particularly factors associated with these states disparate industrial development drives 
defined the agendas of opposition movements and the options available to authoritarian governments9 
Pnor to addressing these questions in a frontal manner it would perhaps be fruitful to provide a bnef 
account of the process of liberalization in these countries
By 1987 President Chun and his Democratic Justice Party (DJP) were finding their authority 
increasingly questioned As the government and opposition New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) were 
deadlocked on the issue of constitutional reform and demonstrations and strikes wreaked havoc upon South 
Korean society the country learned in January of the torture and death of a Seoul National University 
student This revelation was especially troublesome for Chun s DJP since it was attempting to cultivate 
public support for a transition to a parliamentary form of government Prior to January the opposition 
NKDP had been split between those who saw no compromise with government proposals for 
parliamentarianism and thus favored direct presidential elections and those who were willing to accept the 
DJP s plan m exchange for other democratic concessions Revelation of the torture death of a student 
activist however had the three pronged effect of exposing publicly the brutishness if the Chun regime 
uniting (albeit temporarily) the opposition and engendering public support for the opposition s 
initiatives30
29 See Hagen Koo Middle Gasses Democratization and Gass Fonnation the Case of South Korea Theory and Society voi 20 
(1991)
30 See Sun Joo Han South Korea in 1987 the Pohucs of Democratization Asian Survey voi 28 no 1 (Jan 1988) p 53
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At this juncture actual power within the NKDP rested m the hands of Kim Young Sam a moderate and 
Kim Dae Jung a long time dissident and activist who was currently under house arrest While the two 
Kims had their differences they were able to crush party leader Lee Mm Woo s offer to accept DJP 
proposals for parliamentarism in exchange for government recognition of basic civil freedoms and release 
of political prisoners Nonetheless the nft within the NKDP was not mended and in April the two Kims 
defected and formed a new party the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) with Kim Young Sam as its 
leader With almost three quarters of NKDP members joining the two Kims Lee Mm Woo had no recourse 
but to merge the remnants of his party with the People s Democratic Party which had split from the 
NKDP in 1986 1
Chun s Apnl 13th decision to suspend debate on constitutional reform proved to be an ill conceived one 
for students took to the streets m greater numbers labor activists called for even more wildcat strikes and 
segments of the middle class openly acknowledged their support for the opposition Chun s justification for 
ending talks was that the opposition was far too splintered to behave as a responsible negotiating partner 
Social unrest reached its zenith however when Chun nominated in June his former military colleague 
Roh Tae Woo as his successor under the existing constitutional framework which provided for indirect 
election of the president
Surprising both the opposition and hardliners within the DJP Roh announced on June 29th that 
constitutional reforms would be undertaken so as to provide for popular presidential elections the 
restoration of civil freedoms and amnesty for political prisoners No sooner did the executive office seem 
to be within the reach of the RDP however when a power struggle erupted between the Kim Young Sam 
and the recently emancipated Kim Dae Jung prompting the latter to defect and form an alternative 
opposition party the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) and announce his candidacy for president While 
Kim Dae Jung contended that he was the natural presidential candidate given his lengthy record of protest 
and martyrdom Kim Young Sam conversely believed that only he could gamer the electoral support of 
an increasingly middle class public With a constitutional framework enabling the candidate with a 
plurality of the vote to capture the presidency this split m the moderate opposition was reflected in the 
December election Since each candidate knew he could win by secunng firm support from a minority 
campaigns were conducted to maximize regional and class interests Capturing 36 6 percent of the vote 
Roh s geographic support base rested in the densely populated southeastern provinces and his class basis 
of support was from the industrial bourgeoisie Receiving 28 percent of the vote Kim Young Sam also had 
a support base from the southeast m addition to his wide appeal to the urban middle classes Kim Dae 
Jung s 27 percent of the vote came primarily from the southwestern provinces and segments of the urban 
proletariat31 Although the losing candidates charged the government with unfair campaigning and 
electoral fraud it seems fairly clear that the defeat of the opposition can be attributed to the belated split 
between the rivaling Kims
In contrast to the South Korean case where a swift reforma on the part of the Roh government seemed 
necessary to prevent eventual ruptura political liberalization in Taiwan took on a far more gradualist 
flavor Prior to the 1987 lifting of martial law the KMT enjoyed a monopoly m administration at both the 
national and local levels and party cells penetrated virtually all social organizations By outlawing 
independent political associations encapsulating others into state sanctioned organizations and by 
coopting Taiwanese political elites the Leninist KMT regime was able to achieve what the military 
governments in South Korea could not namely the effective depoliticization of society and the 
channeling of citizen energies into economic rather than political endeavors
Despite the KMT s relative success in attaining its political and economic objectives an opposition 
movement committed to democratic reform did emerge m the 1970s Comprised primarily of native 
Taiwanese intellectuals who had close ties with domestic industrialists and overseas Chinese the tangwai 
(meaning outside party ) sought to challenge KMT hegemony in the political arena by engaging in both 
legal and extralegal political activities With reference to its legal tactics the tangwai utilized local and 
provincial elections to provide for at least some representation of the opposition s interests Winning
31 Ibid p 56
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approximately one third of the seats in the provincial assemblies in the 1977 elections the officially 
banned protoparty organization was perceived by the KMT as a viable political force that must be 
reckoned with While KMT softlmers acting under the aegis of an aging President Chiang Ching kuo 
flirted with the idea of negotiation at this juncture hardliners gamed the upper hand following a series of 
street demonstrations m a northern province which culminated in the vandalization of a police station 32 
Hardliners assumed an even more rigid posture toward Taiwan s opposition in 1979 when street nots m 
the industrial city of Kaohsing climaxed m the arrest of virtually all radical elements within the tangwai
With reference to extralegal activities beginning m 1984 tangwai politicians produced a senes of 
magazines cntical of both government policies and the personal conduct of certain KMT officials In 1985 
two apparently government backed libel suits filed against tangwai magazines culminated in a series of 
street protests in Taipei and a ceremonial send off for the defendant as he prepared to serve his pnson 
term 33 By this time it became apparent to tangwai dissidents that conviction in a libel case could be 
used to gain greater public support for their initiatives
It should be emphasized that just as the KMT government was split between hardliners and softlmers 
so too was a nft evident within the opposition tangwai Hardliners within the KMT who were for the most 
part septuagenarian leftovers from the Chianlg Kai shek era assumed a staunchly anti communist posture 
envisioned the KMT one day retaking the Mainland and saw no compromise with the opposition With 
most of these gentlemen nearing retirement age and with new native Taiwanese blood imbuing the KMT 
however they found their bargaining position rapidly dissipating 34 Softlmers acting under the aegis of 
Chiang Clung kuo were deeply concerned w ith the issue of succession and felt that some liberalizing 
measures might be necessary so as to appease and continue to coopt the native population While radical 
elements within the tangwai preferred street protests to convey their demands moderates on the contrary 
concentrated on building electoral support using the Legislative Yuan as an arena for negotiations35
After losing seats in the 1983 provincial assembly elections however moderate tangwai politicians 
persuaded radicals to join them in the formation of a fact finding political organization the Association for 
Public Policy Three years later this organization was transformed into an extralegal political party the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) At this point one can assume that Chiang and his softliner 
colleagues had three options available to them First they could abide by hardliners wishes by cracking 
down on all dissident organizations and having DPP politicians arrested Second they could make a last 
ditch attempt to coopt opposition politicians Jnto a KMT dominant governmental framework Or third 
they could end martial law and the 36 year bjan on independent political organizations and hence allow 
the DPP to compete unencumbered m upcoming elections The KMT chose the latter option and by 
1989 a large segment of Legislative Yuan sejats were opened to competition and the DPP thus scored 
significant gains m both local and national ejections
Let us now return to the questions posed at| the beginning of this section In his analysis of political 
liberalization in South American countries Kaufman we may recall argues that the initial impetus to 
liberalize relates to their declining sense of fear toward opposiuon movements Protracted 
authoritarianism one can assume has the twofold effect of demobilizing previously militant societal
elements and engendering a political climate
and hence to expand the menu of issues open
favorable to capital accumulation and industrial
development. Authoritarian governments wíl ingness to broaden the scope of citizen political participation
to public scrutiny then must be viewed as a logical
consequence of their success in achieving their political and economic objectives
32 See Tun jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard Taiwan'in Transition Journal o f Democracy vól 1 no 2 (1990) p 68 and Cheng 
and Haggard Regime Transformauon in Taiwan Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives in Cheng and Haggard eds Political 
Change in Taiwan (Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers 1992) pp 12-13
33 Yangsen Chou and Andrew J Nathan Democratizing Transition in Taiwan Asian Survey voi 27 no 3 (March 1987) p
282 I
34 Cheng (fn 15) p 485 and Cheng and Haggard (fn 32) p 68
35 Jurgen Domes Poliucal Differentiation in Taiwan Group Formation within the Ruling Party and Opposiuon Circles 1979- 
1980 Asian Survey voi 21 no 10 (Oct 1981) pp 1015-1021
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To what extent is Kaufman s theory of political liberalization in newly industrializing South American 
countries relevant to the analysis of South Korea and Taiwan7 In the latter country forty years of martial 
law under the aegis of a Leninist political party produced not only remarkable industrial growth rates but 
also the further demobilization of an already political docile population The highly factionalized tangwai 
opposition movement which emerged in the early 1970s was consolidated in the early 1980s and which 
gained widespread credibility by the late 1980s therefore was reformist in nature and did not seek to alter 
considerably existing political institutions or KMT economic policies In the former country however 
where military backed governments were unable to institutionalize themselves and where EOI strategies 
had the politically dangerous effect of creating a rigid class structure and accompanying class conflict 
student and working class opposition movements were far more militant wielding economic as well as 
political agendas In the wake of widespread social unrest Roh s swift decision to concede to the 
demands of the comparatively moderate RDP and to later subject the new constitution to a national 
referendum thus can be viewed as the optimal choice given existing circumstances In effect he had two 
choices available to him either he mobilize troops to quell demonstrations and risk large scale violence 
and possibly civil war or he could make wholesale concessions to the moderate opposition and nsk the 
loss of power 36
Figure 12 1 depicts a Kaufman like analysis of the repression/toleration calculus of authoritarian states 
and capitalist elites m South Korea and Taiwan With reference to the South Korean case where radical 
student and working class groups had vehemently opposed both the Park and Chun regimes and had 
accordingly demanded both political reform and economic redistribution and where a moderate middle
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36 This observation is attributed to Han (fn 30) p S3
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class based opposition desiring no alteration 
mid 1980s military generals perceived the 
heightened repression Only when the middl
of the economic status quo did not gain momentum until the 
jolitical economic costs of liberalization to exceed those of 
e classes began to show their support of protesting students and
when capitalists defected from the ruling coalition did the Chun/Roh government concede to 
liberalization What policy position militaryj generals and export capitalists shared however was that the 
demands of organized labor should remain effectively controlled within a corporatist framework In 
Taiwan where a politically acquiescent labor movement posed no threat to the KMT regime but where 
subethnic cleavages threatened to destroy die fabric of Taiwanese society the tangwai opposition 
movement was interminably oppressed culminating in the 1979 crackdown In part because of their 
confidence in their ability to maintain power and m part because of capitalists paradoxical acceptance of 
both the legitimacy of the KMT and the demands of the increasingly moderate opposition the government 
at last conceded national level liberalization measures in 1986
Let us explore further the class composition and policy platforms of the opposition movements which 
emerged in these countries What distinguished the tangwai in Taiwan from opposition movements in 
many other rapidly industrializing countries was its wariness to appeal to class interests Recall that the 
industrial development strategies pursued by the KMT created numerous avenues for workers to utilize 
their meager savings to invest in small scale productive enterprises Upward mobility was for the most part 
a reality in Taiwan where the KMT s generous fiscal incentive schemes enabled ambitious yet capital 
poor entrepreneurs to realize their investment objectives Working class discontent was thus averted by 
this potential for upward mobility in addition to the aforementioned enterprise levelsocial welfare 
programs
The implications of the KMT s industrialization policies for the character of the political opposition are 
manifold First, m part because of the fluid ¡class structure of Taiwanese society and m part because of 
widespread legitimacy of the existing relations of production distributive and other economic issues were 
of little concern to tangwai activists Second though Taiwan s opposition was led by a diffuse assortment 
of western educated intellectuals and professionals it was supported by citizens of all social classes 37 
What united these individuals was their commitment to end Mainlanders dominance of the political 
system and KMT control over state administrative apparatuses Third though under martial law 
independent political associations were strictly prohibited economic growth and prosperity one can 
assume created the conditions necessary for the emergence of a healthy civil society Indeed throughout 
the period of authoritarian rule in Taiwan business professional cultural and other independent 
organizations flourished 38 While these associations refrained from engaging in political activity it would 
seem that they may have provided viable organizational basis upon which subsequent politically onented 
associations could be formed
At the fore of the tangwai s agenda then were two salient political issues As already mentioned 
political liberalism and the realization of full fledged democracy was the moral objective which united 
this diffuse assortment of native Taiwanese I While both the tangwai and the KMT claimed that their 
ultimate aim was to achieve liberal democracy the KMT maintained that because the Chinese 
Communists refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan the government could not declare a 
termination of the state of emergency The opposition criticized this reasoning on the grounds that it was 
merely a shallow justification for maintaining the KMT s monopoly of political power and Mainlanders 
dominance in the upper echelons of the party 39 Additionally many elements of the tangwai favored 
formal independence of Taiwan from the Mainland The refusal of the KMT government to declare 
Taiwan s de jure independence and its accompanying perpetuation of the myth that it was the legitimate 
government of the entire China the opposition claimed had deletenous consequences for domestic 
political development and Taiwan s legitimacy in the eyes of the international community 40 These
37 Alexander Ya Li Lu Political Opposition in Taiwan The Development of the Democratic Progressive Party in Cheng and 
Haggard Political Change in Taiwan (fn 35) pp 133j—134
38 See Hsin Huang Michael Hsiao The Rise of Social Movements and Civil Protests in Cheng and Haggard Political Change 
in Taiwan (fn 32)
39 Lu (fn 37) p 135
40 Ibid p 138
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observations notwithstanding what should be underscored again is that economic issues did not enter the 
tacit bargaining arena of the KMT and the opposition tangwai
In South Korea conversely the opposition was fragmented on class lines with students and industrial 
labor favoring sweeping political reforms normalization of relations with North Korea the expansion of 
social welfare provisions and the liberalization of existing exclusionary modes of labor and industrial 
relations and the middle classes and elements of the industrial bourgeoisie who while favoring political 
reform desired no alteration of existing relations of production Until the 1972 promulgation of the Yushin 
Constitution and Chun s subsequent tightening of the political reigns students labor activists and the 
Christian Urban and Industrial Mission acted quite independently of one another and were deemed rather 
innocuous by the ruling DJP Following the drive toward heavy industrialization and the accompanying 
centralization of state decision making apparatuses however student working class and Christian church 
organizations interests began to converge Students now examined the socioeconomic system criticized 
the unjust corrupt and foreign capital dependent economy and demonstrated for or with workers 41 
Industrial labor—especially skilled workers in large chaebol firms (Hyundai and Daewoo for instance)— 
defied FKTU leadership and engaged in lengthy wildcat strikes Members of the Urban and Industrial 
Mission despite laws prohibiting third party intervention in labor disputes bargained on the behalf of 
striking workers While alone this coalition of popular sector groupings posed no overt threat to either the 
Park or Chun governments it did have the effect of stymieing industrial producuon and hence thwarting 
the accumulation objectives of the state and its capitalist allies
Crucial to the formation of this radical coalition demanding social in addition to political democracy in 
South Korea was the establishment of the intellectual led minjung (people s) movement m the 1970s 
This Korean variant of the populism which emerged in South American countries decades pnor envisioned 
society deeply divided upon class lines with workers and peasants suffering from the oppression of a 
ruling class comprised of state elites and conglomerate capital Attempting to address the social and 
economic inequities accompanying South Korea s drive toward EOI by instilling within the working class 
a proletarian consciousness minjung activists functioned as an important educational resource and agent 
of mobilization for workers in manufacturing firms 42 Since despite restrictive labor legislation enacted 
during the yushin period workers formed many independent unions and engaged in wildcat strikes this 
movement (which presently remains active) can be viewed as influential However because state law 
strictly prohibited labor unions from forming or making financial contributions to political parties its 
political organizational capacity was rendered somewhat ineffectual
That the urban middle classes and segments of the industrial bourgeoisie functioned as key proponents 
of democratic reform by the mid 1980s many analysts have noted Eschewing radicals demands for social 
democracy and accompanying redistributive economic policies these two social groupings taking their 
cue from the moderate RDP demanded little more than a new constitution providing for popular 
presidential elections and free competition between political parties 43 Since neither the Park nor the Chun 
governments ever sought any support base among the expanding middle classes one can assume that their 
attitudes toward authoritarian governmental forms were negative
This speculation notwithstanding one must nevertheless wonder why segments of South Korea s 
industrial bourgeoisie which had thrived for so long on generous state subsidies and incestuous relations 
with the ruling DJP would suddenly denounce authoritarian rule and proclaim their support for democratic 
reform This is an especially intriguing theoretic question since the role of the bourgeoisie in promoting 
democratization is subject to some controversy in social science literature Moore we may recall argued 
that so long as production is commercialized and so long as feudalism has been displaced the bourgeoisie 
will favor liberal democracy Wnting m the late 1980s Rueschemayer et al contend that with some 
exceptions the industrial bourgeoisie has been historically mimical to democracy since extension of the
41 Sun Joo Han Student Activism A Comparison beleen the 1960 Upnsing and the 1979 Protest Movement in Lim Chong 
Kim ed Political Participation in Korea Democracy Mobilization and Stability (Santa Barbara Clio 1981)
42 Koo (fn 29) pp 503-504
43 Ibid p 497-498
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franchise to the labonng classes would pose a threat to their economic interests44 While this latter 
contention explains well bourgeois support for military regimes in South Korea during the 1960s and 
1970s belated bourgeois endorsement of democratic reform in the mid 1980s requires further theoretic 
scrutiny
Let us examine for a moment the South Korean political economic situation as perceived by the 
industrial bourgeoisie Labor unrest had disrupted production m numerous chaebol firms Students 
Christian human rights organizations and minjung activists had alerted large segments of the working 
class to the corruption of the policy process The urban middle classes which previously had been 
politically acquiescent and generally disenchanted with student protest movements now questioned 
business alleged close relations with the ruling DJP And even Chun s developmentalist DJP was 
attempting to distance itself from chaebol interests Indeed by 1980 the South Korean economy was 
beginning to exhibit the signs of overly ambitious planning Growth rates that had averaged almost ten 
percent a year between 1962 and 1979 fell to just over two percent in 1980 and 1981 At the same time 
inflation rose to 26 percent from an annual average of 16 percent between 1962 and 1979 The Chun 
government sought to remedy these dismal figures by implementing a senes of harsh industnal 
retrenchment measures Subsidies to many heavy industrial sectors were cut credit was tightened and 
perhaps most disagreeable to chaebol industrialists large firms were required to sell off certain 
subsidiaries and to liquidate unproductive real estate investments that were unrelated to their main lines of 
business Further availability of credit was made contingent upon compliance 45 To add insult to injury 
responding to a perceived external debt crisis the Chun government liberalized heretofore restrictive 
investment laws so as to grant foreign investors greater access to the South Korean economy Chaebol 
capitalists therefore would have to compete with foreign industrialists in the domestic market
Confronted with these restrictions the FKI launched a counterattack It defended the big push toward 
heavy industrialization arguing that industrial concentration was necessary to achieve economies of scale 
The FKI further maintained that controls on credit to large firms would depress investment limit the pace 
of recovery and generate unemployment and other negative externalities Finally it argued that punishing 
big business for its size success and compliance with government indicative plans was based on 
political rather than economic motivations 46 Despite these arguments the Chun government remained 
firmly committed to its policy of industrial Retrenchment and its effort to distance itself from the interests 
of big business
By way of summary let us re examine the repression/toleration calculus of authoritarian and capitalist 
elites in South Korea and Taiwan In the former country not only had the state lost its legitimacy in the 
eyes of the working and middle classes so too had chaebol capitalists who were perceived perhaps as 
being the real culprits behind protracted authoritarian rule Maintenance of the political status quo or 
military crackdown then would likely engender the economically undesirable effects of increased work 
stoppages brought on by large scale violence and an impending civil war For South Korea s industrial 
capitalists who bore much of the brunt of Ghun s industrial restructuring measures and who were uncertain 
of what continued authoritarian rule under the aegis of Roh might bring political democratization (and
perhaps a return to FKI participation in the 
attractive of an otherwise unenticing set of
economic policy making process) was perceived as the most 
alternatives That Kim Young Sam s moderate RDP advanced 
no redistributive economic policies was surely comforting to capitalists though they nevertheless 
supported Roh in the 1987 election as already indicated Assuming that authoritarian governments need at 
least some base of support m society the regime s belated loss of legitimacy amongst all social classes 
most likely prodded Roh to enact liberalizing political reforms
Given the organizational capacities of the Leninist like KMT it was well positioned to guide the 
democratization process Recall that while independent candidates were allowed to compete m local and
44 Dietnch Rueschemeyer Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D Stephens Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago 
University of Chicago Press 1992) p 6
45 Stephan Haggard Institutions and Economic Policy Theory and a Korean Case Study World Politics vol XLH no 3 
(1990) pp 225-226
46 Ibid p 227
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provincial elections and while beginning in 1983 the KMT refrained from overtly repressing the opposition 
tangwai its immense financial and organizational resources and its accompanying near monopoly on the 
dissemination of information rendered the tangwai less effectual than it otherwise might be When it 
finally became apparent that the opposition had transformed itself from being a fragmented movement 
comprised of feuding intellectuals to a unified one boasting support from native Taiwanese of all social 
classes the KMT one can presume sought to avert a political crisis by liberalizing at a time when it 
could still capture a large segment of the electorate Despite the tenacity of the DPP and despite the 
lifting of restrictions on political organizations the KMT still maintains an advantage at election time In 
contradistinction to the South Korean case where military backed regimes were grounded upon a tenuous 
alliance between authoritarian and capitalist elites the mere fluidity of Taiwan s class structure obviated 
the need for the KMT to appeal to one or another social class Capitalist supporters of the opposition DPP 
therefore pursued not a discemibly capitalist agenda but rather one which would benefit the political 
interests of all indigenous Taiwanese
Conclusion
On the Mode of Transition in Newly Industrializing Countries
To conclude it is perhaps important to summarize what this paper has and has not attempted to do First 
no attempt has been made to assess the role of international influences on the democratic transitions m 
South Korea and Taiwan While international factors were deemed by this author to be beyond the scope 
of her inquiry a few observations arc worth mentioning With reference to South Korea it appears as 
Cummings and others have noted 47 that the United States performed only a minimal function in promoting 
political liberalization and subsequent democratization However with the case of Taiwan one might 
plausibly contend that the KMT s diminishing status and legitimacy in the international community helped 
prompt the regime to implement reforms Expelled from the United Nations in 1971 and derecognized by 
the U S m 1978 Taiwan s long term survival (and eventual independence) would seem to necessitate 
amicable diplomatic relations with the West and Japan While the U S continues to bolster Taiwan s 
national security apparatus via arms sales the ultimate fate of the! new regime may hinge upon the 
government s capacity to convince the international community of its legitimacy especially if the 
Mainland government opts for pohucnl reform
Second this paper has accorded only scant theoretical attention) to comparison of democratization of 
one party regimes to democratization of military dictatorships As many observers of political reform in 
Taiwan have noted democratization of a one party regime is inherently problematic in that the Leninist 
party must somehow transform itself from being the state to merely an independent political association 
competing for access to the state 48 Despite this apparent difficulty other observers of the situation m 
Taiwan argue that precisely because the KMT government recognized its limits and enabled a civil 
society to develop and flourish the transition from authoritarian rule was inevitable but comparatively 
peaceful
Either way this is to be contrasted withe the South Korean experience where political parties whether 
military backed or oppositional have historically been weak While speculation on the reasons for this 
weakness clearly extends beyond the scope of this paper one observation warrants mention Recall that 
both the Park and Chun governments prevented the possible formation of a labor party by prohibiting trade 
unions from forming or contributing financially to political parties While some analysts would deem this 
maneuver prudent in that the working class lacked an institutional mechanism through which it could 
articulate its demands one might plausibly argue that had the working class and its student cohorts such a 
mechanism then they might not have taken to the streets in the violent manner that they did While the 
absence of a labor oriented party was obviously not a problem m Taiwan South Korea s more rigid class 
structure may necessitate a party which can better mediate working class discontent
47 Cummings (fn 11) p 8
48 See for instance Cheng and Haggard (fn 32) pp 18-21 for a theoretical discussion of this issue
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What this paper has attempted to explain is how structural economic exigencies and class 
configurations associated with South Korea is and Taiwan s disparate EOI strategies defined the mode 
character and duration of transitions from authoritarian rule It does not suggest that process oriented 
models of democratic transitions have no analytic value for comparativists but rather reminds analysts 
that strategic choice takes place with in unique socioeconomic contexts which should neither be ignored 
nor treated as givens In light of this clarification then this paper attempts to demonstrate how the 
disparate industrial development drives pursued by the KMT and military backed regimes m Taiwan and 
South Korea produced different types of opposition movements and hence contributed immensely to 
defining the political agendas of governments and oppositions both prior to and during the penods of 
political liberalization This sort of analytic framework—one which considers both socioeconomic 
structure and strategic choice—could be of great utility to comparativists interested in political 
liberalization in rapidly industrializing countries for it is sensitive to the economic stakes m democratic 
transitions
Chapter 13 ,
Identifying an Agenda
How and Why Ethnic Groups and Nations Choose their Goals
by Swarna Rajagopalan i
In the post Cold War era conflicts between ethnic groups1 have replaced that between ideological blocs 
as the central international security problem Bosnia Kashmir Afghanistan Rwanda Nigeria South 
Africa Sri Lanka Mexico— these strife tom locales are only the tip of the iceberg Numerous hostile 
inter ethnic relationships are not violent and therefore do not earn global headlines Nevertheless one is 
still unable to formulate the rule Have ethnic identity will go to war as groups follow different 
developmental trajectories some are acquiescent while others arrive at accommodations within their 
political environment and others that are majority communities respond to that in a range of ways—from 
oppression to magnanimity
Security analysts who come out of the international relations tradition and whose theories are rooted in 
the Cold War experience have few theories with which to predict the outbreak of ethnic conflicts or even 
their influence on the foreign policies of states Indeed the question of why groups follow different 
political paths remains to be answered satisfactorily even in the literature on ethnonationalism
I
What are the influences that affect the politicization patterns of pthnic groups7 Why does nationhood 
lead in some cases to secessionist and separatist movements in some to regionalism and participation 
within constitutional contexts and in others to a purely socio cultural expression7 Are the roots of such 
outcomes to be found in the characteristics of particular cultures or in the socio political context m which 
the nation is located7
This paper will examine the recent political histories of Tamil communities in four modem states as a 
launching pad to identify how the interaction of state and groups in society contribute to the politicization 
of communities as well as other factors that make their appearance in these cases From the four very 
different responses of people who share a single cultural heritage will be derived ideas about how ethnic 
identities evolve and the role that the interaction of the group and the state plays in the process
i
The Tamils
Tamil is one of India s oldest languages and the history of Tamil literature which includes two older 
periods of cultural efflorescence goes back at least twenty centimes (Gazetteer 1988 192) The 
geographical limits of India s peninsular terrain however denied Tamil dynasties the glory of Northern 
conquest and thus their place in India s ancient and mediæval history is diminished m contemporary 
narratives However under the Imperial Cholas (ninth to thirteenth centuries A D ) Tamil conquests 
extended across the seas to Sri Lanka and South-East Asia Conquest is important not as an index of glory 
but as a facilitator of contact and migration 2 |
Tamil expansion in the early mediaeval period—the tenth to twelfth centuries A D —covered almost all 
of modem South-East Asia except modem Laos and Vietnam Ceylon (Sri Lanka) was the most frequent 
casualty of Tamil impenal designs Additionally Tamils controlled ¡the sea routes from the straits of 
Malacca to Mauritius Naturally emigration and the creation of overseas communities has not been 
unknown since early times i
1 The ethnicity and nationalism literature is characterized by confusion in the usage of central terms This paper follows Walker 
Connor s usage of terms related to ethnicity and nationalism See Appendix One forja glossary derived from his work (1994 89 117)
2 For more on South India history see K A N Sastn The Culture and History of the Tamils (1964) Mukhopadhyay Calcutta and 
by the same author A History o f South India from Prehistoric Tunes to the Fall o f Vijayanagar (1966) Oxford Madras also Burton 
Stem Peasant State and Society in Mediavai South India (1980) Oxford Delhi
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Tamil and have always taken pnde m its distinctive political
British colonial rule added another dimension to this emigration—the movement of indentured 
plantation labour from one colony to others Accordingly like labourers from other Indian regions Tamils 
traveled to the West Indies South Africa Sn Lanka Malaysia and elsewhere in South-East Asia Tamils 
however had a way of remaining distinctively Tamil even as they blended into this worldwide movement 
of labour This may be attributed to the non j Indo-European nature of their language and culture which m 
theory makes it difficult for them to bndge the gap between their culture and others It is also the fact that 
unlike some of the other communities whose members also were taken abroad Tamils have always had a 
strong consciousness of the high culture of 
history (Pandian 1987 Ramaswamy 1993)
In our time 3 the Tamil community is a visible and often vocal presence in at least four state contexts 
but always a linguistic minority— India Sn| Lanka Malaysia and Singapore In addition there are Tamils 
in parts of the Malagasy Republic Malay Peninsula Myanmar Indochina Thailand East Africa South 
Africa F iji Mauritius and the West Indies There is also a large group of Tamil émigres in North 
America—mostly from India some from Sn Lanka Although not a statistically significant linguistic group 
in North America they are highly visible m the technologically advanced sectors of industry and are very 
culturally active
The Tamils of Tamil Nadu India
Tamil is one of the fifteen languages recognized by the Eighth Schedule of the Indian constitution as an 
Indian language entitled to certain privileges and considerations Until 1956 Tamils by and large lived in 
Madras state which was also home to thret other major linguistic communities—the Telugu speakers 
Kannadigas and Malayalis—and other important but smaller communities—the Konkam speakers Tulu 
speakers and Coorgis In 1956 the reorganization of states on linguistic grounds—demanded incidentally 
by the Telugu speakers of Madras state—resulted in the creation of a predominantly Tamil state The 
population of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu numbered almost forty nine million in the 1980 s which 
includes a sizeable number of non Tamils 4,
Tamil Nadu politics has been quintessential^ the politics of identity—caste identity linguistic identity 
identity vis à vis the dominant North Indian people and even on the water issue vis à vis neighbouring 
Telugu and Kannada speakers It is also characterized by the dominance of an unbroken line of 
charismatic leaders—E V Ramaswami Naicker (Periyar) C N Annadurai (Anna) M Karunanidhi 
(Kalaignar) M G Ramachandran (Puratchi Thalaivar) and Jayalalitha Jayaram (Puratchi Thalaivi 
Amma)5 They are addressed by the honorific titles they adopt which define their relationship to the Tamil 
people often m familial terms They command a devotion that to the Westernized outsider is almost
bizarre and which is sometimes expressed in acts like self immolation
The Dravida movement is the single most prominent thread m the history of Tamil politics in modem 
times Hindu society in Tamil Nadu has traditionally been more caste conscious than that in almost any 
other part of India. Partly this is a function of demography—m other parts of India there is a larger 
number of Brahmins more non Brahmin upper castes—there are no equivalents of the Kshatnya and 
Vaishya castes in Tamil Nadu and more socio economically dominant intermediate castes In Tamil 
Nadu this was not so There was a small number of Brahmins who were extremely orthodox but some of 
whom in the period of British rule had seen fit to acquire a Western education and were therefore in a 
position to monopolize administrative employment now as traditionally
3 The Encyclopaedia Britannica (Volume 11 15tl edition 1994) says that there are approximately 57 million Tamils around the 
world in the twentieth centuiy While this should not be taken to be an exact count the reliability of the source encourages one to 
regard this as a somewhat likely figure
It should be noted that finding census figures for tie  total numbers of Tamil speakers in various parts of the world has been 
difficult Forming a minority in each of the countries that they live in Tamils are counted in those categories that suit each state 
administration best. It is near impossible in most cases to get much more than approximations on the numbers of Tamils m each 
country
4 Source India Statistical Pocket Book 30ih edition 1989
5 Translations of these titles are Penyar—Great 3ne Angnar Anna—Scholar / Older Brother Kalaignar—Artiste (Karunanidhi is 
a Tamil writer of some repute) Puraitchi Thalaivar / Thalaivi—Revolutionary Leader Amma—Mother
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In the early years the Dravida movement had one theme—justice to the depressed classes The Justice 
Party aimed at the uplift of the non Brahmin community in what was the multi lingual Madras Presidency 
of British Indian empire The caste composition of their respective support bases6 dictated that the Justice 
Party and the Indian National Congress were ranged on opposite sides in the struggle for freedom The 
Justice Party supported Bntish rule as preferable to the Brahmin hegemony of the Congress In the late 
thirties the movement was radicalized under the leadership of Naicker and then began the potent 
equation of North-Brahmin-Sansknt-Aryan and South-non Brahmin-Tamil-Dravida The latter were to be 
redeemed from the yoke of the former
The rejection of Brahmins Brahmin defined Hinduism and Hindi gathered force and set in motion an 
internal social transformation in Tamil Nadu The movement set as its goal a separate Dravida state— 
Dravidasthan and to that end Naicker reorganized the party as the Dravida Kazhagam (DK) or Dravida 
Federation (Hardgrave 1979 170) In the post independence penod a faction of the DK broke away to form 
the Dravida Progressive Federation or the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the leader of this 
party was C N Annadurai—or Anna the first of the film industry talents to shape the course of Tamil 
Nadu politics 7
The DMK while participating in electoral politics retained its agitational strategies While it captured 
power in Tamil Nadu it agitated against the central government s impending adoption of Hindi as the 
administrative language as per the Indian Constitution in 1965 Language riots erupted all over southern 
India, and ultimately the central government was forced to give in and assure the non Hindi speaking 
states that English would remain an alternative for as long as required Nevertheless in 1965 Hindi did 
become the official language of India and language riots consumed Tamil Nadu This issue was resolved 
by the official adoption of the three language formula and the recognition of regional languages as official 
and English as the link language
The anti Hindi agitation had three consequences for the development of Tamil identity One the making 
of common cause by Brahmins and non Brahmins alike against Hindi blunted some of the anti Brahmin 
rhetoric of the DMK Two in the eyes of the Tamil Brahmins the DMK became palatable as the voice of 
the Tamil community in its dealings with the North The Brahmins in spite of being the southern bastion 
of Sanskntized Hinduism and in spite of speaking a very Sanskritized Tamil took pnde m their Tamil 
ness and tended to view that as a mark of refinement over North Indian Brahmins This would in the 1980 s 
be particularly salient in the framing of policy towards Sn Lanka Linguistic affinity overshadowed the 
caste factor m the way that Tamils would present themselves to the rest of India even if caste Süll 
loomed large in state electoral poliucs and in the daily lives of Tamils Finally the anü Hindi movement 
being led by talented writers and film makers the post independence penod in Tamil Nadu has seen an 
efflorescence of Tamil language and literature The language has been purged of non Dravidian influences 
and its propagation has meant better cultural and political literacy (see Pandian 1987 64-66) The case of 
Tamil Nadu provides an interesting instance of the symbiotic relationship between culture—high and 
low—and politics
The 1960 s also saw a change in what the DMK identified as its goal In the 1960 s secession was 
consütuüonally prohibited and in a turnabout the DMK gave up its demand for a separate Dravida/Tamil 
state The Dravida pames in the 1990 s lead in the demand for increased decentralizauon and regional 
autonomy ^
The Dravida domination of Tamil culture and politics has had important consequences for the 
community as a whole Although the anü Brahmin thrust of DMK rhetoric has blunted somewhat Tamil 
Brahmins lost prestige within Tamil Nadu society their Tamil their dress their lifestyles becoming an 
object of mockery and they lost out on educational and employment opportunities as a consequence of
i
6 That the support base of the Congress as party and as movement has largely been among the highest and lowest æchelons of 
Indian society is a fact widely demonstrated and accepted in the study of Indian politics The Justice Party and many contemporary 
non-Congress pames and movements draw their strength from intermediate castes the lower middle class and the labour movement.
7 Important works discussing the nse and growth of the Dravida movements include Irschick (1969) Hardgrave (1965 1964-65 
1973) Barnett (1976)
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the high percentage of these reserved for no 
flight of Tamil Brahmins from Tamil Nadu
n Brahmins This reversal of traditional quotas resulted in the 
Always a mobile and relatively enterprising community Tamil 
Brahmins combated state quotas in four ways—one by competing with considerable success in all India 
competitions for educational access and jobs two by setting up their own industries generating jobs for 
their community three by emigrating to otlier parts of India and since the 1970 s in increasing numbers 
via graduate education abroad to North America Great Britain other advanced industrial states and even 
the Middle East Finally those who couldn It get away made their peace in time honoured fashion by 
learning how to speak and live in the new >vays by supporting and coming to terms with the new 
dispensation and thus m two generations lending it that final Indian stamp of legitimacy—Brahmin 
endorsement This is epitomized in the continued dominance of Jayalalitha Jayaram a Brahmin over 
politics in Tamil Nadu Her ongins are irrelevant to the incredible personalized support she commands
Tamil ness has in a sense prevailed over caste distinctions as the salient identity for Tamils at large
Notwithstanding the anti caste anti religion 
society continues to be caste conscious and
thrust of the Dravida movement in a quotidian sense Tamil 
devout with more temples now dotting the countryside than
ever before On the other hand the Tamil layer of a Tamil s identity precedes the Brahmin Chettiar
Vellala or Adi-Dravida layer and all share 
popular culture The affinity felt toward the
a pride in Tamil high culture and an avid interest in Tamil 
Jaffna Tamil at the worst part of the Sn Lankan crisis and the
pressure on the Indian Government to intervene in some way came from Tamils of all castes
In political terms vis à vis the Indian state Tamil political leadership has chosen to play within the 
system to maximize its benefits Ever assured of a majority of Tamil Nadu s Parliamentary seats the 
Dravida parties use electoral and legislative] support as leverage in their relationship with all India parues 
and with the central government Additionally their astute leadership has seldom lost an opportunity to 
exploit the centre s vulnerabilities with regard to other regions and regional leadership It has chosen to 
attend opposiüon conclaves and confabulations and has also very effecüvely used its popularity to coerce 
the central government into a response An example of this was the inter state dispute over the waters of 
the Kaven river m June 1993 the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister went on a hunger strike and there were 
nots stoppages of work and self ímmolaüons all over Tamil Nadu m support Alarmed the centre was
forced to intervene Tamil logistical support 
instance
to the Tamil Tigers of Sn Lanka m the 1980 s was another
The response of the Indian state to the initial anti Hindi movement was to accommodate the fears of the 
non Hindi speakers through constitutional and informal guarantees At least in the Tamil case which came 
early in the post independence era repression played no part in the state s response to secessionist 
demands Subsequently when the Dravida parties have come to dominate Tamil Nadu politics the all 
India parties and the Congress have been inclined by and large to deal with them as equals and 
associates rather than as subordinate and dispensable as they have treated other regional parties and 
leaders Although Tamil Nadu has not experienced the best of governance that has had as much to do 
with the fact that the Dravida parties have not been able to translate their mandates into good 
admmistrauon
The Tamils in Sri Lanka
Tamil speakers in Sn Lanka are identified as three distinct groups—Sn Lankan Tamils Indian Tamils and 
Tamil Muslims of the North-East who ldenufy themselves as Muslims rather than Tamils The first 
compnses those Tamils who are descended from the settlers in the early Christian era and into the second 
millenium They constitute around 12 6 percent of the population The Indian Tamils constitute 5 6 percent 
of the population and are the descendents of the indentured labourers brought over by the Bntish 
plantation owners to work on the coffee and tea plantations of central Sn Lanka s highlands Tamil 
speaking Muslims are a part of the larger diverse grouping of Muslim merchant community who totally 
constitute 7 percent of the population (Tam'biah 1986 4-5) Contrary to more common and simplified 
representations of the demographics of the conflict that has made the Tamil famous world wide Tambiah 
points out that 47 percent of all Tamils actually live in Sinhalese dominated areas (1986 12)
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The Indian Tamils who are the plantation workers did not at the time of Independence have citizenship 
in either India or Sn Lanka In 1964 this was somewhat resolved by the pact between the Prime Ministers 
of India and Sn Lanka whereby 525 000 Tamils of Indian ongin were to be granted Indian citizenship and 
375 000 Sn Lankan by the year 1979 The rest of the people would be equally divided between the two 
states by an informal arrangement While initially the number of applications for Indian citizenship were 
lower than the quota set forth by the pact, as ethnic tensions grew so did the number of applications As 
Bastian puts it the implementation of the pact had contrary implications for the plantation Tamils 
On the one hand it has led to a whole process of relocation of families to another country 
sometimes a place that the repatriates have never seen But on the other hand the granting 
of the Sn Lankan citizenship to a certain section removes an | important factor that had 
limited the mobility of these people and contributed to their condition of captive labour 
(1986 185)
This change in citizenship status has had political consequences naturally These Tamils joined the 
community of voters and because a new multi member constituency was carved out in order to ensure 
representation for them they became an important vote bank
Because Tamil identity is most tangibly discerned through language language policies have lam at the 
heart of the process whereby this identity has been politicized In ¡Sri Lanka at the time of Independence 
it was generally agreed that English would in time be replaced by Sinhalese and Tamil However bí 
lingualism did not appeal to the Sinhalese and m the mid 1950 s demand for Sinhala Only began to be 
made by Buddhist activists and the Sinhalese educated intelligentsia (de Silva 1993 280) Part of the 
motivation for this was the advantage that the Tamils had in the colonial administration as a consequence 
of the larger numbers of Christian missionary schools in the north Bí lingualism would perpetuate this 
advantage and this was not acceptable to the Sinhalas In 1956 Sinhala was made the only national 
language with provisions for protecting minority language rights
The Federal Party which was the mam Tamil party made three demands as part of its organized 
response to this policy—autonomy under a federal structure for the Northern and Eastern Provinces panty 
of status for Tamil and Sinhala and settlement of citizenship rights for Indian Tamils—the plantation 
workers (The last as we have seen was resolved in 1964 ) Negotiations ensued between Pnme Minister 
Solomon Bandaranaike and the Tamil leaders and it was decided ¡that Tamil would be recognized as the 
official administrative language in the Northern and Eastern provinces In addition a Regional Councils 
Bill was to be introduced and the internal migration of Sinhalese into the Northern and Eastern provinces 
was to be limited This in turn was protested by the Sinhalese activists who had asked for Sinhala Only 
and a new Bill was passed in 1958 that included the right of Tamils to use their language in 
corresponding with the government and in local government affairs to continue educating their children 
in Tamil and to sit for competitive examinations for entry into thp government and local government 
service in Tamil with the proviso that they would be required to gam proficiency in Sinhalese to continue 
in service and to gain secure promotion within these services (de Silva 1993 290) Solomon 
Bandaranaike was assassinated and his successor was unable or disinclined to put this into effect
A subsequent realignment of forces on the language question occurred but in legal terms the impasse 
continued In reality however the 1958 modifications had taken effect Sn Lanka was bí lingual for all 
practical purposes as seen in the use of the Tamil language in the national insignia coins and currency 
postage stamps m road signs and in all official and semi official documents at every level (de Silva 
1993 293) What happened was that as the group rights of the Sinhalese and Tamils to the use of their 
language m education and adminstration were recognized the individual Sn Lankan s nght to choose the 
medium of education that she or he preferred was slighted and over the years a gulf developed between 
the two communities as they could less and less communicate with each other This was institutionalized 
through Chapter IV of the 1978 Constitution of Sn Lanka In 1987 as a consequence of the Indo-Sn 
Lankan pact the 13th amendment to the constitution granted Tamil the status of official language and 
panty with Sinhala
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K M  de Silva (1993 299-301) describes he language safeguards m Sn Lanka as being equal to those of
the Québécois in Canada and as better than those enjoyed by the people of the Swiss cantons This may 
be true now but the 1987 constitutional amendments came four years after the traumatic 1983 nots and by 
then the war between the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam and the government of Sri Lanka was a fact
The demand of the Tamils for a separate state was first made m 1958 but gained acceptance in the 
1970 s The 1972 constitution had made Sinhalese the official language of Sn Lanka and Buddhism the 
state religion Almost simultaneously the Tamil United Front was formed which later became the Tamil 
United Liberation Front and pressed for a separate state of Tamil Eelam What was originally conceived 
as political opposition to certain governmental measures had now blossomed into a demand for an 
autonomous state (Nithiyanandan 1987 124)
The 1983 nots were the worst case of ethnic violence known in Sn Lanka According to Tambiah 
(1988 294) since Sn Lanka attained independence there have been at least six bloody nots the worst of 
which were in 1958 1977 1981 and 1983 In the seventies young Tamils developed a disdain for the 
political style of the older Tamil leadership The violent Sinhala insurrection in the South in 1971 the 
economic crisis that affected the Jaffna peninsula as a consequence of the oil shock changes in the 
education and employment structure with more Sinhalese than Tamils gaining jobs and the change in 
economic policy from a welfare to a market orientation the political stratagems that most appealed to the 
Tamil youth were those of violence and terrorism
There have been two threads to the Tamil movement—the militant one which has taken centre stage 
and the constitutional one which has at times lost both clout and credibility The Tamil militants were 
organized into a variety of organizations tne most prominent one of which was the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam Through the years the militants have spared neither civilian nor state official and in the 
period following the 1987 Indo-Sn Lanka Xccord when the Indian Peace Keeping Force was sent to assist 
the Sri Lankan government in the disarming of the Tamil militants the Tigers fought the Indian army on a 
war footing
Tamil politicians began by demanding cultural and educational rights and in four decades have moved 
to a range of more extreme goals—autonomy to secession They have tried constitutional and 
unconstitutional means and the latter have gained ascendancy and legitimacy because the state has 
chosen to respond m kind
The Tamils of Malaysia
Tamils constitute almost 80 percent of the 
approximately 11 percent of the Malaysian
Indian community in Malaysia (Rajoo 1985 150) which is
population (Meams 1986 77) The Malaysian Tamil is either 
Ceylonese or Indian in origin The large part of the Tamils are like other Indian migrants descended from 
those brought over by the British at the enc of the last century as plantation and estate workers In the 
urban areas Ceylon Tamils were white col ar workers in the public and private sectors as were Brahmins 
among the Indian Tamils and Tamil Christians Other groups in the Tamil community like the Chettiyars 
and the Vellalas were money lenders financiers nad small scale business owners
Rajoo asks m his essay on Indian identity and world view in early twentieth century Malaysia— who
did the Indians identify themselves with in 
contradictory affinities—one with the fami 
then a larger Indian civilizational identity
The first Indian organization m Malaysia 
founded around 1937 It was supplanted by
Malaya9 His answer is that there were two apparently 
y and by extension the jati (sub caste) and the village and
was the Central Indian Association of Malaya which was 
the Malayan Indian Congress The Tamil community divided 
along caste lines as it was showed in addition the influence of the Dravida movement m Tamil Nadu 
India Dr E V Ramaswami Naicker visited Malaya in 1927 and upon his urging in 1932 the All Malaya 
Dravidian Association (in Tamil sangam | which actually means convention or gathering) was held in 
Penang and attended among others by high caste non Brahmins In the 1950 s the Tamil Unity Movement
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was founded These however never claimed a position of political authority nor to speak for the 
community at large nor even just for Tamils vis a vis the Malaysian government
Rajoo quotes Arasaratnam
Culturally the Indian leadership frowned at any tendency to1 alienate themselves among any 
section of the community They wanted the Indian community to preserve its integrity This 
was even encouraged by Government policy as communalism lay at the very basis of public 
policy in Malaya. The Indian community was getting its share of recognition because it was a 
separate and lentifiable community and its continuing advancement lay in such identity 
(emphasis mine) (1985 172)
Tamils continue to rally behind the Malaysian Indian Congress and since they continue to be the largest 
part of the Indian community and to control the Congress there is no need for them to break away and 
form a Tamil political grouping Indeed affiliation with the category Indian was seen by Ceylon 
Tamils to be advantageous and so in 1970 they lobbied successfully to be counted as Indians Although 
parts of the Indian community who were in direct competition with the Ceylon Tamils for jobs were not 
too pleased this arrangement has continued and the Ceylon Tamils are also represented through the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (Meams 1986 82)
This has not created a pan Tamil sentiment in Malaysia and feelings of resentment and rivalry between 
the Indian and Ceylonese Tamils persist It is extremely unlikely that m those circumstances Tamils will 
come together as a separate ethnic group and that leading the larger leading collective they will make 
any other than the most general economic or political demands As the Malaysian political system has 
sought to accommodate Tamils as part of a constructed Indian community so have Tamils adjusted and 
acted within the limits of that framework satisfied and acknowledging that they now have a Malaysian 
identity
The Tamils of the United States8 i
Of my four cases this constitutes almost the short take m the margin the little aside because the 
Tamil minority in the U S is so insignificant—socially politically and even statistically that census 
figures for Tamil speakers could not be obtained* Nor has anyone written seriously about them 
Nevertheless this is an interesting community because it illustrates some of the reasons why a community 
might not define itself in separatist terms
The U S Tamil like the Malaysian Tamil might be Sri Lankan or Indian in origin This divides the 
community especially on the issue of support to the Sri Lankan separatist movement The Indian Tamil 
community is further divided into Brahmins and non Brahmins The two groups might share an interest in 
popular culture but do not always share one of the two main factors that unite Tamil Brahmins—Carnatic 
classical music (The other is an interest in temples and rituals )
Tamils have organized sometimes across these lines sometimes along them While each large 
metropolitan area has its own Tamil Sangam or Tamil Association organizations that supposedly 
represent the community as a whole are based in New York The plurality of organizations at this level 
suggests that they might follow the divide m the community at large This effectively undermines their 
prospects of articulating their identity and interests m political terms Members of the Sri Lankan Tamil 
community have invested more energy in raising funds and lobbying support for the militant Tamils in Sn 
Lanka than m furthering their own interests here
This low political profile bears little relationship to the high visibility of Tamils in cultural programs and 
festival celebrations The Tamil community in Cleveland Ohio is an example Every April for seventeen
8 There seem to have been no studies on this community of immigrants and there is title data available Attempts to use the 
Internet s Tamil newsgroups as a source of sources and a sounding board met with only four responses three of which were highly 
personal descriptions of Tamils in the respondents communities The case descnpuon that follows is therefore merely an 
impressionistic profile 1
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years the local Tamil arts society has been organizing the Thyagaraja Aradhana 9 This festival is the 
major cultural event for conoisseurs of Carnatic music—mostly Tamils—in North America In 1994 it was 
called a festival of the whole of Ohio April 2 was declared Lalgudi Day after the most prominent 
performer a Cleveland regular and the Governor s office declared the four days of the festival 
Thyagaraja Days Further the festival is run on donations only—the performance and the meals are free 
to visitorsf There are around 5 000 Indians in Cleveland—obviously a considerably smaller number of 
Tamils (Shanker 1994 44i)
Thus not only do Tamils have a strong ssnse of cultural heritage and celebrate their heritage m style 
but they have considerable financial and political clout at the local level Typically Tamils m the U S 
are highly skilled and work in administrative and elencai jobs at one end and academic and research jobs 
at the other Correspondingly they earn well and live in the more affluent quarters They have by and 
large done better m this society than they would have at home
Their political identity is subsumed under the larger Asian Indian identity and they are represented by 
the groups that speak for other Asian Indians Their economic interests are those of other upper middle 
class upper class Amencans and for the most part they are represented in those by others Tamils in the 
United States seem to have found no reason to organize themselves as a distinct group The question that 
this paper asks is pertinent to a stage in the process of ethmcization that is still one step away 10
A Summary of the Cases
The Tamils in the four states discussed above all display a consciousness of their Tamil ness Yet the 
way in which they have translated that cultural consciousness into politics has differed
In Tamil Nadu the first expression of Tamil identity was through the politics of caste then through 
language with a demand for independence and finally through the politics of region with a demand in 
conjunction with other regional parues and (leaders for regional autonomy In Sri Lanka too language and 
citizenship were central to the first phase of Tamil nationalism and continued to be even as economics 
defined those planks more distinctly m the |l970 s The demands moved from federalism to secession and 
in recent years it seems that the two branches of the Tamil movement are demanding federalism and
secession between them It is in Sn Lanka 
legitimately demanding a separate state In
that Tamil identity—the Tamil nation has come closest to
______ y ________o ___r ________  Malaysia Tamils while dominating Malaysian Indian politics
are not playing the Tamil card in any political sense Their domination of the Malaysian Indian Congress 
seems to be enough The U S case is the farthest from political significance In the U S as m Malaysia if 
Tamils are counted in the census their numbers are not significant enough to ment reportage They are 
subsumed under the larger category of Indians
The four cases seem to fall into two dichotomous categones 1) cases where the community is 
subsumed under a larger grouping and whelre this is not so The Tamils in Malaysia and the U S are 
examples of the former and those in Sri Lanka and India of the latter 2) cases where the community is 
dispersed and where it is territorially concentrated—has a homeland 11
These dichotomies characterize the plac|e of the community in society at large It would seem that 
where a national group is dispersed across the country with no particular concentration m any one area 
and where they can make no claim of traditional or historical occupation the demands that community 
can make are likely to be restricted to economic concessions or cultural and educational rights Where the 
group is by and large concentrated m one area and where they can claim to have occupied that territory 
for a few generations—the Sn Lankan Tamil case is almost the classic example—it is easier to generate
9 Thyagaraja was one of three main composers of Carnatic music and it is customary in South India to celebrate his large œuvre 
with music fesuvals These begin with a religious ceremony and everyone singing five compositions that do not, unusually admit 
improvisation The festival lasts two to four days and| features both amateurs and professionals
10 Stages of ethmcization are spelt out in footnote number 16
11 This paper will not enter the debate over traditional homelands and the validity of such claims This is more than adequately 
addressed by K M De Silva Separausm in Sn Lanka The Traditional Homelands of the Tamils in Premdas et al eds Secessionist 
Movements in Comparative Perspective 1990 page! 32-47
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support for separatist or secessionist claims This is not to say that such claims will not be contested but 
that they will hold at least a little credibility in the eyes of third parties
The other dichotomy is also important Reminiscent of what Yaèl Tamir calls the Russian doll 
phenomenon — every national territory however small includes among its inhabitants members of 
other nations (Tamir 1993 158)—when nations are counted as part of other nations or equally real 
identities and have tended to count themselves m that fashion then in order to assert themselves they 
have to distinguish themselves twice over—once as distinct from the larger identity group—m the cases in 
this paper Indians —and then from the rest of society Often being subsumed into another larger 
category happens because on the whole that larger group is distinct from the host society while internal 
distinctions within that group are both numerically insignificant and mutually unintelligible to outsiders 
Therefore when a nation is counted as part of a larger grouping it is both difficult and of dubious value for 
them to assert their identity as distinct
i
A third difference between the four cases arises in the different state policies that define their political 
relationship with the rest of society In India cultural diversity and the nght to preserve and propagate 
one s language and culture were protected as Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution and this was 
reinforced by the linguistic reorganization of states in 1956 Further in response to the anti Hindi agitation 
of the late 1950 s and early 1960 s the central government acknowledged the anxieties of the non Hindi 
speaking majority especially m the South by assuring them that no imposition of Hindi would occur This 
accommodating attitude of the central government changed m subsequent decades but its initial lack of 
repression served to somewhat integrate the Tamils and the Dravida parues into the mainstream
Sn Lanka s government was indecisive about the relauve status of S inhala and Tamil Promises of 
fairplay and fears of Sinhalese culture being swamped exercised contrary but equally strong pressures on 
the decision makers with the latter seeming to win almost everyume Given the size of the Tamil 
populauon its history of self government and its concentration m two regions the consociational pattern 
would seem the most effecüve accommodation 12 but of Brown s three methods of managing diversity Sn 
Lanka progressed steadily towards the first—identification of the state identity with that of the majonty 
community (Brown 1989 13—4)13 Tamil protests were met with hostility and when Tamil acuvists turned 
to violent methods the state could not resist the pressures of the Sinhalese extremists to respond in like 
fashion The Tamil nauonahsts were led to extremism at least partly by the way in which the state 
organized its response to them >
In Malaysia the state chose to manage socio cultural diversity m Malaysia through three simplisüc 
categories—Malays Chinese and Indians In so doing it recognized the importance of the non Malay 
populauon but m a way that clearly defined the limits to their pohucal consequence By lumping all 
Indian groups—indeed South Asians at large—into this one category of Indians the Malaysian 
government at once recognized their distinctiveness vis a vis Malays and Chinese gave them political
space proportionate to their numbers and at the same time left no room for Indians to legiUmately define
12 See however Paul Brass cnlique of consociationalism as a solution to the political problems of multi nation societies
(1991 333 348) ¡
13 Brown outlines three methods of managing diversity identification of the national identity with that of the majority
community ethnic neutrality and consociationalism I
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their political identity in a different way Ir this situation Tamils have already benefitted as much as any 
Indian group—more by virtue of their numerical superiority and their control of the Malaysian Indian 
Congress The Malaysian system has placed Tamil leadership m a position where it must oppose the 
dominant group m order to define itself but must also cooperate with them in order to maintain their 
foothold m the national system Some writers acclaim the Malaysian system for having accomplished the 
difficult task of accommodating truculent minorities with the minimum of violence (Horowitz 1989)
The U S case is most useful here The Tamil community here fits stereotypes of a model minority and 
unlike other groups that are now beginning Ito chafe at the shackles of this stereotype is proud of it There 
is no official repression here and no denial of rights On the other hand this is because Tamils in the U S 
are in so alien an environment and m such small numbers that they would not seek the educational rights 
the special minority privileges and the cultural rights—the right to conduct business in Tamil for 
instance—that they have fought bitterly for elsewhere In the U S dispersed identified officially as Indian 
and not Tamil a microscopic minority of relatively high socio economic status—and in the case of 
Brahmins often having left an economic environment that was hostile Tamils have no reason to upset the 
apple-cart of their comfortable middle class: American lives in a quixotic search for a Tamil nation in 
North America14
Building a Theoretical Model
So what have we learnt from these cases about the reasons why nations choose to express their politics in 
a variety of ways9 Nations acting politically identify grievances and goals 15 They set or seek to set 
alter or seek to alter political agendas They choose between issues as to what they will mobilize around 
and they choose strategies and goals Specifically this paper will ask why they choose the goals they 
choose and make the demands they make The demands of ethnic or nationality groups include 
autonomy self determination representation local political control resource control land rights 
religious freedom or language rights (Clay 1989 232)
At this point it is important to distinguish between goals and means We will not address the question of 
means That is it will not ask why some groups choose constitutional means and why others don t why 
some turn to the use of violence and others don t It will ask why the goals themselves are chosen Also 
while it is true that the success of means chosen reinforces goals just as failure prompts reassessment our 
focus is on a prior stage of decision making 16 To clarify we will look at the factors that go into the initial 
calculation of what constitutes a reasonable goal for a nation We do not presume that such a calculation 
will lead to the adoption of such a goal
A nation may identify three types of goals—those that it might pursue in ideal conditions those that it is 
possible to attain and still more modest goals that it might consider adequate far short of the possible 
In the category of goals that might be ideal but not necessarily feasible might be nation state status for the 
Malaysian Tamils Were the Tamils of India to have agitated for a linguistic province that would have 
been a goal that it was eminently possible jto attain 17 Secession on the other hand while physically 
feasible rather stretched the category of the possible from the point of view of resources and 
circumstances Had the Tamils of Sn Lanka sought merely affirmative action that would have been 
modest and well within the realm of the possible
14 The fact that this case study reads absurdly proves my point.
IS We accept that decisions about means and ends 
nauon Prominent among those who have argued this
and attempts to mobilize the people of a nation are made by the elite of that 
is Paul Brass
16 If one were to map the stages whereby a nauon might pass pobucally this might be how such a map looked 
from the possession of identily-and the ldeniificauon of an issue as gnevance-which is seen to affect the naUon as an aggregate
and is articulated as though the nauon s distinct ldenuty is in some sense the cause of that grievance— the identification o f goal ( or 
that remedy which will ensure the removal o f the grievance)—the idenuficauon of the means or technique whereby the goal is most 
likely achieved—acuon and outcome— success or reappraisal of goal and technique
This is a tentauve mapping and this paper only purports to consider the stage that is in bold print here
17 The Tamils of India do occupy a linguisucally ¡defined province but it was not through their agitating for one Rather it was a 
consequence of linguisuc minorities in the erstwhile ' ’armi dominated Madras province demanding a province of their own This 
agitauon led ulumately to the linguistic reorganization of Indian states in 1956
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Language rights political i control Self determmation
FIGURE 13 2 Categories of Goals Source The demands in this Figure are) adapted from Clay s list of the demands that 
ethnic groups might make (1989 232)
From the point of view of the state one might systematically categorize demands into petitions and 
challenges Petitions are those demands that are still within the realm of the state s powers In this 
category are demands for economic rights (land rights affirmative action quotas special privileges over 
some resources) cultural rights (language rights religious freedom cultural freedom and educational 
rights) and other demands like being categorized in a certain way in census counts or not being subsumed 
in a larger category Demands for representation are also demands within the framework of a political 
system Challenges are those that seek to alter the state s powers and undermine its legitimacy Into this 
group of demands fall regional autonomy federalism separatism I recognition of homelands or special 
status and secession All of these potentially seek to alter the fundamental structure of the state The 
examples used here for either category are merely illustrative and m each case what is possible or what is 
ideal what is merely a petitition or what constitutes a fundamental challenge to the state must differ 
according to differences in the two factors described below-the nation s place and particular state 
structures
Based on the four case histones described above two factors appear as potential causes for the way in 
which ethnic groups identify and articulate their interests within the political system The first is the 
group s place within that socio political environment and the second the state s structure and policies 
towards the group 18 While other local (histones of other groups—their successes and failures in making 
demands on the state and natural disasters) transnational (diaspora intervention by regional and extra 
regional states and externally prompted movement of people) and global factors (telecommunications 
global movement of finance and arms and the international recognition of certain principles like self 
determination)19 contribute to the viability of one or the other political agenda the agenda must anse out 
of one or both of these sets of conditions 20 To sum up
a group s place + state structures and policies—> group s choice of demands and goals 
This is more complex than this statement implies Each of the two causes has a number of facets for each 
facet of the two causal factors there is a limited menu of potential outcomes and because the outcome is 
finally determined by the interaction of a number of these facets a more detailed model is needed
A Group s Place in Society
The group s place m society is determined by four features numbers socio economic status history and 
relationship with other groups
18 This is not different from the way that Paul Brass explains both identity formation and the transformation of ethnic identity
into nationalism (1991) i
19 These factors are both interesting and enormously influential in determining the course and outcomes of the politics of nations 
and states but they are not identified here as having the power to cause grievances and discontent. Further while they contribute to 
the choice of technique they do not contribute to the choice of goal
20 The elements of language culture or religion are not here regarded as factors that determine the choice of goal but as factors 
that define the basis on which the nation s interests are aggregated They define thel group they promote identity and unity facilitate 
mobilization and aggregation but language culture and religion do not in themselves affect the choice of goal The fact that some 
goals are related to language culture and religion does not contradict this It should be borne in mind that this paper is concerned with 
calculus that affects the choice of goal and not the nature of the goal itself
I
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Numbers The first and most objectively determined are its numbers This encompasses in tum absolute 
numbers (how many members of the ethnic group or nation live in that society) relative numbers (what 
percentage of the population do they constitute7 what is the percentage ethnic composition of the rest of 
that society7) and distribution across the state territory (what is the regional distribution of this 
population7 are they dispersed or concentrated m one area or more7)21
Where a nation stands on this feature can be divided into a limited set of outcomes in the following 
way
The Percentage of the State s Population that It Forms the nation s population forms (approximately) 
less than 5 percent (the Tamils in the U S ) between 6 percent and 15 percent (Tamils in Malaysia and 
India) between 16 percent and 50 percent (Tamils in Sn Lanka) and over 51 percent or a clear 
majonty (Tamils in a hypothetical Tamil state of Eelam) of the population of the state as a whole
Degree of Diversity in the Social Environment a society which is more (four or more than four groups) 
or less (three or less than three groups) diverse 22 like India and Sri Lanka respectively with one group 
numerically preponderant (Hindus in India) one or two groups preponderant (Malays and Chinese in 
Malaysia) several groups of approximately the same size (linguistic groups in India) or several groups 
of varied sizes
Location Dispersed or Concentrated concentrated in one area ( approximately 90 percent or more of 
the nation s population) or dispersed soj that small groups of nationals are scattered all over (Tamils in 
the U S ) or are concentrated in two or more areas in more or less equal numbers (Tamils in Sn Lanka 
according to Tambiah)23
Obviously these features could occur in any combination and in each different combination lead a 
nation to different goal choices In the four cases described above this is what we see
Tamils in India—between 6 percent 'and 15 percent in a state of several other groups of 
such size concentrated in one region—a secessionist movement recapitulation and then 
strong regional parues and regionalijsm
Tamils in Sn Lanka—between 16 percent and 50 percent in a state where there is one 
other large ethnic group incidentally the majority claiming roots in one region but in fact
concentrated in two—moving from cultural and economic demands to self determination
and separatism
Tamils in Malaysia—between 6 percent and 15 percent in a state with three major ethnic 
groupings of one of which they forn the dominant subset dispersed—seeking a political 
voice through alliance with the majority
Tamils in the U S —less than 5 percent m a state with many immigrant ethnic groups of 
one of which it is a subset dispersed—seeking to assimilate and if at all to act politically 
through organizaüons of the larger grouping
The full range of population conditions 
than others and as the other facets of this
|and choices of goals includes some which are more self evident 
model are explored the picture gets more complex
Socio Economic Status Somewhat along he same lines and potentially easy to determine is the group s 
socio economic status What are the chiefj occupations of members of the group7 Where are they placed m 
the state s overall income distribution7 Do they control any sector of the economy or any resources that 
are of vital importance7 What is the class structure within the group7 What is the educational/literacy 
average for the group7 And how does the group figure on all of these counts in relation to society at large7
21 Paul Brass alludes to the effect that distribution of population has on the salience of particular goals (1991 59 61)
22 It should be noted that there is more than one way to count groups in a state and that in itself may be an issue m the politics of 
that state Therefore a sute may be more or less diverse depending on the basis selected for the count For example Sn Lanka is less 
diverse if you count major linguisuc groups and more diverse if you factor religion in to the count.
23 Tambiah 1986 12
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That is the three components of socio economic status that are pertinent to the choice of group 
objective are income areas of employment and education Income\ is most directly and obviously related 
Money especially m an age where agitation involves the use of high tech media and possibly high tech 
weaponry is an important determinant of the ability to begin and sustain any political campaign Since 
political campaigns must raise their funds within the community the income levels of members 
especially in conjunction with their numbers can be decisive
Employment Patterns are important too partly as they affect income but more as they determine class 
interest as well as potential for mobilizauon Class affiliation may affect national choices in two ways For 
one when strong they might render identity less appealing as a basis for mobilization— the Tamil 
community in the U S exemplifies this somewhat An occupational survey would probably show that most 
Tamils in the U S are professionals and academics Their interests^ coincide enough with those of other 
Americans in their class that it would undermine the utility of mobilizing politically as Tamils For 
another strong but conflicting class interests within the community would undermine the unity of the 
nation While on some issues identity would remain politically relevant on others the leadership of the 
community would be seen as likely to protect class interests rather than those of the nation The Tamil 
community in Malaysia might provide an example of this—while on some issues the Tamils are one 
community the class interests of the plantation workers and the white collar and entrepreneurial Tamils in 
the city are divergent enough that in the absence of other reasons to work together such as a common foe 
they would not cooperate on issues that they do not agree on 24 Occupational distribution also determines 
simple physical location which is a feature of the nation s population that affects political prospects and 
hence choice of goal
Education provides leadership but education also provides exposure to other peoples (that is those 
different from one and one s kind) their subjectively defined ideas and identities and to the history and 
ideologies of self determination and liberation Education breeds erudition and the ability to articulate The 
leadership of many a national movement has come from those who by one set of entena or another could 
claim more knowledge than others For instance the leadership of the Dravida movement in Tamil Nadu 
owes its immeasurable support to the wntten and oratoncal talents of its leaders who were also gifted 
members of the Tamil film industry
As education is a vehicle for socialization the values attitudes and histories that schools and 
universities validate might either reinforce those of a nation or expbse its members to a different world 
view—either different for varying somewhat or different by virtue of contradicting their own Education 
predisposes the individual to think about her/his situation and then to accept or reject the identity and 
place that seem to be reserved for her/his people In addition education is a means whereby individuals 
can change their socio economic situation and thence their political efficacy
I
History The third feature that determines the group s place is history This itself encompasses five 
considerations—
what is the origin of the group9
what is the role it has played m that society7
does it have a history of self government7
are there historical rivalries between this group and others or¡ one other7 
how does the group tell its history and what does it emphasize m that telling7
History as noted is recorded and remembered differently by different actors Therefore for each of 
these questions there are three possible alternative responses from within that socio political context and
24 While this model discusses only class interests it should be noted that in the! case of ethnic groups in India in particular and 
South Asia at large caste plays the same role as class Caste interests are often as entrenched m economic relationships as class 
interests and the caste alliances that are forged pohucally may as well cut across more conventional entena of ethnic identity The 
politics of Tamilnadu exemplify this They simultaneously entertain an internal caste conflict and an external Tamil response to 
non Tamil India
In general caste poses a theoretical problem to the South Asian student of identity—is it ethnicity class or even more potent a 
little bit of both 7
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in post colonial states a possible fourth the colonial version That is the stories that the group tells about 
itself the stories that its major nval(s) tell (about it the official state histones and the histones that the 
chroniclers of empires put together are as likely to disagree as they are to agree In the first three cases 
convergence is truly as likely as divergence The colonial histones are likely to differ somewhat from the 
official histones that the post colonial state! puts out To the extent that official and national histones are 
not sharply contradictory and the past is not remembered as a history of nvalry or conflict, the likelihood 
that groups will choose extreme goals is less
The four Tamil cases bear this out The Tamils in India chose secession and then though they gave up
this demand have remained very assertive 
positive feelings of national pride and inde
about their rights as a linguistic nation This is due as much to 
pendence as to the undercurrents of contempt and alienation25 
that have come to characterize the North Sbuth relationship On the other hand no ancient hatred 
animates this relationship making it possible for Tamil leaders to sausfice with demands for regional 
autonomy decentralization and greater influence within the existing system In Sn Lanka on the other 
hand the history of Tamil conquests and the antagonistic manner in which the two sides tell their stones 
makes it possible for the Tamil leadership to consider an extreme demand pursued by extreme measures 
and impossible for either leadership to back down and compromise In Malaysia the absence of such 
potent histoncal baggage enhances the pragmatic acquiescence of the community In the U S too quite 
obviously this is the case
Relationship with Other Groups The last feature is a composite and consequence of the first three The 
relationship of the group with other groups is intuitively a function of its numbers socio economic status 
and history Is it large enough to threaten other groups7 Is it wealthy enough to cause resentment7 Does it 
have a history of self government or of domination over other groups7 Would the history of the state or 
society include a history of conquest and oppression7 If it is a minority group then what has its 
relationship been with the political center7 If it is the majority group then what are the terms on which it 
has accommodated other groups in society7
State Structures and Policies
On the other hand the structure and policu s of the state transform potential into actual demands Modem 
states are mostly multi nation states To use Buzan s (1992) three components of the state—the physical 
bases of the state the institutional bases of the state and the idea of the state—the state s relationship 
with ethnic groups is defined by contact at| the following points
The definition of boundaries the definition of units within the state the distribution of 
resources and deployment of force
The distribution of power provisions in the system for interest aggregation articulation and 
representation the question of grouR and individual rights 
The definition of the state s identity jand ideology
The Physical Dimension Boundary definition might cut through a nation s homelands or completely 
include a nation within a state where it forms either a majority or minonty No matter which of the three 
happen the state is constrained by the need to preserve its integrity m its relationship with the nation If 
the nation so included is divided by the new inter state boundaries then that sets the state up for a 
Pandora s Box of troubles either immediately or at any time in its history It also limits the state s menu 
of possible responses because any restiveness on the part of a border group is instantly a source of 
insecurity to the state Thus when state boundaries are dividing lines for a people then even as they are 
more likely to agitate so is the state likely to view this with hostility Examples of this abound—Kashmir
the Karens between Thailand and Burma 
three
the Nepalese in three states in the Himalayan foothills to name
25 Contempt and alienauon are strong words but on an average they are manifested through mutual stereo typing and 
preconceived notions These can get nasty and there are real political grievances between the central government which is dominated 
as a function of the system of representation by the îorthem states and the rest This is often a subject of critical comment and 
satirical writing in the Indian press and two writers whose writings come to mind are RGK and O V Vijayan
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When boundaries put the nation m question m a majority position then the margin whereby that nation 
is the majority is likely to determine every other aspect of state ideology identity and policy When the 
margin is narrow the acrimony and therefore the tendency of all sides to be extreme is greater (for e g 
the Tamils in Sn Lanka) A clear majority which is however not overwhelming is likely to be forced to 
accommodate the other nations in the state The most fascinating cases are those of overwhelming (or 
other) majorities that come to perceive themselves as besieged and as minorities The Sinhalese in Sn 
Lanka fit this description as do the Hindu parties of India Indeed I this is far more common than one 
would expect. This is why it is important not to make the assumption that the politics of identity is always 
the politics of minority groups Overwhelming majorities in a democracy must accommodate others and 
the tension between the democratic accommodation and the nationalist exclusivism comes to define 
politics 1
When state boundaries leave a nation in a minority position then its institutions become very important 
to the demands—if any—that that minority makes A minority nation must walk a fine line between 
petition and challenge for challenges that it cannot back up by action leave it twice as vulnerable and 
petitions only work to the extent that the state has institutional channels to receive and process them
If the state is a federal one or even if it is a unitary state the drawing of units—federating or local 
government—becomes a critical one m determining how a group sees itself This applies to electoral 
constituencies as well Like external boundaries these internal demarcations can either disempower or for 
practical purposes disenfranchise a nation or on the other hand empower it by giving it a homeland a 
zone of autonomy control over resources or even just guaranteed representation in the political process 
How this internal demarcation is done determines whether the group will demand autonomy or 
representation as well as the constraints within which it will have to mobilize itself
The distribution of resources is particularly important in developing states where the state takes on the 
task of setting the developmental agenda and allocating resources Investment in new projects arbitration 
of disputes regarding natural resources building infrastructure and providing incentives disincentives and 
subsidies are activities that the state undertakes that inevitably leave some part of its citizenry less than 
happy Additionally when the state undertakes developmental activity that threatens the traditional home 
and/or lifestyle of a people that gives nse to another set of demands that is new to the repertoire of ethnic 
and nationality groups but is very real in our time
The deployment of force by the state can be read by groups within the state in a number of ways But 
even pnor to deployment the composition of those forces is a potential source of trouble—whether the 
police and armed forces of a state reflect its diversity or not determines whether they are perceived as 
impartial or not When the forces overwhelmingly come from one group the line between the state and 
that group seems thin to others The chances of other nations within that state voicing their demands in 
violent terms and the chances that they will ask for more than representation and cultural rights are high
The Institutional Dimension The second dimension—the institutional—is important in that it determines 
the opportunities available within the system for a nation to seek redress of grievances imbalances and 
negligence The distribution of power between units offices and groups is a result of the distribution of 
control of resources and of responsibilities The system of representation if any and the nature of the 
political parties determine the opportunities for the group to make its interests known or as a majority to 
determine who is in and who is out
The question of rights is central partly since grievances stem from perceived denial of rights and claims 
are couched in the rhetoric of rights However rights are also important because they lend legitimacy to 
other demands that a group majority or minority may make Individual rights when guaranteed are a 
safety valve for dissent and when denied are a state s biggest Achilles heel Group rights are more rarely 
recognized and are inherently in conflict with the state s need to integrate its citizenry Group rights range 
from the cultural and educational rights this paper has referred to repeatedly to the right to self 
determination To the extent that states are supposed to preserve their integrity they are always a threat to 
the survival of groups
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The Ideational Dimension Finally the identity and ideology of the state provide the seal of legitimacy to 
the way in which the state apparatus relates to groups Ethnically defined states are by definition more 
vulnerable than others to separatist and secessionist pressures Ethnically defined states with very small 
minority groups may be able to accommodate those groups by a recognition of their difference in some 
way or even to assimilate them but this is not common States that do not define themselves in this way 
are no less likely to give offense if by virtue of an overwhelming majority community they are identified 
by disgruntled groups as not really ethnically neutral While secular pluralist universalist ideologies are
less likely to provoke than more parochial 
they are likely to be treated as inconsequential 
injustices
ideologies in the presence of other grievances and problems 
merely the window dressing of the state s store of
Critique
Why a nation chooses to make one set of demands and not another is a function of its place in the socio 
political context and of the state s structures and policies The next logical step that this paper has not 
taken is to identify specifically which features lead to what precise range of outcomes and therefore 
which concatenation of circumstances can be expected to lead to what choices In the absence of such a 
precise identification not only is the model vague and fruitless but also one it does not answer the 
question asked two it does not help us predict and three it is difficult to operationalize and test
The model is to be criticized also for two unintended but intrusive assumptions that kept finding their 
way into the researcher s  thought processes—first that the ethnic groups or nations m question would be 
minorities in the state context This is a common error and the fact that militant nations are often 
majorities out to avenge wrongs like the Sinhalese m the late 1980 s does not seem to change this 
misperception The second assumption is that the groups define their agenda m the context of a somewhat 
liberal democratic state However there ì s j  no empirical evidence to support this and in discussing the 
guarantee of group and individual rights this model does not clarify precisely what the political context 
might be
If the model is extended along these lines however then a test of the model is called for This could be 
done by a survey of a large number of cases in which ethnic groups have been politically inactive and 
active in a variety of ways Alternately this researcher proposes a senes of case studies that would do the 
same thing but with a smaller number of cases and m more depth As it stands in social scientific terms 
this model is merely hypothetical
Importance and Implicauons for Theory and Policy
Notwithstanding the above entique this is potentially an important line of inquiry The horrors of ethnic 
conflict in our time make it imperative that the threat that these pose to international security is 
acknowledged The actions of national groups stem not from atavistic tendencies and ancient pnmordial 
grievances but from a conjunction of moije contemporary and tangible socio political conditions An effort 
equal to that devoted to the study of ideological conflict and arms races must be made to understand and 
devise appropriate policies to diminish the prospects of ethnic conflict and dissatisfied or oppressed 
nations This model is directed towards that very effort
In theoretical terms this work is important for two reasons First and foremost while others have 
considered the relationship between ethm^ politics and the state there has been no systematic attempt to 
create a model of this relationship This model proposes to fill that breach
Secondly in so doing this model links the literature on ethnicity to that on state society relations
lending to both a dimension that they have so far lacked Writers on ethnicity and ethnic conflict have 
focused on the state on class on history and culture on the existence of diversity—however there has 
been little interest in studying developments in this sphere as by products of the interaction between state 
and society On the other hand those who write on state society relations have until now shown little
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interest in ethno nationalism Perhaps recent developments m Europe will inspire such an interest but if 
and when that happens this model will provide a point of departure
Summary and Conclusion
Nations or the leaders of nations choose their political objectives on the basis of a calculus that takes 
into account on the one hand the place of the group in society and on the other the structure and policies 
of the state(s) in which they operate Their place in society is a funcuon of their numbers relative to the 
population of the state at large the socio economic standing of their members their history and their 
relationship with other groups The structures and policies of the state by delimiting or defining the 
physical institutional and ideational dimensions of the state limit or define the legal and political 
environment of the nation Decision makers m order to remain credible to their public must choose goals 
that while not being perceived as compromising the interests of the nation must seem ideal but be 
somewhat feasible The decision is based on a consideration of these complex and often subjectively 
determined factors
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Appendix
A Glossary of Terms Used
Glossary denved from Terminological Chaos in Walker Connor Ethnonationalism the Quest for
Understanding (1994)
nation—a self defined grouping of people who share a common ideology common institutions and
customs and a sense of homogeneity and a strong group sense of belonging associated with 
a particular territory considered to be peculiarly its own (Plano and Olton The International 
Relations Dictionary New York 1969 119 cited in Connor 1994)
state—a territorial juridical unit
nation state— territorial political unit (a state) whose borders coincided or nearly coincided with the 
territorial distribution of a national group That is a situation m which a nation had its own 
state (96) Connor criticizes the use as synonymous of nation state and nation state this holding 
true only in rare contexts
The words transnational and nationalization apply to the state rather than the nation
nationalism—identification with the nation as opposed to loyalty to the state for which the term
patriotism is preferred here Ethnonationalism and nationalism are synonymous when nationalism 
is used strictly as identification with a nation as opposed to state
ethnicity—Strictly speaking this means a group characterized by common descent It does not as some 
use it refer to minority groups alone and it is not identical with nation The key to understanding 
what constitutes an ethnic group lies in understanding particular social settings but more 
pertinently the relationship between the ideas of ethnicity and nationality Connor takes from 
Weber the idea of ethnic groups as prenational peoples or potential nations and goes on to write 
While an ethnic group may be other defined the nauon must be self defined That is until 
the members of an ethnic group see themselves as unique and as a nation they are an ethnic 
group
tribe— an ethnically homogenous sociopolitical unit but one which forms only part of a larger
interrelated grouping (107) Connor clarifes that this is the sense n which the term is used in 
every context outside the African so one nation may comprise many tribes In the African 
context tribe is used for nation potential or actual
communalism— religious identity communalism by postulating a fundamental identity along religious 
lines that would both incorporate several nations and sever others repudiated the importance that 
we have ascribed to the nation concept (110)
_____________________Chapter 14 |_______________
The Politics of Economic Reform in Post Colonial States 
Economic Exigencies and Political Imperatives
by Norma M Ramisi
The road to the free market was open and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous 
centrally organized and controlled interventionism ,
—Karl Polanyi
Abstract
In the early 1980s the debt crisis and the resulting economic collapse led many 
developing countries to undertake structural adjustment programs (SAPs) designed by 
international financial institutions These programs were undertaken in an effort to combat 
the economic inefficiencies of the previously pursued strategies of state led growth 
However in most of these cases the programs have had limited success In this paper I 
will assess the role of market strategies in post colonial jstates by looking at the 
development strategy m Algeria from independence to the October riots in 1988 My 
central thesis is that the structural adjustment programs have failed to achieve the goals 
set by the IMF and the World Bank (e g increased growth and investment) due to the 
fact that the macro economic policies prescribed by these programs have not been 
adjusted to the local political economy and history of the state
Political Logic The State as the Solution
After independence most post colonial states followed a political logic to development by which they 
sought to assure domestic stability Based on the belief that European domination had been the source of 
underdevelopment this logic called for the former colonies to break their bonds with the international 
capitalist system and to cultivate self reliance and the best means to achieve this was to promote heavy 
industrialization (Pfeifer 1992) It was believed that this heavy industrialization would transform the 
country s socio economic sector sufficiently to absorb the masses of peasant labor and modernize 
agriculture Moreover it was assumed that only the state could undertake the resource mobilization 
needed to carry this out The pnvate sectors were too weak financially and had too many ties to the 
métropoles so the state would have to amass the capital needed toi finance the country s import 
substitution industrialization and large scale agricultural development Industrial and agricultural growth 
would then supply the mass of population with food consumer goods as well as capital goods (Tlemcam
1989) I
This was the dominant strategy followed by most developing countries m the 1950s and 60s However 
by the 1970s there was a growing recognition that this statist model had failed The stress on capital 
intensive industrialization failed to create sufficient jobs for the rapidly expanding work force Instead it 
created dual markets a relatively high wage employment coexisted with under employment The neglect 
of the agricultural sector contributed to a widening food gap Moreover ISI was import intensive the state 
needed to import raw matenals/capital to establish their infant industries Many of the countries continued 
to rely on external sources of investment capital and to accumulate1 large external debts The goals of 
national economic independence and social welfare proved elusive and the resultant structural 
inefficiencies culminated in the debt crisis which began in the early 1980s (Waterbury 1990 Pfeifer 
1992)
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Economic Logic The State as the Problem
To resolve the Third World debt cnsis Western actors have tried to employ the monoeconomics of the 
neo orthodox view of development in countries dependent on the IMF and the World Bank This strategy is 
based on an economic logic — i e the measures needed to pursue economic efficiency in both 
international and domestic arenas The two central tenets of this strategy are export led growth and a 
minimalist state and its vehicle for reform is the market1 Central to this neo orthodox view is the 
perception of the state as the key obstacle to development (Callaghy 1989)
Nevertheless in most cases there have been problems with this strategy of economic liberalization on 
two fronts Domestically this strategy has furthered unemployment inflation a scarcity of basic goods and 
a decline in educational and social service facilities leading to a further delegitimization of the state as 
evidenced by the noting which has occurred in many of these countnes Internationally SAPs have failed 
to restore investor confidence and to reduce foreign debts (Ihonvbere 1992) These problems have been 
aggravated by random macropolicies in Western countries which have created erratic shifts in balance of 
payments and the fact that the world market may not be able to absorb expanded exports of liberalizing 
developing countries (Pfeifer 1992)
Why have these programs failed7 Western states/actors have pressed these post colonial states to adopt 
open economies without embedding them in the realities of domestic state society relations The structural 
adjustment programs advanced by these actors do not take into consideration the existing socio economic 
and political inequalities in underdeveloped social contexts Consequently enormous social costs 
(are) imposed on the vulnerable segments of the populations the human resources for transformation are 
crippled domestic structural inequalities increase and the marginalization of these countnes proceed 
apace (Ihonvbere 51)
These effects are due in large pan to the fact that many of the policies overlook the centrality of the 
state m developing societies Their central concern is getting the state out and yet paradoxically the 
IMF and the World Bank are attempting to use this very state as the primary weapon in their struggle to 
reform political economies Given the weak markets in these countnes insofar as a country opens up to 
the rest of the world the state will have to play a central role m mediating between the domestic society 
and international actors While international financial institutions have begun to recognize this in practice 
policy design fails to reflect this recognition For as Claude Ake contends destatizauon can only go so 
far because the objective conditions (eg a weak entrepreneurial class) which produce statism remain as 
strong as they have always been (parentheses added) (Ihonvbere 1992 51) Thus the problem is not the 
extent of state intervention but rather the nature and quality of such intervention (Olowu 1990 Callaghy
1990)
Embedded Liberalism A Balance Between State and Market
In his article Toward State Capability and Embedded Liberalism m the Third World Lessons for 
Adjustment Thomas Callaghy argues that recent studies have shown that the original nse of capitalism 
in Europe was not purely (or even predominantly) a private matter of the market In reality it took a 
balance between bureaucratic states and consolidating markets to foster the conditions necessary for 
capitalism to develop This has also been proven to be the case with East Asian countnes such as Korea or 
Taiwan These successful exporters have protected their domestic goods from competition from imports
1 The specific policies prescribed by this view include
(1) Pricing policies more in line with real market conditions to stimulate production and m particular exports in 
agriculture
(2) Sharp reduction in governmental activities especially in economic matters and reliance on market incentives to stimulate 
private sector activity rather than bureaucracy
(3) Better management of remaining central government activities through the strengthening of planning finance project 
generation and policy making functions
(4) Inward looking import substitution industrialization strategy to give way to outward looking export-onentation
(5) In agriculture focus on small holder agriculture rather than large scale government managed farms m industry focus on 
the informal sector and the encouragement of foreign capital (World Bank 1981 Olowu 1990)
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have pursued import substitution activities through parastatal sectors and have allowed for an 
interventionist role for the state Consequently at the international level market forces have been 
permitted to move toward comparative advantage at the domestic) level the state has been used to 
minimize and buffer the disruptive social consequences (Callaghy 1989) In these countries relatively 
open international economic policies and domestic political stability coexist Neither political nor 
economic logic prevails but rather a balance between the two
In my analysis of the development strategies pursued in Algena from independence to the 1988 riots I 
plan to show that Algena has not been able to balance the two logics This is due to a combination of the 
colonial legacy the policies pursued by political leaders in the post independence era and international 
constraints My argument is that all of these factors have contributed to the limited capacity of the state to 
adopt an open economy while embedding its policies m domestic constraints— i e balancing 
international economic efficiency (macro economic ideals) with domestic stability and well being (micro 
economic realities) i
The Case of Algeria
The Political Logic of the Early Years (1962 1978) ,
Seek ye first the political kingdom and everything else will be added unto you
—Kwarne Nkrumah
After independence in 1962 the leadership of the Algerian nationalist movement (the FLN) assumed 
power on a platform of socialist reform Their goals were growth equity and national economic 
sovereignty (Waterbury 1990) and the means by which they sought to achieve these goals was a strong 
centralized state There were two general components to this strategy Economically the leaders adopted 
a Soviet style command system with a circumscribed role for private capital The underlying assumption 
behind this plan was that the private sector would be beholden to outside interests as opposed to the 
interests of domestic society and that it would export capital rather' than reinvest profit (Waterbury 1990) 
The planners wanted to implement policies which would prevent international capital and potential local 
compradors from influencing economic decisions (Vanderwalle 1992 190) Politically the leaders 
created a system which would correspond to a command economy-^ i e a single party (FLN) system 
(Akacem 1993) The goal was to centralize economic and political1 decision making power for fear that 
any dissipation would slow down implementation of the strategy (Vanderwalle 1992) Moreover the FLN 
provided a link between the political elites and the masses throughout the country through which the elites 
could establish a patronage system based on far reaching clientelistic networks hence a close symbiosis 
between party and state (Vanderwalle 1992 190)
In many ways this vertically integrated structure was actually a carry over from the absolutist military 
bureaucratic regime instituted by the French during the colonial period The leaders inherited the 
bureaucratic apparatus and tried to accumulate power on the basis of this apparatus regardless of the fact 
that the political institutions lacked any organic connection to the political traditions of the host societies 
(Sandbrook 199 ) By the 1980s this estrangement would have serious implications for economic policy 
making but initially the institutions did not pose serious problems for the new regime because the leaders 
could rely on their revolutionary credentials as the basis for their legitimacy However the apparatus was 
not reinforced immediately after the nationalist leaders ascended power The first years after 
independence were marked by a struggle to overcome internal conflict among the elites and to 
demobilize the masses
Consolidation of Power (1962 1965) On the eve of independence nearly all of the French settler 
community (about one million strong) withdrew leaving large tracts of agricultural land and industrial and 
commercial units unoccupied Most of this property was seized by heading members of the state apparatus 
but the masses also took advantage of this unprecedented opportunity to seize control With the
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assistance of the UGTA (Union Generale des Travailleurs Algeriens) they collectively occupied some of 
the abandoned property and established self management units (Tlemcam 1989)
Initially under the first president Ahmad Ben Bella the state institutionalized this expenment at self 
management It was seen as means of empowering the peasants and the working class and as a check on 
the authoritarian tendencies of the emerging bureaucracy and technocracy But this era of romantic 
populism was short lived In time the institutionalization of these units by the state bureaucracy led to a 
de radicalization of the movement and a subordination of the movement to the control of state technocrats 
(Tlemcani 1990) ONRA (the National Organization of Agrarian Reform which was created by combining 
several of the colonial agencies) was given authority over the committees in the agricultural sector and an 
Economics Ministry assumed control of the factory councils in the industrial sector (Tlemcani 1989) 
Shortly thereafter the UGTA was forcibly integrated into the party structure
By the time that Ahmad Ben Bella was ousted by his minister of defense Houan Boumedienne m 
1965 state bureaucratic power had been consolidated The colonial apparatus had been restored only this 
time the nationalist leaders were at the helm The state was now in a position to implement 
Boumedienne s vision of a rational top down model of development (Waterbury 1990)
The Statist Model of Development (1969 1978) Algeria s First Four Year Plan of 1969 1973 was based on a 
program of heavy industrialization with an emphasis on industrializing industries Following the model 
of French economist Gerard Destanne de Berms this strategy called for the establishment of basic 
industries which would stimulate secondary and tertiary industrial growth allowing for the creation of an 
intenndustrial matrix in which different sectors (e g petrochemical or agricultural) would be 
interconnected by their inputs and outputs (Akre 1992) It was expected that each sector would become a 
supplier and buyer for the other sectors Thus the economy would become internally integrated and 
independent of external forces
This mode of industrialization was made possible by the state s monopoly over the country s natural 
resources particularly oil and natural gas These raw materials served two purposes First they served as 
resources for a modem petrochemical sector—one of the two key industrializing industries This sector 
produced fertilizers and the chemicals used to manufacture plastics and other finished products Second 
earnings from the export of oil and other hydrocarbon products were used to pay for the import of the 
capital goods needed for the establishment of the second key industrializing industry —the steel industry 
(Waterbury 1990) These two basic industries were to serve as the economic locomotives which would 
manufacture the items needed to transform the economy at large by 1980
By 1973 two of the major goals set out by the First plan were achieved First, actual investment in 
industry had reached 46 4 percent of total investment which was slightly higher than the planned amount 
of 45 percent This allowed for the expansion of educational services and the training of skilled personnel 
for the new industries Second there was an increase m total aggregate growth The GDP in 1973 
represented a 9 percent increase from 1972 and GNP per capita grew steadily in this penod (Akre 1992) 
However these gains entailed high costs
With the emphasis on heavy industry the inequalities between the urban and rural sectors were 
aggravated Only a 3 percent growth rate was accorded to agriculture and with a yearly population growth 
rate of 3 2 percent this decline in agricultural production posed senous problems for meeting the goal of 
food self sufficiency Moreover in pursuing a capital intensive strategy of development the state failed to 
meet the goal of full employment Few jobs were created in this penod (Akre 1992)
The government tried to rectify some of these problems with the Second Four Year Plan of 1974 1977 
which called for a greater emphasis on the intermediate and light consumer goods mdustnes The goals 
were three fold a decrease m imports the creation of 45 000 new jobs and a rise in the overall standard 
of living It was hoped that this plan would yield a rise in per capita income and that this increase would 
offset the imbalances between the urban and rural sector incomes2 (Akre 1992)
2 Under the First Four Year Plan urban income rose by 37 pecent while agricultural rose by 10 percent (Akre 1992 80)
TThe Politics o f Economic Reform in Post Colonial States
With the Algerian economy riding the economic boom from the rise m oil pnces in the mid 70s 
investment in the light consumer goods industnes and the agricultural sector did increase under this plan 
yet once again a disproportionate amount of total investment was reserved for heavy industry and in 
particular for metallurgy petrochemicals mechanics and electronics (Waterbury 1990)3 The National 
Charter of July 1976 which appeared in this period had reaffirmed!the strategy of industnalizing industnes 
maintaining that these industries were to play a decisive strategic role since they provided for the 
independence of the national industry and quite simply of the country (Akre 1992 81) Therefore while 
this plan succeeded in establishing an industrial base for the domestic market (Pfeifer 1992) by the late 
1970s the continued emphasis on heavy industry came to a head Production was not able to meet 
increasing demands for food housing and consumer goods and it was becoming more apparent that this 
gap was a consequence of the contradictions of IS I
The Contradictions of ISI The Economic Dimension To begin with the focus on import substitution 
industrialization and heavy industry at the expense of agricultural development made the state 
increasingly dependent on external forces ISI became import intensive in two regards First the neglect of 
agriculture and the subsequent decline in agricultural production led to major food shortages Algeria 
once an exporter of food had to import two thirds of its food (Akre 1992) Second a focus on heavy 
industry demanded the import of capital goods technology and technical assistance During the first two 
Four Year Plans most of the Algerian industrial units were turnkey plants i e the choices involving 
equipment licenses and manufacturing methods were the foreign contractor s responsibility (Tlemcam 
1989)
This reliance on external forces was compounded by the fact that these imports could only be purchased 
with hard currency In the case of Algeria this hard currency was earned m two ways through the sale of 
exports primarily oil and natural gas4 and through loans from international lenders which would be 
serviced at some point in the future with expected export revenues Thus Algeria s need to maintain these 
revenues guaranteed its integration into the world capitalist system— its self reliant path to 
development was compromised by definition (Pfeifer 1992)
Social welfare was also compromised by Algeria s ISI particularly with respect to land reform and 
employment Despite the socialist rhetoric of an agrarian revolution there was virtually no redistribution 
of land within the first ten years after independence and the lands that were eventually assigned to the 
landless or smallholding peasants were relauvely poor Moreover the peasants did not have a say in the 
land allotments since the administrative leaders of the assigned cooperatives were appointed by the state 
Basically agrarian reform in this period served as a mechanism of surplus drainage from the rural to the 
urban areas (Tlemcam 1989 120)
Employment did not fare much better As mentioned earlier ISI was capital intensive and created 
relatively few jobs By the late 1970s and early 80s unemployment was estimated at 16 percent in the 
cities and 18 percent in the countryside (Waterbury 1990) Moreover the few jobs that were created were 
concentrated in the industrial centers and within these centers they were generally reserved for the urban 
middle classes and skilled workers the party s main constituency This bias aggravated the already 
existing class contradictions and these contradictions were further | intensified by the massive rural to 
urban migration which characterized this period
Finally even the producuvity and efficiency of the industrial sector itself suffered from the 
contradictions of ISI The non existent agricultural growth led to a low demand for industrial products 
which in turn meant that new industries were operating below capacity (e g steel industry was operating 
at 40 percent capacity Waterbury 1990) Also due to tariff protection and monopoly status the public 
sector industnes had little incentive to increase the use of existing capacity and minimize production 
costs The result was the high cost production of either upper income luxury goods or mass consumer
3 For the first two Four Year plans investment in heavy industry accounted for 60 70 percent while agriculture only accounted for
15 percent (Tlemcam 1989) 1
4 By 1980 the U S alone was purchasing more than half of Algeria s petroleum exports The U S also played a dominant role in 
providing loans and consultation services (Tlemcam 1989)
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goods In both cases the industries were a drain on the national economy Algeria could not benefit from 
international comparative advantage because the exports were too costly and the pnces for the mass 
consumer goods had to be heavily subsidized by the government
The Contradictions of ISI The Political Dimension The contradicuons of ISI had political as well as 
economic ramifications due to the political logic on which the economic strategy was based This 
strategy which was adopted in most post colonial contexts in the post independence era had three 
characteristics establishment of clientelistic networks through the extraction and distnbution of rents 
expansion of the state size including an extension of civil service and parastatal sectors and purchasing 
urban support with social services and subsidies (Callaghy 1989) Given the nature of colonial experience 
and the independence struggle this strategy had a clear welfare thrust Growth and equity were key 
objectives However when the government failed to deliver the goods the weakly legitimated regime had 
to resort to personalistic authority and force (Sandbrook 1993) Patrimonial mechanisms became the 
dominant mode of governance making economic policy making subordinate to clentelistic ties and 
corresponding political rents This had a cyclical effect on the economic development strategy The over 
centralized (and highly inefficient) bureaucratic apparatus which the newly independent states with weak 
markets demanded impeded economic growth Economic stagnation in turn led to a further 
delegitmization of the state which led to a greater centralization of power (and greater alienation of the 
government from the interests of society as a whole) Algeria became what Callaghy has termed a 
predatory state It was neither autonomous from societal pressures nor embedded in the surrounding 
society— i e reliant on private actors who could serve as a potential engine for economic development 
Algeria lacked the cohesive and insulated Weberian bureaucracy necessary for a strong state and the 
independent economic power of capital necessary for a strong market—the attributes of a developmental 
state (Evans 1992)
The Economic Logic (or Benjadidism )— 1979 1988
The Principle of relieving debts by increasing them
—J H Mensah
By the late 1970s there was growing dissension within the Party on how to respond to the contradictions 
of state led growth One camp was committed to the socialist path to development through a 
bureaucratized state while another camp sought to challenge this strategy with a model of economic 
liberalism based on privatization Within one of year of President Boumedienne s death in 1978 the later 
camp ascended to power with the election of the leading reformist Chadli Benjadid and by 1980 the 
country embarked on an economic restructuring program Acknowledging that the industrial sector had 
become a drain on the economy Benjadid s central objective was to pursue greater efficiency by 
replacing the vertically integrated bureaucracy with horizontally ordered structures more amenable to a 
market onented strategy (Vanderwalle 1990) However the reform measures were restricted to the 
economic realm Conforming to the international dominant development ideology of the time5 the reforms 
were not extended to the political realm for fear that the bureaucratic elite s political monopoly would be 
threatened (Tlemcani 1990) According to this ideology privatization requires a strong state which can 
repress opposition groups and intervene in micro economic issues but it also requires a state which will 
withdraw from involvement in macro economic issues (Olowwu 1990)
In his first term (1979 1984) the primary focus of Benjadid s restructuring program was the 
decentralization of public enterprises In an effort to disperse economic and political decision making new 
regulations were passed which restricted the workforce of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) to a 
maximum of 30 000 As a result sixty six larger firms were broken down into 474 specialized firms For
5 Enielis sums up this dominant ideology aptly in the title of his article Algeria Under Chadli Liberalization Without 
Democrauzation or Perestroika Yes Glasnost No1 It is only in the middle to late 1980s following events in Eastern Europe that 
we witnes a shift in the official development ideology and a concern with political as well as economic liberalization For further 
discussion on the international political climate in the 1970s see the introduction to Richard Sandbrook s The Politics o f Africa s 
Economic Recovery
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example the state run hydrocarbons company (SONATRACH) was divided into thirteen specialized units 
(Bennoune 1988) The new regulations also limited the responsibilities of the individual units to specific 
aspects of production and gave company managers limited authority over these aspects
These measures had a marginal effect in the earlier years of Benjadid s first term due to the residual 
strength of the opposition and the politicization of the finance system (Mortimer 1990 Vanderwalle 1990) 
Benjadid had to move cautiously and remain within the ideological parameters established by his 
predecessor At best his reforms were Boumedienmsm with a human face — i e restructuring or 
reforming the economy without abandoning state control (Mortimer 1990 186) However in the latter 
years of his first term Benjadid pushed for an expanded role for the private sector by supporting local 
entrepreneurs and encouraging foreign investment with the new Investment Code of 1982
Previously the private sector had been circumscribed by the state and was only allowed to develop in 
certain areas (e g primarily services and commerce Pfeifer 1992) Yet within these areas the capitalist 
class benefited from the subsidized inputs provided by the public sector and state protection from 
international competition The Investment Code of 1982 provided} new incentives by decreasing the tax 
rates on profits and offering credit to export oriented enterprises (Vanderwalle 1990) The state offered 
special benefits to private sector enterprises which adhered to the ¡provisions of the new Code and in 
particular companies which were sponsoring domestic labor intensive projects (Vanderwalle 1990)
The Investment Code also stipulated new regulations for foreign investment Whereas previously the 
state had only permitted turnkey projects now the state sought to* encourage joint ventures through tax 
exemptions and subsidized credit Moreover the government did|not restrict engagement in these ventures 
to bilateral agreements between governments Multi national corporations were also allowed to invest6 
(Pfeifer 1992) ¡
The agricultural sector was another area targeted for reform Ini 1981 a presidential decree was issued 
calling for the restructuring of state farms This led to the reorganization of the self managed farms into 
3 429 roughly equal units called domaines agricoles socialistes | (DASs) (Swearmger 1992) The 
remaining farms the agrarian revolution cooperatives were privatized and distributed to those working 
them and to pnvate individuals (Ghiles 1988) By 1984 most of the collective farms had been abolished 
and the managers of the denationalized farms were given greater I liberties in marketing their own produce 
(Vanderwalle 1990)
As a consequence of these liberalization measures (and of fortuitous economic windfalls) Algeria s 
economy began to show some signs of recovery by the mid 80s There was a slight improvement m GDP 
per capita However this recovery was short lived as Algeria had become increasingly dependent on 
(and increasingly marginalized from) the world market With 98% of its exports based on hydrocarbons 
Algena s economy was vulnerable to fluctuations in hydrocarbon prices and with the drastic decline m the 
hydrocarbon pnces in 1986 its export revenue was halved7 Consequently Benjadid s second term was 
charactenzed by efforts to address the balance of payments crisis including a self imposed structural 
adjustment program (SAP) and intensification of earlier liberalization measures
The SAP (otherwise known as the stabilization program ) was adopted by the Benjadid government to 
avoid debt rescheduling with international lenders the IMF was only brought in to serve as a consultant 
Nonetheless the specific policies dictated by these measures were modeled after IMF and World Bank 
prescriptions These policies called for a cut in real wages and in subsidies for consumer goods a 
reduction in investment spending a decrease in imports8 and deregulation of domestic pnces (Pfeifer 
1992) It was expected that these belt tightening measures would stabilize the balance of payments cnsis 
and enable Algeria to continue repaying its debt 1
I
6 SONATRACH signed an agreement with British Petroleum Exploration in July 1992 concerning cooperation m the production
and marketing of hydrocarbons (Pfeifer 1992 112) ,
7 Export earnings fell from $13 billion in 1985 to $8billion by 1986 (Mortimer 1990 163)
8 Imports fell 30? between 1986 and 1987 (Pfeifer 1992 114) 1
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Debt servicing became a central concern of the government in the later half of the decade but improved 
productivity was still viewed as the principle engine of economic and social development (Ghiles 
1988) In 1987 the government continued its drive toward institutional reform by abolishing the Ministry of 
Planning and replacing it with the Conseil National de Planification This Conseil extended autonomy to 
local managers allowing them to set pnces and determine production and distnbution levels along market 
principles In 1988 this process was extended by a statute granting legal autonomy to EPEs but most 
companies continue to be managed by former or current state bureaucrats
The government also intensified liberalization efforts m the agricultural sector In an attempt to combat 
the inefficiency and low productivity of state farms the government passed a law in December of 1987 
calling for the break up of the DAS units into Exploitation Agricoles Collectives (EACs) By April of 1988 
12 108 EAC units or collectives were formed (Tlemcam 1989 Swearmger 1992) The state sull retained 
the Utles to these lands but leased them out to EAC members
The stringent policies implemented in this period permitted Algeria to build a trade surplus and to avoid 
rescheduling its debt but these measures exacted high costs For nearly fifteen years the government was 
able to conceal the contradicuons of state led growth and the negauve effects of the liberalization policies 
because increased revenue from the nse in oil pnces gave the illusion of prospenty Earnings from 
hydrocarbon exports provided Algena with the means to carry out both its developmental and welfare 
funcuons (Tlemcam 1990) allowing the bureaucracy to maintain power domestically and to service the 
debts of ISI intemauonally However following the drastic drop in hydrocarbon pnces in the mid 80s the 
1988 nots9 which came in response to a decline in the standard of living revealed the seventy of Algena s 
economic crisis
By 1988 it had become increasingly apparent that the liberalization strategy pursued by the Benjadid 
government was contributing to a polarization of Algerian society with the working class beanng the brunt 
of the economic costs Decentralizauon of the public enterprises for the promouon of increased efficiency 
(measured by output per worker) resulted in the loss of jobs Unemployment was estimated at somewhere 
between 25 and 40 percent with no immediate relief in sight10 (Rummel 1992) Reductions m subsidies 
and devaluation of die dinar caused prices to soar Although many middle class Algenans particularly 
producers for export farmers and members of the state ruling class benefited from these measures they 
had a devastating effect on the urban poor Privatization also led to the marginalization of the lower 
classes While there is no reliable data it is suspected that most private firms were appropriated by 
members of the ruling class (ì e the state bourgeoisie) (Tlemcam 1990) Finally cutbacks in imports 
resulted in major shortages of basic goods especially food These shortages coincided with the appearance 
of highly priced luxury goods resulting from the increase m private sector activity (Pfeifer 1992 Rummel 
1992 Tlemcam 1990) The 1988 riots which reflected the growing gap between the elites and the masses 
were merely a substantiation of the overall limits of the privatization strategy
Reinserting the State in the Development Formula 
Economic Disengagement via State Development
In the article The State as Problem and Solution Predation Embedded Autonomy and Structural 
Change Peter Evans contends that in order for market oriented reforms to succeed in developing 
contexts the state must be able to respond to the perceived problems of private actors and rely on these 
actors for implementation Only by establishing organic ties to societal actors while simultaneously 
insulating itself from poitical demands can a state rationally 11 assess monitor and shape responses to 
policy initiatives (Evans 1992) In Algena the state is too alienated from the general population and too
9 The widespread spontaneous noting in October 1988 resulted in 159 deaths several hundred injunes and over 3 000 arrests 
(Mortimer 1990 164)
10 Unemployment is a particularly onerous problem in Algena given the demograhic trends—i e sixty percent of the population 
is under the age of twenty (Rummel 1992)
11 The term rational is used here to refer to Weber s vision of the model bureaucracy For a discussion of Weber s views on the 
role of the sute m development see Evans 1992 p 146
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beholden to particulanst interests to perform this role It does not have the capacity to implement fiscal 
policies an economic exigency while guarding against the social costs a political imperative
j
A weakness of the privatization model is that it does not provide a theory on how to develop this 
capacity (1 e a theory of state reform) it only advocates removing the state from the economy In effect 
the proponents of this model of development (e g international lenders and accordingly the reformist 
camp in Algena) have reduced the cnsis of the state to a balance of payments cnsis For them the 
solution is one of making the right macro economic choices However what they fail to realize is that the 
balance of payments cnsis is actually a symptom of a more fundamental political cnsis which is rooted 
in the history of state society relations and which demands a political solution
Limits to the Economic Logic as a Response to the Cnsis of die State
The proponents of the market onented strategy were correct in identifying the state as the key obstacle to 
development m Algeria In the article Development and the State in Post Colonial Algena Tlemcam 
observes that the bureaucratic regime instituted by the French during the colonial era led to an extremely 
uneven distorted and dependent development that included a systematic dispossession of the peasantry 
and the working masses (Tlemcam 1989 116) This was the apparatus that the nationalists mhented at 
independence However the political elites that came to power did not alter this system Instead they 
took the place of the colonists and used the apparatus to build their own base of support. By monopolizing 
and appropriating the hydrocarbon resources the government was able to concentrate all economic and 
political decision making12 and to reproduce itself through the extraction and distribution of rents 
(Callaghy 1989) The state bureaucratic bourgeoisie in effect betame the dominant class Moreover the 
statist strategy which Algeria employed in 60s and 70s reinforced this state dominance and the alienation 
of the population leading to the domestic and international structural inefficiencies mentioned above
The structural adjustment program as outlined by the IMF and the World Bank was prescribed to 
remedy these inefficiencies Conventional wisdom held that if the state was the problem its removal was 
the solution but this solution failed dismally As discussed earlier the austenty measures suggested by 
this program led to further unemployment inflation food shortages etc This was due in part to the 
seventy of these measures but more importantly to the fact that these measures were super imposed on 
a sea of corruption structural weakness political instability poor management and deepening class 
contradictions (Ihonvbere 1992 53)— a sea which continues to widen13 Thus even while international 
lenders economists etc identify the state as the mam obstacle to development and call for its removal 
they continue to use it as the key instrument for development and particularly in contexts where there is a 
weak entrepreneurial class or where this class is synonymous with the state bureaucracy (Tlemcam 1990) 
This is the central paradox that proponents for the market strategy have overlooked the state can be part 
of the solution as well as the problem Thus what they have failed to realize is that the key issue is not 
the extent of state intervention but rather the nature of such intervention
In a telling critique of both the staust and market strategies and in an effort to further the debate on the 
role of the state m development Africanist Dele Olowu argues that in order to overcome the impasse that 
most centralized states face developing countries need micro level msututional diversity to counter the 
hierarchical structures demanded by the statist strategy Decentralizing and democratizing the state would 
tranfer the locus of power and allow for the establishment of newi bases of political support These bases 
m turn would serve as a check against tendencies toward the recentralization of power and and attempts 
to reestablish a system of political rents which have diminished the independent power of capital in most 
post colonial states (Olowu 1990) The state would be autonomous from particulanst interests and yet 
embedded in the social matrix This would enable the state to retreat from micro economic areas and sull
12 This monopolization has enabled the stale to organize production and distribution and to control the nature of investment and 
the process of capital accumulation (Tlemcani 115)
13 In the book A Political Economy o f the Middle East Waterbury argues that decentralization has actually increased the 
centralization of state power because of the weak market system in most developing states Whereas in the past there were only a 
few ministries now there are many smaller enterprises according the state a larger coordinating role (Waterbury 1990)
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intervene in key macro economic areas and buffer some of the negative effects of global economic 
imperatives— balancing the economic and political logics
The SAPs have failed to strike this balance because they have failed to confront the source of the 
problem on the appropriate front— i e reforming the state on both political and economic fronts Instead 
the programs have maintained and reinforced the hierarchical administrative apparatus which impeded 
the development process m the first place by focusing on macroeconomic issues and neglecting the 
political domain (Olowu 1990)
Given Algena s place m the current global economic system it has no other practical alternative but to 
implement the structural adjustment program and privatize the economy Therefore the key issue the 
government faces now is how to develop the capacity to minimize the negative consequences of 
privatization While some are quick to proclaim the end of history it is becoming increasingly apparent 
that as in the case with early capitalism both the state and the market must play a role in developing this 
capacity m order to meet the economic imperatives of the global market and the political imperatives of 
domestic pressures What is needed is a balance between the economic and political logics of 
development Thus the major challenge confronting Algeria and other post colonial states face is not the 
removal of the state but rather finding the state s proper role for assuring this balance
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